Tag: karan thapar manipur

In an interview with Karan Thapar, former Union home secretary Gopal Krishna Pillai discusses the ethnic clashes in Manipur – still ongoing – between the Meitei and Kuki communities. Pillai lists the steps that the Union and state governments should have taken to restore law and order – like recovering stolen weapons and prosecuting cases of violence. He also lists measures that the government should take to get relief and rehabilitation measures underway, so that the people know that they have not been forgotten. Pillai says the situation in Manipur is unprecedented in independent India, but steps can be taken to resolve the crisis. 

The following is a transcript of the video interview that was published by The Wire on August 28. It has been edited lightly for style, clarity and syntax.

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Hello and welcome to a special interview for The Wire. Tomorrow [August 29], the Manipur assembly meets for its Monsoon session, and today we ask how effectively have governments in Delhi and Imphal handled the crisis? And more importantly, what are the steps necessary to handle the law and order situation and beyond that, the tricky but not irresolvable political issues that underlie.

Those are the key concerns I should raise today with the former home secretary whose knowledge of the Northeast – and Manipur in particular – is not just unsurpassed, it’s also unrivalled, Gopal Pillai.

Mr. Pillai, on August 29, the Manipur assembly will convene for its Monsoon session for just one day. But it’s already clear that all 10 Kuki MLAs – two of whom are ministers, seven are in fact, from the BJP – will boycott the session. At least two national newspapers, The Hindu and the Times of India, suggest that even the 10 Naga MPs may skip the session. In which case, beyond meeting constitutional requirements, what real purpose does this one-day session serve?

I don’t think it really serves any purpose except to show that one instrument of the administrative, the constitutional, is still alive and kicking. Nothing more than that. 

In fact, isn’t that a danger that if all 20 Naga and Kuki MLAs do not attend the session, it will be an all-Meitei session and that will deeply underline how deep and how, perhaps irreversible, the division in Manipur has become?

I’m not so sure yet whether the Naga MLAs would not attend the session.

Although, two newspapers The Hindu and the Times of India have suggested they wanted it.

If they do, I mean, it only sends a political signal of how isolated in one sense the Meiteis are from the rest of the population in Manipur.

[Editor’s Note: While the 10 Kuki MLAs, including two cabinet ministers, did not attend the 11-minute session, the 10 Naga MLAs did attend.]

And that would, in a sense, bring home to the rest of India how deep and perhaps irreversible this divide is becoming.

Well, the division is very deep. Whether it’s irreversible, I would still wait to see how the developments take place on the various steps that the government needs to take – and whether they would take those steps.

I want very much to talk to you about the steps that need to be taken and I want to talk about those steps in terms of different issues that occur: law and order, political issues and background issues. But before I come to that, let me ask you first for your assessment of the way governments – both in Delhi and Imphal – have so far handled this crisis. What is your assessment of chief minister Biren Singh’s handling over almost the last four months?

I think what we have to realise is that there has been a constitutional breakdown. The state government has been more, shall I say, explicit by its absence rather than its presence across all of Manipur – including the Meitei-dominated areas. And to that extent, what was mentioned in the Supreme Court… one of the justices of the Supreme Court mentioned that there is an apparent constitutional breakdown.

In that case, should the chief minister be replaced?

That is a political decision for the government of India to take. And I think with the governments being of the same – both BJP governments in the Centre and state – it is unlikely that if they have not taken a decision so far, that they would take such a decision in the future. 

In the not-so-recent past, Indira Gandhi dismissed the Darbara Singh government in Punjab when she felt that they were failing to handle the situation vis-a-vis [Sikh separatist leader Jarnail Singh] Bhindranwale. And that was a Congress government dismissed by a Congress prime minister. So the precedent exists. And I believe Nehru did that in his time as well.

Surely, the interest of Manipur should be paramount, not the party interest of the BJP. Which is why I ask… because clearly, this is the chief minister who has lost the confidence of the Kuki people – that’s 16% – and several newspaper accounts say 15 of his 32 MLAs – including eight Meitei – have also publicly expressed a loss of confidence in him. So is he an obstacle now?

I don’t think so, I don’t see the political party in power seeing it that way. Because if they saw it, they would then remove him. It might happen in the future, it’s quite possible. But at the moment, I don’t see the government removing him because they feel that he serves a particular political purpose.

In fact, the home minister in his speech in the Lok Sabha said he was being retained because he’s “cooperating” and that was in terms of removing the chief secretary to moving the DGP, accepting Kuldiep Singh. But as a former home secretary who clearly puts the interest of Manipur before the politics, does cooperating make up for the fact that he’s been incompetent in restoring law and order? Does it make up for the fact that he’s unacceptable to 16% of his population and perhaps pretty close to 50% of his own MLAs? 

See, it’s a question of… one is of constitutional propriety and the other is the political aspects. And obviously, in this case, the political issues have taken priority over constitutional aspects and it’s very clear.

Is that unfortunate in your eyes?

It is unfortunate, yes, because it sends a wrong signal not just to Manipur. It sends a wrong signal to all the states in India and especially other states in the northeast of India.

So retaining Biren Singh is sending the wrong signal?

Yes, I think. I have no doubt about it.

Let’s come to the handling of the situation by the central government. In the speech that he made in the Lok Sabha when the no-confidence and debate happened, the home minister spoke for two hours and he explained the present crisis in terms of an influx of illegal refugees – Kuki refugees – from Myanmar from 2021. Now, there’s no doubt that is precisely how the Meitei believed the situation had arisen. But the Kuki have a very different explanation. Did the home minister make a mistake in only giving the explanation from one side, rather than from both sides? Has he ended up perhaps inadvertently making himself look partisan?

See, once you have supported the chief minister and not dismissed the chief minister, then you have to follow the narrative of the chief minister and that is exactly what the Union home minister has done. So, that was expected. Because if he had to follow any other narrative, then it would mean that he would have to dismiss the chief minister.

And this follows from you saying that retaining Biren Singh sends a wrong message to Manipur, therefore the explanation – as far as the Kukis are concerned – sends the wrong message to them as well.

Yes, no doubt about it. 

