Tag: Omar al-Bashir

Sudan: Amidst Continuing Violence, India Seeks Assistance From International Players To Evacuate Citizens

The ongoing violence, which includes warplanes flying over the capital, has made it difficult for nations to retrieve their citizens because of restricted civilian movement and disrupted transportation links.

New Delhi: Reflecting the significant influence of international players in Sudan’s latest bout of internecine fighting, India has been in touch with Saudi Arabia, UAE as well as the US and the UK to find a way to get stranded Indians out of Khartoum. The ongoing violence, which includes warplanes flying over the capital, has made it difficult for nations to retrieve their citizens because of restricted civilian movement and disrupted transportation links.

Since clashes erupted between two Sudanese military commanders, over 290 people, including an Indian national, have lost their lives. The two factions are currently vying for control of crucial government and military facilities, and the situation appears to be escalating towards a potential civil war.

A 24-hour-ceasefire called on Tuesday evening unravelled with the fighting continuing for a fifth day. Another day-long truce has been called on Wednesday, but it remains to be seen if it will halt the violence, even if temporarily.

Fourteen countries issued a joint statement on Wednesday calling for an immediate end to violence and urged Sudanese military leaders to engage in dialogue without delay. The signatories included the US, Germany, Canada, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, South Korea, Spain, Switzerland, Sweden, and the UK.

The latest fighting that began on April 14 was triggered over the integration of the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces – led by General Mohamed Hamdan Daglo – into the Sudanese army, led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan. But, the two generals have been at loggerheads after joining forces to derail the country’s path to civilian rule by seizing power in October 2021. The Sudanese military had earlier ousted long-time President Omar al-Bashir in April 2019 after protestors rallied to the streets for democratic change.

However, instead of being shunned, the generals were being wooed by Western diplomats who wanted them to help in a transition towards democracy. As per the New York Times, the US never imposed sanctions that it had threatened to impose on Hamdan on his financial interests in West Asia.

Hamdan had apparently grown closer to Saudi Arabia and the UAE as he sent troops to fight in Yemen. With the Saudi and UAE leadership becoming more entangled in Sudan’s political establishment, they along with Egypt, began a high-profile Arab initiative to give back power to the former prime minister. As part of the initiative, the three Arab countries also courted the army chief Burhan to find a peace agreement.

Meanwhile, Russia had also taken the side of Hamdan since the Sudanese general was crucial in operations in gold smuggling, as per Western media reports. Moscow also wanted to dock Russian warships on the Red Sea ports of Sudan.

The rapid descent of Khartoum into a warzone is prompting questions about the effectiveness of the diplomatic roles of the foreign countries and the United Nations, who have been attempting to broker a compromise between the two sides for several months.

Before the conflict broke out, the Indian-origin community in the country was estimated to be around 1,500, dating back to a Gujarati trader travelling from Aden in 1856. In addition, there are around 2,500-3,000 Indian nationals in the country.

But, the current estimate of the Indian community in Khartoum is not known as the Indian government is cautious in providing any details that could be a security concern.

With the fighting having broken out without any warning on April 14, millions in Khartoum are trapped inside their homes with their food and water running out.

With the Internet largely down and mobile networks unstable, communications to establish a rescue mission is immensely difficult. The Indian embassy has set up WhatsApp groups to take the turn.

The Indian external affairs minister S. Jaishankar had spoken to the Saudi and UAE foreign ministers, who have “assured their practical support on the ground”.

“Our Ambassador in Washington DC and High Commissioner in London are in touch with their respective host Governments. We are also working with the UN, which has a substantial presence in Sudan,” said government sources.

However, the fighting is so intense that other countries have not yet begun any evacuation plans, with advisories insisting that everyone should stay indoors.

The US has already stated that it doesn’t plan to organise an evacuation as of now. Earlier, a US diplomatic convoy came under fire and the EU ambassador was assaulted in his residence.

“Situation on the street is very tense and movement is very risky at this stage. Our priority is safety of movement and well-being of individuals wherever they are located,” said Indian government sources, indicating that rescue plans were ruled out for now as the transport links were not safe.

Japan announced that it was going to send a military plane to bring back 60 citizens from Sudan, but it doesn’t seem likely to be mobilised soon.

German magazine Spiegel reported that a German military operation to evacuate roughly 150 citizens was forced to stop due to fighting in the Sudanese capital.

Sudan Fighting Rages as Cease-Fire Falls Apart

Fighter jets roar over and bombs rattle the Sudanese capital after the failure of a truce between the army and paramilitary forces. The fighting reportedly forced Germany to abandon an evacuation mission.

Fighting between the Sudanese army and paramilitaries raged in Sudan for a fifth day Wednesday after an internationally brokered 24-hour truce collapsed.

Gunfire, air strikes and bomb explosions have rocked the capital, Khartoum, and some other parts of the Horn of Africa nation.

The violence erupted on Saturday between forces loyal to the head of the Sudanese army – Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, the country’s de facto ruler – and his deputy, Mohamed Hamdan Daglo, known as Hemedti, who commands the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF).

Both men, with a long history of human rights abuses, are battling for control of Africa’s third-largest country, which is rich in natural resources.

The bloodshed has so far claimed at least 270 lives and left over 2,600 wounded, said the director-general of the UN’s World Health Organisation, Tedros Ghebreyesus.

A 24-hour cease-fire was to have been in effect from sundown Tuesday to sundown Wednesday.

But despite the agreement, fighting continued between the two warring parties.

The army blamed the “rebel militia” for the collapse of the truce, accusing it of continuing “skirmishes around the army headquarters and the airport.”

The RSF, in turn, accused the army of “committing violations” and breaching the cease-fire by launching “sporadic attacks” on its forces and bases around the capital.

The failure of the truce, despite strong international pressure, raises fears of a prolonged conflict.

How is the violence affecting people?

Most of the fighting is currently reportedly taking place in the capital area, where roughly 12 million of the country’s 46 million people live.

The violence has left many civilians trapped indoors and desperately seeking essential supplies.

Many are running out of food and water. It has become dangerous to venture out of the homes to restock on supplies, witnesses told AFP news agency.

“Thousands upon thousands of civilians are trapped in their homes, shielding from the fighting, with no electricity, unable to venture out and worried about running out of food, drinking water and medicine,” said UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Volker Türk.

Many hospitals and other healthcare facilities have also stopped functioning, either because they were damaged or had to be evacuated for safety reasons.

On Wednesday morning, thousands of people began leaving their homes in Khartoum, some in cars and others on foot, including women and children.

They said the streets were littered with dead bodies, the stench of which filled the air, reported AFP.

What’s the conflict about?

The fighting is the latest chapter in Sudan’s political turmoil of recent years.

The country witnessed mass protests against three decades of iron-fisted rule under dictator Omar al-Bashir in 2019. The demonstrations were led by an alliance of pro-democracy activists.

Burhan and Daglo, along with other generals, staged a coup to topple Bashir.

The generals and civilian protest leaders then struck a power-sharing deal with the aim of later holding elections and forming a civilian government.

Burhan and Daglo then jointly orchestrated a coup in October 2021, derailing efforts to hand over power to a civilian government.

Under international pressure, both generals recently agreed to a framework agreement with political parties and pro-democracy groups.

But the signing was repeatedly delayed amid tensions over the integration of the RSF into the armed forces and the future chain of command.

The latest bout of violence is also a new blow to the nation’s faltering economy.

