In Charts: How Govt and Private Sector Investments Have Fared in Recent Years

2022-23 saw the highest number of government investment projects being dropped in the last few decades, data shows. Over 1,100 projects were dropped in that year. Private sector investments have also been consistently dropping over the last few decades.

New Delhi: Earlier this week, Chief Economic Advisor V. Anantha Nageswaran said that the government cannot solve all social and economic problems like unemployment.

“In the normal world, it is the commercial sector which needs to do the hiring,” the CEA said.

He added that growing investments are going to create more job opportunities during the decade.

While the current government has spoken of a better investment environment and more jobs, it appears preposterous for the CEA to suggest that the government cannot solve the issue of joblessness.

However, let’s acknowledge that while governments can implement policies to spur job creation, they cannot guarantee full employment for every individual in the economy. But more investments lead to the requirement of more labour, and hence, more jobs.

However, don’t these events call for significant attention on the issue? Several Indians are desperate to go to a war-torn country as they can’t find work here; unpaid labour and self-employment – which often do not offer stable income – are on the rise; and around 60 million workers have returned to jobs in agriculture, as a result of job losses in other sectors.

With the help of data from the Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE), let’s take a look at how government and private sector investments have panned over the last few decades.

In 2014-15, 1,339 government projects were announced (see Chart 1), which increased to 1,892 in 2018-19, and 1,637 in 2022-23. However, only 322 government projects were completed in 2014-15, and 816 and 883 projects in 2018-19 and 2022-23, respectively (see Chart 2).

In 2014-15, 1,383 private sector investments (only Indian) were announced (see Chart 1), which increased to 2,283 in 2018-19 and 1,567 in 2022-23. However, only 496 projects were completed in 2014-15, 796 in 2018-19 and 917 in 2022-23 (see Chart 2).

Made with Flourish  (Chart 1)

Made with Flourish (Chart 2)

As Chart 3 shows, 2022-23 saw the highest number of government investment projects being dropped in the last few decades. Over 1,100 projects were dropped in that year. Private sector investments have also been consistently dropping over the last few decades.

While seven government projects were stalled in 2022-23, 30 were stalled in 2018-19 and 49 in 2014-15. Nine private sector investment projects stalled in 2022-23, 17 in 2018-19 and 93 in 2014-15 (see Chart 4).

Made with Flourish (Chart 3)

Made with Flourish (Chart 4)

India Cannot Ignore the Tough Questions of Inequality in its Labour Market

An examination of the Periodic Labour Force Survey 2021-22 report shows that the sluggishness of the labour market continues and concerns remain about the quality of jobs.

Measured in terms of gross domestic product (GDP) growth, the Indian economy has been recovering over the past few quarters of the post-pandemic period though concerns remain over the sluggishness of the labour market.

Data from the Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE) showed that the unemployment rate continued to be very high at 8.5% as of August 1, 2023. When such a high unemployment rate is combined with a significant decline in labour force participation (one of the lowest in recent times at 35.9% in 2022-23, according to the CMIE), it does not augur well for the prospects of the labour market in a country with an inadequate social safety network. 

Concerns over high unemployment predate the COVID-19 pandemic. The Periodic Labour Force Survey (PLFS) survey 2017-18 suggested an unemployment rate of 6.1% and pandemic-induced disruptions worsened the poor labour market outcome. The evidence is well documented in recent literature.

The factors that impede the recovery of the sluggish labour market require utmost attention. Against this backdrop, the release of the PLFS 2021-22 report allows us to compare labour market dynamics in post-COVID compared with pre-COVID conditions.

The PLFS is conducted in a July-June cycle. Since the last quarter of annual PLFS 2019-20 survey experienced the full force of first wave of pandemic and all the four quarters of 2020-21 survey encompassed both aftermath of the first wave as well as the devastating effects of the second wave (even if there was no national lockdown), the present study compares the employment situation in the PLFS 2018-19 and 2021-22, thereby mitigating any potential biases. 

In a break from the earlier trends reported in both the CMIE and PLFS surveys, the 2021-22 report shows improvements in the employment situation compared to all previous reports of the PLFS, which is a bit unexpected because the pandemic massively disrupted economic and social life. Based on the reports, the labour force participation rate (LFPR, which represents the number of people in the labour force as a percentage of the population) and the worker population ratio (WPR, or the percentage of employed persons in the population) of those aged above 15 years increased from 50.2% to 55.2% and from 47.3% to 52.9%, respectively, between 2018-19 and 2021-22. This reduced the unemployment rate from 5.8% to 4.1%

The primary driver of this increase in participation is female participation. The rise in both LFPR and WPR is more than 8 percentage points for females while they increased marginally by 2-3 percentage points or males. Historically, females have had greater labour market engagement in rural areas than in urban areas and there was no exception to this even after pandemic.

Among those who are 15 years and above, the WPR of rural women (in usual status) has increased significantly by 10.3%, from 25.5% to 35.8 %, with a marginal change in urban employment (from 18.4% to 21.9 %).

Stylised facts about these increases in participation raise the question of the workers’ job locations. 

Where are the workers located?

According to the National Statistical Office, workers are classified under three broad categories – self-employed, regular wage/salaried employee, and casual labour. In urban areas, a significant number of females are in regular salaried jobs. But in rural areas more women fall into the self-employed category. 

In pre-pandemic 2018-19, 59.6% of rural women were in self-employment, of which 21.8% worked as own account workers and the rest (37.9%) as helpers in household enterprises, which were mostly unremunerative (Table 1). In post-pandemic (2021-22), self-employment increased to 67.8% (by more than 8%) for females, with proportionately less increase in own account work and a significant increase in helpers. 

In rural areas, female participation as helpers is primarily as agricultural workers in family firms. Since agricultural activities (being essential items) were mostly permitted during the pandemic, the lockdown did not much affect female participation in farm activities as helpers. An industry-wise classification confirms that female participation in agriculture is not only around 70%; it has increased from 71.1% to 75.9% in post pandemic times while male participation in agriculture reduced from 53.2% to 51%.

Despite the pressure of reverse migration, male workers joined less in agriculture in post-pandemic. In rural areas, males were largely engaged in self-employment activities. Compared to females, within self-employment, there were more male own account workers and few helpers and there were no significant changes in participation in post-pandemic. In urban areas too, the importance of self-employment activities as a source of livelihood grew for both males and females after pandemic. 

Table 1: Percentage distribution of workers in usual status by status in employment

  Self-employment regular wage /salary casual labour
own account workers and employers helper in household enterprise all self-employment
  Rural Female
2018-19 21.8 37.9 59.6 11 29.3
2021-22 25.1 42.7 67.8 8.1 24.1
  Urban Female
2018-19 24.9 9.6 34.5 54.7 10.7
2021-22 26.7 12.7 39.4 50.3 10.3
  Rural Male
2018-19 48.2 9.2 57.4 14.2 28.3
2021-22 47.3 11.3 58.6 14.7 26.8
  Urban Male
2018-19 34.6 4.1 38.7 47.2 14.2
2021-22 35.0 4.6 39.5 46.2 14.3

Source: PLFS rounds.

In the casual workers’ category, participation of both rural males and females has declined, with relatively greater declines observed for females (by 5.2% points compared to 1.5% points decline for males). The decline in female participation in casual work cannot be justified with unavailability of work under Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA) since female participation in MGNREGA remains around 55% over 2018-19 and 2021-22 according to official statistics.

