Klaus Fuchs, Scientist Who Levelled Atomic Playing Field for the Sake of Humanity

A new book tells the compelling story of the German physicist and communist who fled the Nazis in the 1930s and ensured, during the course of his work in Britain and the US, that the Americans would not have a monopoly over the nuclear bomb.

Klaus Fuchs is a forgotten name except among historians of the Cold War and espionage and among those who have a special interest in ”bomb physics’’ which is the shorthand for the science – especially physics and mathematics — that went into the making of the atom and hydrogen bombs.

There was a time, however, in the early 1950s when Klaus Fuchs was headline news. In January 1950, he confessed that he had passed on to the Soviet Union top secret information regarding the making of the bombs. It was only then that people outside a select group of scientists got to know how deeply Fuchs, a top-ranking physicist, had been involved in the making of the bombs in the United States and in Great Britain.

Nancy Thorndike Greenspan, Atomic Spy: The Dark Lives of Klaus Fuchs
Viking, 2020

Nancy Thorndike Greenspan reconstructs the life and career of Fuchs through detailed research and a riveting narrative. She uses the phrase “dark lives’’ in the subtitle but this is by no means a book that lacks in sympathy for Fuchs. She forces her readers to reconsider their idea of what constitutes treason.

Fuchs was born in 1911. His father Emil was a Lutheran priest and Fuchs grew up in Eisenach in Germany. They were a happy family but as Emil recalled in the aftermath of the First World War “political developments cast their shadows over cheerful work and family life.’’ After school, Klaus enrolled in the University of Leipzig to study mathematics and physics where he was taught by none other than Werner Heisenberg.

As a student, Klaus opposed the rising tide of Nazism and this brought him close to the German communist party which was involved in organising the resistance. He moved to Berlin where he went underground and escaped to Paris a few hours before the Gestapo arrived to arrest him. He was 21 years old with no money, no prospect of education and no French. He lived in Paris for two months as a destitute and in September 1933 crossed the Channel to Britain. At immigration he produced a letter that contained an offer to study theoretical physics at the University of Bristol, fees to be paid by his father. He was granted entry for three months and no employment without government permission.

At Bristol, he worked with Nevill Mott, a former student of Max Born, and in 1935 and 1936 published two articles that were recognised as major contributions: the second of these is still cited today as a paper that fundamentally altered the understanding of the electrical conductivity of thin metallic film and served as the foundation for microelectronics. It was becoming clear that Fuchs was emerging as an outstanding scientist. By 1936 he had submitted his dissertation for a PhD degree. With Mott’s encouragement, Fuchs moved to Edinburgh to work with Max Born.

Fuchs’s scientific work with Born was rudely shattered when Britain declared war on Germany. He spent the first years of the war in internment as an enemy alien. Life in the camps, where conditions were rough, strengthened Fuchs’s communist links. Changes in policy regarding enemy aliens saw Fuchs back in Britain in 1941 and on Born’s recommendation he got a job in Birmingham University where he worked with the famous physicist Rudi Peierls, who became a friend and patron. In Britain, Peierls was among the handful of physicists who understood the implications of the experiments Otto Hahn and Lise Meitner that led to the splitting of the uranium atom. Peierls and Otto Frisch (a nephew of Meitner and also working in Birmingham) worked out that splitting the uranium atom and the consequent initiation of a chain reaction contained the potentialities of the atomic bomb that could be used to defeat Hitler.

Also read: Enrico Fermi, the Quiet ‘Pope’ in a Collapsing World

Without revealing details of the work he was doing, Peierls got Fuchs involved in the research on the implications of Hahn and Meitner’s discovery. Within his first week in Birmingham, Fuchs had made fundamental contributions. When the project to make a bomb started first in Britain and then in the US, Fuchs was an obvious choice to be part of the team. It was around this time that Moscow Centre made its first approach to Fuchs through a young woman, Ursula Kuczynski, codenamed Sonya. Fuchs began passing on information to Soviet Russia about the ongoing research on the bomb.
When the making of the bomb gathered momentum under Operation Manhattan in the US, Fuchs was one of the British scientists who became part of the project under Robert Oppenheimer.

Harry Gold. Photo: Wikimedia

His Moscow Centre contact in the US was Harry Gold (codenamed Raymond) and Fuchs was given the codename Rest. Greenspan provides details about Operation Manhattan, especially about daily life in Los Alamos and the explosion of the first atom bomb. Throughout his stay in Los Alamos, Fuchs passed on valuable and critical information to Gold whenever he came out of the camp to shop or to run chores. As a result, when Stalin, Truman and Churchill (to be replaced by Attlee) met at Potsdam the day after the bomb had been tested in Los Alamos. Truman dangled the new weapon before Stalin who was fully briefed about the bomb though he pretended not to know anything.

After the war, Fuchs returned to Britain and given his reputation and his brilliance, he was appointed to the Atomic Energy Research Establishment as the head of its Theoretical Physics Division. Fuchs continued to pass on information to the Russians. By now, the context had radically changed. Nazi Germany was no longer the enemy but for the US and Britain, the Soviet Union was, and a different kind of war – later to be called the Cold War — had been inaugurated. Through defections from the Soviet Union and the breaking of the codes that the Russians had used during World War II, it became clear that there had been a spy among the Los Alamos scientists through whom vital and secret information had gone to Soviet Russia. The MI5 and the FBI began to zero in on a number of suspects and Fuchs was high on the list given his communist past and other circumstantial evidence. Greenspan is superb in her description of how the evidence against Fuchs was accumulated.

Also  Read: The Scars of Nagasaki, 45 Years Later

In 1950, it was decided to confront Fuchs and the task was given to Jim Skardon, who had earned his laurels by interrogating Indian armed revolutionaries who the British labelled “terrorists”, and who was later to interrogate Kim Philby. In his first two meetings with Fuchs, Skardon failed to extract a confession. Fuchs himself asked for a third meeting and offered a full confession. He was arrested, convicted and imprisoned for 14 years. He was allowed to go back to East Germany in 1959 where he lived till his death of lung cancer in January 1987.

Not for one moment did Fuchs regret what he had done. Nor was there any sense of triumph. He had acted according to his moral conscience. He like many other scientists in Los Alamos knew that the atomic bombs had been dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki not to precipitate a Japanese surrender but to intimidate the Soviet Union. From the beginning of his involvement in bomb physics, he did not want the bomb to be the monopoly of one power. This was the only reason he passed on information to the Soviet Union that, till the end of the war, was an ally of the US and Britain but was deliberately kept out of the loop about a crucial development in the fight against Nazi Germany. Dick White, the head of both MI5 and MI6, noted that Fuchs’s motives were “relatively speaking pure. Different from other spies, money was not the goal. He was a scientist who got cross at the Anglo-American ploy in withholding vital information from an ally fighting a common enemy.’’

Fuchs received no payments from the Russians, and, unlike in the case of Philby, his passing on of secrets did not lead to the loss of lives. He may have saved millions of lives. He passed on information to Russia – I refuse to use the word “spied”, after reading Greenspan – for the sake of humanity.

Rudrangshu Mukherjee is Chancellor and Professor of History, Ashoka University

This review was first published in the Business Standard. All views expressed are personal.

Nuclear Goes Retro – With a Much Greener Outlook

Returning to designs abandoned in the 1970s, start-ups are developing a new kind of reactor that promises to be much safer and cleaner than current ones.

Troels Schönfeldt can trace his path to becoming a nuclear energy entrepreneur back to 2009, when he and other young physicists at the Niels Bohr Institute in Copenhagen started getting together for an occasional “beer and nuclear” meetup.

The beer was an India pale ale that they brewed themselves in an old, junk-filled lab space in the institute’s basement. The “nuclear” part was usually a bull session about their options for fighting two of humanity’s biggest problems: global poverty and climate change. “If you want poor countries to become richer,” says Schönfeldt, “you need a cheap and abundant power source.” But if you want to avoid spewing out enough extra carbon dioxide to fry the planet, you need to provide that power without using coal and gas.

It seemed clear to Schönfeldt and the others that the standard alternatives simply wouldn’t be sufficient. Wind and solar power by themselves couldn’t offer nearly enough energy, not with billions of poor people trying to join the global middle class. Yet conventional nuclear reactors — which could meet the need, in principle — were massively expensive, potentially dangerous and anathema to much of the public. And if anyone needed a reminder of why, the catastrophic meltdown at Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi plant came along to provide it in March 2011.