And I presume this is why the Kuki have responded so angrily towards the home minister said in Parliament. The list of Kuki organisations which have condemned the home minister’s speech is pretty long: it’s the Kuki Inpi, the Indigenous Tribal Leaders Forum, the Committee on Tribal Unity and all 10 Kuki MLAs, including seven who are from the home minister’s own BJP. Doesn’t this mean that, at the time when the home minister needed to reconcile the Kuki and the Meitei, and therefore reach out to the Kuki, he ended up offending and annoying them instead?

Well, that is what I think the strategy was. So I don’t, you know, find anything new. This has been the strategy of the BJP and therefore he’s just following that line.

Can you explain that further Mr Pillai? You believe the strategy of the BJP is to side with the Meiti and push the Kuki aside?

Well, that’s what they’ve done in actual practice, that’s what they’ve done. So… it’s something unfortunate but it’s happened and the consequences are there, which we have seen. And now we have, in one sense, to pick up the pieces and see where we take them forward.

We are saying something very important and I’m only repeating it so the audience understands you fully. You’re actually saying the government of India has taken sides in the Meitei Kuki conflict and it’s taken the side of the Meitei?

Yes, no doubt about it.

This is truly unfortunate, isn’t it? 

It’s unfortunate but that’s politics today.

If you had been home secretary and you saw this happening, what would you have said to the home minister?

No, I think first, the most important thing is that you have to maintain law and order. And if you find that the state government – because law and order is the state subject – if they are unable to maintain that, then I think you have to take what action follows from that.

You’re suggesting that if you were home secretary and the law and order was not under control, you would have said to the home minister, dispense with your chief minister?

Yes. I think if he could not control the situation and the law and order situation went out of control, as it went, and you had a complete breakdown of law and order, then I think you really need, in one sense, to have dismissed the chief minister. Because that I think was.. you don’t have to impose President’s Rule but you could have got rid of him and brought in somebody else who you could try. And if he still failed, then the only other option is President’s Rule.

So I’ll sum up this bit, you’re saying two very important things. One, that the strategy that the BJP is using in Manipur, which is to take sides with the Meitei against the Kuki, is the wrong strategy, it’s unfortunate. And secondly, retaining Biren Singh as chief minister – which follows from that strategy – is another terrible mistake.

Yes, it is. I think in the long term, it’s a mistake.

Let’s come to the prime minister’s handling. For 79 days, he refused to speak in public about Manipur – not a single syllable. Thereafter, if you count up the occasions when he’s spoken about Manipur, it comes to a total of under 10 minutes. Which means in nearly four months, the prime minister of India has spent less than 10 minutes speaking about one of the worst crises India faces. As a former home secretary, what do you make of that?

I think the prime minister has left it to the home minister to take a call. I think this is one… it’s, again, a decision that he has taken, He thinks the home minister is handling it, and he doesn’t want to interfere with what the home minister is doing. Therefore, he’s kept his – shall I say – minimal approach rather than intervene directly.

Given the seriousness of the crisis and the fact that it’s carried on for months, was the prime minister right to leave this entirely to the home minister? 

That’s a difficult call for me to make is that. It’s the prime minister of India, he takes the call. He’s politically very astute. So he’s taken the call, I think very deliberately and in a measured way. So we’ll have to see how things pan out in the months to come, to see whether that call was right or wrong.

Earlier, when we were talking about the home minister, you said he has consciously put BJP politics ahead of India’s constitutional requirements. That, it seems, is also true of Mr Modi?

Let’s see how things go… the matter is already before The Supreme Court… the issues which are coming [up], I think, we’ll see how it pans out.

Practically everyone I’ve spoken to in Manipur – and in the last four months, I think I’ve done about 30-31 interviews – whether these guests were Meiti, Kuki, Meitei Pangal or Naga, they’ve all said that they feel let down by the prime minister. Many have said they think the prime minister has turned their back on them. One of them even said to me, “We can’t even see the prime minister.” Then, are people in Manipur justified in feeling and thinking like this?

See I think you are… In a state, you are depending on the prime minister to solve all your local problems. They have to be solved at the local level. And I think you cannot expect the prime minister to solve the problem, especially as complex and complicated as Manipur, just by the prime minister intervening. It’s a matter which you have to solve yourself, and I think if you are not able to solve it, there are other constitutional remedies – which of course, have not been taken – but you have to solve the problem by discussion and dialogue among the groups in Manipur itself.

My last question about the prime minister. Many people say, many people in Manipur, that he’s not just the most popular person in the country, he’s by far the most powerful. Were he to take an initiative, were he to fly in for a day, were he to invite civil society organisations to meet him, he would give a message that he personally cares, and that would encourage people to talk, perhaps to reconcile. That initiative needed to be taken by him. How do you respond to that?

I think any prime minister, in a situation of this nature, needs to reach out to the people because they are all his [people], he’s the prime minister of all of India. And therefore, he needs to reach out at the earliest when the situation [demands]… unless there is, you know, the intelligence briefings and the other reports, which we are getting are totally different, in which case, that’s another issue. But if the reports are what has come out in the newspapers, and has come out through the discussions that you’ve brought out in some of your interviews as well as the reports of people who have gone there of different parties… it shows a real issue, possibly unheard of in post-independence India. And I think the prime minister would have been well advised to have intervened personally and then see where it goes from there.

So you’re saying the prime minister needed to reach out in the early stages?

Yes, at least I think, after the after the Union home minister’s visit – which was good, the Union home minister spending three days in Manipur is unheard of in any law and order situation in the country in Independent India – when that didn’t work, I think the prime minister should have stepped in.

By calling people to him or by visiting Manipur?

He could have visited Manipur, he could have called people across – anyway. Just the fact that the prime minister is concerned about the situation would have made a tremendous difference. Because people of the Northeast – whether it’s Meiteis, whether it’s Kukis, whether it’s Zomis and so on – all of them are… the human touch is very, very critical for them – that somebody cares. And it would make a tremendous impact.

By failing to reach out, by failing to give that human touch – to use your words that somebody cares – and let’s be honest Mr Modi is very good at doing it when he wants to, has he, in the case of Manipur, been irresponsible?

I would say, you see, it’s a call that he made.

The wrong call?

It’s a call that’s for him to take, because he said he would have left it to the Union home minister to take the decision. He may have felt that his interfering would undermine the Union home minister’s position… I mean any number of reasons there could be. And he sort of felt that his interference, at the early stages, may have been wrong. I personally feel that his intervention would have had a very salutary effect on the situation. But that is my view – others may feel different.

