How Will India Fare in the Brewing Global Food and Fertiliser Crisis?

According to a research note by SBI, for every one dollar of increase in the pooled gas rate, India’s fertiliser subsidy bill shoots up by Rs 4,000-5,000 crore.

There is no such thing as a localised conflict in a globalised world. Sooner rather than later, fallouts from the Russia-Ukraine war will overwhelm the operations of developed and developing economies alike, leading up to the largest, and possibly, the worst food crisis the world has seen in decades.

The focal point for the imminent crisis emerges from the pivotal position the two countries occupy in the global food exports matrix. Ukraine and Russia together command a lion’s share of exports in wheat, barley and corn.

In the case of wheat, the two countries cumulatively corner 28.5% of the exports market between themselves, as per the Observatory of Economic Complexity.

The war, and the accompanying shortages it is triggering, has scrambled the fiscal math of a number of countries while large populations of poorer countries are progressively being pushed towards a hand to mouth paradigm as food prices skyrocket across the globe.

Also read: From Grain and Corn to Edible Oil, India Will Feel the Food Ripples of Ukraine’s Crisis

In Turkey, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s flawed and unheeding economic acumen has damned the country’s future. Adding to their woes is the Russia-Ukraine conflict, which has inflated food prices to such an extent that Turkey’s impoverished citizens are forced to stand in line for hours waiting for government-issued bread; the same bread that is beyond their reach when sold in local bazaars.

Locals queue for Istanbul Municipality’s cheap bread to make small savings in their household budget in Sultangazi district of Istanbul, Turkey, December 7, 2021. Photo: Reuters/Umit Bektas

Tunisia, on the other hand, has been crippled by three years of droughts crimping the country’s agriculture output. The country imports close to 50% of its food grains for consumption, and this, not surprisingly, is eating into the country’s budget. The  food grain costs, alone, will scale up to  $1.2 billion this year, a jump of nearly 60% from the previous year.

Elevated food prices are also wrecking havoc elsewhere.

In Morocco, street protests are becoming commonplace whereas in Sudan, where inflation is faring at an incredible 260% under a military regime, an upsurge of forceful protests is being quelled by equally violent crackdowns.

Other countries like Eritrea, Syria, Ethiopia are already contending with horrendous food scarcity crises that are threatening to worsen in the coming days.

This is beyond alarming to satraps in power given that history holds ample evidence substantiating the fact that many insurrections in this region have stemmed from food inflation forcing people to spill out in unison onto the streets, in protest against their governments. The dictators in power are keen on avoiding a repetition of the historic arc but such a move will cost the local economies dearly further adding to their debt burden.

Meanwhile, whatever hopes the global economy was pinning on China to make up for the food grain deficit are now categorically dashed thanks to the wave of destructive floods that hit China last year during the planting season. The harvest for this year is being chalked up to be quite low.

An aerial view shows rescue workers evacuating residents on a flooded road following heavy rainfall in Zhengzhou, Henan province, China July 22, 2021. Picture taken with a drone. Photo: Reuters/Aly Song/File Photo

Food prices have been virtually on an uninterrupted  rise since the pandemic, which in its wake, choked supply chains across the globe. In nominal terms, price of cereals stood at an all time high in February 2022, according to the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations.

The organisation also runs a Food Price Index which shows that the global cereal and vegetable oil market – both segments in which Russia and Ukraine play a significant role – have been the most affected. Over the course of 2021, international prices of wheat and barley rose 31% over their corresponding levels in 2020 whereas in the rapeseed and sunflower oil sector, annual price increases in the magnitude of 65% and 63% respectively have been observed.

The story with maize is no different. Maize price measures have risen by over 20% in the first week of March as concerns over the crop yields in Brazil and Argentina occupy the spotlight. The spill-over effect of rise in wheat prices, rising energy costs and the closing down of Ukrainian ports are working in a combination to put maize out of the reach of the common man. Matters are further compounded by the protectionist tendencies with which several nations have responded to the crisis.

Moldova, a small exporting nation when it comes to wheat and corn, has barred shipment of these products while Hungary has outlawed grain exports. Egypt has also responded in the same vein by banning exports of wheat, lentils and flour.

For a few months now, Russia has been experimenting with higher tax rates on wheat exports whereas Ukraine has stopped exports of wheat and other staple foods to ensure its citizen have access to enough food resources.