The industry wise participation confirms that their participation has largely fall in non-agricultural activities like in construction work it has reduced from 6% to 5.3%, in trade, hotel and restaurant from 4.3% to 3.7%, other service from 9.1% to 6.8% respectively. The increase in household chores because of the pandemic, care responsibilities, competition from jobless males, and the pressure of reverse migration could have been other reasons for this decline.

For males, the industry-wise participation confirms that their participation decline is mainly visible in agriculture 53.2% to 51%, but increase in participation in all other non-agricultural sectors mentioned above. So, the rural dynamics is changing in post COVID time.

It is clear that while females were systematically pushed out from all these non-agricultural activities and greater engagement with farming, males are more in wholesale and retail trade, construction work, manufacturing, transport, communication, and other services which were even if disrupted by pandemic-induced lockdown but males reestablish their foothold. Conversely, for females, the displacement appears to be enduring and irreversible.

Coming to regular salaried jobs, workers’ participation in them fell in both rural and urban areas irrespective of gender because of the lockdown. However, the magnitude of decline was more in urban areas, which have a higher concentration of regular salaried jobs. At the same time, it is noticeable that the magnitude of decline is more for females than males in both rural and urban areas which again reenforces the notion of discouraged worker effect or permanent loss of women from job market. This again can be connected with social security provision under regular jobs.

According to the 2021-22 PLFS report, 62% of regular salaried workers do not have a written job contract, 49.2% of regular wage/salaried employees not eligible for paid leave, 53% are not eligible for any social security benefit. The Covid-19 pandemic exposed the fragility of livelihoods due to the growing informalisation of formal jobs. 

Education and workforce participation

The increase in women’s work participation in rural areas was observed across all education levels after pandemic (Table 2). But the WPR was significantly higher for illiterate women and those who had studied to the primary level, coinciding with the higher participation of females as helpers. The U-shaped relationship, particularly the high WPR at low levels of education, was because those at the lower end of the education spectrum could not afford to remain unemployed. Interestingly, both in rural and urban areas, those with a technical education (diploma/certificate courses) obtained jobs at a greater proportion even after pandemic, which reconfirmed the importance of skilled workers to the service-led growth of India. 

Table 2: WPR across education levels for 15 years above population 

  Not literate Literate, up to primary Middle Secondary Higher secondary Graduate Post graduate and above Diploma/ certificate courses
Rural female 2018-19 30.7 29.8 21 17.2 13.8 18.4 31.5 34.3
2021-22 43.7 43.4 30.6 23.0 20.9 25.7 35.3 50.5
Urban female 2018-19 21.9 20.6 15.9 9.9 9.5 23.1 36.8 34
2021-22 24.0 26.5 18.8 13.8 13.8 25.9 37.4 41.3
Rural male 2018-19 76.5 85.6 74.7 60.5 55.8 69.1 75.4 66.4
2021-22 77.3 86.9 78.3 65.1 61.1 75.6 83.9 76.3
Urban male 2018-19 72.6 80.2 73.1 60.6 52.3 69.5 79.9 73.7
2021-22 72.9 82.9 74.9 61.5 55.8 71.7 80.5 76.2

Source: PLFS rounds. 

Interestingly, for males, there is no significant difference in participation across all education levels between rural and urban areas, and the pandemic did not make any significant difference to this pattern. This can partly be explained by the role of men as breadwinners, which was backed by a long history of masculinity. Contrary to the general perception, the higher workforce participation among less educated workers pointed to a precarious job recovery.

The relatively lower workforce participation among the educated points to higher unemployment among the educated, perhaps due to the lack of jobs that match their expectations. In all likelihood, technology-driven post-pandemic recovery may accentuate this problem. 

Impact on the Disadvantaged 

The Indian labour market is segmented among social and religious groups. Even though Covid-19 was thought to be blind to social stratification, the vulnerability to the virus was not homogeneous in all social and religious groups. Overall, socially disadvantaged communities had a higher WPR than the general category and it increased after the pandemic – by 7.4 percentage points for Scheduled Tribes from 40.6% to 48%, followed by 4 percentage points for Scheduled Castes, 4.2 percentage points for Other Backward Classes, and 3.4 percentage points for the general category. 

Compared urban areas, the work participation of women from disadvantaged communities was much higher in rural areas. After the pandemic, there was a sharp increase in the female WPR in rural areas, particularly among STs (from 28% to 40.1%), followed by SCs (18.9% to 25.7%) and OBCs (18.9% to 25.9%). The male WPR has changed marginally by 3-4 % and remains around 50-55% across social groups in rural and urban areas. Given the low asset base at home, perhaps women from disadvantaged social groups could not afford to wait for better prospects. 

In terms of religion, Christians had the highest WPR (42.6%), followed by Hindus (40.5 %), Sikhs (38.9 %), and Muslims (33.5%) in 2021-22. While there is no significant difference in the male WPR across religions, for females, particularly in rural areas, it varied to a large extent. There was a notable surge of 9.4 percentage points in the WPR within the Christian demographic, closely pursued by a rise of 5.7 percentage points among Muslims and a 4.6 percentage point upturn among Sikhs.Me Occupying the lower rung on the socio-economic hierarchy, individuals hailing from religious minority groups found themselves compelled to eschew unemployment.

Whether we look at the rise in unemployment or precarious employment after pandemic, it points to the sluggishness of the labour market. An examination of the latest PLFS shows that despite some improvements in labour market outcomes, concerns remain about the quality of jobs. The analysis of labour market outcomes in terms of rural and urban, gender, education, and social and religious groups shows that structural questions relating to the segmentation of labour market require urgent attention.

There is higher workforce participation among women, especially from disadvantaged groups. If these structural problems are not addressed, post-pandemic growth will be more unequally shared than earlier. Public policies designed to address concerns about the job market should not only focus on employment generation, which has been low since the pre-pandemic period, but also aim to improve the quality of jobs.  

Namrata Singha Roy teaches Economics at Department of Economics, Christ University, Bengaluru.

It Will Take Another 27 Years for India to Have a Bigger Labour Force Than China’s

…if we assume the labour force participation rates for both countries will remain constant, and so will other factors.

India is set to overtake China and become the most populous country on the planet by this month. One implication of this is that potentially, India’s labour force would soon be larger than China’s. If the productive capacity of India’s massive labour force is effectively harnessed, India could be on its way to become the new Asian giant. The Elephant would finally overtake the Dragon. Or would it?

However, the story isn’t so straightforward.

For one thing, India’s bigger population size will not translate to a larger working age population for the country (vis-à-vis China) immediately (Figure 1).

Figure 1

While India’s total demographic cohort would be bigger than China’s by the end of 2023, China will still have a bigger working age population (those aged 15-64) for another two years. It is only in 2025 that there will be more people aged between 15-64 in India (994.7 million) than in China (987.4 million).

But not all people in the working age group are in the labour force, which comprises employed individuals and those willing to work but not employed (i.e., unemployed). For that we must look at the labour force participation rate, or LFPR. India’s LFPRs are not only much below the global average, but significantly lower than China’s. As of 2021 (the latest year for which comparable data is available), 75.8 percent of China’s working age population (15-64) was part of its labour force i.e. they were either employed, or looking for work, data from the International Labour Organisation’s (ILO) modelled estimates show. In India, on the other hand, only 51.3 percent of those in this age group were part of the labour force in the same year.

Figure 2

Much of this difference is driven by the chasm between the female labour force participation rates in the two countries. India has lower rates of both male and female labour force participation compared to China, but the gap is much bigger for female LFPRs. In 2021, 76.2 percent of Indian men (15-64) were part of its labour force, and in China this share was 80.5 percent. In the same year, only 24.6 percent of women (15-64) were part of the labour force in India, in sharp contrast to 70.8 percent in China.