Absolutely. So in your personal opinion, he took the wrong call?

In my personal opinion, he should have reached out to the people in Manipur, even perhaps visited Manipur. Or at least, he should have called everybody over. The least he could have done was to call everybody over to Delhi for talks in the first week or 10 days.

Let’s now – with this in the background – come to steps that are necessary to tackle the problem. And let’s start with the law and order issue because I imagine that’s the most immediate concern. If the home minister were to pick up the phone and say, “Gopal Pillai, no one knows the Northeast better than you, no one understands Manipur better than you, what is your advice to me with regard to tackling law and order?” What would you say?

Well, first, I think you have to.. what shall I say… reduce the number of arms with the civilian population. I think the number one priority in terms of law and order – I’ll come to the relief and rehabilitation separately – is the recovery of the 4,000-odd weapons that were looted from the police armouries. You can’t have 3,000-4,000 arms floating around in the civilian population and expect the situation to calm down. So, that is the number one priority.

I imagine that the police and the security advisors are doing their best to try and recover the weapons. What is it that they should be doing, that clearly they haven’t done, that would recover weapons quickly?

See two things, as I put it. One, I think every single officer in charge of the armouries, from where weapons were looted, should have been first dismissed from service. Pure dereliction of duty. This is the first time it’s happened in this sort of case. Second, to a large extent, people know with whom the arms. You should by now have been raiding houses across Manipur to recover these arms, which has not happened. And you put drop boxes, I mean, it’s the most ridiculous situation, that after the arms are looted, you put drop boxes in different parts and expect the people who have looted the arms to come and drop the weapons in.

That is one aspect. Second, I think you have to start slowly. Initially, yes…

Can I interrupt that point before you come to the second aspect? A corollary of what you said is that people are aware of who’s got the arms and they should have been raiding their houses. If they haven’t done that, and they know who’s got the arms, then, in a sense, they’re quite happy for them to keep the arms.

Yes, which is why you’re not seeing these raids. I mean, if I were the DGP of Manipur – even if not the old, the new DGP has come in. If I was the SP in Imphal or Churachandpur and so on, my first priority would be to recover these weapons. These police weapons are so [are] identifiable, the numbers are there and so on and so forth. You should be raiding houses to recover these.

And if you don’t raid the houses, does that suggest complicity? Or at least acceptance that they’ve got the weapons and we don’t mind them having the weapons?

Yes, definitely, there’s no doubt about it. Because by now – three months have gone by, more than three months have gone. If you haven’t been raiding those [houses] to get the weapons back…. that’s, I mean that is one key aspect, for controlling the law and order situation and bringing the violence down.

Come to the second, I interrupted you, please come to the second.

The second aspect in terms of which [law and order can be tackled] is the issue of filing these cases which are now, of course, some cases with the Supreme Court etc, those cases which will go to Assam, cases which are within [Manipur] itself. Opening up of.. You have to open up supply lines, because if you block supply lines, whether it’s by the Meiteis or by the Kukis etc, it’s not good and so…

Forcibly, those highways must be cleared of blockade.

The highways must be cleared of blockades. You can have, I think initially, you still need, possibly for the next six months, you still need the buffer zones, as still the situation and the violence comes down. A couple of steps they have taken, which I have seen, which I’ve mentioned partly also earlier. Like, they posted some tribal officers to the hill districts who have now – All India Service officers – which gives some confidence to the people that, okay we’ve got people who we know, we can trust them, they have come to do…

You also need to start what I call… of course, the CBI has taken over some cases. But there are other cases where people, like yesterday you saw, three houses burned down. Which is what you are trying to basically send a message to the Kukis and the Zomi that you are not welcome back [in Imphal]. Three months have gone by, we’ve half burnt your house, now we are completely burning down your houses. It sends a message that you don’t even think of coming back. Though, personally, I think none of them will come back, that’s another issue.

So again two-three weapons looted from residents of some director of health or something. I mean, you can’t allow this sort of slackness. Somebody has to be held responsible, which is why I said, dismiss the officers and they are both in the hill districts and in the valley.

None of them have been dismissed so far. 

Not one. So the moment you dismiss them, you are sending a signal that this will not be tolerated. At least the next time somebody comes to loot the armoury, people will open fire. I mean, you just can’t allow that to happen.

You know, as I hear you speak, the things you are suggesting they are obvious. They are things that should have been done immediately and yet they haven’t been done. What does that tell us about the attitude and performance of a whole lot of functioning, is not just the chief minister, but I’m not excluding it, but the DGP, the security advisor, the SPs, the whole administration of state?

Totally unprofessional. I you want to put it, I would even say incompetent. Because if 4,000 weapons have been looted and by now you haven’t been doing raids. I mean you saw, cases when riots take place and so on and so forth, the first thing that you do if there are weapons have been used by anybody, people raid. The civilians have to feel a little bit uncomfortable, that this will not be [tolerated]. Therefore, the next time they try to do this, there will be second thoughts. Whereas, if they feel that nothing is going to happen to them… (shrugs)

In fact, by failing to raid you’re giving them carte blanche, you’re encouraging them to carry on.

Yeah, you’re telling them that the government has actually told you, “Keep the arms.”

Are there other steps that you would advise to the home minister, if he hears you, to tackle law and order? One of them is to get back the weapons, raid if need be. The second is to file the case and prosecute them. Are there other steps in terms of law and order?

See, these are the first steps. Then, you start the second process of what I call giving relief, rehabilitation and compensation part of it… which is not… but it is equally important because from the relief camps itself stories [are emerging from] both sides, youngsters and all, are going now into what you call as you know “village defence forces” and so on and so forth.

So if you don’t give confidence to the youngsters that you are to go and study in the school or you are providing some online education and so on, within the relief camps itself… but then, your first priority is to go and get arms training from civilians to protect your own villages – that’s a failure of the state. Because the state is supposed to protect the citizens. Uou don’t expect the citizens to take arms to protect themselves.

People like Harsh Mander who visited with his Karwan-e-Mohabbat, people from the Church who are present – including Meitei people in the valley – all tell me that the majority of the relief is being provided in the camps, not by the state, but by civil society groups, by the church and by Meitei organisations. In other words, the state has opted out of doing what it should be doing.