India’s woes

But it is not just food inflation that is roiling the global markets. Fertiliser production has also taken a drubbing, and consequently fertiliser costs have been rising uncomfortably. The prices of urea, an essential ingredient in manufacturing of nitrogen fertilisers, has risen by two and a half times over the past 12 months, in tandem with the price rise of phosphorous fertiliser rising during the same period.

Also read: India Has a Serious Hunger Problem and it Needs Urgent Policy Intervention

Currently, India’s dependency on imports is to the extent of 25% requirement for urea, 90% in case of phosphates (either as raw material or as finished fertilisers) be they di-ammonium Phosphate or mono-ammonium phosphate or  triple superphosphate, and 100% in the case of potash according to documents from the Department of Fertilisers.

Representative image of a farmer spraying fertiliser. Photo: IFPRI/Flickr CC BY NC ND 2.0

Between FY ’21 and FY ’22 (April-January), India’s urea imports from Russia have shot up from $27.15 million to $123.79 million, while imports from Ukraine were at $368.79 million by the end of January 2021.

While supplies from Ukraine are paralysed, Russia’s ministry of industry and trade in early March urged domestic producers to stop exports overseas. There is still hope for India, in that, it could make up for the deficit by pressing for higher imports from China, Oman, Saudi Arabia and UAE, countries from whom India has imported a sizeable share of urea in recent years. However, even if India does manage to find a way around the problem of urea sourcing, it will find itself occupied by concerns of rising fertiliser subsidies.

Also read: The Little-known Nitrogen and Phosphorus Crisis of Industrial Agriculture

Underpinning the rise of fertiliser prices would be the hike in natural gas prices, a key material required in the manufacturing of urea. The current allocation of Rs 1.05 lakh crore is likely to fall short considering the massive upsurge in global natural gas prices.

According to a research note by SBI, for every one dollar of increase in the pooled gas rate, India’s fertiliser subsidy bill shoots up by Rs 4,000-5,000 crore.

But, there could be a silver line to the imminent food crisis. The Food Corporation of India is currently sitting on wheat stocks of 23.4 million tonnes, which is three times the mandated stocking norms of 7.4 million tonnes. India currently commands around 14.14% of the total wheat production in the world but is far from leading in wheat exports considering that in 2020, it barely accounted for 1% of the global trade. The country has been pacing ahead in wheat exports in FY ’22, tripling its total export to 6.6 million tonnes from 2.15 million tonnes exported in FY ’21, as per data from the Union commerce ministry.

For now, India is setting high hopes and aiming to breach the 10 million tonnes mark for wheat exports. However, this will be possible provided India can manage to chart a way through several World Trade Organisation norms that prohibit export of commodities procured at minimum support prices. India will also have to step up its game when it comes to delivering wheat that is not of a sub-standard quality.

What India Really Eats

Analysis of large-scale representative datasets shows that a vegetarian meal is the cultural practice of a minority of India’s population.

Analysis of large-scale representative datasets shows that a vegetarian meal is the cultural practice of a minority of India’s population.

A kebab stall in Jaipur. Credit: Travis Wise/Flickr CC BY 2.0

A kebab stall in Jaipur. Credit: Travis Wise/Flickr CC BY 2.0

At a time when food has provided so much grist for the identitarian and nativist mill, it is important to infuse into public discourse a modicum of reason through facts.

For long, India has been mythologised as a vegetarian, and particularly beef-eschewing, society. Such a representation has further been ideologically explained (and justified) by a wide range of scholars, politicians and popular discourse by constructing India as a society primarily shaped by religious norms which purportedly ‘explain’ the proclivity to vegetarianism and the beef-taboo. Such a representation has had obvious consequences over the last century or so, and much more recently in the openly toxic mixture of communalism and casteism.

While much has been done (and continues to be done) by scholars, particularly historians, to dispel this narrative, the scale and near-legendary status of the above representation has made it difficult to counter in a systematic manner. A key assumption that stands as a hurdle in countering this myth is the idea that social groups (such as religious communities or castes) in India are homogenous, with their members simply following culturally-prescribed norms of behaviour. Such assumptions hide the immense variability within any social group. They also contribute to false representations of Indians as exceptionally anti-individualistic and group-oriented. Indians thus appear as ‘cultural dupes’, mutely following rather than actively questioning, challenging, bending and transgressing social norms.