This difference in LFPR essentially means that in 2021, while there were 986.5 million people in China aged 15-64, there were 747.9 million people who were employed or looking for employment, our calculations show. In India, on the other hand, there were 950.2 million people aged 15-64 in 2021, but only 487.9 million were part of the labour force (Figure 3).

Given the wider gap in FLFPR, this difference was starker for the female population, our calculations show. In 2021, China had an estimated 478.3 million women aged 15-64, and its female labour force was an estimated 338.6 million in size. In India, the female labour force was only 112.8 million in comparison even though it had 458.2 million women in that age group.

Figure 3: Estimated working age (15-64 years) population and labour force, India and China, 2021 (in millions)

 

China India Ratio (China/India)
Population 986.5 950.2 1.04
LFPR (in percent) 75.8 51.3
Labour force size 747.9 487.9 1.53
Female population 478.3 458.2 1.04
FLFPR (in percent) 70.8 24.6
Female labour force size 338.6 112.8 3.00
Male population 508.2 492.1 1.03
MLFPR (in percent) 80.5 76.2
Male labour force size 409.2 375.1 1.09
Source: Population numbers from UN Population Estimates.
Labour force participation rates based in ILO’s modelled estimates via The World Bank

So, while India’s working age demographic group was almost comparable in size to China’s, its labour force was significantly smaller, largely due to its much lower rates of female labour force participation.

In this context, when is India likely to overtake China’s labour force? 

Not anytime soon.

If we assume constant LFPR rates as the most recent ones for both countries, it will take another 27 years for that to happen. It is only in 2051 when India will have more people in the labour force (15-64) than China (assuming everything else remains constant). These calculations are based on UN populations estimates available for all years up till 2100.

Figure 4

(To view this visualisation fully on your device, click here)

If India’s LFPR were to increase to 60 percent, this could happen by 2040. (Users can enter different LFPR values in Figure 4 to see how this timeline changes in different scenarios).

For India’s labour force to exceed China’s in absolute numbers by 2030, India’s LFPR would need to increase sharply from the current level of roughly 58 percent (the labour force participation rate by usual status for the 15-64 age group as estimated by the Periodic Labour Force Survey, 2021-22) to 71 percent for the next seven years. There is no reason to believe that such drastic improvement could be achieved in a short span of time. Any increase in overall LFPR is contingent upon on improving the share of women in the labour force, which is not impossible, but would need a dedicated set of comprehensive initiatives.

What about India’s demographic and gender dividends? 

The mere existence of a larger working age population does not constitute a demographic dividend. For it to be a dividend, first, the working age population must be in the labour force. Second, they must be productively employed. Otherwise, a large number of people in the working age group who are not productively employed can represent a huge challenge as the unfulfilled need for livelihood opportunities is a sure-fire recipe for discontent and unrest which can enhance conflict.

India is already grappling with a jobs crisis, as roughly 5.5 million new jobs that the country needs are not getting created, which makes agriculture the sector of last resort for people to eke out a livelihood.

Additionally, India is already grappling with low female LFPRs. One reason responsible for the low levels is undercounting of women’s economic work on family enterprises. Accounting for this work raises LFPR estimates, as India’s official Economic Survey has attempted to do. While recognizing women’s (unpaid) contribution to family enterprises is very important, it is not a substitute for paid work, the opportunities for which are not growing as rapidly as needed. There is dire need for expansion of rural non-farm employment, both for men and women, but especially crucial for women as they are unable to travel long distances to access work, due to their predominant responsibility for domestic chores.

China’s rapid growth was in no small measure due to one element of their economic reforms: the expansion of rural industry via the Township and Village Enterprises (TVEs) that absorbed its massive workforce in small, labour intensive, nonfarm work opportunities. Between 1978 (the start of the economic reforms) and 1995, China’s rural industries grew over 20 percent per year, raising their share in industrial production from 3 percent in 1971 to 30 percent in 1990.

This is the bus that India seems to be missing. If there isn’t enough remunerative work for young people and women, a very large potential pool of talent will remain un- or underutilized and the much-vaunted demographic dividend will remain illusory for India.

Skill differences

The other big contrast between the two countries is seen in the training/skill differences of the population. While in both countries, gross enrolment ratio for tertiary education (GETR) has been increasing, India’s GETR in 2021 was roughly half that of China in 2021 (Figure 5).

Figure 5

Not only does China have a higher GETR compared to India for both men and women, but the relative difference has also increased over recent years. In 2015, China’s GETR was 1.7 times that of India. By 2021, it was twice the level of India. The female gap remained roughly constant over the period (from 1.9 to 2.1), whereas the male gap increased from 1.6 to two.

The Elephant-Dragon Tango will continue

A sober reflection reveals that while India will become the most populous country, it is not about to overtake China in terms of a bigger and more educated labour force. This is not to suggest that the continued growth of the Chinese economy is free of its own set of challenges. In addition to battling geo-political challenges to its global expansion plans, China has to deal with a shrinking labour force, ageing population and boosting productivity growth. How acutely these challenges affect the Chinese rate of growth is a) a subject matter for another article and b) something only time will tell. This piece focuses on the Elephant-Dragon comparison.

Increasing female LFPRs, not only via correctly measuring women’s work, but via creation of an ecosystem that provides remunerative and sustainable livelihoods close to home (read rural nonfarm employment) and investing in an educated, skilled and healthy workforce should be India’s top priority, based on its own demographic reality, not just because of a presumed competition with China.

Ashwini Deshpande is Professor of Economics, Ashoka University, and can be reached at ashwini.deshpande@ashoka.edu.in. Akshi Chawla is editor, CEDA, and can be reached at akshi.chawla@ashoka.edu.in.

This article was originally published by CEDA.

A Knotty Affair: India’s Burgeoning Population and Stagnating Middle-Income

The middle class in India is feeling the squeeze because real wages have not risen, but costs are rising.

As per the State of World Population Report published by the United Nations Population Fund, India will soon become the most populous country in the world. At this point, India also has a relatively ‘younger’ working-age population compared to China. Depending upon how one reads the data, this can be a boon or bane, as labour is an important component of growth in national income or gross domestic product (GDP).

If labourers are productive, then their income and the economy grow. Much of the GDP growth that occurred among the emerging Asian economies during the second half of the last century was through increased labour force participation. These countries, for example, China, South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, and Vietnam, were able to absorb labour from the low-productive agricultural sector to the high-productive manufacturing sectors. Much of the supply of white goods like mobile phones, air conditioners, refrigerators, computers, etc. are manufactured in these countries, thereby making their economy transition from low to middle and high-income economies.

This is why there is a flourishing middle class in these economies. According to Pew Research, the share of Chinese who are in the middle-income group jumped from 3% to 18% during this century, however, the share of Indians middle-income group remain unchanged for the most part. Although, thanks to reforms and the consequential high growth rates in GDP, India was able to reduce poverty – from 40% in 2004 to 10% in 2019 – however, the drop in poverty merely resulted in an increase in the low-income population. Data from the recently published India Consumer Economy 360 survey points towards a fall in income growth for the poor and middle-income households, whereas that of the high-income households surged.

Source: India’s Consumer Economy (ICE) 360 survey

Ergo, although in India the poor are becoming richer, the society is also becoming more unequal, that is, the rich are becoming richer much faster. New World Wealth, a Johannesburg-based company, published a report claiming that India is the second-most unequal country in the world, with millionaires controlling 54% of the wealth. In Japan, the most equal country in the world, millionaires control only 22% of the national wealth. In India, the number of ultra-high-net-worth individuals (with net assets of $30 million or more) has grown by 11% year-on-year in 2021, the highest percentage growth in the Asia-Pacific. 