Yes, I think that has been, one, absence. There are two-three things the state can do. The state has a limited capacity, I mean Manipur government is not like, you know, you would find, say Maharashtra or Karnataka or a Delhi government. etc., where – you know, the capacity of the state is limited. It’s a small state, a small number of offices. Very large community organisations are there, so it’s all right that the community organisations come forward. But the state must provide money, provide [prefab] housing, they must be able to provide doctors from government hospitals because most of the hospitals are medical colleges and so on. They should be able to provide clothing and so on and so forth.

The relief and compensation which would have been expected from a state has not come. It’s actually a tribute to the strength of community organisations in Manipur – both Meitei as well as the Christian organisations – that they have been able to get… In fact, we have an IAS officer in Manipur– current, Meitei officer – who has actually reached out to the IAS community through his batchmates, and money has actually flowed from our WhatsApp groups to his NGO, which is actually….

But that is an individual taking an initiative, not the state.

Rather than the state.

In fact, you mentioned the need for doctors and medical care, you mentioned the need for money. Newspaper reports, and I’m going entirely by them, suggest that very little of the money that was promised has actually reached people, whether it’s up in the hills, whether it’s down in the valley. And as far as the Kukis are concerned in the hills, there is a real crisis of medical treatment. Doctors are absent, medicine supplies are absent, they’re having to travel in some instances to Nagaland or Assam. And some reports suggest that people who are critically ill have died.

Yes, I think my information itself tells me that the number of people who have died in these camps has crossed 50. So when you say that 100 and some odd people were killed in the riots, you almost got another 35-40% of people who have died post riots, in the camps out of various illnesses.

This is because of the inefficiency or incompetence of the state administration.

Yes, it not being able to provide adequate health… In fact, I would have expected even from the government of India that they should have started health facilities from AIIMS and so on and so forth, doctors from various places should have been sent. 30, 40 doctors should have been sent, by rotation, for a month or two months to many of these relief camps just to provide basic health facilities.

Not only have they not been sent by the Government of India, but it seems that it hasn’t even occurred to the Government of India that this is needed.

No, they are aware. I think the Union home minister had promised that 50 medical teams would be sent. 

Absolutely, when he was there but they have not gone.

They haven’t gone. 

He made a promise and even three months later, the government has failed to fulfil it. 

So that is why the condition in the camps are so poor, and many of them are… now, of course, slowly the prefabricated houses [are coming up] because the Supreme Court panel has, you know, pointed out the total inadequacy of what has been provided. I expect things to improve now but this is something which should have been done in the first 15-30 days.

We’re coming to the end of what I call the first section, which is restoring law and order, relief and rehabilitation. You’ve painted a picture which is deeply depressing. The essential steps to resolve order are obvious but they’re not being taken. Who knows when they will be taken? The steps for relief and rehabilitation are obvious, they are not being taken – with the exception of housing. Nothing else is really happening. So when will we have a restoration of law and order? When will people be given relief and rehabilitation? It doesn’t look as if there’s an endpoint in sight.

Yeah, I expect that… See, it is unfortunate because again, it’s a failure of the government that I expect that… the Supreme Court panel has now given its report. They have pointed out the inadequacies etc., that have now been communicated to the state government and I think next week the response of the state government and the central government will come as to what they have done. I expect that again the state government and central government will, to avoid being criticised by the Supreme Court, say that we are rushing some equipment, some doctors and so on and so forth to show that…

That’s just face-saving. 

That’s face-saving, because it should have been done much before this because… 

So we failed as a state in restoring law and order and relief and rehabilitation.

Yes, we have. We’ve had riots, you know, 100 people [dying] is not something which is people in India, the size of India, we have not faced before. But in all cases which have happened – whether it’s in UP, whether it’s in Bihar, whether it’s in Kerala, whether it’s [anywhere else] – the State has responded very quickly. In any riot situation, the state responds very quickly and if you don’t respond quickly, it’s a real failure. That’s where the administration – officers also – are responsible.

This is where Manipur is a clear outlier. We haven’t responded quickly. In fact, we know what we should be doing, and we’re not doing it. It’s very hard to move further, but academically, I will. I imagine, side by side with tackling law and order – which as you pointed out, is being done ineffectively, if it’s being done at all – the government also needs to turn its attention to the very difficult, intractable, political issues. Are the talks that are happening with the COCOMI, on the one hand from the Meiti side, and with the ITLF from the Kuki side, the right way of tackling this political issue? Or should the government be reaching out through civil society groups and, perhaps through highly regarded individuals who both sides respect like for example, Ratan Thiyam? 

See, the government has started, I think to an extent that fact, that the dialogues have started even though, it’s still with one party, one party rather than everybody sitting across the table. That stage hasn’t yet come because of the acute mistrust between the communities. The process has started.

I think the steps on law and order, which I mentioned earlier; the steps on relief, rehabilitation and compensation. The compensation, so far, has been very inadequate. People have lost, I mean some in some places, crores of rupees, and you are then saying I’ll give you Rs 3 lakh, Rs 5 lakh – which are still not been given. So, this whole issue of assessing what has been the damage done, finding out who the people, etc,. This is something which should have been done, still not done. But let us assume that those are done.

These are all steps, as part of what I call as the background to the political process, which is in one sense, at the moment they’re talking of separate administration. I still put it as – if you are looking at the territory integrity of Manipur being preserved, you are looking at as greater autonomy, whether it’s a Sixth Schedule status, whether it’s something more. These are still, I put it as, one-two years down the line. Because the Manipur issue of autonomy to the hills, is also linked to the Naga Peace Talks. Since the Naga Peace Talks have also stalled a little bit, in a sense. You can’t have a solution for Kukis and this thing, without keeping the Nagas issue also. So I expect that.. that is a issue of two or three years before that will take [shape]. But in the meantime, you can do a number of steps. 

Which are?

Which are, say getting district administration functional once more fully. So, you have now a situation where you have a total, shall I say… of course, I think we have to be very clear that not all of Manipur is affected. Most of the Naga hill districts like Ukhrul, Tamenglong, Senapati, etc., – no problem at all. Absolute[ly no problem]. Meitei officers are working there, Naga officers are working there, Kuki officers are working there. There is no problem. So you’ve got 30% of that areas, all those areas, which are, shall I say, normal administration is functioning.