This short essay, a summary of our article in the current issue of the Economic and Political Weekly, is a challenge to the above representation of India and Indians. In that paper, we analysed three representative large-scale datasets of self-reported behaviour (National Sample Survey, National Family Health Survey and India Human Development Survey) to establish some basic facts about what ‘India’ eats. The findings seriously question many public claims about food habits – and importantly, suggest that no general claim based on a social group can pass muster.

How prevalent is vegetarianism in India?

The extent of overall vegetarianism is much less than common claims and stereotypes suggest; survey estimates show that between 23% and 37% of the population of India is vegetarian. Thus, far from being a vegetarian nation, India is a meat-eating majority nation. The notion of ‘non-vegetarian’ and the discourse around vegetarianism, then, reflect the hegemony enjoyed (thus far) by the ‘minority’ vegetarian population.

Where are the vegetarians in India?

There is considerable regional variation in vegetarianism, although there is a pattern – states in India’s west and north have a relatively higher level of vegetarianism compared to states in the east and south. Six states (all in the northeast) have less than 2% incidence of vegetarianism. Among states with at least two crore population, three have less than 5% (Assam, West Bengal and Kerala) and three have over 75% (Haryana, Rajasthan and Punjab). These regional patterns could be due to the agro-ecological availability of foods, cultural politics related to locally-dominant social groups (castes, religions) and gendered differentiation in food habits.

Vegetarianism, by state. Credit: NSS

Vegetarianism, by state. Credit: NSS

Intriguingly, there is little substantive difference in vegetarianism between rural and urban locations. Vegetarianism increases with urban size, from small towns to large towns to small cities to large cities. However, complicating this picture, the megacities have a lower incidence of vegetarianism. Any explanation for all this would need to include the fact of working-class migrations from different parts of India and across castes and religions.

How internally diverse are social groups in India?

There is considerable variability within social groups, trumping all stereotyped characterisations, especially those based on religion and caste. This, therefore, also complicates generalised characterisations of ‘India’ based on meaningless averages.

Apart from Jains (overwhelmingly vegetarian) and Sikhs (majority vegetarian), no other religious category is majority vegetarian. Hindus – by far the largest group in the population – are majority meat-eaters. Turning to government mega-caste categories, incidence of vegetarianism is least among STs, but closely followed by SCs, and it is higher among OBCs and highest among non-SC/ST/OBCs. Further, we see immense variation even among Brahmins, with only two-thirds of Brahmins and one-third of ‘forward castes’ being vegetarian – much lower than stereotypes would have it.

A vendor waits for customers at his stall at a wholesale food market in Mumbai October 14, 2013 file photo. Credit: Reuters/Danish Siddiqui

A vendor waits for customers at his stall at a wholesale food market in Mumbai October 14, 2013 file photo. Credit: Reuters/Danish Siddiqui

How does gender shape food practices of groups?

Overall, the incidence of vegetarianism is higher among women than men, and the gap is substantial (almost ten percentage points, with incidence among women almost 50% higher than among men). Interestingly, the size of the gender gap is similar between rural and urban areas, across different city types and across mega caste categories. Further, the gender gap is greater in regions where overall incidence is greater.

Vegetarianism, by gender and caste category. Source: NFHS

Vegetarianism, by gender and caste category. Source: NFHS

A portion of the gender gap may be related to the fact that men eat outside of the household a lot more than women do, and with greater moral impunity than women. This allows men to enjoy greater ‘flexibility’ from norms in a patriarchal context. The other side of the same coin is that the burden of maintaining a ‘tradition’ of vegetarianism falls disproportionately on women. Overall, the significant gender gap within social groups and regions makes claims of a group and regional ‘traditions’ problematic.


Also read


How prevalent is beef-eating in India?

Although there is a paucity of data sets and a greater likelihood of underreporting, it appears that the extent of overall beef-eating may surprise everyone. On the one hand, it is much more than the beef-taboo stereotype suggests, while on the other it is far less than – and with significant variation within – religious and caste groups stereotypically thought to eat beef.

Nationally, at least about 7%, but more realistically closer to 15%, of the population eats beef. The incidence of beef-eating is 42% and 27% among Muslims and Christians, respectively; the incidence is 5% each for Hindu SCs and STs. And yet these figures – themselves likely reflecting underreporting – mask large variations within groups: the incidence among Muslims is 7% in Rajasthan and 67% in West Bengal, and the incidence among SCs is close to zero in Rajasthan and 22% in (undivided) Andhra Pradesh.