On the other hand, says Schönfeldt, the worldwide nuclear engineering community was beginning to get fired up about unconventional reactor designs — technologies that had been sidelined 40 or 50 years before, but that might have a lot fewer problems than existing reactors. And the beer-and-nuclear group found that one such design, the molten salt reactor, had a simplicity, elegance and, well, weirdness that especially appealed.

Molten salt reactors might just turn nuclear power into the greenest energy source on the planet.

The weird bit was that word “molten,” says Schönfeldt: Every other reactor design in history had used fuel that’s solid, not liquid. This thing was basically a pot of hot nuclear soup. The recipe called for taking a mix of salts — compounds whose molecules are held together electrostatically, the way sodium and chloride ions are in table salt — and heating them up until they melted. This gave you a clear, hot liquid that was about the consistency of water. Then you stirred in a salt such as uranium tetrafluoride, which produced a lovely green tint, and let the uranium undergo nuclear fission right there in the melt — a reaction that would not only keep the salts nice and hot, but could power a city or two besides.

Also read: Why Indian Physicists Are Setting up a Tricky Experiment in an Active Uranium Mine

Weird or not, molten salt technology was viable; the Oak Ridge National Laboratory in Tennessee had successfully operated a demonstration reactor back in the 1960s. And more to the point, the beer-and-nuclear group realised, the liquid nature of the fuel meant that they could potentially build molten salt reactors that were cheap enough for poor countries to buy; compact enough to deliver on a flatbed truck; green enough to burn our existing stockpiles of nuclear waste instead of generating more — and safe enough to put in cities and factories. That’s because Fukushima-style meltdowns would be physically impossible in a mix that’s molten already. Better still, these reactors would be proliferation resistant, because their hot, liquid contents would be very hard for rogue states or terrorists to hijack for making nuclear weapons.

Molten salt reactors might just turn nuclear power into the greenest energy source on the planet.

Crazy? “We had to try,” says Schönfeldt. So in 2014 he and his colleagues launched Seaborg Technologies, a Copenhagen-based start-up named in honour of the late Glenn Seaborg, a Manhattan Project veteran who helped pioneer the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. With Schönfeldt as chief executive officer, they set about turning their vision into an ultracompact molten salt reactor that could serve the developed and developing world alike.

Example of a molten salt reactor scheme. Photo: US Department of Energy Nuclear Energy Research Advisory Committee, CC BY-SA

They weren’t alone: Efforts to revive older nuclear designs had been bubbling up elsewhere, and dozens of start-ups were trying to commercialise them. At least half a dozen of these start-ups were focused on molten salt reactors specifically, since they were arguably the cleanest and safest of the lot. Research funding agencies around the world had begun to pour millions of dollars per year into developing molten salt technology. Even power companies were starting to make investments. A prime example was the Southern Company, a utility conglomerate headquartered in Atlanta, Georgia. In 2016, the company started an ambitious molten salt development program in collaboration with Oak Ridge and TerraPower, a nuclear research company in Bellevue, Washington.

“In the next 20 to 30 years, the energy environment is going to undergo a major transformation to a low- to no-carbon future,” says Nick Irvin, Southern’s director of research and development. There will be far fewer centralised power plants and many more distributed sources like wind and solar, he says. Molten salt reactors fit ideally into this future, he adds, because of both their inherent safety and their ability to consume spent nuclear fuel from traditional nuclear reactors.

Getting there won’t be easy — not least because hot molten salts can be just as corrosive as they sound. Every component that comes into contact with the brew will have to be made of a specialised, high-tech alloy that can resist them. “You dissolve the uranium in the salt,” says Nathan Myhrvold, a venture capitalist who serves as vice chairman of TerraPower’s board. “What you have to make sure is that you don’t dissolve your reactor in it!”

Also read: Link Between Uranium From DRC and Hiroshima: A Story of Twin Tragedies

Certainly, no one expects to have a prototype power plant operating before the mid-2020s, or to field full-scale commercial reactors until the 2030s. Still, says Schönfeldt, “it will be exceedingly hard, but that is significantly better than impossible.”

Rethinking nuclear

To Rachel Slaybaugh, today’s surge of entrepreneurial focus on nuclear technology is astonishing. “It feels like we’re at the beginning of a movement, with an explosion of ideas,” says Slaybaugh, a nuclear engineer at the University of California, Berkeley, who has written about green energy options in the Annual Review of Environment and Resources.

But, as nuclear engineer Leslie Dewan points out, this explosion is also something of a throwback to the post–World War II era. “Nuclear power technology was incredibly new,” says Dewan, who in 2011 cofounded one of the first of the molten salt start-ups, Transatomic Power in Cambridge, Massachusetts. It was a time of blue-sky thinking, she says, “where they were trying many, many different types of technologies, running experiments, building and prototyping.”

Atoms may be the smallest unit of matter, but they are made up of even smaller subunits, including protons, neutrons and electrons. Photo: Halfdan, CC BY-SA

The basics had been known since 1938, when German scientists discovered that firing a neutron into certain heavy atomic nuclei would cause the nucleus to fission, or split into two pieces. The rupture of such a “fissile” nucleus would release an enormous amount of energy, plus at least two new neutrons. These neutrons could then slam into nearby nuclei and trigger the release of more energy, plus 4 neutrons — then 8, 16, 32 and so on in an exponentially growing chain reaction.

This runaway energy release could produce a very powerful bomb, as the wartime Manhattan Project demonstrated. But taming it, and turning the chain reaction into a safe, steady-state heat source for power production, was a lot trickier.

Fission is what produces nuclear energy when a neutron strikes an unstable atomic nucleus and splits it into “fission products” of lighter nuclei. According to Einstein’s mass–energy equivalence formula, the process transforms a tiny bit of the original nucleus’s mass into energy . Photo: Fastfission in Illustrator, CC BY-SA

That’s where all the postwar experimentation came in. There were reactors fueled by uranium, which comes out of the ground containing virtually the only fissile isotope found in nature, uranium-235. There were reactors known as breeders, which could accomplish the magical-sounding feat of producing more fuel than they consumed. (Actually, they relied on the fact that uranium is “fertile,” meaning that its most abundant isotope, uranium-238, almost never undergoes fission by itself — but it can absorb a neutron and turn into highly fissile plutonium-239.) And there were reactors fueled with thorium, a fertile element that sits two slots to the left of uranium in the periodic table, and is about three times more abundant in the Earth’s crust. A neutron will turn its dominant isotope, thorium-232, into fissile uranium-233.

The three naturally-occurring isotopes of hydrogen. They are all variants of hydrogen as each isotope has one proton. The identity of the isotope is given by the number of neutrons. Photo: Dirk Hünnige, CC BY-SA

At the same time, designers were trying out different types of coolant: the fluid that circulates through the reactor core, absorbs the heat being produced by the fission reactions, and carries it out to where the heat can do something useful like running a standard steam turbine to generate electricity. Some opted for ordinary water: an abundant, familiar substance that carries a lot of heat per unit of volume. But others went with high-temperature substances such as liquid sodium metal, helium gas or even molten lead. “Coolants” like these could keep a reactor running at 700 degrees Celsius or more, which would make it substantially more efficient at generating power.

By the 1960s, researchers had tested reactors featuring combinations of all these options and more. But the approach that won out for commercial power production — and that is still used in virtually all of the 454 nuclear plants operating around the world — was the water-cooled uranium reactor. This wasn’t necessarily the best nuclear design, but it was one of the first: Water-cooled reactors were originally developed in the 1940s to power submarines. So in the 1950s, when the Eisenhower administration launched a high-profile push to harness nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, the technology was adapted for civilian use and scaled up enormously. Other designs were left for later, if ever. By the 1960s and 1970s, second-generation water-cooled reactors were being deployed globally.

Even then, however, there were many in the field who were uneasy with that choice. Among the most notable was nuclear physicist Alvin Weinberg, a Manhattan Project veteran and director of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory. Weinberg had participated in the development of water-cooled reactors, and knew that they had some key vulnerabilities — including water’s low boiling point, just 100°C at normal atmospheric pressure.