Nearly a third of Sudan’s people, almost 16 million, already rely on humanitarian aid, according to the UN.

What are foreign governments planning to protect their citizens?

Foreign governments, meanwhile, are mulling how to support their citizens currently in Sudan.

The German army said Tuesday it was preparing to support the Foreign Office in case a military-secured evacuation of German citizens is needed.

On Wednesday, the Speigel news magazine, citing unnamed sources, reported that a mission by the German military to evacuate around 150 citizens had to be halted due to fighting in the capital. A spokesperson for the defence ministry declined to comment on the report.

The US Embassy late Tuesday advised Americans in Sudan to shelter in place. It said there were no immediate plans for a government-coordinated evacuation.

Japan said on Wednesday that its defence ministry had begun the “necessary preparations” to evacuate around 60 of its nationals from Sudan, including embassy staff.

This article was originally published on DW.

Sudan Military Reinstates Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok, But Protests Continue

The deal faces opposition from pro-democracy groups that have demanded full civilian rule since Bashir’s ouster and have been angered by the deaths of dozens of protesters since the October 25 coup.

Khartoum: Sudan’s military reinstated Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok on Sunday and promised to release all political detainees after weeks of deadly unrest triggered by a coup, although large crowds took to the streets to reject any deal involving the army.

Under an agreement signed with military leader General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, Hamdok, first appointed after the overthrow of autocrat Omar al-Bashir in a 2019 uprising, will lead a civilian government of technocrats for a transitional period.

A hero for the protest movement, Hamdok quickly became the villain for some.

Also Read: Sudan: Amid Ongoing Protests Against Military Coup, Al Jazeera Says Bureau Chief Arrested

Tens of thousands of people joined scheduled rallies in the capital, Khartoum, and its twin cities of Omdurman and Bahri. Security forces fired bullets and tear gas to disperse them, witnesses said. A 16-year-old protester in Omdurman died from a bullet wound, the Central Committee of Sudanese Doctors said.

The United States, Britain, Norway, the European Union, Canada and Switzerland welcomed the reinstatement of Hamdok and in a joint statement urged the release of other political detainees. The United Nations also welcomed Sunday’s deal

Western powers had condemned last month’s takeover and suspended economic assistance to Sudan, which has been trying to recover from a deep economic crisis.

The coup triggered mass demonstrations against the military, and medics aligned with the protest movement say security forces have killed 41 civilians in increasingly violent crackdowns.

Hamdok said he agreed to the deal to prevent more casualties

“Sudanese blood is precious. Let us stop the bloodshed and direct the youth’s energy into building and development,” he said at a signing ceremony broadcast on state television.

Burhan said the deal would be inclusive. “We do not want to exclude anyone except, as we’ve agreed, the National Congress Party,” he said, referring to Bashir’s former ruling party.

But the agreement made no mention of the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC), the civilian coalition that shared power with the military before the coup. A number of people at the signing ceremony had political ties to Bashir.

‘No Legitimacy’

The FFC said it did not recognise any agreement with the military. The Sudanese Congress Party, a leading FFC member, several of whose leaders are detained, described Hamdok joining the deal as “illegitimate and unconstitutional” and providing political cover for the coup.

Several of the resistance committees that have been organising protests also put out statements rejecting any deal with the military.

Hamdok was placed under house arrest when the military seized power, derailing a transition towards elections in 2023.

The military dissolved Hamdok’s Cabinet and detained a number of civilians who held top positions under the power-sharing deal agreed after Bashir was toppled.

Politicians Omer Eldigair, Yasir Arman, Ali Alrayah Alsanhouri and Siddig al-Mahdi would be released on Sunday night, a government source said. Only Arman is among the former sitting officials, many of whom had engaged in a war of words with military leaders before the coup.

Under Sunday’s deal, a constitutional declaration struck between the military and civilians in 2019 will remain the foundation in further talks.

“The next government will focus on limited issues, chiefly the democratic transition,” Al Jazeera quoted Hamdok as saying in an interview. Hamdok said elections would take place before July 2023, the channel added.

World Bank Halts Sudan Operations in Blow to Coup Leaders, Strike Calls Gain Support

After isolation from the international financing system across three decades of Bashir’s rule, Sudan had achieved full re-engagement with the bank in March and gained access to $2 billion in financing.

Khartoum: The World Bank halted disbursements for operations in Sudan on Wednesday in response to the military’s seizure of power from a transitional government, while state oil company workers, doctors and pilots joined civilian groups opposing the takeover.

Thousands of people have taken to the streets since Monday’s coup led by armed forces Chief General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and several have been killed in clashes with security forces.

He said he acted to stop the country slipping into civil war, but the World Bank decision to pause payments and stop processing new operations is a setback to his plans for one of Africa’s poorest countries.

After isolation from the international financing system across three decades of Bashir’s rule, Sudan achieved full re-engagement with the bank in March and gained access to $2 billion in financing.

Also Read: Sudan Military Chief Burhan Says Army Ousted Government To Avoid Civil War

“I am greatly concerned by recent events in Sudan, and I fear the dramatic impact this can have on the country’s social and economic recovery and development,” World Bank President David Malpass said in a statement from Washington.

Abdalla Hamdok, prime minister in the deposed transitional government, had touted World Bank re-engagement as a major accomplishment and was depending on the funding for several large development projects.

The government had instituted harsh economic reforms that succeeded in achieving rapid arrears clearance and debt relief and renewed financing from the World Bank and IMF.

An IMF spokeswoman said the fund was monitoring developments but it was “premature” to comment.

Hamdok, who was detained on Monday and is under guard at his home, was in good health when visited by envoys from France, Germany, Norway, the UK, the United States, the European Union and the United Nations, the UN mission in Sudan said on Twitter on Wednesday. The West has called for restoration of the council and the release of civilian leaders.

Hamdok says any retreat from the path to democracy threatens stability and development in Sudan and he warns against the use of violence against protesters, a source close to him said.

Late on Wednesday, Sudan state TV reported that Burhan had relieved six Sudanese ambassadors from their posts, apparently because they rejected the military takeover. The six were envoys to the United States, the European Union, China, Qatar, France and the head of mission to Geneva.

March of Millions

Scattered protests took place in Khartoum on Wednesday and intensified at night across the capital, although no new bloodshed was reported.

In one Khartoum neighbourhood, a Reuters journalist saw soldiers and armed people in civilian clothes removing barricades erected by protesters. A few hundred metres away, youths built barricades again minutes later.

“We want civilian rule. We won’t get tired,” one said.

In Bahri across the river, witnesses told Reuters protesters were met with tear gas and heard gunshots on Wednesday evening as protesters came out across the capital’s three cities.

In the northeastern city of Atbara, protesters marched and chanted, “Down with the military regime”.

Neighbourhood committees announced plans for protests leading to what they said would be a “march of millions” on Saturday.

Workers at state oil company Sudapet said they were joining the civil disobedience campaign to back the stalled democratic transition and pilots from the national carrier Sudan Airways have gone on strike, as have pilots from carriers Badr and Tarco Airlines.

Sudan’s armed forces sacked Ibrahim Adlan, head of the county’s civil aviation authority, sector sources said.

Central Bank employees have also stopped work in a further setback for the functioning of the economy.

Doctors belonging to the Unified Doctors’ Office group of unions also said they were striking. The doctors were one of the driving forces behind the uprising that brought down Bashir.