But in other areas, like Churachandpur and Kangkokpi, you’ve got now administration which, a lot of officers are missing because if they were Meitei officers, they’ve left, if they were Kuki officers from [the Valley], you know, they’ve left. So maybe in the initial stages, empowering deputy commissioners to fill up vacancies on a temporary basis for a one-year period by hiring local people to fill up the vacancies in, say, the primary health centres, in the district hospitals, in schools and so on. A modicum of administration is restored and people can go about their normal lives. 

What you’re suggesting as you said, sounds so obvious. Why is it not being done? 

I really don’t know. Though I must say that in the first instance last week, they just started posting All India Service tribal officers to the hill districts, so three or four officers have been posted. I mean the first steps, maybe they are starting to realise that…

Tell me something. There are so many things that need to be done in terms of restoring law and order, rehabilitation, getting the administration functioning, empowering district magistrates so that they can temporarily appoint people. You’ve made it seem so simple and obvious – I’m astounded that it’s not happening, but leave that aside. Should the chief minister be removed to facilitate all of this happening? Is he an obstacle? Is that why it’s not happening?

Since I haven’t talked to the chief minister or you know, some of the people in the administration, it’s difficult to say, But I would have expected that from the Union home ministry, because the MHA has a very special relationship with states in the Northeast.Hhistorically, it’s been the maa-baap (mother and father) figure. So I would have expected the Ministry of Home Affairs to have taken far more initiative, you know. By now, the joint secretary (Northeast) would have been, you know, camping in Imphal and making sure all these things are done. 

I take it he’s not doing that?

We haven’t heard of him. Have you heard of the joint secretary (Northeast)? So that’s what is really the problem – that you need people… half a dozen central government officers should have actually been camping in Imphal – the health secretary, the joint secretary (health), joint secretary (school education) and so on should have been camping in Imphal and issuing orders.

The picture you’re painting becomes even more worrisome, Mr. Pillai. Not only has the administration in Imphal collapsed, there seems that the administration in Delhi – which technically, should know what’s required – is not doing it. For some reason or the other, it’s not acting. None of these joint secretaries have gone there, none of them have camped, none of them have taken the initiative.

Yeah, very unfortunate, very unfortunate.

This, in a sense, makes my next question irrelevant. But given that it is difficult for a BJP government to dismiss a BJP chief minister, should President’s Rule be imposed? Where you don’t dismiss the chief minister, but you just take over charge yourself? Or would that be no use? 

Yeah, it’s a political call which they have to decide. Which means that you are, shall I say, you are unhappy with what the chief minister is doing. But if you are happy with what the chief minister is doing then what happens…

The other problem with President’s Rule is then Delhi would be directly responsible and its failure would be immediately obvious. There wouldn’t be a buffer in between any longer.

That is true, and that is why I said all these things have to take place simultaneously, across different agencies, all ministries of the government of India because you have a huge, all-state crisis. And therefore all departments, at least key departments – which are, you know, health, education, water supply – Centre has to push it. This is something that they should have done in the first 30 days. They haven’t done it. They need to do it because that inspires confidence among the people that the state and the central government cares. It is very important – especially for the people of the Northeast – to feel that the state government and the central government care about them. They are very emotional people, and unless you approach them emotionally, you will never be able to, you know, win their confidence.

At the time when the message that’s needed is, “We care, we will reach out, we will help you”, the message that’s going both from Imphal – where the government has collapsed effectively – and Delhi – where the government seems to be indifferent and not bothered – is actually, “Carry on as you are, we don’t care, do what you want.” You know, this is why I think, people in Manipur feel, let’s not put in terms of the PM, the system has turned its back on them. Whether it’s in Imphal or Delhi, they’ve been forgotten.

Yeah, that’s the general feeling on all sides – including the Meiteis. 

Have you ever come across something similar in terms of utter mishandling, both at the level of central and state government?

No, this is unique. When things are so obvious, we are not even looking at the other aspects of, you know, could this situation have been anticipated? Were there warning signs? Because there have been clashes pre-May and so on. So we’re not even looking at those issues which will come, which I hope you know as things calm down and so on, people will start to write. But I think… and there are still many other issues, which I mentioned are the background issues, which are still… the refugee issue, the issue of the illegal drug trade, the issue of forest rights and forest conservation, which now, again…

I’ll pick these up with you one by one. But before I do, I’ll point out something that you hinted at, because it will intrigue the audience. Clearly, you believe there were signs before May 3, that the problem was lurking under the surface, that it needed attention and care and that warning sign was ignored.

Yes, I think the signs were there. There were small clashes, there were small protests, there was even, you know, the issue of, you know, one the chief minister’s functions, which he was supposed to go to Churachandpur, where there was his, you know, the ground on which he was that, whatever the structure, the shamiana and all, got burned down etc. The warning signs were all there. It’s a question of how you put it together but that’s a separate…

So there was inefficiency, incompetence or even irresponsibility in ignoring these warning signs.

It was there.

And I imagine these are warning signs that not only were ignored in Imphal, they were warning signs that should’ve struck warning bells in Delhi, but those warning bells didn’t ring here either. 

Yes, I don’t think so because by now, otherwise, you should have had, you know, you would have deployed another 50 companies of CRPF before this whole thing happened, saying that we anticipate things are going to blow up. 

So, the failure of the Indian system, both at Manipur and Delhi, is not just in terms of handling and responding to the crisis post-May 3, it’s also failing to heed warning signs that were ringing, and which should have been paid attention to. It’s a much longer “history” of failure.

Yes, I think the signs were there. Now, you may say that… how you could have reacted to those signs is different, but they were definitely there and I don’t see any sort of precautionary steps taken – either as a state or the central level – to handle those warning signs. If [any steps] were [taken], they have not been disclosed publicly. But the warning signs are there. I’ve talked to people in the administration in Manipur, I’ve talked to people in the armed forces and so on. Everybody says the warning signs were there. 

Everyone saw that, everyone knew there were warning signs. No one acted. You can only blame yourself.

Let’s come to the background issues. Let’s go through them one by one. First I’ll take up the issues raised by the Meitei, then I’ll come to the issues raised by the Kuki, just for simplicity.