Commercial nuclear plants could get that up to 325°C or so by pressurising the reactor vessel. But as Weinberg and others knew very well, that was not enough to rule out the nightmare of nightmares: a meltdown. All it would take was some freak accident that interrupted the flow of water through the core and trapped all the heat inside. You could shut down power production by dropping rods of boron or cadmium into the reactor core to soak up neutrons and stop the chain reaction. But nothing could stop the heat produced by the decay of fission products — the melange of short-lived but fiercely radioactive elements that inevitably build up inside an active reactor as nuclei split in two.

When the nuclei of uranium-235 atom are struck by a neutron, they release a large amount of binding energy and at least two additional neutrons, which can then go on to split two more nuclei. The result is an exponentially growing chain reaction, which can produce a nuclear explosion if it’s allowed to run away — or used for nuclear power if it’s contained and controlled inside a reactor. Photo: Fastfission, CC BY-SA

Unless the operators managed to restore the coolant flow within a few hours, that trapped fission-product heat would send temperatures soaring past the 325°C mark, turn the water into high-pressure steam, and reduce the solid fuel to a radioactive puddle melting its way through the reactor vessel floor. Soon after, the vessel would likely rupture and send a pressurised plume of fission products into the atmosphere. Included would be radioactive strontium-90, iodine-131 and caesium-137 — extremely dangerous isotopes that can easily enter the food chain and end up in the body.

To forestall such a catastrophe, designers had equipped the commercial water-cooled reactors with all manner of redundancies and emergency backup cooling systems. But to Weinberg’s mind, that was a bit like installing fire alarms and sprinkler systems in a house built of papier-mâché. What you really wanted was the nuclear equivalent of a house built of fireproof brick — a reactor that based its safety on the laws of physics, with no need for operators or backup systems to do anything.

Weinberg and his team at Oak Ridge believed that they could come very close to that ideal with the molten salt reactor, which they had been working on since 1954. Such a reactor couldn’t possibly suffer a meltdown, even in an accident: The molten salt core was liquid already. The fission-product heat would simply cause the salt mix to expand and move the fuel nuclei farther apart, which would dampen the chain reaction.

Pressure would be a non-issue as well: The salts would have a boiling point far higher than any temperature the fission products could produce. (One common choice for nuclear applications is FLiBe, a mix of lithium fluorides and beryllium fluorides that doesn’t boil until 1,400°C, about the temperature of a butane blowtorch.) So the reactor vessel would never be in danger of rupture from molten salt “steam.” In fact, the reactor would barely shift from its normal operating pressure of one atmosphere.

Also read: Spotted: New Clue to Uncover Why Universe Is Made of Matter, Not Antimatter

Better still, the molten core would trap fission products far more securely than in solid-fueled reactors. Caesium, iodine and all the rest would chemically bind with the salts the instant they were created. And since the salts could not boil away in even the worst accident, these fission products would be held in place instead of being free to drift off and take up radioactive residence in people’s bones and thyroid glands.

And just in case, the liquid nature of the fuel allowed for a simple fail-safe known as a freeze plug. This involved connecting the bottom of the reactor vessel to a drain pipe, which would be plugged with a lump of solid fuel salt kept frozen by a jet of cool gas. If the power failed and the gas flow stopped, or if the reactor got too hot, the plug would melt and gravity would drain the contents into an underground holding tank. The mix would then cool, solidify and remain in the tank until the crisis was over — salts, fuel, fission products and all.

Molten salt success, then a detour

Weinberg and his team successfully demonstrated all this in the Molten Salt Reactor Experiment, an 8-megawatt prototype that ran at Oak Ridge from 1965 to 1969. The corrosiveness of the salts was a potential threat to the long-term integrity of pipes, pumps and other parts, but the researchers had identified a number of corrosion-resistant materials they thought might solve the problem. By the early 1970s, the group was well into development of an even more ambitious prototype that would allow them to test those materials as well as to demonstrate the use of thorium fuel salts instead of uranium.

The Oak Ridge physicists were also eager to try out a new system for dealing with the waste fission products — one that again took advantage of the fuel’s liquid nature, but had been tested only in the laboratory. The idea was to siphon off a little of the reactor’s fuel mix each day and run it through a nearby purification system, which would chemically extract the fission products in much the same way that the kidneys remove toxins from the bloodstream. The cleaned-up fuel would then be circulated back into the reactor, which could continue running at full power the whole time. This process would not only keep the fission products from building up until they snuffed out the chain reaction — a problem for any reactor, since these elements tend to absorb a lot of neutrons — but it would also enhance the safety of molten salt still further. Not even the worst accident can contaminate the countryside with fission products that aren’t there.

But none of it was to be. Officials in the US nuclear program terminated the Oak Ridge molten salt program in January 1973 — and fired Weinberg.

The nuclear engineering community was just too heavily committed to solid fuels, both financially and intellectually. Practitioners already had decades of experience with experimental and commercial solid-fuelled reactors, versus that one molten salt experiment at Oak Ridge. A huge infrastructure existed for processing and producing solid fuel. And, not incidentally, the US research program was committed to a grand vision for the global nuclear future that would expand this infrastructure enormously – and that, viewed with 20-20 hindsight, would lead the nuclear industry into a trap.

Key to that vision was a different way of dealing with the buildup of fission products. Since Oak Ridge–style continuous purification wasn’t an option in a solid-fuel reactor, water-cooled or otherwise, standard procedure called for burning fuel until the fission products rendered it useless, or spent. In water-cooled power reactors this took roughly three years, at which point the spent fuel would be switched out for fresh, then stored at the bottom of a pool of water for a few years while the worst of its fission-product radioactivity decayed.

Alpha radiation consists of helium nuclei and is readily stopped by a sheet of paper. Beta radiation, consisting of electrons or positrons, is stopped by thin aluminium plate, but gamma radiation requires shielding by dense material such as lead, or concrete. Photo: Stannered, CC BY-SA

From there, the plan was to recycle it. Counting the remaining uranium, plus the plutonium that had formed from neutrons hitting uranium-238 nuclei, the fuel still contained most of the potential fission energy it had started with. So there was to be a new, global network of reprocessing plants that would chemically extract the fission products for disposal, and turn the uranium and plutonium into fresh fuel. That network, in turn, would ultimately support a new generation of sodium-cooled breeder reactors that would produce plutonium by the ton – thus solving what was then thought to be an acute shortage of the uranium needed to power the all-nuclear global economy of the future.

But that plan started to look considerably less visionary in May 1974, when India tested a nuclear bomb made with plutonium extracted from the spent fuel of a conventional reactor. Governments around the world suddenly realised that global reprocessing would be an invitation to rampant nuclear weapons proliferation: In plants handling large quantities of pure plutonium, it would be entirely too easy for bad actors to secretly divert a few kilograms at a time for bombs. So in April 1977, US President Jimmy Carter banned commercial reprocessing in the United States, and much of the rest of the world followed.

That helped cement the already declining interest in breeder reactors, which made no sense without reprocessing plants to extract the new-made plutonium, and left the world with a nasty disposal problem. Instead of storing spent fuel underwater for a few years, engineers were now supposed to isolate it for something like 240,000 years, thanks to the 24,100-year half-life of plutonium-239. (The rule of thumb for safety is to wait 10 half-lives, which reduces radiation levels more than a thousand-fold.) No one has yet figured out how to guarantee isolation for that span of time. Today, there are nearly 300,000 tons of spent nuclear fuel still piling up at reactors around the world, part of an as yet unresolved long-term storage problem.

In retrospect, those 1970s-era nuclear planners would have done well to put serious money back into Oak Ridge’s molten salt program: As developers there tried to point out at the time, the continuous purification approach could have solved both the spent-fuel and proliferation problems at a stroke.

The proliferation risk would be minimal because — unlike the kind of reprocessing plants envisioned for the breeder program — the Oak Ridge system would never isolate uranium-235, plutonium-239 or any other fissile material. Instead, these isotopes would stay in the cleaned-up fuel salts at concentrations far too low to make a bomb. They would be circulated back into the reactor, where they could continue fissioning until they were completely consumed.