Power-sharing between the military and civilians had been increasingly strained over several issues, including whether to send Bashir and others to the International Criminal Court, where they are wanted for alleged atrocities in Darfur. Military commanders now leading Sudan also served in Darfur.

At his first news conference since announcing the takeover, Burhan said on Tuesday the army had no choice but to sideline politicians who he said were inciting people against the armed forces.

UN Special Representative Volker Perthes met Burhan on Wednesday and told him the United Nations wants to see a return to the transition process and the immediate release of all those arbitrarily detained, UN spokesman Stephane Dujarric told reporters in New York.

Serious Risk 

Events in Sudan – Africa’s third largest country – mirror those in several other Arab states where the military has tightened its grip following uprisings.

Willow Berridge, a Sudan expert at Newcastle University, said it would be difficult for Burhan and the army to suppress street mobilisations against the takeover because of the presence of resistance committees in many neighbourhoods.

“My greatest fear is that he will fall back even further on the only legitimacy he can depend on – violence. It is a very serious risk,” Berridge said.

Burhan has close ties to states that worked to roll back Islamist influence and contain the impact of the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings, including the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Egypt.

International Criminal Court: A Report Card

Despite severe shortcomings, the importance of the ICC lies in the possible deterrent effect it may have on the commission of most serious crimes under international law in future

This is the last in a series of eight articles on the International Criminal Court (ICC). The Rome Statute creating the ICC entered into force on July 1, 2002 and the court is now in its 20th year. To mark the occasion, The Wire is publishing a series of articles evaluating its performance over the past two decades. See also: Part 1 (Afghanistan)| Part 2 (Powerful states staying above the law)| Part 3 (Rohingya crisis)| Part 4 (Palestine)| Part 5 (Sexual and gender-based violence)| Part 6 (Victims’ rights)| Part 7 (State cooperation)

On September 15, the trial chamber of the International Criminal Court (ICC) authorised a full-fledged investigation into Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte’s “war on drugs” campaign, observing that there was reasonable basis to believe that crimes against humanity were committed, particularly of murder. The court also observed that these did not appear to be a legitimate law enforcement operation, or “mere excesses” but a “widespread and systematic attack against a civilian population pursuant to or in furtherance of a state policy”.

On August 9, 2021, Brazil’s Indigenous People Articulation filed a statement before the International Criminal Court (ICC), accusing President Bolsonaro of carrying out genocide, ‘ecocide’ and crimes against humanity and causing more than 1,160 deaths of indigenous people.

On August 3, 2021, the Sudanese cabinet voted to ratify the ICC treaty, pursuant to which the ICC prosecutor announced establishing an office with a permanent team in Sudan to investigate and gather more evidence against officials indicted by the ICC, including former president Omar al Bashir.

On July 14, 2021, the Yoruba Nation agitators of Nigeria petitioned the ICC, alleging that the former Nigerian president, minister of justice, chief of army staff and inspectors general of police committed genocide and crimes against humanity against the Yoruba people in various parts of Nigeria.

The agitators affirmed their collective will for a criminal investigation, prosecution and justice. At a time when the developments at the ICC are keenly followed on some counts, and when it has faced scathing criticism on some counts, it is gratifying to see sets of victims from different geo-political contexts look to the ICC, as a last straw for their pursuit of justice and accountability.

Supporters of Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir carry a mock coffin representing the International Criminal Court in Khartoum, Sudan, June 15, 2015. Photo: Reuters/Mohamed Nureldin Abdallah

The International Criminal Court: a snapshot

The ICC was created in 1998 through the Rome Statute, in order to prosecute individuals committing the most serious crimes under international law – war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide and aggression. It is a judicial institution of a permanent nature that became functional in The Hague, The Netherlands on July 1, 2002.

The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), established by the UN Security Council in 1993 and 1994, respectively, are predecessors to the ICC that prosecuted individuals for heinous crimes under international law but within specific geo-political contexts.

The ICC was primarily created to end impunity for the most heinous crimes by making accountable individuals involved in those crimes, irrespective of their rank, position or stature. By holding them criminally responsible, it hopes to deter and prevent future crimes of a similar nature; and ensure that justice remains an essential ingredient for everlasting peace and security. A snapshot of the ICC is given in the table below:

Headquarters The Hague, The Netherlands
Functioning from July 1, 2002
Ratifications 123  (out of 195 countries)
Cases before the court 30
Arrest warrants issued 35
Suspects detained in ICC 17
Suspects at large 13
Convictions 10
Acquittals 4
Situations under Preliminary Examinations 12
Ongoing investigations 15
Number of judges 18
Chambers of judges 3

(pre-trial, trial and appeals)
Number of staff personnel 900

(from approximately 100 countries)
Estimated budget for 2020 €149,205,600

Ratifications, withdrawals and the challenge of state cooperation

Ratification of the Rome Statute/treaty by a state leads to its membership in the ICC, with a binding effect of the contents of the statute for the state concerned. The Rome Statute of the ICC has 123 state parties till date out of a UN membership of 195 countries (including two with observer status – the Holy See and the State of Palestine). The geographic distribution indicates that 33 state parties are from the African region, 28 from Latin America and the Caribbean, 25 from Eastern Europe and North America, 19 from Asia Pacific and 18 from Eastern Europe.

The entrance of the International Criminal Court (ICC) is seen in The Hague, Netherlands. Photo: REUTERS/Jerry Lampen

The numbers for the Asia Pacific are deceptive as they include Asian countries such as Cambodia, Fiji, Japan, Mongolia, Republic of Korea and Timor-Leste, and also countries in the Pacific region such as Cook Islands, Cyprus, Jordan, Marshall Islands and Palestine. While Asia has few member states, Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Maldives are the only SAARC countries to have ratified the treaty and become member states of the ICC. Ironically, South Asia is one of the few regions in the world that does not have a regional human rights mechanism to address heinous human rights violations including the most serious crimes under international law.

Despite 123 member states to the ICC, powerful countries such as India, Iraq, Israel, Russia, China and the US have not become state parties so far. It is necessary to reflect on the reasons for the same – are they afraid of the ICC as skeletons may tumble out from their closets, or has the ICC not inspired enough confidence in them, or a bit of both?

Additionally, the unprecedented act of ‘unsigning’ the ICC Treaty by the US in 2002 was followed by Russia’s ‘unsigning’ in 2016, Burundi’s withdrawal from ICC’s membership in 2017 and the Philippines’ withdrawal in 2018. These can be termed acts of desperation made with a view to shield the perpetrators of ICC crimes within their countries. Russia’s ‘unsigning’ is discussed in further detail in one of the articles of this series.

An interesting development is the African Union’s 2017 resolution directing African countries to withdraw its membership from the ICC Statute en masse as a protest against the ICC excessively focusing on African situations, and due to ICC’s attempt to prosecute an incumbent head of state (Sudanese president al-Bashir, up to 2019). It is not clear if immunities available to a head of state under national laws would be respected by the ICC.

The withdrawals (both actual and threatened) possibly indicate waning support for the ICC. At the same time, the African Union’s resolution seems to have only a symbolic effect, as there were no mass withdrawals in pursuance of its resolution. Africa remains a region extending broad support for the ICC, notwithstanding the resolution. This is discussed more elaborately in the article on state cooperation in this series.

Reduced membership to the ICC leads to reduced state cooperation for ICC’s work, as the non-state parties are under no legal obligation to cooperate with and assist the ICC in its work. Even the state parties to the ICC statute have failed to discharge their obligation, as obvious from the failure of several African countries in implementing ICC’s arrest warrant against Omar al-Bashir – the Sudanese president accused of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity.