How do political ideologies impact self-reporting of food practices?

There is evidence of cultural-political pressures affecting reported and actual food habits. For instance, on average, states with larger shares of OBCs in the population also tend to have larger vegetarianism gaps between OBCs and Hindu ‘forward castes’ – indicating a possible ideological ‘breaking free’ by OBCs. Similarly, states with larger shares of Muslims in the population also tend to have more incidence in reported beef-eating among Muslims.

It is striking that the four southern states top the list of beef-eating among SCs in the major states; these are precisely the states with a relatively longer and stronger history of Dalit liberation movements. All of this suggests that any reported data need to account for the bias towards underreporting of meat and beef, and over-reporting of vegetarian diets, due to the social hazards of such admissions. Hence, the title of our paper underscores the need to provincialise vegetarianism.

OBC, Muslims and population shares

OBC, Muslims and population shares

To conclude, analysis of large-scale representative datasets shows that a vegetarian meal is the cultural practice of a minority of India’s population. It is important to complicate most pictures of food habits in India by attending to variations (across different dimensions of location type, region/state, social group, gender and class – and within social groups). Attention to variations allows us to better understand the social processes that sustain social phenomena such as food habits. What is claimed as a group or national ‘tradition’ is not innocent of power and struggles over hegemony. Basic questions such as ‘what is food’ and ‘who decides who can eat what’ get determined in the registers of power, desire, identity and preferences.

Balmurli Natrajan is an anthropologist at William Paterson University of New Jersey and Suraj Jacob is a political economist based in Udaipur.

Partition Changed India’s Food Cultures Forever

The older cuisines like Mughlai faded away and in their place came the robust makhni gravy and tandoori dishes

The older cuisines like Mughlai faded away and in their place came the robust makhni gravy and tandoori dishes

Four generations of the Gujrals: Kundan Lal Gujral with his wife, Prakash Devi, holding their grandson, Monish. Standing next to Prakash Devi is daughter-in-law, Rupa; and Kundan Lal’s mother, Maya Devi. Courtesy: Roli Books

Four generations of the Gujrals: Kundan Lal Gujral (the founder of Moti Mahalwith his wife, Prakash Devi, holding their grandson, Monish. Standing next to Prakash Devi is daughter-in-law, Rupa; and Kundan Lal’s mother, Maya Devi. Courtesy: Roli Books

At the far end of a crammed Daryaganj gulli, bustling with all manner of trade, is a heavy wrought iron gate. Push it ajar and you step into an overgrown garden defining its central courtyard. The Terrace is an old sprawling home that takes you back in time. It’s the last intact kayasth haveli in “Shahar” – “The City” – the once magnificent Shahjahanabad, the only city that really mattered for its residents.

Two years ago, on a peaceful winter afternoon, the sun streaming on to our armchairs in the garden, I met Mrs Rajesh Dayal here for the last time. She had lived here since the 1930s. I was interviewing her for my book on Kayasth cuisine and culture.

“I remember Booby,” she had said earnestly at one point in our rambling conversation. Booby, the cook from the Muslim quarters of Ballimaran, had been quite in demand back then. The Kayasths, great epicures and fond meat-eaters, called him home for family weddings, sangeets, Holi and Diwali gatherings. Booby would get to work, digging up the soft ground in a clearing by the Yamuna, lining the pit with hot charcoal, placing a big, fat degh of meat, spices and vegetables inside this pit and then covering it with earth. It was in this craftily assembled indigenous oven that he would let fabulous dishes like the shabdegh stew overnight – till the meat and turnips that went into the smoky curry were of the same texture, splitting at the touch of a spoon.

“I have never had that kind of shabdegh again. It’s a dish that disappeared,” Dayal’s voice had trembled. Dayal died before the book, Mrs LC’s Table, saw the light of the day. Along with her what passed away were memories of those elusive stews and treats and the men who had cooked these. As for Booby, like many others of his ilk, had been swallowed up by Partition, never to be seen again.

The bloody years post Second World War II up to the Partition of India in 1947 rent Delhi’s older cultural fabric in a decisive way. Cuisine was a minor but still a very significant casualty. What the city lost in terms of its artful, elaborate dishes was replaced by newer, bolder, tomato-laden flavours from western Punjab. As a new immigrant community poured in from across the new border, new tastes and techniques gained ground. Tandoori became the food of Delhi. Mughlai, the older cuisine that had come about as a result of a composite culture of Shahjahanabad, faded.