The reactor’s purification system would likewise offer a solution to the spent fuel issue. It would strip out the reaction-quenching fission products from the fuel almost as quickly as they formed, which would potentially allow the reactor to run for decades at a stretch with only an occasional injection of fresh fuel to replace what it burned. Some of that fuel could even come from today’s 300,000-ton backlog of spent solid fuel.

Also read: How African Researchers are Adding to Deeper Knowledge About Neutrons

Admittedly, it would take centuries for even a large network of molten salt reactors to work through the full backlog. But burning it would eliminate the need to safely store it for thousands of centuries. By consuming the long-lived isotopes like plutonium-239, molten salt reactors could reduce the nuclear waste stream to a comparatively small volume of fission products having half-lives of 30 years or less. By the 10 half-life rule, this waste would then need to be isolated for just 300 years. That’s not trivial, says Schönfeldt, “but it’s something that can be handled” — say, by encasing the waste in concrete and steel, or putting it down a deep borehole.

Unfortunately, the late 1970s was not a good time for reviving any kind of nuclear program, molten salt or otherwise. Public mistrust of nuclear energy was escalating rapidly, thanks to rising concerns over safety, waste and weapons proliferation. The power companies’ patience was wearing thin, thanks to the skyrocketing, multibillion-dollar cost of standard water-cooled reactors. And then in March 1979 came a partial meltdown at Three Mile Island, a conventional nuclear plant near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. In April 1986, another catastrophe hit with the fire and meltdown at the Chernobyl plant in Ukraine.

The resulting backlash against nuclear power was so strong that new plant construction effectively ceased — which is why most of the nuclear reactors operating today are at least three to four decades old. And nuclear power research stagnated, as well, with most of the money and effort going into ensuring the safety of those aging plants.

“The nuclear industry was not in an innovation frame of mind for 30 years,” says TerraPower’s Myhrvold.

Old tech revival

This defensive crouch lasted well into the new century, while the molten salt concept fell further and further into obscurity. That began to change only in 2000, when Kirk Sorensen came across a book describing what the molten salt program had accomplished at Oak Ridge.

“Why didn’t we do it this way in the first place?” he remembers wondering.

Sorensen, then a NASA engineer in Huntsville, Alabama, was so intrigued that he tracked down the old Oak Ridge technical reports, which were moldering in file cabinets, and talked NASA into paying to have them scanned. The files filled up five compact discs, which he copied and sent around to leaders in the US energy industry. “I received no response,” he says. So in 2006, in hopes of reaching somebody who would find the concept as compelling as he did, he uploaded the documents to energyfromthorium.com, a website he’d created with his own money.

That strategy worked — slowly. “I would give Kirk Sorensen personal credit,” says Lou Qualls, a nuclear engineer at Oak Ridge who became the Department of Energy’s first national technical director for molten salt reactors in 2017. “So Kirk is one of those voices out in the wilderness, and for a long time people would go, ‘We don’t even know what you’re talking about.’” But once the old reports became available online, “people started to look at the technology, to understand it, see that it had a history,” Qualls says. “It started getting more credibility.”

It helped that rising concerns about climate change — and the ever-growing backlog of spent nuclear fuel — had put many nuclear engineers in the mood for a radical rethink of their field. They could see that incremental improvements in standard reactor technology weren’t getting anywhere. Manufacturers had been hyping their “Generation III” designs for water-cooled reactors with enhanced safety features, but these were proving to be just as slow and expensive to build as their second-generation predecessors from the 1970s.

So instead, there was a move to revive the old reactor concepts and update them into a whole new series of Generation IV reactors: devices that would be considerably smaller and cheaper than their 1,000-megawatt, multibillion-dollar predecessors, with safety and proliferation resistance built in from the start. Among the most prominent symbols of this movement was TerraPower. Launched in 2008 with major funding from Microsoft cofounder Bill Gates, the company immediately started development of a liquid sodium-cooled device called the Traveling Wave Reactor.

The molten salt idea was definitely on the Gen IV list. Schönfeldt remembers getting excited about it as early as 2008. At MIT, Dewan and her fellow graduate student Mark Massie first encountered the idea in 2010, and were intrigued by the reactors’ inherent safety. “We both became nuclear engineers because we’re environmentalists,” says Dewan. Besides, her classmate had grown up watching his native West Virginia being devastated by mountaintop removal mining. “So Mark wanted to design a nuclear reactor that’s good enough to shut down the coal industry.”

Also read: Lise Meitner – the Forgotten Woman of Nuclear Physics Who Deserved a Nobel Prize

Then in March 2011, the dangers of the nuclear status quo were underscored yet again. A tsunami knocked out all the cooling systems and backups at Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi plant and sent its 1970s-vintage power reactors into the worst meltdown since Chernobyl. That April, Sorensen launched the first of the molten salt start-up companies, Huntsville-based Flibe Energy. His goal ever since has been to develop and commercialise a Liquid-Fluoride Thorium Reactor — pretty much the same device that was envisioned at Oak Ridge back in the 1960s.

Dewan and Massie founded Transatomic the same month. And other molten salt start-ups soon followed, each building on the basic concept with a host of different design strategies and fuel choices. When Seaborg launched in 2014, for example, Schönfeldt and his colleagues started designing a molten salt Compact Used fuel BurnEr (called CUBE) that would not only run on a combination of spent nuclear fuel and thorium, but also be really, really small by reactor standards. “The fact that you can transport it to the site on the back of a truck is a major upside,” says Schönfeldt, “especially in remote regions.”

TerraPower, meanwhile, decided in 2015 to develop a much larger molten salt device, the Molten Chloride Fast Reactor, as a complement to the company’s ongoing work on its sodium-cooled Traveling Wave Reactor. The new system retains the latter’s ability to burn the widest possible range of fuels — including not just spent nuclear fuel, but also the ordinarily non-fissile uranium-238. (Both designs take advantage of the fact that a uranium-238 nucleus hit by a neutron has a tiny, but non-zero, probability of fissioning.) But unlike in the Traveling Wave Reactor, explains the company’s chief technical officer, John Gilleland, the molten salts’ 700°C-plus operating temperature will allow it to generate the kind of heat needed for industrial processes such as petroleum cracking and plastics making. Industrial process heat currently accounts for about one-third of total energy usage within the US manufacturing sector.

This industrial heat is now produced almost entirely by burning coal, oil or natural gas, says Gilleland. So if you could replace all that with carbon-free nuclear heat, he says, “you could hit the carbon problem in a very striking way.”

Of course, none of this is going to happen tomorrow. The various molten salt companies are still refining their designs by gathering lab data on liquid fuel chemistry, and running massive computer simulations of how the melt behaves when it’s simultaneously flowing and fissioning. The first prototypes won’t be up and running until the mid-2020s at the earliest.

And not all the companies will be there. Transatomic became the molten salt movement’s first casualty in September 2018, when Dewan shut it down. Her company had simply fallen too far behind in its design work relative to competitors, she explains. So even though investors were willing to keep going, she says, “it wouldn’t feel right for us to continue taking their money when I didn’t see a viable path forward for the business side.”

Still, most of the molten salt pioneers say they see reason for cautious optimism. Since at least 2015, the US Department of Energy has been ramping up its support for advanced reactor research in general, and molten salt reactors in particular.

Meanwhile, notes Slaybaugh, licensing agencies such as the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission are gearing up with the computer simulations and evaluation tools they will need when the advanced-reactor companies start seeking approval for constructing their prototypes. “People are looking at these technologies more carefully and more seriously than they have in a long time,” she says.

Perhaps the biggest and most unpredictable barrier is the public’s ingrained fear about almost anything labeled “nuclear.” What happens if people lump in molten salt reactors with older nuclear technologies, and reject them out of hand?

Based on their experience to date, most proponents are cautiously optimistic on this front as well. In Copenhagen, Schönfeldt and his colleagues kept hammering on the why of nuclear power, which was to fight climate change, poverty and pollution. “And we kept telling people the three big advantages of molten salt reactors — no meltdown, no proliferation, burning up nuclear waste,” he says. And slowly, people were willing to listen.

“We’ve moved a long way,” says Schönfeldt. “When we started in 2014, commercial nuclear power was illegal in Denmark. In 2017, we got public funding.”

This article originally appeared in Knowable Magazine, an independent journalistic endeavour from Annual Reviews. Sign up for the newsletter.