A reason for unequal income distribution is that most of our labourers are stuck in low-productive sectors. According to the Periodic Labour Force Survey (PLFS) 2021-22, agriculture still remains the largest source of employment, employing 45.5% of the workforce. Construction is at a distant second, employing 12.4%, closely followed by trade, hotel and restaurant, employing 12.1% of the workforce. Now all these sectors require low/semi-skilled labourers, with low productivity. 

India’s labour productivity – economic output per hour of work – is just 12% of the US levels. In purchasing parity terms, GDP per hour worked is $70.68 for the US, in comparison to India’s $8.47, and this cannot be explained by differences in the working population alone. Types of employment, and access to finance and technology matter. For a long time, output per hectare, a common measure of agriculture productivity, remained low in India. For example, in potato farming, the productivity of an Indian farmer is less than half of that of the US, Germany, and the Netherlands. In the case of rice, it is less than half of that of the US and Egypt, and for wheat, it is less than half of that of the UK and Egypt.

India leapfrogged into services without being able to create enough jobs in the manufacturing sector. Even the success stories of the manufacturing sector – Reliance, Godrej, Tata Group, etc – employ a capital-intensive mode of production. For a long, everyone thought labour market reforms such as giving more power to the companies to hire and fire workers will bring in the required change. That did not happen in spite of the Central labour law reforms in 2020.

Instead, over the last five years, there has been an increase in self-employment in low-productive agriculture and the urban informal sector. There are not enough jobs getting created and according to PLFS 2021-22, on the basis of current weekly status unemployment level remained stagnant at 8.8%, without declining much since 2017. High skilled-services sectors such as banks, Information Technology, etc., are not able to absorb workers. In India, according to PLFS 2021-22, only 1.3 % have technical education and only 0.7% have diploma/certificate graduate level in vocational education. Technical knowledge and education are a must for getting a job in the manufacturing or service sectors. On the other hand, a concomitant rise in income inequality is leading to the creation of low-paid and low-productive jobs such as housekeeping, security services, and other gig-type jobs such as Zomato delivery workers

A photo of Swiggy and Zomato delivery workers. Photo: PTI

Rising costs, wages stagnant

A low productive workforce means a lower income, in particular when the informal labour markets are monopsonistic (a higher number of labourers looking for jobs as opposed to employers or aggregators). There has been no significant growth in real wages at the all-India level over the past eight years.

On the contrary, the cost of healthcare and education is rising, most of which has to be borne privately. As per the latest household social consumption data (NSS 75th Round), only 4% of the rural population and 19% of the urban population reported that they had health expenditure coverage. According to the Economic Survey 2022-23, almost half of all medical expense is still borne by the patient themselves. 70% of India’s population who still reside in rural areas has to borrow more (25%) in comparison to their urban counterparts (18%) to meet their healthcare needs, driving an estimated 6 crore Indians into poverty, every year.

The government’s insurance coverage programme Ayushman Bharat, does not cover primary healthcare such as prenatal care, and other common diseases such as influenza and diarrhoea, which form a major part of household expenses on health. Even for the tertiary sector, and if one is lucky to get covered under government insurance coverage, new medicines for terminal illness diseases and surgical procedures remain outside the budget of a majority of the Indian household. For example, each round of chemotherapy and radiation costs more than Rs 1 lakh, whereas a vital organ transplant (liver and kidney) can cost anywhere between Rs 20 and 30 lakh. 

The same applies to quality education. At a time when public spending (Central and state governments taken together) is only 4.5% of GDP, it is not surprising that for a majority of the population, education is delivered by the private sector. Because of the failures of government schools to provide a decent education, studies show even the poor income households prefer sending their kids to private schools. The learning outcomes in government schools deteriorated post-pandemic. The ASER 2022 report flags widening learning gaps. Basic literacy levels of children have taken a big hit, with their reading ability compared with their numerical skills worsening sharply and dropping to pre-2012 level. However, sending kids to private schools cost money. As per a survey conducted by ET Online research, educating a child between the age of three to 17 years costs around Rs 30 lakh; a 4-year BTech or a 3-year BSc costs around Rs 4-20 lakh; and a five-and-half-year MBBS degree can cost up to Rs 1 crore.

No wonder in India, the middle class is getting squeezed.  

Nilanjan Banik is professor, School of Management, Mahindra University. He tweets @banik_nilanjan.

Growth in Female Labour Force Participation in India Now Seems to Be Stagnating

Among the women who work, the share of those who are self-employed has been increasing in recent years, even as their average earnings, already low, have dwindled further, the periodic labour force survey shows.

After recording some improvement in recent years, India’s notoriously low female labour force participation rate (LFPR) seems to have stagnated, data from the Periodic Labour Force Survey (PLFS July 2021-June 2022) shows. 29.4% of women (aged 15-59) were part of India’s labour force in 2021-22, as compared to 29.8% in the preceding year. In contrast, men’s LFPR improved from 80.1% in 2020-21 to 80.7% in 2021-22.

Figure 1

These numbers reflect the labour force participation rate (LFPR) based on current weekly status (CWS). An individual is considered to be a part of the labour force by current weekly status if they were either employed (or looking for work (unemployed)) for at least one hour on at least one day in the week preceding the survey.

The conspicuously low share of women in the labour force is not a new trend. India has historically reported low FLFPR, which started declining soon after the turn of the millennium.

The cyclical nature of women’s work

However, in recent years, women’s LFPR saw some improvement. In 2017-18, 22.9% of women aged 15-59 were part of the labour force. This improved to 23.4% in 2018-19, and saw a jump of nearly 5 percentage points in 2019-20. This period corresponds to July 2019 to June 2020, and includes the initial months of the Covid-19 pandemic when India was under a stringent lockdown brought in to check the spread of the new virus.

Research evidence indicates that even where women’s participation in the labour force is low, it often increases during times of crisis, indicating its counter-cyclical nature. In the 1999-2000 to 2004-05 period in India, for example, women’s participation in the labour force increased to supplement falling incomes in response to distress conditions in agriculture (Abraham, 2009). In their research, Mehrotra et al (2014) found that a large part (18 of 60 million, i.e. roughly 30%) of this increase in employment was due to rural women joining the workforce as self-employed workers in agriculture. In contrast, women quit agriculture in the high growth period of 2003-04 to 2011-12, but without an accompanying increase in non-farm employment, women’s overall LFPR fell in this period.

More recently, in their research investigating the links between pandemic income shocks and FLFPR, Ishaan Bansal and Kanika Mahajan (2021) had found that the probability of women’s employment increased in households that experienced sharp negative income shocks induced by the pandemic-related lockdowns in India. However, this improvement in women’s employment was only transitory in nature, and women’s employment started to decline once the economic situation of households improved, they found, underscoring that women’s labour often acts as an insurance during low-income periods for poorer households.

After increasing for another year, in 2021-22, the improving trend seems to have been arrested (Figure 1). However, the changes haven’t been homogenous for all women – in 2021-22, the LFPR saw small dips for rural women, women from Scheduled Tribe, Scheduled Caste, and Other Backward Class communities, as well as women who were illiterate or had primary-to-middle level of education. On the other hand, the LFPR among urban women, women with graduate (or higher) level education, or who were illiterate saw a marginal improvement between 2020-21 and 2021-22. (Figure 2)

Figure 2

 

Ongoing shifts in women’s work in India

Sixty percent of women (aged 15-59) who were working in India in 2021-22 were self-employed, the PLFS data shows. Among men, the corresponding share was 50.9% (Figure 3).