Some of Shahjahanabad’s fabulous Mughlai treats can still be found: shabdegh, the meat-and-turnips winter delicacy, mutanjan pulao, rich with dried fruits, gola kebab, where the art lay in removing the kebab with such dexterity from its skewer that a whole round of mince fell off on the plate, special Meerut kulfi that shaukeen denizens of shahar preferred, dil ke kebab, pieces of the heart, roasted on the sigri.

But most of these delicacies live only in faint and fading memories. “There was just one kebabchi outside Jama Masjid who did gola kebabs till about two decades ago. When he stopped, I asked him why and he replied, ‘bibi, ab woh purane log hi nahin rahe. (The old connoisseurs are all gone)’. His new customers only wanted cheaper indiscriminate kebabs,” says Salma Husain, Persian scholar and author of the book The Emperor’s Table on the cuisine of the Mughals.

Delhi’s true Mughlai food was the product of a syncretic culture brought about by the close living together of Shahjahanabad’s four original communities: The Muslim aristocracy, the educated kayasths, part of the court and the baniyas and khatris who owned businesses and banks. It was a cuisine that developed over two-and-a-half centuries, thriving on sustained patronage much after Bahadur Shah Zafar, the last emperor of Hindustan, was exiled. Partition changed all that.

The tandoor (or “tannur”, as it is called in Arabic) is of Central Asian origin, where it is still used to bake bread. That was the tandoor’s initial use in the Punjab too. The culture of sanjha chulha in the villages of the Punjab was centred on a common tandoor, around which women gathered to bake fresh bread but to also exchange the minutiae of their lives.

Hindu refugees from the Punjab carried their clay ovens to the great metropolis of Delhi. Their grit, hardiness and enterprise was apparently no match for the culturally sophisticated but effete Dilliwallah. Businesses changed hands and Delhi’s cuisine became firmly and predominantly tandoori.

In 1947, a refugee from Peshawar, Kundan Lal Gujral, first opened a restaurant called Moti Mahal in Daryaganj, not far from The Terrace. “The building had suffered badly during the rioting; its roof had disappeared and parts of it hung dangerously,” says senior Delhi resident Anil Chandra, one of Moti Mahal’s early patrons, who got to know Gujral.

In this building, Gujral, set up a tandoor and started selling roasted chicken with naan in the style of old Peshawar eateries. “The old residents of Delhi, both Hindu and Muslim, were not chicken eaters and there was some resistance till younger people got exposed to the new flavours,” says Chandra. Dal makhni, tandoori chicken and naan aside, there was soon a demand for curry. At this point, the practical Gujral decided to use leftover tandoori chicken (since refrigeration was expensive) in a rich sauce he concocted with butter, curd, tomatoes. The makhni gravy was born and “Indian” food would never be the same again.

It wasn’t as if the old Mughlai food disappeared entirely from the old city, though. Restaurants like Flora were still famous for their Mughlai delicacies in the early decades post Partition. “These restaurateurs and caterers such as Hakim, who was one of the most famous caterers of old Delhi, chose to stay back after Partition. Some of the kebabchis and kulfi and chaat wallahs who had disappeared in the aftermath of Partition, scared and scattered, also returned,” points out Husain. But business was no longer the same. Much of the old gentry had moved out. Newer tastes were emerging – and newer ways of doing business. The old food businesses shut.

In Delhi, what also disappeared was the Anglo-Indian food. Cutlets, chops and scones were replaced by Indian snacks served up by fancy restaurants in Connaught Place, now owned by Punjabi families. Restaurants like United Coffee House and Kwality had come up as cafes in the early 1940s, catering primarily to Europeans and troops posted in Lutyen’s Delhi around the time of the Second World War. In the aftermath of Partition, as tandoori took over and the Punjabi palate gained ground, the European and Anglo Indian food these places served too changed.

The interior of United Coffee House, Delhi. Photo courtesy: Anoothi Vishal

You can still come across a certain style of “continental” food at Kwality and United Coffee House. But these old-fashioned au gratins and chicken a la kievs that we still spot on their menus are a throwback to the 1960, when a second round of “conti” appeared on fashionable tables.

