When French president Emmanuel Macron dissolved parliament on June 9, 2024, he took the French and European political classes completely by surprise. Even his own advisors were wrong-footed. His decision appeared to be a catastrophic miscalculation: the far-right had done extremely well in the European elections, and most people thought that they would take advantage of this momentum to secure a large number of seats in parliament, possibly an absolute majority.
A month later, as the dust settles on a frenetic electoral cycle, the French political landscape looks like a bomb site. The much-trailed far-right victory never materialised, held off by a massive “republican front”. Instead, voters gave the largest number of seats to a left-wing alliance, closely followed by Macron’s own party and allies.
Nevertheless, the far-right made gains, and this has left the French parliament finely balanced between a left bloc, a centrist bloc, and a far-right bloc. In most European countries, this issue could be managed through coalitions, but the French electoral system is designed to deliver large governing majorities, not fragmented and divided party squabbling. With the standard political reference points thoroughly scrambled, everyone – including the voters – seem dazed and confused.
The question, then, is: did anyone really win the French election?
For the far-right, the answer is probably no. Marine Le Pen and her prime minister-in-waiting had set up their party, the Rassemblement National (RN), for victory. They secured an electoral alliance with part of the centre-right, and the polls had them in first place, winning between 200 and 300 seats. They dreamed of an absolute majority of 289 seats or more, which would have allowed them to implement their populist and anti-immigrant programme. They wanted Macron to be the first leader in modern French history to swear in a far-right prime minister.
But the final result was a disappointment. Parties and voters across France mobilised against the RN. Candidates dropped out after the first round to ensure tactical voting against the far-right, and voters themselves turned out in large numbers to express their concern about the possibility of a far-right government. Across the two rounds, the turnout was the highest for a legislative election since the early 1980s. The end result was that the RN captured 126 seats, a modest increase on the 89 seats they won in 2022.
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Already, the recriminations have begun. Marine Le Pen has gone back to railing against an electoral system that, she believes, is rigged against the RN. This is not entirely untrue: the two-round electoral system was indeed designed to suppress the political extremes. But the reality is that a majority of French people do not want an RN government, and they used the electoral tools at their disposal to stop it from happening. The far-right will gain credibility and cash from their good performance in this election, but they are still a long way from power.
As for Macron and his allies, they have emerged from these elections chastened but not obliterated. With 168 seats, they are the second force in parliament. A coalition with parts of the moderate left or the moderate right might just hold in a fractious parliament, but it is unlikely to last very long.
One thing is clear, however: this is no personal victory for Macron. He remains a profoundly divisive figure, even more so after his shock dissolution, and his MPs were only saved by the fact that many left-wing candidates withdrew to give them the best chance of winning. His centrist bloc is in tatters, and, in the days since the election, there have been rumours that it could collapse altogether with mass defections to other parties.
Macron said he wanted “clarification” from these elections, but he has got the opposite. The parliament is more splintered than any other since the 1950s. This makes sense. Since 2017, Macron has been trying to refashion the French political landscape by breaking the stranglehold of the left and the right. But this has created an ungovernable country and exposed the dysfunctionality of France’s political institutions.
Finally, there is the left. On paper, they are the winners of this electoral cycle. Their hastily concocted alliance – the Nouveau Front Populaire (NFP) – came first with 182 seats. By any measure, this is an impressive result. The left has not won a national election since 2012, not least because a large swathe of its moderate electorate shifted its allegiance to Macron in 2017. The fact that a motley crew of Trotskyists, left radicals, socialists, social-democrats and greens was able to stick together and remain relatively disciplined for the duration of an electoral campaign is worthy of mention.
Moreover, the left has, for the first time, been able to channel a strong French anti-fascist reflex into a more positive platform for change. Left-wing voters were not simply voting against the RN, although this is what scared them the most; they were also voting for a radical social and economic programme.
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Except that, in a political system that works only with absolute majorities, the left is essentially powerless. It will not be able to govern alone, and it will certainly not have a majority to pass its key legislative innovations. And this assumes that the alliance will hold, when, in fact, the parties that make up the NFP have quite different positions on both domestic and geopolitical questions.
There are many possible ways out of this impasse. Macron could dissolve parliament again, but not for at least a year. The left could form a government with the centrist bloc agreeing not to vote it down. The centrist bloc could look to form a “grand coalition” of the kind that has periodically ruled Germany in recent decades. There might even be a radical change in the electoral system.
The problem is that none of these solutions is easy to implement. They all require a fundamental change in the way the French and their representatives do politics. These latest elections confirm that the French have strong views about politics, that they understand what is at stake, and that they do not want the far-right in power (yet). But they do not immediately suggest that the French are ready to think differently about how they are governed.
The challenge going forward will be for France’s political elites to channel a high degree of politicisation into institutions that were designed for a different political universe. Failing that, the next electoral cycle will have even fewer winners than this one.