Richard Feynman Was Wrong About Beauty and Truth in Science

There is absolutely no reason to think that simplicity and beauty are reliable guides to physical reality.

The American physicist Richard Feynman is often quoted saying: ‘You can recognise truth by its beauty and simplicity.’ The phrase appears in the work of the American science writer K.C. Cole – in her Sympathetic Vibrations: Reflections on Physics as a Way of Life (1985) – although I could not find other records of Feynman writing or saying it. We do know, however, that Feynman had great respect for the English physicist Paul Dirac, who believed that theories in physics should be both simple and beautiful.

Feynman was unquestionably one of the outstanding physicists of the twentieth century. To his contributions to the Manhattan Project and the solution of the mystery surrounding the explosion of the Space Shuttle Challenger in 1986, add a Nobel Prize in 1965 shared with Julian Schwinger and Shin’ichirō Tomonaga ‘for their fundamental work in quantum electrodynamics, with deep-ploughing consequences for the physics of elementary particles’. And he played the bongos too!

Also read: An Earth Unbound: Why Do We Struggle so to Understand Our Planet?

In the area of philosophy of science, though, like many physicists of his and the subsequent generation (and unlike those belonging to the previous one, including Albert Einstein and Niels Bohr), Feynman didn’t really shine – to put it mildly. He might have said that philosophy of science is as helpful to science as ornithology is to birds (a lot of quotations attributed to him are next to impossible to source). This has prompted countless responses from philosophers of science, including that birds are too stupid to do ornithology, or that without ornithology, many bird species would be extinct.

Richard Feynman. Photo: Wikimedia Commons/Copyright Tamiko Thiel 1984 – OTRS communication CC BY-SA 3.0,

The problem is that it’s difficult to defend the notion that the truth is recognisable by its beauty and simplicity, and it’s an idea that has contributed to getting fundamental physics into its current mess; for more on the latter topic, check out The Trouble with Physics (2006) by Lee Smolin, Farewell to Reality (2013) by Jim Baggott, or subscribe to Peter Woit’s blog.

To be clear, when discussing the simplicity and beauty of theories, we are not talking about Ockham’s razor, explained by my colleague Elliott Sober for Aeon. Ockham’s razor is a prudent heuristic, providing us with an intuitive guide to the comparisons of different hypotheses. Other things being equal, we should prefer simpler ones. More specifically, the English monk William of Ockham (1287-1347) meant that ‘[hypothetical] entities are not to be multiplied without necessity’ (a phrase by the 17th-century Irish Franciscan philosopher John Punch). Thus, Ockham’s razor is an epistemological, not a metaphysical principle. It’s about how we know things, whereas Feynman’s and Dirac’s statements seem to be about the fundamental nature of reality.

Also read:Discovering Bankimchandra Chattopadhyay as a Popular Science Writer

But as the German theoretical physicist Sabine Hossenfelder has pointed out, in Aeon, there is absolutely no reason to think that simplicity and beauty are reliable guides to physical reality. She is right for several reasons.

To begin with, the history of physics, seldom studied by physicists, clearly shows that many simple theories have had to be abandoned in favour of more complex and ‘ugly’ ones. The notion that the Universe is in a steady state is simpler than one requiring an ongoing expansion, yet scientists do now think that the Universe has been expanding for almost 14 billion years.

In the 17th century, Johannes Kepler realised that Copernicus’ theory was too beautiful to be true, since, as it turns out, planets don’t go around the Sun in perfect (according to human aesthetics!) circles, but rather following somewhat uglier ellipses.

Beauty is in the eye of the beholder

And of course, beauty is, notoriously, in the eye of the beholder. What struck Feynman as beautiful might not be beautiful to other physicists or mathematicians. Beauty is a human value, not something out there in the cosmos. Biologists here know better. The capacity for aesthetic appreciation in our species is the result of a process of biological evolution, possibly involving natural selection. And there is absolutely no reason to think that we evolved an aesthetic sense that somehow happens to be tailored for the discovery of the ultimate theory of everything.

Also read: Sex Isn’t Binary, and We Should Stop Acting Like It Is

The moral of the story is that physicists should leave the philosophy of science to the pros, and stick to what they know best. Better yet: this is an area where fruitful interdisciplinary dialogue is not just a possibility, but arguably a necessity. As Einstein wrote in a letter to his fellow physicist Robert Thornton in 1944:

I fully agree with you about the significance and educational value of methodology as well as history and philosophy of science. So many people today – and even professional scientists – seem to me like someone who has seen thousands of trees but has never seen a forest. A knowledge of the historic and philosophical background gives that kind of independence from prejudices of his generation from which most scientists are suffering. This independence created by philosophical insight is – in my opinion – the mark of distinction between a mere artisan or specialist and a real seeker after truth.

Ironically, it was Plato – a philosopher – who argued that beauty is a guide to the truth (and goodness), apparently never having met an untruthful member of the opposite (or same, as the case might be) sex. He wrote about that in the Symposium, the dialogue featuring, among other things, sex education from Socrates. But philosophy has made much progress since Plato, and so has science.

It is, therefore, a good idea for scientists and philosophers alike to check with each other before uttering notions that might be hard to defend, especially when it comes to figures who are influential with the public. To quote another philosopher, Ludwig Wittgenstein, in a different context: ‘Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent.’Aeon counter – do not remove

Massimo Pigliucci is a professor of philosophy at City College and the Graduate Center of the City University of New York.

This article was originally published at Aeon and has been republished under Creative Commons.

‘When Do We Become Scared?’

The stories of two physicists, and how they regarded the use of nuclear weapons to protect their loved ones, have something to offer our era of trigger-happy presidents and isolated dictators.

On December 2, 75 years ago, a team of 15 people created the world’s first human-made self-sustaining nuclear chain reaction under the stands of an old football stadium at the University of Chicago. The experiment was part of the Manhattan Project, the US’s effort to build a nuclear weapon during World War II. It was led by an Italian émigré named Enrico Fermi, widely acknowledged to be the ‘architect of the nuclear age’.

Many reports marking the 75th anniversary of that significant achievement have extolled Fermi. He comes first to mind when thinking of the Chicago Pile I, the name of the nuclear reactor in which his – and his team’s – feat was achieved. Four years after doing so, in fact, all of the people responsible for the experiment’s success gathered at the University of Chicago for a reunion, and a subsequently famous photograph was shot. Fermi is seen standing front row, left, his face calm.

The Chicago Pile I team. Credit: Los Alamos National Laboratory/Wikimedia Commons

The Chicago Pile I team. Credit: Los Alamos National Laboratory/Wikimedia Commons

This calmness is troubling because the nuclear weapons industry needs to be peopled with conscientious scientists and engineers who are aware of what they’re doing. Going by Gino Segrè’s and Bettina Hoerlin’s recent biography, The Pope of Physics, Fermi does not appear to have been so. Excerpt: ““At some level, he was able to treat the bomb blast as just another physics experiment”, the book reads. In another instance, a single line writes off any discomfiture that may have arisen after Fermi witnessed the Trinity test: “… while he was seemingly infallible, he was also human.” In a third, it quotes [Leo] Szilard: “The struggles of our time did not affect Fermi very much, and he is no fighter”, as if to excuse Fermi from judgment.”

After the Chicago Pile I reactor went critical, i.e. a chain of nuclear fission reactions was kicked off inside it, one member of his group present there is said to have asked Fermi, “When do we become scared?”

The person who asked the question was Leona Woods, the sole woman in Fermi’s group that worked on Chicago Pile I. You can see her in the photograph above, with a gentle smile in the midst of a sea of suits. Her question meant that someone present understood what they had just done.

At the time of her participation in Fermi’s experiment, she was only 23 years old. She had received her PhD under Robert Mulliken and had subsequently been recruited into Fermi’s group for her skill with vacuum technology, to measure neutron fluxes (neutrons were the particles used to instigate nuclear fission).

Mulliken hadn’t been her first choice, however. She had approached the Nobel laureate James Franck, also a scientist with the Manhattan Project, before that and asked to be his graduate student. While Franck agreed, he had told her, “You are a woman, and you will starve to death.”

A year after Fermi’s experiment, Woods married another physicist, John Marshall, and became pregnant with their son. She was the only female scientist at the Manhattan Project, and she had felt it necessary to hide her pregnancy from her colleagues there. She would dress in baggy clothes to conceal the changes in her body; she would come earlier than others to work so she could deal with her morning sickness without anyone else noticing. After her son was born, she didn’t have maternity leave, returning to her work in a few days.