The Meitei believe that the Kuki are involved in poppy cultivation and in illegal drug trade. What we know from the interview that Thounaojam Brinda has given me and she’s given it also to other [outlets]. In fact, she alleges, that the chief minister has been protecting a drug lord who is a BJP functionary and his wife too, she alleges, is involved. So is this charge made by the Meitei against the Kuki, pointing fingers only in one direction? Or are they all involved in it?

I think everybody is involved. There’s no, I mean it’s been there in the past – the drugs, both within Manipur as well as outside. Manipur has a history of drug problems, starting from HIV, then the whole community got together to, you know, sort of tackle that. So it’s something which is there. I don’t think its… Everybody is involved, it’s a fact. And how they’re going to tackle it is… I think it’s the Narcotics Control Bureau, the Enforcement Directorate… all these people are now to see, you know, the PMLA and so on, money laundering etc., because it’s big money. Poppy cultivation, the cultivation by the farmers is what? Maybe 5% of the total drug trade. So the poppy cultivation itself is small, but there is a large inflow of drugs and chemicals coming across. And it’s partly because again, we don’t realise… because mainstream media in India has not covered a civil war which is going on in Myanmar.

I mean, they’ve been, you know…. we’ve had coverage once, in the 1960s, the air raid on Aizawl, those big headlines… that [the air force was] used against their own citizens. The Myanmar government is bombing away left, right and centre, and therefore, you are going to have these refugees coming in to India. And I think it is very important for the government of India to have, if not a refugee policy, at least keep a complete tab on who is coming across the border and put them into refugee camps. 

How serious is the influx of illegal Kuki refugees from Myanmar? All the newspaper reports I’ve read suggest that a survey done by the Manipur government put the numbers that entered Manipur under 3,000. Something like 45,000 have gone to Mizoram. How worrying is an influx of 3,000? Or is it being exaggerated to point fingers?

See, one, since the actual thing has not been done, I would be skeptical about the numbers. I think, the figures in Mizoram are slightly more than 45,000 etc,. Maybe [in Manipur] 3,000 is slightly on the lower side. It may be higher, maybe 10,000, maybe more. But these are refugees. See, nobody likes to leave his village and come across just carrying whatever is on the back of their head to another place unless there dire straits on the other side. So it is important for you to say that these are refugees, like when you know Bangladesh… they had a problem in East Pakistan and so on.

10 million came.

10 million came. So we said, “There’s a problem.” The refugee camps were set up, you document them, you fingerprint them, you photograph them, you can do all that you want, and they remain as documented refugees in refugee camps.

You’re saying a very important thing. These people who’ve come, whether they’re three, four, five or ten thousand, they’re refugees – they are fleeing from terror in Myanmar. Obviously, at some point, they want to go back to their home. But they are not people who’ve come to make a living forever in India. There is a distinction to be made between refugees from militant Myanmar terror and people who have come to make a home in India. They’re the first, not the second.

Yes and therefore once you document these refugees, he never becomes an illegal migrant because he always remains a refugee. Then you have to take up with the government of Myanmar to send them back at some point of time, when the situation is [fine].

But something else flows from what you’re saying. I’m talking now both about what you said earlier about the poppy trade and also about these refugees. In both cases, the finger has been pointed almost exclusively, at the Kuki, but you’re saying both sides are involved, in the poppy trade and the drug trade – Brinda’s interview makes that clear, the involvement on the Meitei side goes all the way to the chief minister. And again, you are saying, as regards these refugees, they’re not coming to permanently settle, they are fleeing for fear of their lives and they want to go back one day. Again, the finger is pointed to the Kuki, and said you’re deliberately changing the demography – they’re not.

I don’t think the demography will change. We don’t see that numbers yet. But remember, all the time we’re talking of “Kukis” but the Kukis, they are also the Zomis, they are the Chins – all are different. I mean we look at it… the Kuki is not the same as the Zo and the Chins. They fought, you know, in the late 90s, the Kukis and the Paites, they had a huge fight where, you know, thousands were killed. So we have to see that different ethnic tribes from across the border are coming. Whether some of them are also involved in the drug trade, it’s a matter for… its open. And if I am coming here and I am, shall I say not put in a refugee camp, where I’m housed as a UN High Commissioner for Refugees, they give you a refugee status, stamp, etc. Then you are on your own. And when you are on your own, I would not be surprised if some of them are also involved in this illegal drug trade because they will then… they have to survive.

In other words, the administration, the system needs to respond more effectively to this, to ensure that refugees remain refugees. And this is again another area where the state administration has failed.

Yeah, I think we’ve seen. Even in Mizoram, they are officially saying these are refugees. Some of them are housed in camps, some of them are housed with individual families, because they’re, you know, their relatives, their Chins, their communities, the same places and so on. But the government of India has not given a single pie to the Mizoram government to help in… the Mizoram government are saying, “These are the refugees who have come across, we got the names we’ve got this thing, we give you all [information]. We are providing funds from our state budget, help us with some money.”

The Mizoram government asked for Rs 10 crore, which is not a vast sum of money. I believe they were given Rs 3 crore, eventually, after a two month delay. But another aspect of that is that there are some 14,000 Manipuri refugees in Mizoram and the Manipur government has done nothing whatsoever to help them. I mean it could have sent money to Mizoram to help them. Those people are surviving on either Mizo government largesse or Mizo civil society charity.

The third background factor is this charge made against the Kuki about encroaching on forest life. How accurate is it? Or is it a misunderstanding, as the Kuki claim, of the slash-and-burn style of cultivation? 

See, it’s a complicated issue because you’re looking at… The hill areas, by and large, forest areas. They’ve been doing slash-and-burn [style of cultivation] for centuries. You also have in Manipur, I mean the Forest Conservation Act, you have the forest rights for tribals who have been there. That’s one aspect of what they do. There’s now also forests which are to be preserved as forests and not to be [used for] slash-an- burn [style of agriculture].

I’ve yet to examine the implications of the new Forest Conservation Act which was passed in Parliament in their previous session, where the government has got the right to say this is a forest and this is not a forest, so there are some areas on which there is a little bit of a gray area. Those have not yet got implemented. Again, when the Manipur government starts to implement the new Forest Act, and declare a particular area as non-forest and so on and so forth, it will create…

Absolutely, but this is the Manipur government again wrongly pointing fingers at the Kuki and claiming that they’re encroaching, when in fact, the government doesn’t understand the style of cultivation the Kukis use? Is there a mistake being made in pointing a finger at them?