Non-implementation of ICC’s arrest warrant against Simone Gbagbo – a former first lady of the Côte d’Ivoire accused of crimes against humanity, and against Saif al-Islam Gaddafi of Libya for attacking unarmed civilians during the Arab Spring protests have left the ICC look red-faced: like a jumbo warrior with a toy gun.

Also Read: Twenty Years After 9/11, End of an Era in Us, but Story Continues in India

Situations under preliminary examination

The Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) of the ICC makes a preliminary examination in any given situation, prior to seeking permission from a pre-trial chamber to launch a full-fledged, formal investigation. The aim of the preliminary examination is to assess if the situation meets the legal criteria set out by the Rome Statute in order to warrant an investigation by the OTP.

This includes jurisdictional matters, complementarity (whether the concerned state is willing or able to carry out prosecutions for the ICC crimes), gravity (seriousness and scale of crimes), and the interests of justice. The OTP’s policy paper on preliminary examinations, released in 2013, outlines the focus areas and processes followed by the OTP in its preliminary examinations.

At present, six situations around the world have an ongoing preliminary examination by the OTP. These include Bolivia (alleged crimes against humanity committed in August 2020); Colombia (alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity since 2009 and 2002, respectively; Guinea (crimes against humanity committed in September 2009); Nigeria (war crimes and crimes against humanity, with the completion of preliminary examination in December 2020, and awaiting pre-trial chamber’s authorization for an investigation); Ukraine (alleged ICC crimes since November 2013); and Venezuela (alleged crimes committed during demonstrations and political unrest since April 2017). It is evident that these examinations span varied geographical regions such as Africa, Eastern Europe and South America.

Not every preliminary examination by the OTP leads to an investigation. In certain situations, the OTP decided to close the preliminary examination based on factual and legal analysis, concluding that there was no reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation, or such an investigation would be legally untenable at the present point in time.

Examples of this include Comoros, Greece and Cambodia (closed in November 2017), Gabon (closed in September 2018), Honduras (closed in October 2015), Iraq/United Kingdom (closed in December 2020) and the Republic of Korea (closed in June 2014). Among these, the decision of the ICC Prosecutor to close the examination into UK’s war crimes in Iraq has evinced the strongest criticism. This has been more elaborately discussed in the article titled ‘Catching the Big Fish’ in this series.

Situations under investigation

As a next stage after the completion of preliminary examination by the OTP, upon authorisation by the pre-trial chamber, the prosecutor would commence an investigation into a situation. The investigations focus on gathering and examining evidence, and lead to identifying certain suspects who would subsequently be charged with the commission of ICC crimes. The OTP is duty-bound to investigate both incriminating and exonerating circumstances equally.

The OTP is currently investigating 14 situations. Some of them are ongoing investigations into older situations, even after some accused have been charged, prosecuted and convicted or acquitted. These include Central African Republic (two investigations on alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity committed since July 2002 and from 2012 onwards); Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in Eastern DRC since July 2002); and Uganda (alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity by the Lords Resistance Army and the Ugandan authorities since July 2002).

Investigation will shortly commence on the Philippines situation (alleged crimes committed since July 2016 in the “war on drugs” campaign). Investigations have been commenced into the situations in Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire, Georgia, Kenya, Libya and Mali. Additionally, there are ongoing investigations into the situations in Afghanistan, Bangladesh/Myanmar and Palestine, which are situations of special interest to South Asians. Separate articles in this series on each of the three situations discusses various dimensions for international justice.

While the first several situations from which the accused were subjected to a trial before the ICC were from the African region, leading to a large-scale public perception that the ICC was going after the African region, the current situations under investigation and preliminary examinations indicate a wider regional diversity.

Also read: What Explains COVID-19’s Lower Impact in Africa?

Convictions: too little, too late?

Since its inception in 2002, till date, the ICC has dealt with 30 cases, with some having multiple numbers of accused persons. Out of these, there have been ten convictions and four acquittals. A major milestone for the ICC was the 2012 conviction of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, for war crimes, particularly in relation to enlisting and conscripting child soldiers in DRC. He was sentenced to 14 years imprisonment and was released in March 2020.

Bosco Ntaganda from the DRC was convicted of war crimes and crimes against humanity and was sentenced to 30 years of imprisonment, in one of the longest periods of imprisonment awarded by the ICC. Germaine Katanga from the DRC was convicted of war crimes and crimes against humanity, and sentenced to 12 years’ imprisonment. Dominic Ongwen was convicted of crimes against humanity and war crimes in Northern Uganda, as a commander of the Lords Resistance Army (LRA), and sentenced to 25 years’ imprisonment.

In a historic judgment – the first in the context of the destruction of monuments as a war crime – Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi was found guilty as a co-perpetrator of the war crime for intentionally directing attacks against religious and historic buildings in Timbuktu, Mali, in June and July 2012, and was sentenced to nine years’ imprisonment.

Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi ( a.k.a. Abu Tourab) enters the courtroom of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague the Netherlands, September 30, 2015. Photo: Reuters

Questions have been raised about the fact that in the 19 years of its existence, the ICC has convicted only ten persons from a handful of situations. Given the scale at which the global community has invested time, human and financial resources, and built an elaborate infrastructure for the ICC’s functioning, this appears hugely disproportionate and woefully inadequate.

Some have critiqued the cost of international justice as too high and the convictions too few to have a deterrent effect. Others have argued that the cost-effectiveness of the court cannot be judged merely by the number of convictions or the (lack of) speed at which it convicts. The rules of procedure may be too elaborate and cumbersome, leading to prolonged litigation. If the ICC is to have a deterrent effect to prevent possible crimes in future, justice must not only be done but also perceived to be done, in the eyes of the global community.

Acquittals

Among the acquittals, an early one was of Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui – a leader from the DRC situation in 2012. He was acquitted of war crimes and crimes against humanity and ordered to be released. There was global outrage over the acquittal of Jean-Pierre Bemba – the former vice-president of the Central African Republic, by the appeals chamber in June 2018. Bemba had been convicted by the trial court of serious crimes such as murder, rape and pillaging.

This was followed by a much-publicised case in 2019, in which Laurent Gbagbo – the former president of Côte d’Ivoire – was acquitted of all charges of crimes against humanity: intentional attacks on civilians leading to the deaths of thousands, rape, other inhumane acts, attempted murder, and persecution in the context of 2010-11 post-election violence in Côte d’Ivoire. The prosecution based its case on the testimony of 82 witnesses and other evidence. Yet the trials chamber acquitted him on the ground that there was insufficient evidence to illustrate a common plan to foment violence.

Charles Blé Goudé – Gbagbo’s right-hand man – was similarly acquitted of crimes allegedly committed in the same context. The two acquittals were confirmed by the appeals chamber of the ICC in March 2021. He has recently demanded compensation from the ICC, alleging “grave and manifest miscarriage of justice”.

As is obvious from these facts and figures, the information about convictions and acquittals, drawn from the official website of the ICC, appears to conflate cases related to the major ICC crimes, and those related to offences against administration of justice (such as tutoring and bribing of witnesses).

Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Aimé Kilolo Musamba, Jean-Jacques Mangenda Kabongo, Fidèle Babala Wandu and Narcisse Arido have been convicted for offences against administration of justice, mainly related to Bemba’s case. So the actual outcomes related to the major ICC crimes may be lesser.