The bombs were used on August 6 and 9, 1945, killing about 150,000 people and prompting the Imperial Japanese army to surrender within a week. The weapons had achieved their stated outcome – to spare US forces from mounting what had been anticipated to be a long-drawn, bloody and expensive invasion of the Japanese mainland.

While there is little to know about Fermi’s reaction in this regard, Woods had become more pragmatic. Three years earlier, she had asked, “When do we become scared?” After the bombs ended the war, she said, “I think we did right, and we couldn’t have done it differently. It was a frightening time.” According to APS Physics, her answer had been prompted by “her brother [having] been a marine on Okinawa, and her brother-in-law … a captain of a minesweeper during the war”.

Fermi, like Woods, had also been scared. He had to flee Rome in 1938 because Benito Mussolini’s fascist regime had just released the Manifesto of Race, a charter that stripped Jews of their civilian rights in Italy. His wife Laura was Jewish. So perhaps some of Fermi’s calmness was simply the face of a man giving his all to build a weapon that would vanquish the people who had forced him and his wife to leave their home and country.

Then again, both these people had secured the safety of their loved ones at a great price: their empathy. In their eagerness to end the war without further bloodshed on their shores, they had precipitated the killing of hundreds of thousands of people on a faraway island, seeding many generations with hereditary diseases and the horrific memory of what a weaponised force of nature looks like.

There is a similar lack of empathy prevailing at the moment between the trigger-happy US President Donald Trump and North Korea’s leadership. After World War II ended, the US (and the Soviet Union) spent a better part of the Cold War amassing a stockpile of nuclear warheads because, in their logic of things, more warheads meant more security. As Alex Wellerstein, a historian of science, has said, let’s not be surprised when “a weak, vulnerable country buys into that logic”. Further, the remorse that Fermi and Woods lacked are also on display, but worse. According to Wellerstein,

Be wary of anyone who tells you North Koreans are ‘crazy.’ ‘Crazy’ is the 21st century way to dehumanise your enemies, to make it easier to say, ‘They can’t be dealt with like rational human beings.’ The DPRK leadership are dictators with no regard for their people or human rights. That, unfortunately, is not because they are crazy (and hardly makes them even unique). When it comes to nukes, they are acting like textbook ‘rational actors.’ …

It is difficult to do so, but try to put yourself in the [DPRK leadership’s] position. They [control] a small, poor, weak, isolated country. They have one half-friend (China) who benefits from their being a point of attention for the rest of the region. They are otherwise surrounded by enemies. … If you back them into a corner, they might do ‘crazy’ things. If they feel all is lost, they might do ‘crazy’ things. If they feel there is no hope, watch out. The same as we might, the same as most proud people might.

So, when do we become scared?

Review: Enrico Fermi, the Quiet ‘Pope’ in a Collapsing World

The Pope of Physics, by Bettina Hoerlin and Gino Segrè, is an informative biography of Fermi that also manages to deepen the sense of quiet mystery surrounding the legendary physicist.

The Pope of Physics, by Bettina Hoerlin and Gino Segrè, is an informative biography of Fermi that also manages to deepen the sense of quiet mystery surrounding the legendary physicist

Enrico Fermi. Credit: Enrico Fermi Collection, Atomic Heritage Foundation

Enrico Fermi. Credit: Enrico Fermi Collection, Atomic Heritage Foundation

Most books that are good are also useful as a result, and vice versa. Sadly, The Pope of Physics – a biography of the Italian-American physicist Enrico Fermi that is written in a style as flat and dry as the Mojave – is an exception. Its goodness is difficult to find but its usefulness is immediately apparent. No other biography of Fermi is as authoritative as this one, although with regard only to his early years. The book is filled with anecdotes from that period that help understand his famously clinical nature.

Fermi made lasting contributions to quantum mechanics, nuclear physics, cosmology and chemistry. It is impossible to walk a few paces down these roads without stumbling upon a marker saying, “Fermi was here”. Growing up in Italy, he was a bright student of physics learning under an old guard dismissive of the new-fangled quantum theories. He was also a philosopher of science racing against his contemporaries in Germany, the Netherlands and England to extend the ideas of Max Planck to explain nature’s fundamental constituents. A key figure in his early years was Orso Corbino, a physicist and statesman who ensured Fermi received all the important university admissions and appointments, who kept things moving for Fermi despite the political upheavals then rocking Italy.

The authors, Bettina Hoerlin and her husband Gino Segrè, nephew of Fermi’s student Emilio Segrè, are to be thanked for deftly fleshing out a young Fermi through the pages of history. Born in 1901, he lost his brother at a young age, was an apprentice in a farm for some time, married a Jewish girl, drove a car reputed for breaking down and became known as the future of Italian physics. As a physicist, he was famous for his ability to make quick sense of problems and simplify calculations to their essence in a jiffy. His students playfully claimed Fermi had “an inside track to god”. At the Via Panisperna, where the physics department of La Sapienza – the University of Rome – was located, he was nicknamed Il Papa, The Pope. Corbino was Padreterno, the Almighty himself.

The regime marches closer

It was also at the Via Panisperna in 1934 that Fermi and his colleagues discovered the potential of neutrons – slowed down to a particular speed – to cause nuclear activation, a precursor to the atomic bomb as well as the nuclear power plant. The first time their experiment was conducted, the setup led Fermi into confusing fission products for transuranic elements. This was a stroke of luck because it prevented the technology from falling into the hands of the fascist Benito Mussolini and his Nazi ally across the border. But as the political climate worsened, Fermi, his family and most of his colleagues were forced to emigrate from Italy. Mussolini would enact the Leggi razziali in 1938, legalising racial discrimination against the country’s Jews (of whom the physicist’s wife Laura was one).

Unsure of how he would make his ‘escape’, Fermi was helped by Niels Bohr, who told him that he was going to win the Nobel Prize for physics that year. So on December 6, 1938, Fermi flew to Stockholm with his family to collect the prize, from there flew to New York on January 2 and used the prize money to settle down. And it is after this point that The Pope of Physics loses its sheen. Fermi’s life in the US has been much better documented than his life before and that is what keeps the book interesting for as long as it does. In fact, the most significant of his contributions in the US are synonymous with the dawn of the Atomic Age, and books about the dawn of the Atomic Age have been abundant given the moment’s political consequences.

Gino Segrè and Bettina HoerlinThe Pope of Physics: Enrico Fermi and the Birth of the Atomic AgeHenry Holt, 2016

Gino Segrè and Bettina Hoerlin
The Pope of Physics: Enrico Fermi and the Birth of the Atomic Age
Henry Holt, 2016

At the same time, it is interesting to consider Fermi’s political affiliations. The man was known for being closed off and that further contributed to his reputation of being a clinical and forthright theorist. The Pope of Physics quotes Nella, his daughter, as saying, “It wasn’t that he lacked emotions, but that he lacked the ability to express them.” But then, there are those moments that make one wonder if there ever was any turmoil behind that pokerfaced visage.

For example: Hoerlin and Segrè write about how Fermi, though aware of Mussolini’s actions while being shielded from them by Corbino, accepted an opportunity to join the Royal Academy (set up to rival the Accademia dei Lincei) while in Italy – at the request of Mussolini – and had his salary doubled, joined the Fascist Party and turned down an apprentice because of the latter’s manifest antifascist sentiments. In the mid 1930s, he laboured with the motif “physics as soma”, ‘soma’ being a stress-relieving substance that plays a major role in the society of Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World (1932), as a way to sidestep the theatre of Italian politics.

He only noticed how dark the clouds over the horizon had become when Hans Bethe, Felix Bloch, Rudolf Peierls, Georges Placzek and Edward Teller had stopped visiting Via Panisperna because they were “searching for safe havens in the United States and the United Kingdom”, when Italy’s invasion of Ethiopia and participation in the Spanish Civil War made the atmosphere at home more polarised and, finally, when the Boys – what the physicists at Via Panisperna were called – themselves began to emigrate to escape Mussolini’s and Hitler’s Jewish persecution laws.