Figure 3

Self-employment includes a diverse set of individuals – from those who own a business with hired labour, to those who operate enterprises without any hired workers. It encompasses all individuals who do not work under a fixed contract and salary. Individuals may be self-employed because of a range of factors – this could be an aspirational choice but could also be a way to find work when one is not able to find wage or salaried employment.

“Self-employed” includes those who are own-account workers, employers or unpaid helpers. Among women who were self-employed in 2021-22, more than half (53%) worked as “unpaid helpers” and 44.5% were working as “own account workers” (those who operate their own enterprises without hiring any labour). Only 1% among those self-employed employed others in their enterprise. In comparison, of the men (aged 15-59) who were self-employed in 2021-22, 74.3% were own account workers, 5.9% were employers, and only 17.9% worked as unpaid helpers (Figure 4).

Figure 4

Working as an unpaid helper in a family-owned enterprise is a particularly inferior form of work – as it does not lead to independent income or increase women’s participation in the public sphere (Mehrotra, 2014). As Deshpande (2021) notes, much of the work undertaken by such workers includes “bottom-of-the-rung, survivalist livelihood activities”.

In 2017-18, 48% of women (aged 15-59) were self-employed, a proportion similar to that of men (48.9%), but this proportion has grown over the last four years. A similar growth has not occurred among male workers. And among women, this increase in self-employment has been driven largely by rural areas (Figure 5).

Figure 5

Similarly, among men and women of different age groups, women aged 15-19 were most likely to be self-employed and also most likely to work as unpaid helpers. In fact, in 2021-22, half (50.8%) of all women in this age group worked as unpaid helpers in 2021-22, up from 37.9% in 2017-18. Men above 30 years were the least likely to be working as unpaid helpers (4.4%).

Figure 6

The share of women working as unpaid helpers has increased for women regardless of their education levels, as Figure 6 shows, including those with higher levels of education. In 2017-18, 6.2% of women (age 15-59) with graduate (or higher) level of education worked as unpaid helpers. By 2021-22, this share had increased to 11.2%. At the same time, the share of those with this level of education having salaried jobs decreased from 79.7 to 72.1%.

A disproportionate presence in agriculture 

According to PLFS, workers can be working on different types of enterprises including proprietary enterprises (enterprises in the informal sector where an individual is the owner), public sector enterprises, public private companies and others (such as employer’s households, cooperatives and trusts). In 2021-22, 68.5% of women worked on proprietary enterprises, up from 54.8% in 2017-18. In rural areas, the share of women working on proprietary enterprises is much higher: three out of every four (75.7%) rural women workers worked on proprietary enterprises in 2021-22, as compared to 59.3% in 2017-18. In urban areas, their share was 56.6% (up from 51% in 2017-18).

Since these shares also include agriculture enterprises (most of which are proprietary enterprises), we also examine the trends after excluding agricultural enterprises. The share of women working on proprietary enterprises in that case is 58.4%. This varies between 55% for urban women and 61.6% for rural women.

This is not surprising since agriculture continues to employ an overwhelming share of women in India – 57.3% of the women aged 15-59 who were working were working in agriculture in 2021-22. In contrast, only 34.4% of the male workforce was employed in agriculture.

As CEDA has documented previously, the number of people employed in agriculture increased significantly during the Covid-19 pandemic. As stringent measures brought in to check the spread of the new virus disrupted the economy and led to large-scale migration and job losses for millions of Indians, agriculture became a fall-back option for many.

But the economic crisis had a gendered impact, the PLFS data shows. The share of women working in agriculture  increased in 2019-20 and 2020-21, the years of the pandemic, before registering a small decline in 2021-22. The share of men too increased, but not as much. More women were working in agriculture in 2021-22 than they were in the year preceding the pandemic. Among men, this was not the case (Figure 7). Additionally, of all working age women employed in agriculture, almost half (47.7%) were engaged as unpaid helpers (compared to 20.2% of men) and another 23.5% were working as casual labourers (compared to 19.3% among men) in 2021-22, the PLFS data shows.

Figure 7

Agriculture is a low-productivity, highly precarious enterprise, with volatile remuneration. The rise in agricultural employment beginning in 2019-20 has reversed the process of structural transformation in which workers move out of low productivity agricultural employment to high productivity sectors like manufacturing. Mehrotra et al. (2014) find that the productivity and wage difference between the two sectors is much higher in India than other Asian economies, such that a regression to agriculture leads to increasing inequality which in turn affects economic growth.

Wide gender wage gaps, especially among those who are self-employed 

On average, women workers earn much less than men across forms of employment. However, the gender earnings gap is most skewed amongst self-employed workers, the PLFS data shows. Among salaried workers, women earned Rs 14,678 per month on average in the Apr-Jun 2022 period, while men earned Rs 19,722 per month (1.3 times that of women). Those who worked as casual labour earned much less in general, but here too, men earned more on average. The average daily wage for women working as casual labour was Rs 272, while for men earned Rs 408 on average (1.5 times that of women).

Figure 8

Among those who were self-employed, the gap was wider. The average woman earned Rs 5,311 per month in the Apr-Jun 2022 quarter, while the average man earned 2.6 times (Rs 13,843). Additionally, women’s average monthly earnings decreased in each quarter of 2021-22, even as men’s average earnings went up. Consequently, the gender gap in earnings has only been widening over time (Figure 8). It is worth noting that earnings for those self-employed only include those who are employers and own-account workers, and exclude unpaid helpers. If the latter were to be included in the calculations, the average earnings would be much lower, and the gender-gap much wider.

Dhruvika Dhamija can be reached at dhruvika.dhamija@ashoka.edu.in. Akshi Chawla is Associate Editor, CEDA and can be reached at akshi.chawla@ashoka.edu.in.

This article first appeared on Centre for Economic Data and Analysis’s website. Read the original here.

World Bank: India’s Economy Expected To Grow 6.9% In Fiscal Year

India’s annual retail inflation eased to a three-month low of 6.77% in October, but some economists believe it could take up to two years before the rate eased to 4% — the middle level of the Reserve Bank of India’s target.

New Delhi: India’s economy is expected to grow 6.9% in the current fiscal year, the World Bank said on Tuesday, adding that it is well positioned to tackle global headwinds.

Asia fourth-largest economy expanded 6.3% in the July-September quarter, and gross domestic product growth for the full fiscal year is likely to be 6.8-7%, the government said last week.

The World Bank raised its forecast for India’s growth to 6.9% for the current fiscal year from 6.5% earlier. The Bank trimmed its expectation for next fiscal year to 6.6% from 7% earlier.

India, like its global peers, has been plagued by a rise in commodity prices and tightening monetary policy by central banks worldwide.

However, the World Bank is confident that the global slowdown has a much lower impact on India, compared to other emerging economies.

“We have no concerns about India’s debt sustainability at this stage,” World Bank economist Dhruv Sharma said, adding that public debt had declined.

The report sees average retail inflation at 7.1% this year and warns that the fall in commodity prices could dampen inflationary pressures.

India’s annual retail inflation eased to a three-month low of 6.77% in October, but some economists believe it could take up to two years before the rate eased to 4% — the middle level of the Reserve Bank of India’s target.

(Reuters)

Watch | How An All-Woman Factory Floor Is Helping Increase Women’s Share in India’s Labour Market

Data shows that if women in India received the same job opportunities as men, the GDP would grow by 18% by 2025.