Suspects at large

A matter of serious concern and introspection is that the ICC commenced proceedings against several heads of state, but has not been able to convict any of them. Former Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir – alleged of committing genocide and crimes against humanity – has successfully remained a fugitive from 2009. This may soon end, as it was recently reported that the Sudan government will surrender him and other officials indicted by the ICC for trial. If he is surrendered, that would be a huge breakthrough in the ICC trial against him for war crimes and genocide.

Charges against the Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta were withdrawn after he and his supporters allegedly “interfered” with witnesses; Bemba and Gbagbo – leaders of Central African Republic and  Côte d’Ivoire respectively, were acquitted.

Walter Osapiri Barasa and Philip Kipkoech Bett, against whom arrest warrants have been issued by the ICC in relation to offences against the administration of justice in the Kenyan situation, continue to remain at large. Since the ICC does not conduct trials in the absence of the accused, their arrest or voluntary appearance in the ICC is a precondition for the cases to proceed.

Ongoing trials and appeals

Trial against Alfred Yekatom and Patrice-Edouard Ngaïssona for war crimes and crimes against humanity in the Central African Republic, and against Abdallah Banda Abakaer Nourain (Banda) for war crimes in Sudan are currently ongoing.

The trial of Al Hassan Ag Abdoul Aziz Ag Mohamed for torture, cruel treatment, outrages upon personal dignity, intentionally directing attacks against buildings dedicated to religion and historic monuments, rape and sexual slavery in Mali, is also currently pending in the ICC.  Dominic Ongwen – a military leader of the Lords Resistance Army in Uganda was convicted of war crimes and crimes against humanity in February 2021. An appeal against the decision of the trial chamber is currently pending.

Another important trial to follow is that of Paul Gicheru, a Kenyan lawyer who has been accused of crimes related to witness interference during the Kenyan cases in the ICC in 2013. The charges against him were confirmed by the ICC judges on July 15, 2021.

Trigger mechanisms

There are three ways in which a case can be taken up by the ICC: referral by the concerned state party, investigation by the prosecutor on their own initiative and referral by the UN Security Council.

Many situations have been referred to the ICC for investigation by the concerned state party themselves due to an inability of the state to prosecute the offenders for ICC crimes in the national courts. Of all the cases that have been prosecuted in the ICC, a majority are through self-referrals of situations by state parties.

Examples include Central African Republic (2004), Democratic Republic of Congo (2004), Gabon (2016), Mali (2012), Uganda (2003) and Union of Comoros (2013). In the initial years of the ICC’s functioning, its investigation and prosecution of offenders from self-referred situations was preferred as there was more assurance of state cooperation for gathering evidence and other such issues in such situations.

The prosecutor’s powers of investigation proprio motu (on own initiative) were a bone of contention in the initial years of the ICC by countries including India, which feared politically motivated investigations by the ICC Prosecutor. However, an observation of ICC’s functioning over the years indicates that the checks and balances to the exercise of the Prosecutor’s powers, built into the ICC Statute, have been implemented in their true spirit.

The Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) cannot proceed with an investigation on its own initiative, though it may undertake a preliminary examination of a situation to gather evidence. The ICC’s pre-trial chamber is required to authorise the commencement of an investigation after it is convinced that the legal criteria have been met. These include jurisdictional issues, and the commission of ICC crimes of sufficient gravity.

For example, the Prosecutor conducted a preliminary examination of the Palestinian situation for nearly five years, and of the Afghanistan situation for close to ten years, before the pre-trial chamber of the ICC authorized a formal investigation. In other situations such as Honduras, the prosecutor closed the preliminary examination on grounds that the legal criteria for an ICC investigation were not met.

The OTP is legally mandated to work with the highest professional integrity and be fair, objective and impartial in its investigation. Although a state may self-refer a situation to the ICC, the prosecutor is not precluded from examining the culpability of the governmental forces in that situation as well.

For example, in the Nigeria situation, at the conclusion of preliminary examination in December 2020, the prosecutor announced that there was reasonable basis to believe that both Boko Haram (and its splinter groups) as well as the Nigerian security forces have committed crimes against humanity and war crimes. In a similar vein, in the Palestine situation, the erstwhile ICC prosecutor issued a statement in May 2021, that she “had reasonable basis to believe that offences have been committed by both Israeli military and Palestinian armed groups, including Hamas, in the Gaza Strip and Israeli-occupied West Bank.”

Such non-partisan positioning of the prosecutor is a welcome and a much-needed one for ICC’s institutional credibility. It advances the ICC’s vision of countering the impunity of perpetrators for ICC crimes, whoever they may be.

The third trigger mechanism is through a UN Security Council referral. The role of the Security Council in referring cases to the ICC, and in deferring cases that are pending before the ICC (for a period of one year) is contentious. The ICC Statute carefully carved out its role in an attempt to harmonise with the mandate given to the Security Council under the UN Charter.

However, the reality that has been unfolding indicates that the permanent members of the Security Council have placed themselves and their allies above and outside the pale of international criminal justice. This is a matter of grave concern that violates rule of law and the ICC’s vision to end impunity for serious crimes under international law.

Shortcomings and limitations

The ICC is not a perfect judicial institution, nor is it a panacea for international justice. Even staunch supporters of international criminal justice have highlighted shortcomings and limitations, in an effort to improve ICC’s functioning. The processes and procedures in the ICC are extremely slow and arduous, leading to concerns if the ICC is doing too little too late.

Justice delayed may mean justice denied, in many situations, as witnesses may weaken in their pursuit of justice, documentary evidence may disappear and victims may die before justice is rendered. The ICC has been rightly criticised for not “taking on” powerful countries, the Prosecutor’s refusal to open an investigation into the UK war crimes being an example.

Significantly, the ICC has faced enormous challenges in state cooperation for implementing arrest warrants and surrendering suspects to the ICC.

ICC judges have been critiqued for their narrow and excessively technical interpretation of the relevant law, leading to adverse consequences such as an acquittal by the appeals chamber in Bemba’s case. The ICC’s record on sexual and gender-based violence has been demonstrably weak, as discussed in another article in this series.

Even though the ICC postures itself as a legal and judicial institution, the role of the UN Security Council in referring situations to the ICC and its veto power in blocking situations from being referred to the ICC necessarily fuses politics with international justice. Despite elaborate witness protection measures by the Victims and Witnesses Unit, witness interference in the ICC appears to be rampant.

Further, the ICC has faced a lukewarm response from South Asia, with only three member states from SAARC – Afghanistan, Bangladesh and the Maldives.

Also read: What Is Keeping India on the Wrong Side of History With Myanmar?

Relevance for South Asia

Despite these severe shortcomings, the importance of the ICC lies in the possible deterrent effect it may have on the future commission of most serious crimes under international law. Victims of heinous crimes deserve justice, and if that is not possible from their national legal systems, they must have recourse to other avenues, including but not limited to the ICC. Victims’ participation and reparations to victims, facilitated by the ICC, help in breaking new ground in treating victims, not as passive recipients but as active agents and important stakeholders in the justice process.

Members of the civil society in India and other South Asian countries have long been engaged with the developments related to the International Criminal Court. From the years 2000 to 2010, ICC-India – an anti-impunity campaign – engaged in deliberations with a cross-section of society in India on the significance of the normative standards and legal principles enshrined in the Rome Statute. Eleven years later, much water has flowed under the bridge, with an ICC that has arrested, indicted and prosecuted several accused persons in relation to heinous crimes in varied geographical contexts. It is interesting for South Asians engaged with the ICC from its inception to observe how the principles and provisions of the Rome Statute have taken shape and been implemented.