See, it’s both. I think you have to look at the fact that there is one slash-and-burn cultivation which is normal. Then, you also have some encroachment which is taking place. People encroach anywhere, I mean it’s across the world…. When any public area is available….

So you’re suggesting that the charge of encroachment may not be wrong but it’s being exaggerated.

I think it’s been exaggerated but I would be surprised if there was not some encroachment into the forest.

That’s human nature?

Human nature.

So on the three background issues we’ve discussed – refugees; involvement in drug trade and poppy cultivation; and encroachment in forest areas – there is an element of exaggeration when the finger is pointed uniquely and exclusively at the Kuki. Both sides are involved in the drug trade. The refugees are actually refugees, they’re not coming to change the demography – they will go back, that needs to be understood. And as regards encroachment, there is some encroachment happening but it’s being exaggerated. Is that correct?

Yes, I think that’s the actual ground situation.

Let’s, then, come to the two critical issues, that are perhaps the last part of this interview.

From the Meitei point of view, the real concern is what they call the “land imbalance”. And they think it should be resolved in terms of giving them Scheduled Tribe (ST) status. Do you believe – given your understanding of Manipur and its complexities – that ST status is the right way of addressing the “land imbalance”? Or are there other ways that could be equally efficacious but less controversial?

Yes, I think so. I don’t think, even among the Meiteis… there was earlier, I think it was almost 70% of the Meiteis didn’t want ST status. Now they say it’s come to 50-50 after these clashes and so on. Land is an issue, no doubt about it. And the Meiteis have a genuine grievance, if I may put it that way. Primarily, again psychologically, that you know people from the hills can buy land in the valley, but you can’t buy land in the hills. And I think this is where I think political statesmanship from both sides involved [is required].

There is a certain land hunger there fore everybody. [In the Valley,] it is very thickly populated and less populated [in the hills], but of course, you also have forest areas.. so it’s not apple to apple. So you need some element of political compromise by which the Meiteis also can have some access to land in the hill areas for certain purposes. You can have a restriction, you can say, ceiling will be 5% or 10% of the total area for A,B,C purposes etc,. Some of it, there have been discussions in the past with the Hill Area Council in terms of – for industrial purposes, for setting up industrial parks in the hill areas; for the Meiteis who come and settle down, who are working government servants. Under the Manipur Public Service Commission, they get recruited, then you can get them posted to the hills, you might marry somebody there and you want to settle down there. Then you should be allowed [to buy land].

That permission from hill councils is already available but it, I gather, is given very grudgingly.

Yeah, it’s given grudgingly, it’s very little.

You are saying that this is an issue, the land imbalance, that with the political initiative taken by sensible farsighted politicians can be very easily reserved.

Yes, people have to realise that it is an issue. You have to realise that the Meiteis have a problem. Don’t brush it aside, under the carpet. “The hills are ours, we are not going to give you a cent of it.” I think you can’t take that attitude.

But the corollary, you’re saying this can be resolved without necessarily giving the Meitei ST status.

Yes.

In other words, you need a far-sighted politician who takes the initiative. And that means someone has to stick their neck out, because that’s what you do when you take an initiative, isn’t it?

Yeah, I think a lot of Meiteis… a lot of responsible citizens also say that the current definition of STs does not apply to the Meiteis. Some of them are Vaishnavite Brahmins; some of them, of course, looking back to their old indigenous faith, in which case, they are, you know, shall have more akin to STs. But today, in the context of where they are now, in terms of their education, their social position, lack of discrimination, nobody discriminates against Meiteis; the educational levels… All the things which ST commission would actually look at to see…

Are missing in their case.

Are missing. So it is unlikely that they would get from the ST commission, an ST status.

But what you are saying is that the land hunger of the Meitei can be resolved if a far-sighted politician would take the initiative. It doesn’t necessarily require ST status but a political decision taken by a sensible politician. That’s the problem. Such a politician is missing. It doesn’t exist on the horizon.

Yeah, but you have to also from the other side… I think the hill areas also, the people must also be a little accommodative. If they see that a little bit of accommodation [is taking place], I think the Meitei politicians will also respond positively.

Let’s come to the last issue. The Kuki, particularly after the experience of the last four months, are demanding separate administration. They’ve made it clear that they cannot live with the Meitei any longer after what’s happened. And this is a separate administration means, either a separate state or a union territory status. Now, if you were home secretary, this is a very tricky demand because if they’re given some sort of separate administration, it will fracture Manipur, because the Nagas immediately would want to join up with Nagaland, and all that would be left is the Imphal valley. And on the other hand, you can also understand that after what they’ve gone through, the Kuki clearly want some measure of autonomy to be able to safeguard themselves. So how would you, if you were home secretary now, tackle this extremely difficult situation?

See I’ve always been of the view that… and in fact, as joint secretary (northeast), there’s even a literally, an affidavit of mine in the Manipur assembly, saying that the government of India is committed to the territorial integrity of Manipur. I’ve said that even during the Naga talks and so on – we are not touching that. If you are not touching that, then the issue then becomes a matter of autonomy. You got the Hill Areas Council, which hasn’t really worked because again the state… no state government likes to give autonomy. It’s happened in Assam when you had Sixth Schedule status and even the Sixth Schedule areas. When we negotiated the Bodo Accord, we gave a lot of autonomy but they still feel that because the money is routed through the state government, who controls the money, controls everything else. So unless there is financial autonomy, it becomes very difficult for anybody to feel that, “I’m really autonomous.” Therefore, an autonomous council, an autonomous area is fine. It can be under the Sixth Schedule. I think, in the past, even in Manipur there’s been…

But the Sixth Schedule doesn’t apply to Manipur.

No, it can be.

It can be applied.

It can be extended to any particular area which the government wants. In the past, Manipur governments have said that this is acceptable but this is something to be negotiated.

There are reports in the papers that the talks that were happening with the SoO [Suspension of Operations] groups and the home ministry – which then got overtaken, when May 3 happened – were reaching a sort of conclusion. Reports suggest the SoO groups were willing to concede that autonomous hill area councils or autonomous territorial councils – perhaps under the Sixth Schedule – would be acceptable. Now, the Kuki say that the door is closed. Do you think it can be reopened? Can this package be sweetened to make the Kuki accept it?