Gayathri works at Kirloskar Brothers – a pump manufacturer in Coimbatore. She takes her two-year-old daughter along with her to the factory.

This job has become possible for her because her employer provides her with a company taxi and a creche facility. This makes Gayathri’s job extraordinary.

Data shows that if women in India received the same job opportunities as men, the GDP would grow by 18% by 2025.

Over 50% Fall in Number of Indian Girls Married Between 15-19 Years

Since 2000, India’s performance across indicators related to child health, education, labour, marriage and violence has improved, a new report says.

New Delhi: The number of girls between the ages of 15 and 19 years who are currently married is down 51% since 2000, a new report says. The country’s average performance across a set of indicators related to child health, education, labour, marriage and violence has also improved.

According to the Global Childhood Report released by UK-based NGO Save the Children, India, with its score on Childhood Index up 137 points, from 632 to 769, has also cut births given by teenagers by 63% since 2000 and 75% since 1990.

The index reflects the average level of performance across a set of eight indicators related to child health, education, labour, marriage, childbirth and violence.

“This reduction has resulted in over 2 million fewer teen births in India now compared to 2000 (3.5 million v/s 1.4 million), meaning progress in India alone accounts for nearly three-quarters of the global reduction in adolescent births during this period,” the report said.

If the rates of girls aged between 15 and 19 years had remained unchanged, there would be 9 million more married girls in India, the report said.

However, even with the improved performance, child marriage prevalence is higher in rural areas as compared to urban areas. These figures are 14.1% and 6.9% for rural and urban areas respectively for age group 15-19 years, the report says.

“India’s gains on its indicators will surely have a multitude effect on the next generation to come. However, while we see progress as per the data in the national averages, we urgently need to focus on narrowing the gaps between rural and urban areas and between people living in different wealth profiles.” the report added.

“Much remains to be done to reach the most deprived children who tend to be the furthest behind and are always the hardest to reach. Development policies and programmes formulated for children must ensure that there is special focus on children belonging to the vulnerable social groups, households in poverty, and children staying in states performing low on development indicators,” it said.

A comparison of End of Childhood Index scores, that evaluates 176 countries on children’s access to health care, education, nutrition and protection from ‘childhood enders’ like child labour and child marriage, finds the overall situation for children has improved in 173 countries since 2000, the report added.

Labour Reform is Fine But Who Holds Employers to Account When Government Fails?

A new community media platform in Delhi-NCR provides an unusual database of accounts by workers of the kinds of violation and enforcement failure encountered daily.

India’s labour law is under reform at a scale not seen since the 1970s. The Wage Code Bill has been tabled in the Lok Sabha and awaits the winter Session. The Industrial Relations Bill is ready for tabling, though press reports indicate that it may not be heard before the 2019 elections.

Opinions differ on what impact the new Wage Bill will have on wage benefits. While press reports argue the Bill hands to the Centre greater powers to set minimum wages across the board, labour researchers argue that wage standards will be weakened, permitting a race to the bottom by states. On the other hand, there is little doubt that the Industrial Relations Bill will finish the work already begun by amendment to the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Central Rules, namely that flexible hire and fire will be the norm across India.

Other than this basic shift in the standard job due to industrial workers, activists have argued that the two bills will reduce the liability of both employer and government to deliver fairness and justice to workers. What’s considered punishable – and the tools to punish – are both being reduced through reform. And yet this reduced accountability of government for rights at work is not compensated by a greater role for worker representatives, in fact quite the opposite. Unions will be fewer and weaker and worker consultation in the factory will also reduce.

For the workers filling India’s factories in Delhi-NCR, Pune, Chennai and Gujarat, the job standard and even the tools in the government’s hand may matter less than what the government chooses to enforce. Labour rights activists argue that the reforms show a slipping commitment to enforce. But the government is vociferous on smart governance and has argued the case for reforms largely in terms of a rationalisation of legislation and a fixing of the ‘plumbing’ of implementation. We must wait to see whether workers will be compensated with better enforcement for a diluted job standard. What is clear is that access to rights and entitlements is weak and there are few signs yet of smart governance pushing through to help.

A new community media platform in Delhi-NCR provides an unusual database of accounts by workers of the kinds of violation and enforcement failure encountered daily. Operating through voice (IVR) on simple mobile handsets, Saajha Manch provides workers useful information on accessing their entitlements and an easy means to share local news and experience. Powered by Gram Vaani, Saajha Manch asks listeners to dial a dedicated number – 92111 53555 – which triggers a call back. Receiving the call, listeners then access and navigate an audio playlist, much of which is contributed by other workers. At any time, they can press ‘3’ and offer their own contribution which will be published after moderation by Gram Vaani’s staff. While on the call, listeners also volunteer to partake in surveys administered over the IVR, where they select responses from a multiple choice by pressing digits.

Saajha Manch’s publicity poster. Credit: Author provided

The size of the problem

Since it launched in August 2017, Saajha Manch has been heard by 9,000 workers across the capital’s industrial regions, many dialling in to listen regularly. The over 1,500 listener contributions published on Saajha Manch show widespread and basic violations in the organised factory sector. More than a third of these contributions talk about wages, including bonus and overtime. Another 15% of these contributions focus on the Provident Fund which – for its heavy bureaucracy and snail-pace of change – functions more like a hefty tax on already paltry wages.

Saajha Manch’s survey of listeners in February 2018 provides further evidence of the scale of enforcement failure. Seventy percent of the 434 respondents were hired in their factories casually and through contractors with no job security, in spite of being engaged in regular and year-round tasks. Thirty-seven percent of these had no proof at all of where they were employed, making it impossible for them to file a grievance. A shocking 61% of respondents reported they were paid under the legal minimum wage and only 7%, above it. Among the vast majority doing regular overtime, only 20% were correctly paid for it (i.e. double the normal rate). With respect to the Provident Fund, only 23% of respondents were confident that their PF contributions were deposited and knew how to access their balance.

Do workers – facing such widespread violations – seek redress?

Yes, if they’re willing to risk their jobs.

Also read: The Ugly Underbelly of Make in India

Ram Karan, a skilled tailor from central Uttar Pradesh who volunteers with Saajha Manch, has worked in the capital for nearly three decades. Called to work on August 15, he went into a Gurugram factory fearing consequences if he exercised his right to refuse. At 5 pm, he tried to leave. Barred by locked doors, he and many other workers were informed they needed to do overtime. Ram Karan objected and got into an altercation with a supervisor which ended in his being fired from his job. In distress, with advice from Saajha Manch he tried to file an FIR against the employer. The police forced him to wait several hours, then refused to file, arguing this was a ‘civil’ and not ‘criminal’ matter. They later changed their stance and told him to ‘come back tomorrow’. Unassured, he instead filed a complaint with the assistant labour commissioner Gurugram. On September 4, he had his first hearing and reported it on Saajha Manch:

People from the company’s management came, claiming that I had never worked for them. The card they make is a punching card which only has a number and a photo, with no address of the company. So I explained to the commissioner that they never write the company’s address on the card, neither do they give joining letters. The commissioner spoke to the company management and warned them that their representatives are called to the labour court on September 17.

Filing an FIR against an employer who had forced workers to work a 12 hour shift on August 15, 2018, in
 Sector 14, Gurugram. Credit: Author provided

As Ram Karan’s story shows, the reasonableness of a worker’s request has little bearing on the response he can expect.  Just over half of the surveyed workers filed a complaint in the last two years, of whom 60% subsequently lost their jobs. Contrary to their declared procedures, government departments consistently fail to protect the names of complainant workers and whistleblowers.