In January 2021, the Association for Relatives of Enforced Disappearances in the North and East Provinces of Sri Lanka requested the UN Human Rights Council to refer the Sri Lankan situation to the ICC. The same month, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Michelle Bachelet, observed the “demonstrated inability and unwillingness of (Sri Lankan) government to advance accountability at the national level” and called for “international action to ensure justice for international crimes”, namely for war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide against the Sri Lankan Tamils.

In March 2021, the UN Human Rights Council passed the eighth resolution on Sri Lanka, emphasising the importance of accountability for crimes committed by all parties in Sri Lanka, including by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).

The situations in Afghanistan, Myanmar and Palestine, currently under investigation at the ICC, and any possible action related to Sri Lanka – will be keenly observed by many Indians and South Asians.

However, if a singular reason must be given for our continued engagement with the ICC, it is that the big and powerful actors (such as the US, UK and Israel) are employing whatever means are at their disposal to shield their nationals from the ICC. They fear that the long arm of international criminal justice may effectively counter impunity, after all.

This is an exciting phase in the ICC’s functioning that gives a glimmer of hope in the global fight against impunity. The ICC’s role as a safety net is of prime importance, particularly when political, military and other leaders escape with impunity from the national legal system due to their official position and political clout. Indians, more than anyone else, know the importance of such a safety net.

Saumya Uma was a co-founder of ICC-India: an anti-impunity campaign on the International Criminal Court and served as its national coordinator in the years 2000-2010. She is currently a professor of law at Jindal Global Law School, O.P. Jindal Global University, India and a Board member of Women’s Regional Network. The views expressed are her own. She acknowledges the research assistance rendered for this article by Navami Krishnamurthy and Sonam Nanda – students of Jindal Global Law School. 

The Khartoum Massacre: When the Sudanese Revolution Lost Its Innocence

A first person account on surviving the Khartoum massacre and trying to make sense of what remains from the Sudanese revolution.

Editorial Note: Almost two years ago, on April 11 2019, the Sudanese dictator Omar al-Bashir was toppled by a military coup after 30 years in power. This came after weeks of sustained street protests, sit-ins, and other forms of civil disobedience by the Sudanese people. The Transitional Military Council (TMC) that replaced al-Bashir included senior officers of the former regime and resisted demands for a fully civilian transitional government. When groups like PI member the Sudanese Professionals Association launched another sit-in in front of the military headquarter in Khartoum, the military responded by murdering and raping hundreds of people on June 11 2019 in what became known as the “Khartoum Massacre.”

In the lobby of Al-Moa’lm Hospital in Khartoum, I looked at the corpses and injured bodies around me. Outside the heavy glass doors that we locked, I saw the four-wheel drive vehicles of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) carrying heavily armed soldiers and heard the sound of bullets. Clouds of smoke rose above the burning tents, casting a shadow over our weeks of dreaming of commune and carnival, in the hopes of achieving a nonviolent revolution.

I realised how tenuous life can be, and what it took for me to remain alive; to be able to write these lines: the death of other comrades and protesters who prevented the attackers from storming the hospital and killing dozens, if not hundreds, more. On the morning of Monday, June 3, 2019, when the Transitional Military Council (TMC) ruling Sudan carried out the Khartoum massacre, dozens including myself narrowly found shelter inside the hospital. Outside, more than 150 people were killed, dozens were thrown into the Nile, and both men and women were raped. Many are still missing today.

The sit-in had begun on April 6 at the army headquarters, about 16 weeks after the start of the popular revolution against the Islamic regime led by Lieutenant General Omar al-Bashir. On April 11, under pressure from the sit-in and the intervention of senior officers, Bashir stepped down. After Al-Bashir stepped down, the so-called Transitional Military Council was formed from a group of senior officers of the former regime, headed by the former deputy minister and defence minister. But he resigned after one day due to the continuing protests that saw in him a continuation of the old regime, and demanded a full civilian government to govern the country until democratic elections could be held.

On the night of June 2nd, I entered the encampment at 10 pm accompanied by friends. We headed to our usual spot near the University of Khartoum Clinic. Despite forewarning signs that the TMC was getting ready to disperse the sit-in, the carnival atmosphere of freedom and comradeship joy prevented me, like many others from anticipating the horror to follow. Near dawn, I headed to the last barricade on Nile Street, where I found the youths huddling around a fire and singing, with dozens of military vehicles just meters away. Returning to the camp, I reassured my friends that an attack was impossible. Less than an hour later we heard gunfire and witnessed the chaos of people trying to escape. A mixed armed force poured from the north toward the sit-in. Although witnesses confirmed that the first to reach the sit-in were wearing the blue police uniform, official investigations are still ongoing regarding the identity of the groups that carried out the attack. The police deny their involvement.

While the forceful dispersal was taking place, the Sudanese Professionals Association (SPA), one of the main groups involved in organising the sit-in, appealed to the Sudanese army to “fulfil their duty and defend the citizens from the TMC’s militia.” But the soldiers guarding the military headquarters refused to let fleeing people take shelter in the compound. My friend and I attempted to reach his car, but we could only get as far as the public hospital where the injured were arriving. As we sheltered in the hospital, what we witnessed from its windows for the next ten hours became a nightmare.

Also read: Bringing Al-Bashir to Justice: The Options Available to the ICC

Outside, army vehicles rolled around, threatening to shell the building. Inside, rescue operations proceeded. The corpses were isolated in one room, urgent cases triaged in another space, while the reception was filled with the wounded whom the hospital staff tried to treat assisted by the revolutionaries—among whom were doctors and nurses. The television hanging on the wall was broadcasting the massacre of our comrades. My phone rang; it was my sister asking in panic about my whereabouts. I informed her of our situation and asked after the safety of others. I sent a message to my wife in Cairo to reassure her, and switched off my phone to preserve the remaining charge. Then I lay on the floor and slept.

By the day’s end, the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC), a broad political and trade union umbrella, would declare a general strike and civil disobedience, as well as terminate negotiations with the regime. In the coalition’s view, the massacre was planned in advance and executed by the regime, which it now labeled the “Coup Council.” It designated “combined forces within the Sudanese military, the Janjaweed militias (also known as the RSF), the national security forces and other militias” as responsible for the massacre, as well as for interventions in other cities including En Nahud, Atbara, and Port Sudan. Meanwhile, the head of the TMC issued his own statement, also cutting off talks. He announced a nine-month timeline, to end with elections under “regional and international supervision.”

I don’t know how long I slept, but I headed down to the ground floor after I awoke. The place was still crowded with the wounded; some of the injured were outside in the hospital yard. The sound of bullets had somewhat subsided, but the smoke was still rising. Aggressors had destroyed the campsite. Shortly after, when we dared venture outside the hospital, we stood in the street looking toward our wasted land. The scene was reminiscent of images of villages burnt down in Darfur years earlier. There had been a revolutionary slogan: “Oh, you arrogant racist, we are all Darfur!” Now the slogan was actualised.

While standing outside, I saw a 10-year-old boy, and asked about his friends. He told me that they were safe, then and added, “They have betrayed us.” His statement stuck in my head. The politicians and military had never intended to protect us or the political community flourishing in the sit-in. The revolutionaries did not lack political foresight: attempts to disperse the congregation had occurred since the beginning of the sit-in. Yet this was a betrayal of our faith, of the euphoria the camp represented. We didn’t think anyone could kill a mockingbird.