A clash of commitments

In another example, in 1939, when Fermi was to make a presentation before US Navy officials about the threat of a German nuclear weapon, The Pope of Physics reads (emphasis added):

Rather than dramatically conveying the German threat, as [Leo] Szilard or [Eugene] Wigner would doubtlessly have done, Fermi was his low-key self. Without embellishment, he laid the facts before the navy officials. In retrospect, the group may have made a mistake in choosing Fermi since he tended to downplay dangers. Those present at the briefing apparently concluded that there was no cause for alarm. The meeting was treated as a courtesy call; no further action would be required.

Neither did Fermi see the need to act further. He was interested in the challenge of producing a chain reaction and not eager to deal with the extra complications of political or military involvement. Fermi only wished to proceed with experimenting. He was also happy to see that the experiments he and [Herbert] Anderson were planning to conduct were similar to the slow neutron ones he and the Boys had performed a few years earlier in Via Panisperna.

Three years later, though he would oppose the American construction of the more-powerful hydrogen bomb down the line, calling it tantamount to “an act of genocide”, Fermi was not just closely involved with the Manhattan Project but was also part of a committee that, in June 1945, called for the bomb to be dropped without warning on an inhabited city.

In both instances, spanning a period from the 1920s to the 1940s, Fermi was supposed to have remained apolitical whereas his colleagues – ranging from the self-assured James Franck to the visibly agitated Szilard – were often thinking of the best ways to stall Hitler’s march to obtaining a nuke as well as to prevent the loss of hundreds of thousands of lives. Fermi thought that scientists weren’t equipped to make the best military decisions, but how easily can this choice be consigned to disinterestedness after having called for ‘The Gadget’ to be used in a surprise attack on a city? Was it a conveniently blinkered worldview?

Indeed, where was the clash of commitments to science and duties on the one hand and to moral sense and conscience on the other, exemplified by J. Robert Oppenheimer’s agony as the first bomb was tested and Karl Darrow’s anxious doubts about the bomb’s meaning as the ash floated down upon Nagasaki, inherent to this part of history? “At some level, he was able to treat the bomb blast as just another physics experiment”, the book reads. In another instance, a single line writes off any discomfiture that may have arisen after Fermi witnessed the Trinity test: “… while he was seemingly infallible, he was also human.” In a third, it quotes Szilard: “The struggles of our time did not affect Fermi very much, and he is no fighter”, as if to excuse Il Papa from judgment.

A harsh vantage point

While it is disturbing to realise a celebrated scientist made it big on the back of fascism, on the back of ignoring one’s political responsibilities except until it affected one personally, Hoerlin and Segrè seem so caught up with fawning over Fermi’s accomplishments that they often climb into the ivory tower after him. This is what makes The Pope of Physics seem like a fond remembrance more than an honest chronicle, leave alone a rigorous investigation, of a man who birthed the Atomic Age. They speak of his gaiety and placidity in moments of incredible tension, of his being an excellent swimmer in the icy waters of Lake Michigan while others would fall behind, of his solving problems until the moment he passed away – all trivia after having skirted the tougher details.

But as fond remembrance, The Pope of Physics is worthy of praise for picking the eyes of Enrico Fermi – perhaps the most reticent of all notable scientists – to see the biggest moments of the 20th century through. It is braver still to have the book reviewed in late 2016 and early 2017, when nationalism is sweeping across the world, economic protectionism is on the rise and people are once again emigrating to escape war on humans (as well as the climate). Given the nature of the times in which this book was written, Fermi’s views – and the indifference of its authors – seem even more inexplicable.

Link Between Uranium From DRC and Hiroshima: A Story of Twin Tragedies

The mine that produced the uranium that made the Hiroshima bomb has since been closed. But its troubling legacy continues to haunt the Democratic Republic of Congo and the local community.

The mine that produced the uranium that made the Hiroshima bomb has since been closed. But its troubling legacy continues to haunt the Democratic Republic of Congo and the local community.

Artisanal miners at an illegal mine pit in the DRC. At severe risk to their health, some still go to abandoned sites to dig out uranium and cobalt.

Artisanal miners at an illegal mine pit in the DRC. At severe risk to their health, some still go to abandoned sites to dig out uranium and cobalt. Credit: Reuters/Kenny Katombe

On August 6 – Hiroshima Day – I participated in a groundbreaking event at the South African Museum in Cape Town entitled The Missing Link: Peace and Security Surrounding Uranium.

The event had been organised by the Congolese Civil Society of South Africa to put a spotlight on the link between Japan and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC): that the uranium used to build the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima came from the Shinkolobwe mine in the province of Katanga.

This was the richest uranium in the world. Its ore had an average of 65% uranium oxide compared with American or Canadian ore, which contained less than 1%.

The mine is now closed, but its existence put it at the centre of the Manhattan Project in the Second World War. The Congo was a Belgian colony at the time and the Congolese suffered from the harsh colonial reality of racism, segregation and extreme inequities.

Following the war, the mine became a focus for the Cold War conflict between the superpowers. Today, freelance miners, desperate to earn a living and at severe risk to their health, still go to the site to dig out uranium and cobalt.

US efforts to secure all the uranium

The Congolese Civil Society of South Africa seeks to bring together the DRC community living in the Cape Town area.

In February this year it presented a memorandum to the South African parliament, asking for support for human rights and democracy in DRC. The organisers believe the uniqueness of Shinkolobwe’s ore has had a destructive impact on their history.

It held its first Missing Link event last year at the University of Cape Town. The second event was much more ambitious. The lecture hall at the museum was packed with Congolese, including families with children and other members of the public. A number of people hailed from the area around Likasi, the nearest town to Shinkolobwe. Posters were put on the walls, including the flags of Japan and DRC, next to each other.

I had been invited to the event because my new book Spies in the Congo centres on America’s efforts to secure all the uranium in the Belgian Congo. This followed Einstein’s warning of the risk that Nazi Germany was building an atomic bomb.

The US arranged for its wartime intelligence agency, the Office of Strategic Services, to send agents to the Congo to protect the transit of the ore and to prevent smuggling to Germany.

The story of these courageous agents – and the dangers they encountered from Nazi sympathisers in the mining multinationals and the Belgian colonial administration – has been secret until now.

Haunted by the ghost of Hiroshima

Also secret, for many long years, was the reliance of the American atomic project on Congolese ore. Following Hiroshima, a statement by British Prime Minister Winston Churchill drew attention to the ‘indispensable raw material for the project‘ provided by Canada. He made no mention of the Congo.

The impact on DRC has been largely invisible to the wider world. But in the local community, it was fully apparent. Oliver Tshinyoka, a journalist in the Congolese Civil Society of South Africa, grew up close to Shinkolobwe.

He describes it as a deserted place where vegetation blankets empty homes. His profound words end my book:

Shinkolobwe has never been commemorated. The town is dead and is haunted by the ghost of Hiroshima.

There was little in the way of health and safety precautions. Speakers at the Missing Link event told of the deformities and illness caused by working in the mine and living near it. Sylvie Bambemba Mwela spoke with pain of her grandfather, who had been poisoned by radiation and had a piece of brain coming out of his mouth.

People nodded in vigorous assent to the statement that when a miner went near a television, he caused severe interference with reception. There were sad references to genetically inherited malformations.

Poems had been written for the event, including ‘Shinkolobwe’s Tear’ by 14-year-old Benina Mombilo. She quietly told a spellbound audience:

When the predator took Africa’s mines, he left behind death, poverty, conflict and war.

Christian Sita Mampuya observed thoughtfully that none of the people living in the Likasi area had been consulted on why the uranium was mined. Nor, he added, are there any records available about the impact on DRC of the exposure to radiation over the last seven decades.

The power of knowing the past

Léonard Mulunda, a trenchant political analyst, insisted firmly that the Congolese must take responsibility for themselves, for their own welfare and government. But he noted that DRC’s lack of information about its past makes it difficult for the Congolese to plan for the present and the future. For this reason, he emphasised the significance and value of the Missing Link event.

Its importance was also highlighted this month in the US by Akiko Mikamo, the author of Rising from the Ashes, whose father Shinji Mikamo is one of the Hibakusha, who are the survivors of Hiroshima.