It wasn’t just Delhi either that saw a change in its food culture, post Partition. Places like Lucknow and Meerut, where Awadh’s composite but inward-looking culture had engendered all sorts of fabulous delicacies for the tables of the aristocracy and rich landlords, also saw a shift. Things like kali mirch chicken appeared in stalls near the railway station with the advent of the migrant dhaba owners.

Intricate older dishes such as the malai paan lay forgotten. Shami kebab, pasande, meat-and-vegetables curries were left confined to a few homes because entertaining declined as many of the rich Muslim landlords migrated.

Umami is a relatively recent term being brandied about in the world of food these days. Much before this “fifth” taste, described as meaty or brothy, was recognised by the Western world as essential to gastronomy, the Punjabi palate had zeroed in on the tomato (naturally rich in glutamates, which contributes to the sense of umami).

Instead of the refined spicing and yoghurt-based cooking of Mughlai food, robust tomato-onion-garlic gravies bursting with umami began to define every single dish in Punjabi restaurants (which, ironically, dubbed themselves Mughlai). If Partition brought about one definite change in the history of Indian food, it was this idea of generic ‘Indian’ gravies. This generic Indian food, tailored for the Punjabi palate, was entirely restaurant created. In India, where there is such a diversity of cuisines that dishes change their character every 100 km, it is ironical that this Punjabi-restaurant creation became the template for “Indian” food both within and outside the country. Foreigners, with little knowledge of regional Indian food, still identify “Indian” exclusively with these bastardised gravies.

The dominance of this kind of restaurant food – kadhai paneer, balti meat, butter chicken et al – continues till today even within the country, though we seem to be finally rediscovering regional Indian cuisines  of late. The indomitable Camillia Panjabi who was responsible for conceptualising so many restaurants at the Taj, the Indian hotel chain, in the 1980s-1990s, says in her book, 50 Great Curries of India: “Attempts to introduce regional Indian dishes in menus always met with customer resistance, in the sense that customers continued to order the Punjabi dishes on the menu. In India, the majority who eat out as part of their lifestyle are Punjabis… Since they form the backbone of the clientele of almost every Indian restaurant in the country, restaurant owners are extremely wary of directing the menu away from Punjabi favourites.”

This culture of eating out may be finally changing with the millennials, but for most of our post-Independent life as a nation, Punjabi food that had first made inroads into Delhi post Partition defined Indian restaurant food.

Partition, of course, brought about other changes too in our food cultures. In Mumbai, as immigrants arrived from cosmopolitan Karachi, they brought with them the widespread culture of snacking in the evenings. “Chaat beyond bhelpuri only appeared with the appearance of the Sindhis, post Partition. They were the great snackers, ” says Panjabi. Chaat, a product of UP’s composite culture, had come to India’s commercial capital in a roundabout way, if we are to believe these accounts.

In Bengal, the hilsa became a source of much rivalry. As migrants from East Bengal brought their own “more refined” way of cooking (as it is widely rated), there was nostalgia for the quality of ilish from the Padma river (in East Bengal, then known as East Pakistan), which is supposed to be better than the fish from the Ganga.

“The quality in Bangladesh is better. In India, the size is also shrinking due to the demand-supply gap. They catch the fish early here and the taste is not so good,” says restaurateur Anjan Chatterjee, whose restaurant chain Oh! Calcutta has a menu that balances East Bengal and West Bengal cuisines.

Chatterjee’s wife belongs to an East Bengal family – he, on the other hand, is a ghoti (from West Bengal), and he acknowledges the superior cooking of the eastern lot. (The culinary rivalry can be as intense as any football one.) While much of the East Bengal food was brought in by the refugees to the common culinary culture of the state, some recipes and foods became elusive.

“There are recipes such as ilish wrapped in a pumpkin leaf, marinated with mango pickle masala, put inside half cooked rice and then steamed that are lost,” says Chatterjee. Dried fish shutki and special pickles from Sylhet, sweets like the malai chamcham and bhapa doi from Comilla and the kormas and kachche gosht ki biryani from the “dawaats” in old Muslim homes in Dhaka are still stuff for nostalgia.

Many of these exquisite dishes may in fact no longer exist in Bangladesh today, where the old Bengali epicurean culture has given way to a newer order. But that’s what large-scale upheavals do. Put us in the churn; some things are lost, others gained – many foods of pre-Partition days are long forgotten, but that cataclysmic event also brought new flavours to India.

Anoothi Vishal is a writer on food and the author of Mrs LC’s Table.