In September 2019, the Prime Minister of the transitional government, Abdalla Hamdok, ordered an investigation into the massacre, establishing a committee with a three-month deadline, renewable once, to publish its findings. Yet today, some 17 months later, no findings have been issued. Varying reports have estimated the death toll between 100 and 150, while medical reports indicate 70 documented cases of rape of both men and women. But in November 2020, another government committee announced the discovery of a mass grave in Khartoum, which forensic sources linked to the massacre. It contained some 800 bodies.

What did we lose in the massacre? Not only hundreds of lives, but also an idea of Sudan as a commons. Since the revolution began in December 2018, questions of territory and boundaries had followed, including around the sit-in in the weeks prior to the massacre. Where did the sit-in territory start? Where did the protection of protesters end? Did a limit denote restricting revolutionary activities within it? Were all activities outside these boundaries therefore illegal and vulnerable to attacks by law enforcement?

Within its boundaries, the sit-in redrew the mental map of Sudan. It expressed an idea of Sudan that until then had only existed in ideology and hopeful fantasy. All of Sudan was present, and not just in territorial terms, despite the tents bearing signs of ethnic and geographic groups, but also in a fluid and carnival sense that challenged the underlying cartographic fiction, like a map of Sudan drawn by a child.

Also read: In Hotbed of Sudan’s Uprising, Activists Torn over Transition Deal

It was this childish revolutionary map—with its representations, expressions, and potential—that triggered fear and anxiety in the old regime and made clear the impotence of the traditional parties that were supposed to lead change. The negotiations over boundaries of the sit-in area, drawn by a joint security committee including both the military regime and the FFC coalition, had represented, symbolically, negotiations over the destiny of the country itself.

When revolutionaries extended the area of their barricades for security reasons, after a first dispersal attempt on May 13, only to be forced to retreat back to the original lines following an internal conflict within the SPA, it signalled a surrender of entire areas from the recognised “occupied” geography. And when one of these areas to the immediate north of the encampment, a poor neighbourhood known as Colombia burdened with negative racial and class stereotypes, including tales of alcohol and drug-use prevalence, became the excuse for military intervention, it amounted to a sacrifice of the neighbourhood by the moderate protestors on the altar of bourgeois morality. Indeed, the different parties—the TMC, the moderates in the FFC, and the radicals in the FFC—had different maps in mind that translated into different visions of Sudanese society. So far, it is the progressive current that has lost out.

On the morning after the violent dispersal of the sit-in, while I was still at the hospital, I heard about bloody events that had spread to many cities, and the occupation by the RSF of the streets of the capital. Their humiliation of Khartoum residents would continue for more than a week.

Movement had resumed in front of the hospital gate, with a number of people gathering outside. Army personnel, accompanied by a few civilians, had parked in front of the entrance. Their presence, we learned later, was to negotiate safe exit for civilians trapped in the hospital. My friend’s car had been completely destroyed, peppered with bullet holes and the interior vandalized. The soldiers negotiating our safe passage stopped me from joining the evacuating group on account of my dreadlocks, which might provoke the RSF because of an assumed resemblance to Darfuri militants, so I was ordered to go back inside the hospital. I later heard stories of people targeted for this exact reason.

Exhaustion lodged in my body and soul. It is an exhaustion that continues today: we have different reactions to dealing with the trauma of a near-death experience, of knowing dead bodies are held in a closed room next to us, of the fear your body will be mutilated or harmed. Many of those who were there that day are receiving therapy for PTSD. My sister-in-law, who witnessed the massacre first hand, wrote this to me recently:

The Khartoum massacre was one of the most difficult moments in my life, to be surrounded by all this death, destruction, and harm is more than anyone could possibly bear. A moment that I do not like to remember but cannot forget. After the massacre, I returned to Egypt to begin a treatment journey of psychotherapy. The psychiatrist diagnosed me with post-traumatic stress disorder. Her opinion was that I should be admitted to a psychiatric hospital for two weeks to be monitored and treated for the visual and auditory hallucinations accompanied with hysterical breakdowns, anxiety, and constant insomnia. I turned down the admission but I am still taking medication.

The sit-in was the necessary distance to be traveled between the revolution and the state. It was a euphoric space where the old ended, and the new could be built. Its dispersal represented a break in this process, or perhaps fed it with new ideas. It certainly clarified contradictions in the political alliance for change that carry lessons not only for understanding history, but also in planning the future.

The wounds on our bodies represent another kind of map: they tell a story of who was there, and who survived.

Amar Jamal is a writer, translator, and post-graduate student in anthropology. He is part of the inaugural class of Africa is a Country Fellows.

This article was originally published on Africa is a Country and is republished via Progressive International.

Sudan Becomes Third Arab State to Set Aside Hostilities With Israel This Year

US President Donald Trump sealed the agreement in a phone call with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Sudanese Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok.

Washington: Israel and Sudan agreed on Friday to take steps to normalise relations in a deal brokered with the help of the United States, making Khartoum the third Arab government to set aside hostilities with Israel in the last two months.

US President Donald Trump, seeking re-election on November 3, 2020, sealed the agreement in a phone call with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Sudanese Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok and Transitional Council Head Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, senior US officials said.

Trump’s decision this week to remove Sudan from the US list of state sponsors of terrorism paved the way for the accord with Israel, marking a foreign policy achievement for the Republican president as he seeks a second term trailing in opinion polls behind Democratic rival Joe Biden.

Netanyahu hailed it as a “new era” for the region, but the Palestinian leadership, watching as more of their Arab brethren appear to give their quest for statehood a lower priority, called it a “new stab in the back.”

“The leaders agreed to the normalisation of relations between Sudan and Israel and to end the state of belligerence between their nations,” according to a joint statement issued by the three countries that also promised US help for Khartoum to secure international debt relief.

Israel and Sudan plan to begin by opening economic and trade links, with an initial focus on agriculture, the joint statement said. A senior US official, speaking on condition of anonymity, said such issues as the formal establishment of diplomatic ties would be resolved later.

Trump touted the deal to reporters in the Oval Office with the Israeli and Sudanese leaders on the line in a three-way phone call, saying at least five other countries wanted to follow suit and normalise relations with Israel.

“Do you think ‘Sleepy Joe’ could have made this deal?” Trump asked Netanyahu, using the president’s pejorative nickname for Biden a day after their final, rancorous debate of the 2020 presidential campaign. “Somehow I don’t think so.”

Netanyahu, reliant on bipartisan support for Israel in Washington, responded haltingly: “Well, Mr President, one thing I can tell you, is, um, uh, we appreciate the help for peace from anyone in America.”

Trump’s aides view his pro-Israel policies as appealing to Christian evangelical voters, who are among his biggest supporters.

In recent weeks the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain became the first Arab states in a quarter of a century to agree to formal links with Israel, forged largely through shared fears of Iran.

Trump insisted the Palestinians also “are wanting to do something” but offered no proof. Palestinian leaders have condemned recent Arab overtures to Israel as a betrayal of their nationalist cause and have refused to engage with the Trump administration, seeing it as biased in favour of Israel.

Also read: Breaking Taboo, UAE, Bahrain Sign Formal Agreements With Israel at White House

“No one has the right to speak in the name of the Palestinian people and the name of the Palestinian cause,” Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas said in a statement.