Last year, the Institute of Commonwealth Studies and the UN Association Westminster Branch invited Akiko Mikamo to give a keynote speech at a conference at the School of Advanced Study on nuclear politics and the historical record. Here she learned about the Congo-Hiroshima link for the first time. She explained:

None of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki survivors I was in contact with had any knowledge of it.

Mikamo contends that it is very important:

… that we learn also about the people and regions that are not widely known or ‘big players’ in history textbooks. But those people’s lives have been significantly affected, and it has serious implications for our global society’s future.

This global connection came full circle at Cape Town’s Missing Link event, where warm and appreciative references were made to Mikamo’s work.

The sufferings generated from Congo’s uranium featured in the singing and dancing during the interval. One song was entitled ‘La peine et la generation suivante de Shinkolobwe.’

A deeply moving contribution was a poem entitled ‘A Bomb Fashioned out of Dirt,’ which was delivered with great power by Beauty Gloria Kalenga and brought tears to many of our eyes. This dirt, she said, using another name for the mine and playing on its meaning, was ‘a fruit that scalds known as Shikolombwe’.

The question period was a time of dignified and respectful dialogue, when many engaged with the issues faced by DRC at this moment, especially in relation to the presidency of Joseph Kabila.

Some argued Shinkolobwe’s miners and their families should be compensated by the Belgian and US governments. There was consensus, however, that compensation should be postponed until there are mechanisms to ensure it is received by the victims.

The Missing Link event was a searching and constructive examination of the past and its relationship to the present. It seemed to me to exemplify the value of public engagement at its best, where everyone listens and interacts and benefits together.

Isaiah Mombilo, speaking on behalf of the Congolese Civil Society of South Africa, said he was proud that DRC’s role in the history of the world was witnessed so successfully on Hiroshima Day in Cape Town this month. It was a way, he believed, of ‘claiming Shinkolobwe’s tears’. But this, he added, was only the beginning:

There is more to say.

A longer version of this article was first published in Talking Humanities.The Conversation

Susan Williams is a senior research fellow at School of Advanced Study in University of London, Institute of Commonwealth Studies.

The Little-Known History of Secrecy and Censorship in Wake of Atomic Bombings

The atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki 70 years ago, is one of the most studied events in modern history. And yet significant aspects of that bombing are still not well known.

Two months after the bombing at Hiroshima. Credit: US Department of Defense

Two months after the bombing at Hiroshima. Credit: US Department of Defense

The atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki 70 years ago, is one of the most studied events in modern history. And yet significant aspects of that bombing are still not well known.

I recently published a social history of US censorship in the aftermath of the bombings, which this piece is based on. The material was drawn from a dozen different manuscript collections in archives around the US. I found that military and civilian officials in the US sought to contain information about the effects of radiation from the blasts, which helps explain the persistent gaps in the public’s understanding of radiation from the bombings.

Heavy handed

Although everything related to the effects of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs was defined at the time as a military secret, US officials treated the three main effects – blast, fire, and radiation – very differently. They publicized and celebrated the powerful blast but worked to suppress information about the bombs’ radiation.

The world learned a month later a few details about that radiation – that some type of “atomic plague” related to the atomic bomb was causing death and illness in the two bombed cities. But for years radiation remained the least publicized and least understood of the atomic bomb effects.

A formerly classified correspondence provides guidelines on disclosure and censorship. Credit: National Archives

A formerly classified correspondence provides guidelines on disclosure and censorship. Credit: National Archives

To this day we have no fully accepted accounting of the atomic bomb deaths in both cities; it has remained highly contested because of the politics surrounding the bombing, because of problems with the wartime Japanese census, and, importantly, because of the complexity of defining what constituted radiation-caused deaths over decades.

In my research, I found US officials controlled information about radiation from the atomic bombs dropped over Japan by censoring newspapers, by silencing outspoken individuals, by limiting circulation of the earliest official medical reports, by fomenting deliberately reassuring publicity campaigns, and by outright lies and denial.

The censorship of the Japanese began quickly. As soon as Japanese physicians and scientists reached Hiroshima after the bombing, they collected evidence and studied the mysterious symptoms in the ill and dying. American officials confiscated Japanese reports, medical case notes, biopsy slides, medical photographs, and films and sent them to the US where much remained classified for years (some for decades).

Historians note the irony of American Occupation officials claiming to bring a new freedom of the press to Japan, but censoring what the Japanese said in print about the atomic bombs. One month after the war ended, Occupation authorities restricted public criticism of the US actions in Japan and denied any radiation aftereffects from exposure to the nuclear bombs.

A Navy photographer takes a picture of a Japanese soldier walking amid the ruins of Hiroshima. Credit: US National Archives

A Navy photographer takes a picture of a Japanese soldier walking amid the ruins of Hiroshima. Credit: US National Archives

In the US, too, newspapers omitted or obscured anything about radiation or ongoing radioactivity. Military officials encouraged editors to continue some kind of wartime censorship especially about the bombs’ radiation. Four official US investigating teams sent to Japan in the months immediately after the surrender wrote reports about the biomedical effects of the two atomic bombs. Several of the reports minimised the radiation effects and all received classifications as secret or top secret so the circulation of the majority of their information remained constrained for years.

Traditional ‘combat’ bomb

The censorship has several explanations. Even Manhattan Project scientists had only theoretical calculations about what to expect about the bombs’ radiation. As scientists studied the complex effects in the next years, the US government classified information from Japan as well as related radiation information from medical research and the atomic bomb tests at the Nevada Test Site.

American officials wanted reassurance that Allied troops landing in Japan would not be endangered by any remaining radiation. Based on pre-bomb calculations, US officials did not think that US troops would be endangered by exposure to residual radiation but the concept of radiological weapons and uncertainty created fear.

Photograph taken at a Roman Catholic church in Nagasaki circa 1945. Credit: US National Archives

Photograph taken at a Roman Catholic church in Nagasaki circa 1945. Credit: US National Archives

An additional explanation for the censorship of information pertaining to radiation is that US officials did not want the new weapon to be associated with radiological or chemical warfare, both of which were expanding in scope and funding after the war. Those associated with the atomic bomb wanted it to be viewed as a powerful but regular military weapon, a traditional “combat bomb.”

The results of the radiation censorship campaign have been hard to pin down both because of the nature of the silencing itself (including its incompleteness), and because knowledge leaked into public awareness in many ways and forms.

Historian Richard Miller observes that, “In the long run, the radiation from the bomb was more significant than the blast or thermal effects.” Yet, for years that radiation remained the least publicized and least understood of the atomic bomb effects.

Legacy of secrecy

Censorship about the radiation deaths and sickness from the atomic bombs in Japan was never, of course, entirely successful.

American magazines featured fictional stories about cities ravaged by radiation. John Hersey’s searing account, Hiroshima, became a bestseller in 1946 just as the summer’s “Crossroads” atomic bomb tests in the Pacific received massive publicity including reports about the disastrous radioactive spray that contaminated eighty of the Navy’s unmanned test vessels.

Campaigns from governmental officials as well as military, scientific and industrial leaders sought to ease the public’s fears with the alluring promises of miraculous medical cures and cheap energy from commercial nuclear power.

Historians have described the American public’s reactions to Hiroshima as “muted ambivalence” and “psychic numbing.” Historian John Dower observes that although Americans demonstrated a longterm cyclical interest in what happened “beneath the mushroom cloud,” the nation’s “more persistent response to Hiroshima and Nagasaki has been “the averted gaze.”

Secrecy, extraordinary levels of classification, lies, denial, and deception became the chief legacy of the initial impulse to censor radiation information from the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs.


Additional reading:

  • Eisei Ishikawa and David L. Swain, translators. The Committee for the Compilation of Materials on Damage Caused by the Atomic Bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the Physical, Medical, and Social Effects of the Atomic Bombings (New York, 1981),
  • Robert Jay Lifton and Greg Mitchell, Hiroshima in America; a Half-Century of Denial (New York, 1995).
  • Richard L. Miller, Under the Cloud; the Decades of Nuclear Testing (New York, 1986).
  • John Dower, Introduction in Michihiko Hachiya, Hiroshima Diary: The Journal of a Japanese Physician, August 6-September 30, 1945. Fifty Years Later (Chapel Hill, 1955; 1995).

The Conversation

Janet Farrell Brodie is Professor of History at Claremont Graduate University.

This article was originally published on The Conversation.