Power concedes nothing without a demand

In this context – of the most basic violations – is the role of unions. At the outset of free India, trade unions were viewed suspiciously – by Gandhi as stoking avoidable class conflict, and by Nehru as a feature of laissez faire capitalism far from the state socialism to which he aspired. The post-colonial state has maintained a huge mandate in inspection, arbitration, conciliation and adjudication, in a paternalistic framework of maintaining industrial peace and protecting workers. But in keeping this role for itself – and curbing the role of unions – the state has spectacularly failed to deliver. And it will not deliver unless the subjects of this protection rise up and force it to. It is to ensure the state’s own basic commitments in law – rather than to bargain for anything more – that collective action is required. Frederick Douglass, former slave and American abolitionist, said in 1857, “Power concedes nothing without a demand. It never did and it never will”. Rights are secured when they are claimed by the rights holders, not when they are written in law.

The odds are stacked against such collective action and solidarity. In 2012, 35% of the workforce of organised industry was hired through contractors and rising, and one of the fastest-growing forms of employment is “regular salaried employment without social security and other nonwage benefits”. The capital region’s crowded market of labour contractors ensures those raising questions can be removed and protects the main employer from accountability to his workers. It also ensures maximum competition between workers – a ‘perfect’ labour market, in the textbook economics sense – wherein wages are bargained down to the minimum. The workforce – ever more comprised of migrants from other states – are not well placed to object.

Migrant citizens

While India’s constitution guarantees full citizenship for Indians across the country, the federal structure means that locals and outsiders are treated differently. Migrants to the capital region find themselves impeded from access to welfare entitlements and basic services because they lack local address proof. As outsiders and non-voters, they are poorly equipped to address the violations and service failures which plague their workplaces and residences.

The three lakh-strong worker settlement at Kapas Hera is built around open drains. Credit: Author provided

Sleeping account holders

Designed for an India of stable job-holders, the Employee State Insurance (ESI) and the Provident Fund (PF) today have a subscriber based largely composed of low-wage migrants, undemanding yet vulnerable, who struggle to push for a better service.

As more workers come under its net, the ESI scheme has been increasing its members (and so revenue) steadily since 2002. And yet its expenditure has not kept pace as subscribers fail to avail the service. Safe in India specialises in compensation for victims of industrial accidents in the automotive supply chain in Gurugram. Their approach is to get so close to the ESIC’s systems that they effectively track and monitor performance on its behalf, submitting regular reports on file status, attending the ESI’s regional Suvidha Samagams (complaint hearings) and reporting back on the forum’s effectiveness. With more than 1,300 workers’ claims delivered in 18 months of operation, the approach is working.

The PF’s equivalent to Suvidha Samagams is the Bhavashiya Nidhi Adalats. Meant for subscribers, it is attended only by employers and a few white-collar staffers pushing their complaints. Gurgaon’s regional commissioner explained to Saajha Manch, “To reach workers, we’ll need a partner to set up the meeting, a tent house on the street. We can’t do it alone”.

A Bhavashiya Nidhi Adalat convened by provident fund for its members, Gurugram. Credit: Author provide

User facing versus hollow marketing

These institutions’s processes are not only opaque but also poorly publicised. Marketing material is published and claims are made, but there is scant focus on making information practical and detailed enough for users to act on it. The government has become adept with respect to publicity and social media. But there is an urgent need to check and filter this information to arrive at a realistic and honest estimate of what it takes to use which service.

With hollow publicity, the accountability loop is breaking: the government can issue details which don’t function and is not held to account. Take for example, the claims made by government regarding the safety and ownership of biometric data on the Aadhaar card, exposed by hackers. Last week’s verdict reaffirmed the government’s responsibility as sole custodians of this data at the highest level.

What can a workers’ media platform like Saajha Manch do to address these failures?

Claims checking

One of the simplest functions of Saajha Manch is to filter the claims made in government advertising of entitlements, helplines and facilitation services, and then post accurate and detailed information so that listeners can get access. Saajha Manch staff and volunteers call up helplines, file online complaints and apply for schemes in order to see if and how they work, and the platform solicits and shares the experience of workers who have used these services. No information goes out unless it is verified.  We have learned, for example, that the Provident Fund’s helplines don’t work, while its online complaints procedure is good; the gas helpline works, from where you can initiate a gas connection and make a complaint; the Aadhaar helpline gives useful information about changing details and linking one’s card but is unable to clarify when and for what purpose a local address is required, and complaints filing online in the Gurugram labour office is much slower and less effective than going in person.

Tailoring As to Qs

The demand for this ‘information about government information’ is striking. On matters relating to the Aadhaar card alone, Saajha Manch received more than 30 queries and grievances in July and August. But it is just the tip of the iceberg of what workers want and need to know. The greater demand, we have learned, is for help with specific queries and grievances. Answers tailored to questions.

Seventy percent of those surveyed were hired in their factories casually and through contractors with no job security, in spite of being engaged in regular and year-round tasks. Thirty-seven percent of these had no proof at all of where they were employed, making it impossible for them to file a grievance.

Saajha Manch’s ‘Pucho aur Jaano’ service provides customised responses to workers who have contributed their questions and problems over the platform. The responses are procured from a network of experts – lawyers, activists, advisers, officials – who either send in their own recorded message or provide the text then recorded by Gram Vaani. When the response is in (up to a week after the query) it is published for all to benefit from and, the original contributor gets a call to inform him/ her. The close to fifty queries received in August ranged from how to acquire local address proof for inter-state migrants, to clarifications on complaint filing for Provident Fund, to how to register a trade union, reservations for disabled people, and how to tackle employers who resort to violence. Responses provide legal, procedural and tactical information and sometimes ask contributors to provide further details to plan the course of action.

Q: Gauruddin works in Gurgaon and banks are refusing to open a local account for him because the address proof on his ID card is from the village.

A: Local address proof will be required. If you don’t have it (e.g. tenancy agreement, utility bill etc), then take a letter from a local guarantor. If this is not possible, issue a signed application to your local MLA or councillor and this person will give you.

Q: Upendra Singh reports how workers seeking to leave his company discover their personal details have been mis-entered in the employer’s PF page, even though the correct details were shared with the employer. The company tells the workers they must change the original details (Aadhaar etc) before it will assist them with PF. [This appears to be a strategy to avoid depositing PF]

A: Gather all those affected and speak with HR. If this doesn’t work, you can file a complaint with the PF office but at least one of you must have proof of working in the unit

Q: Adizhul is a small tiling contractor in Ghaziabad. He took on a job along with a handful of workers, taking no wage advance on trust. After completing the work, he found the builder reluctant to pay him. After returning several times for his money, he was met by goons showing him their lathis.

A: You’ll need to inform us whether the work was being done on a commercial or domestic property. If commercial, you can file a case in the labour office, if domestic, you can file in the civil court. And as for the goons, please file an FIR in the local police station.

Q: We are a group of visually impaired workers with an NGO in Nagpur. How do we go about registering a trade union?

A: Under the Trade Union Act, 1926, the quorum required to register is 10% of workforce or 100 workers. You will need to file a written application to the Registrar of Trade Unions, along with a copy of the union’s constitution, its meeting timings and minute book. After scrutinising these things, the Registrar will get the union registered.

The tailored responses offered by Saajha Manch are popular. Listeners have called to express appreciation, of the value of being able to ask one question after another, and others than those who logged the original query have called to thank the platform for responses which they were also able to benefit from. Over time, Gram Vaani envisages a bank of responses which can be allocated to questions with increasing speed, as the overlap between old and new queries, and the network of expert respondents both grow.