Terrorism list

Trump announced on Monday he would take Sudan off the terrorism list once it had deposited $335 million it had pledged to pay in compensation. Khartoum has since placed the funds in a special escrow account for victims of al Qaeda attacks on U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998.

The White House called Trump’s intention to remove Sudan from the terrorism list a “pivotal turning point” for Khartoum, which is seeking to emerge from decades of isolation.

The military and civilian leaders of Sudan‘s transitional government have been divided over how fast and how far to go in establishing ties with Israel. A sticking point in the negotiations was Sudan‘s insistence that any announcement of Khartoum’s delisting from the terrorism designation not be explicitly linked to relations with Israel.

The Sudanese premier wants approval from a yet-to-be formed parliament to proceed with broader, formal normalisation, and that may not be a quick process given sensitivities and civilian-military differences. It is still unclear when the assembly will be created.

“Agreement on normalisation with Israel will be decided after completion of the constitutional institutions through the formation of the legislative council,” Sudanese Foreign Minister Omar Gamareldin said on state television shortly after Friday’s announcement.

The new agreement was negotiated on the US side by a team that included Trump son-in-law and senior adviser Jared Kushner, who called the normalisation deals the start of a “paradigm shift” in the Middle East.

He said Sudan‘s decision was symbolically significant because it was in Khartoum in 1967 that the Arab League decided not to recognise Israel‘s right to exist.

Sudan‘s designation as a state sponsor of terrorism dates to its toppled ruler Omar al-Bashir and has made it difficult for its transitional government to access urgently needed debt relief and foreign financing.

Many in Sudan say the designation, imposed in 1993 because Washington believed Bashir was supporting militant groups, has become outdated since he was removed last year.

US congressional legislation is needed to shield Khartoum from future legal claims over past attacks to ensure the flow of payments to the embassy bombing victims and their families.

(Reuters)

Sudan: Bashir Trial for 1989 Coup Adjourned in Search of Bigger Venue

Sudanese people chanted slogans outside the court, some in support of Bashir, who has been jailed since he was toppled in April last year following mass protests against his 30-year rule.

Khartoum: Ousted Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir appeared in court on Tuesday at the opening of his trial for leading the military coup that brought him to power in 1989, before the hearing was adjourned to find a bigger venue amid chaotic scenes outside.

Hundreds of lawyers, supporters, family members and journalists jostled outside, complaining to security officials that they were unable to get into the court, a Reuters journalist said.

Sudanese people, ringed by police, also chanted slogans outside the court, some in support of Bashir, who has been jailed since he was toppled in April last year following mass protests against his 30-year rule.

The trial, which includes some of Bashir’s former allies, was adjourned until August 11 when it will be moved to a larger venue.

Bashir could be sentenced to death if convicted, a lawyer and SUNA, the state news agency, said.

State TV footage showed scores of security members inside the packed but otherwise calm courtroom but did not show Bashir himself. Two witnesses who attended the session told Reuters they saw Bashir inside the defendants’ cage in a white prison uniform.

Also read: Bringing Al-Bashir to Justice: The Options Available to the ICC

In December, his lawyer told reporters it was a “political trial par excellence” more than 30 years after the event. Judge Essam Eddin Mohamed Ibrahim promised a fair trial.

Another Sudanese court has already handed down a two-year sentence in December on corruption charges. Bashir also faces trials and investigations over the killing of protesters.

Bashir is also wanted by the International Criminal Court, which issued arrest warrants against him in 2009 and 2010 on charges of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity in Sudan’s restive Darfur region.

Before any statements or evidence could be given, the judge postponed the hearing. “We will end this court session (and adjourn trial proceedings) to take better measures (to have a bigger hall to include all lawyers),” he said.

Sudanese police officers control civilians as they chant slogans outside the court during the new trial against ousted President Omar al-Bashir and some of his former allies on charges of leading a military coup that brought the autocrat to power in 1989 in Khartoum, Sudan on July 21, 2020. Photo:Reuters/Mohamed Nureldin Abdallah

Some lawyers had complained their colleagues had not been able to get into Tuesday’s session. Others asked for more precautionary measures due to the risk from the coronavirus.

Other defendants include former allies of Bashir such as former Vice President Ali Osman Taha and Ali al-Haj, secretary-general of the Islamist Popular Congress Party, judicial officials said.

The judge refused defence lawyers’ requests to release some of the defendants before the resumption of the trial, SUNA said.

A civilian transition government took over from Bashir under a three-year power-sharing deal with the military deal who helped remove Bashir but it has struggled to make fix an economy in crisis.

(Reuters)

Sudan Sentences 29 Intelligence Agents to Death for Teacher’s Killing

Thirteen defendants were sentenced to prison terms and a further four were acquitted in the ruling, which could face several stages of appeal.

Khartoum: A Sudanese court sentenced 29 members of the national intelligence service to death by hanging on Monday over the killing of a teacher in detention in February during protests that led to the overthrow of former president Omar al-Bashir.

The group that spearheaded the protests welcomed the ruling, the first to deliver sentences over crackdowns on demonstrations in the months before and after Bashir was toppled in April.

Prosecuting members of the intelligence services are seen as a test of how far Sudan‘s transitional government will go to erase Bashir’s legacy and challenge the security apparatus.

Also read: 18 Indians Among 23 Killed in Sudan Factory Fire

“This day is a victory for justice, a victory for all Sudanese and a victory for the revolution,” teacher Ahmed al-Khair’s brother Saad told reporters after the verdict.

Thirteen defendants were sentenced to prison terms and a further four were acquitted in the ruling, which could face several stages of appeal.

The judge listed 27 agents from Kassala, the capital of eastern Kassala state, who received death sentences. Another two agents from Khashm al-Qirba, the town in Kassala state where teacher Khair was killed, were also sentenced to death, a lawyer said.

Khair’s death became a rallying point during 16 weeks of protests against Bashir’s rule. His family said security officials initially claimed he had died of poisoning, though days later a state investigation found he had died of injuries from beating.

Hundreds of people rallied outside the court in Omdurman where the verdict was delivered on Monday, some waving national flags or holding pictures of Khair.

Also read: At Least Six Killed As Security Forces Open Fire On Iraq Protesters

They broke into celebration after the ruling. Security forces fired tear gas to try to clear the rally and reopen roads. One woman, who suffered from asthma, died after inhaling tear gas, according to a doctors’ committee linked to the anti-Bashir protests.

The Sudanese Professionals Association (SPA), which spearheaded protests against Bashir, said the trial restored confidence in the judiciary.

“With this ruling, the revolution will have paid off its debt to the martyrs a first time, to be followed as many times as the number of martyrs,” it said.

The SPA is an important member of the Forces of Freedom and Change coalition that struck a three-year power-sharing deal with the military in August.

Dozens of protesters were killed during crackdowns on the protests against Bashir, and dozens died when security forces cleared a sit-in pushing for further change in June.

(Reuters)

Sudan’s Ex-President Bashir Charged With Corruption, Holding Illicit Foreign Currency

Bashir said that he had received $25 million from Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman but that he had not used the money for private purposes.

Khartoum: A Sudanese judge formally indicted former president Omar al-Bashir on charges of possessing illicit foreign currency and corruption on Saturday.

Questioned in court for the first time, Bashir said that he had received $25 million from Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman but that he had not used the money for private purposes.

A lawyer for Bashir said that his client denied the charges against him and that witnesses for the defence would be presented at the next hearing.