I think it can be reopened. It’s a question of… you have to give it a little bit of time. I think you have to allow the other processes which I mentioned earlier… the step-by-step processes in terms of law and order.

And leave this to the last.

And leave this to a couple of years down the line. Because, I don’t think at this stage, anything… forget Sixth Schedule, forget UT, forget a new state, etc., will be discussed at all. 

It’s just too early. 

It’s too early, so that’s two-three years down the line, as I put it.

But you’re also suggesting that to make the hill area councils or the autonomous territorial districts or whatever you call them acceptable, you’d have to also apply the Sixth Schedule of the constitution – so it’s a lot closer to the Bodoland structure. And perhaps, in addition, give them also some measure of financial autonomy. 

Yeah, that is, those are parts which can be negotiated with over a period… I put it as I think, it’s about two three-years down the line, when all other things… As I said, I’m hoping that slowly all the other positive steps will take place, and we don’t have, and this is my great fear, we don’t have… I think for two-three months, I think by November-December, I think there’ll be relative calm. But there is a lurking fear that you might again end up with another burst of violence. 

Why do you say till November-December… What worries you after that?

A umber of issues. From one, the Supreme Court looking at the whole issue, there are some issues which are taking place… the poppy cultivation gets harvested in November, so nobody wants… Both sides, don’t want anything which might affect the cultivation of poppy. So many issues are there on the back of it.

If I understand correctly, what you’re saying is that both sides have an interest in ensuring that the poppy harvest is not affected. Both sides have an interest in watching to see how the Supreme Court reacts, which is why there will be a sense of relative calm until November-December. Your worry is once the poppy harvest is done and once the Supreme Court has perhaps, turned its attention to other matters, the situation can flare up again, around November-December.

Which is why I mentioned that, you know, the earlier steps like recovery of all looted arms; getting the administration in these areas back; [earning the] trust of the people; you don’t have too many sporadic issues which keep tension rising;  but there is a sort of gradual calming… people feel things are back to normal.

Those are critical steps.

Those are critical steps, because otherwise, if you have 3,000-4,000 arms – maybe more, which come in from across the border and so on – you are sitting on a tinder box which you have to be very careful – can always blow up.

But the problem is those critical steps are not happening. We’ve discussed them in detail, but they’re not happening. We have to keep our fingers crossed and hope and pray that they do happen.

Yes, it’s very important that they happen if you are looking at the larger, long-term interests of Manipur.

One last question. There is one ominous sign on the horizon and I want to ask you whether it worries you. Recent statements issued by the United Naga Council increasingly suggest that the Nagas – I’m talking about the Manipuri Nagas, the Tangkhul Nagas – are siding with the Meitei against the Kuki. A statement issued by Mr Th. Muivah [who is leading the Naga Peace Talks] from [Camp] Hebron, seems to suggest the same thing. Does this worry you? Is there here a potential for a second conflict happening? We’ve already got a Meitei-Kuki one, could there now be a Kuki-Naga one developing as well?

No, I don’t think so. I think the NSCN [I-M] and Muivah, what they are really, basically [doing] is stressing is that don’t ignore the Nagas. Which is why I said, any settlement you have with the Kukis etc, don’t leave us out of it. Because there are Naga interests involved, both in the autonomy which can be given to the hill areas, as well as the areas where supposedly Kuki dominance is there. But the Nagas may say that those are some areas, we also have influence in those areas, so don’t count us out, we want to be involved in those negotiations. Which is fair… and I think the whole package of autonomy will come up with the Naga Peace Talks, in terms of the autonomy for the Nagas, autonomy for the Kukis, and autonomy for the Zomis, and so on.

What the Naga United Council is doing, is not spoiling for a fight, it’s simply putting its card down on the table, and saying, “Listen folks! Don’t forget about us.” Right in other words, it’s making its presence felt – it’s not actually spoiling for a fight, even though they’ve accused the Kuki of false history and lies. But that’s just their way of saying that don’t forget about us.

I think so. And I don’t think they will spoil for a fight. In fact, the Naga should be most worried because, in the city of Imphal, they are the only ones left.

Absolutely.

So coming to my last question. Everything that we’ve discussed, both in terms of what the government should do but hasn’t done – whether in Imphal or Delhi – and in terms of what they then need to do – but which will be difficult and will take time – suggest to me that this is not only a very complicated and complex issue, but it’s intertwined with emotional politics, and it will not be easy to solve. And it will take years to solve. You’ve talked about two-three years but it’s possible it could take a whole decade.

Yeah, it depends on how fast – as we said, and we don’t have too many setbacks on the route, which I mentioned. It’s important that we don’t have those setbacks because these are things, which sometimes happen, when you ignore, I think we’ve realised now, that you cannot ignore warning signs. The warning signs of presence of arms with civilians in thousands. I mean, if in Delhi, we had AK-47 and semi-automatic rifles with 10,000 people in Delhi, the Delhi police would be extremely worried. I mean the first thing they would do, if they had looted from Delhi armouries, they wouldn’t sleep at night.

So what we’re saying is that we have to keep our fingers crossed that things don’t flare up, things don’t deteriorate. It could be a sensitive and delicate situation for years to come. We just have to be very careful about how we handle Manipur.

Yes, we have to be very careful how we handle Manipur. 

And not only must the government in Imphal keep its eyes open and its ears open and respond quickly, so must the government in Delhi. We can’t afford for laxity, we can’t afford for people diverting their attention.

I don’t think we can afford it at all. I mean this is something which has both, not just domestic implications, it has international ramifications.

Yes, because it’s interpreted as Hindu versus Christian, abroad.

And if the violence of the civilwWar in Myanmar goes out of control, then you can expect refugees to come in bigger numbers… like you’re seeing in Europe from Africa, you know. Every time you have… in Sudan or in Nigeria, in all these countries, you have civil war and all of them finally take a boat and swim across. Here, this is just across. They’ll come here and those which are on the other side.

In addition, they’ve got kinship because the same tribes are split between Myanmar and India, and sometimes India-Bangladesh as well.

I thank you for opening our eyes, I thank you for the honesty with which you’ve addressed the situation. I hope, in particular, the government in Delhi is listening to you. There’s a lot that you said, that will benefit them. Thank you very much, indeed. Thank you!

Thank you.

Transcribed by Amna Mannan.