Also read: How to ‘Skill India’ When the Jobs are Bad

In all this detail, there are persistent messages which press home the fundamental rights at work. The responsibility of the principle employer, for example. Whether a contractor is in-between or not, the duty of compliance lies with the person who runs the establishment. Another is the right of all workers to evidence of where they work, i.e. a payslip or an ID card or an appointment letter. This stands regardless of their contract. A third, even though they are given no choice but to subscribe, workers are customers of the PF and ESI services. The services are for them and they must therefore insist that they are welcomed and served correctly. A fourth, that all workers have a right to associate freely and join a union regardless of their contract. They also have a right to be represented in court by a union of which they are not a member. A fifth, India’s constitution grants equal citizenship to all and has no grounds of discrimination against those residing outside their home state. The discrimination shown to inter-state migrants has no basis in law.

In disseminating information and advice, from tactical detail through to foundational values, Saajha Manch hopes to democratise knowledge so that workers can make better use of it. And it is this promise which brings on board expert contributors, aware that they have scant ways to share their experience outside the limited audience of poorly attended hearings and courts. “The use of a media platform like this to raise issues related to labour is a necessary initiative and needs commending”, says Padam Kumar, advocate and expert contributor.

Referring workers to help offline

Workers’ problems are of course not solved by information and advice alone. They may take initial steps only to be faced with a stonewall or tactical dilemma. They may be ready to file a case and need representation. Even if they’ve managed to file, how can they possibly attend on one date after the next as the case hearing is delayed?

Ajmer Singh has worked in the Gurugram court for 18 years helping workers to file and get relief through conciliation and court. “It’s very hard for workers to manage here without help”, he says. “You need to have the contacts, you need to know how to push things”. By attending court on all the dates before a case finally gets heard, Ajmer substantially reduces a worker’s loss in daily wages. Pankaj Pandey requested for such help on Saajha Manch. “I can’t go alone to make a complaint”, he explained. It’s not just that he’d likely lose his job (and therefore fail in carrying the other workers along with him); it’s that he can’t manage the time. Ajmer Singh replied on Pucho aur Jaano, “It’s a simple process to put a complaint if you just write the details and submit to the local labour department… If you were to go together with your co-workers, it would help to create pressure and push the matter to a speedy resolution.”

Swift results for individual wage-related cases are relatively easy to secure, says Ajmer Singh. More difficult are cases of dismissal or layoff which pertain to the Industrial Disputes Act. Anyone who can prove themselves a ‘workman’ (a term used to denote regular or continuous workers of both genders!) can benefit from due process and compensation at layoff or closure, wrongful dismissal and a list of other ‘unfair labour practices’ of employers. But employers work hard to ensure casual and contract workers don’t qualify as ‘workmen’ especially since rulings often have consequences for large numbers of workers. Such cases are especially challenging for workers to take up without outside help. Unions are provided for under the Act, but casual and contract workers are normally prevented from joining unions of permanent workers and must make their own, tricky in an environment when any signs of organising will cost them their jobs.

In January 2018, Saajha Manch published a news item on the sudden lay-off of 54 workers at a factory in Okhla. After covering the story, we put the workers in touch with CITU, a trade union federation with the right to represent non-member workers. With CITU’s help, a proportion of the workers have since won three months’ compensation pay where they would have otherwise been left with nothing. A month earlier in December 2017, 14 regular workers were laid off from another Okhla factory without notice. Following no response to their protests from management, the workers decided to file a case. Here also, the CITU union stepped in to assist with representation and filing. On arriving at court, the company asked the workers to drop the case and come for talks. Along with CITU representatives, workers negotiated to get their jobs back.

Accountability

There are other grievances whose solution is so intractable as to require a bigger campaign to muster political and media pressure. The residential problems faced by the capital’s migrant workers fall into this category. Mohammed Alam reported in September on the landlord-tenant relationship prevailing in Kapas Hera, the three lakh-strong workers’ settlement bordering Gurugram’s Udyog Vihar. Landlords typically lease out 50 rooms charging Rs 2,500-3,000 per head per month as rent, he explained. Over and above this they charge for water and electricity at high rates. Tenants are forced to buy groceries from landlords’ shops and if they refuse, they are asked to leave.

Locked taps selling water from illegally sunk bore wells, Kapas Hera. Credit: Author provided

Building links with local bureaucrats and elected officials, Saajha Manch is poised to explore such civic and residential issues for migrants which in turn affect their ability to negotiate in job markets. Armed with audio testimony, its reporters play back these worker voices to local officials and demand a response. When Sudana Mehta described in mid September how Kapas Hera’s mosquitoes were so flourishing that hospital beds were no longer available, Anil Yadav, Municipal Councillor at the SDMC, responded, “The main problem is the open drainage system… But fogging has started today. We are even informing parents during the school parent-teacher meetings that water tanks should be covered… Anyone can approach us regarding fogging issues, we will work on it.”

Governmentt school kids march in kapas hera to raise awareness on vector borne disease. Credit: Author provided

The more active the complainants, the more accountable the officials. Nayab Singh Saini, Haryana’s minister of state for labour, is used to speaking with the press, but perhaps not in response to the audio testimony of workers. “Before we came to power, the whole system was not functioning properly. We can’t say that we have improved 100%, but a lot has been done and we are still working on it. We have created the website to speed up the process… I don’t think workers feel that the government is only working for the capitalists”.

Also read: For Two Years, Whistleblower Has Pursued MNC on PF Misappropriation, To No Avail

Harish Yadav, regional commissioner for the Provident Fund Gurgaon, responded to a worker who – with no PF number nor wage slip – is uncertain whether his PF is being deposited or not. “It is the responsibility of employers”, he said, “to issue a PF and a UAN number to all employees. If you’re not given one, you can come to our office and file a complaint and we will take legal action. An employer who does not deposit PF is liable under the IPC and we can file an FIR against him”. In a separate comment, he explains what he sees as the value of a platform like Saajha Manch. “Workers face a lot of difficulties due to lack of employers’ cooperation and inadequate information. A service that provides PF-related information and helps to remove the hindrances faced by workers to avail these benefits, is highly commendable”.

Looking ahead

Publicising saajha manch at the mazdoor kishan rally, September 5. Credit: Author provided

The set of workers’ rights enshrined in law is being cut back. Can workers be assured a trade-off, that those rights left will be better implemented? It is unlikely, for enforcement necessarily depends on workers’ collective action, and it is collective action through unions which will face the biggest hit with reforms. Even if contract and casual workers defy odds to build solidarity in the face of threats to their jobs, unions will find their space to operate has shrunk.

Paradoxically, in such an environment, the space opens up for collective action outside unions, as workers find themselves increasingly in the same boat of bad jobs, entitlement failure and deprivation as migrant citizens. Can platforms like Saajha Manch help to promote and instigate collective action, even in the face of repression of unions?

We hope so. By not only informing, guiding and referring, but also connecting workers in a way which is convenient and manageable within the enormous constraints of time and public space in which they operate. The base of Gram Vaani’s community media is stronger in migrant source regions like Jharkhand and Bihar than in destination regions like Delhi-NCR. In these states, Gram Vaani’s audio platforms play a key role in pushing accountability of government and employers. It is the scope to link source and destination, intra-state and inter-state, on which we hope to build as we move forward.

Orlanda Ruthven  is with Gram Vaani community media. She has worked on labour standards and employment in India for many years.