The Watershed Moment in German History That Created Adolf Hitler

That tipping point that led to Hitler’s rise was a set of extraordinary events that played out in Munich exactly 100 years ago today, on November 9, 1923.

Shortly before midnight on May 31, 1962, Adolf Eichmann was hanged inside the maximum security Ramla prison, south of Tel Aviv. Earlier that evening, president Yitzhak Ben-Zvi had turned down Eichmann’s mercy plea post his conviction and sentencing by a Jerusalem court under Israel’s Nazis & Nazi Collaborators Punishment Act, 1950. The 56-year-old Nazi had been found guilty of war crimes, crimes against the Jewish people and crimes against humanity, and Israel’s Supreme Court later confirmed the conviction and the sentence.

A crematorium had been specially built on the prison compound because Eichmann had requested to be cremated, though traditional Jewish custom forbade cremation. Early on the morning of June 1, 1962, before sunrise, the ashes were taken out on a police motorboat and scattered in the sea six miles beyond Israel’s territorial waters; the country’s shores could scarcely be allowed to be soiled by Nazi detritus.

Adolf Eichmann (inside his bullet-proof glass booth) at his trial, 1961. Photo: Author provided

One of the two men charged with the disposal of Eichmann’s ashes was Meilach Goldman-Gilead, an Auschwitz survivor aged 37. Goldman was a Polish Jew who had moved to Israel in the early 1950s and was now a police officer requisitioned to help in the Eichmann trial as one of the junior prosecutors. The ashes had been placed in a two-litre milk jar no more than three-quarters full, and Goldman was struck by how little ash remained of a human adult. It was at that point that Goldman had his epiphany:

“Standing there, I remembered that about a week after I had arrived at Birkenau, in November, 1943, I was taken out of the block with a group of some ten prisoners, and we were led towards the crematoria. We already knew what was happening there, and thought we were being led to our death. The ground was icy and we were walking with our wooden ‘Dutch’ shoes. A Polish ‘capo’ (a prisoner coopted as a forced labour supervisor or prison guard) stood there, with some SS men. We were brought to a mountain of ash. We were told to get wheelbarrows, fill them with ash, and scatter it on the routes the SS guards would take during their patrols, so they wouldn’t slip. It was a full day’s job. Later we were returned to the camp. 

…Immediately after they had removed Eichmann’s body (from the oven) and I saw what little was left of it, I realised how many hundreds of thousands must have been in that ash pile at Birkenau. It’s an association I will not forget for the rest of my life.”

There was no way Gilead could have forgotten. A gangly 17-year-old in 1942, he had looked on helplessly as his parents and 10-year-old sister were bundled off to the Belzec death camp, where all three were to be gassed to death. Adolf Eichmann had been the ‘Final Solution’s’ top gun, overseeing with clinical efficiency the deportation of European Jews to the rash of extermination camps that occupied Poland was dotted with. It was unsurprising, therefore, that the first time Goldman sat opposite Eichmann to take down his testimony before the trial and Eichmann opened his mouth to speak, Goldman “had the feeling I was seeing the gates of the crematorium open”.

Having disposed of Eichmann’s ashes, Goldman and his colleague described their journey back like this: “… [we were] headed back, and the Sun had come up. The fishermen were returning from their nighttime fishing, and we saw Tel Aviv awaken to a new day…..I suddenly felt we were alive: the Sun was shining….[and] the nightmare was over. A new chapter had begun.

Holocaust survivor Abba Kovner testifying at Eichmann’s trial. Photo: Author provided

With Eichmann’s trial and execution, Nazism could plausibly be thought to have run its course. The naivete of such optimism, though, was to become apparent fairly soon.

To Israel, at any rate, it looked as though Nazism had been exorcised for good: wasn’t it extraordinary that it was the Jewish state which happened to send Hitler’s executioner-in-chief to the gallows? Monsters such as Josef Mengele and Klaus Barbie still remained at large – but for then it seemed not far-fetched to believe that the nightmare was finally over.

But if the Eichmann trial marked the end of Nazism in a manner of speaking, was there a point in time that could conceivably be described as Nazism’s jumping-off point, its opening gambit? Can we identify a watershed, a moment which set Nazism on course for its murderous later ascendancy, even though that ascendancy could not necessarily have been visualised at that point? I will argue there indeed was such a point, a crossroads from where several distinct pathways radiated out, some likelier to be followed than the rest, but as has often happened in history, the choice made was as fortuitous as it was bizarre. But being fortuitous did not stop it from leading up to one of the goriest episodes of blood-letting in recorded history. 

That tipping point was a set of extraordinary events that played out in Munich exactly one 100 years ago today, on November 9, 1923. Elsewhere I have referred to the day’s proceedings as ‘Germany’s own 9/11’ but probably that description somewhat downplays the momentousness of their repercussions. The terrifying attacks of September 11, 2001 on New York’s iconic Twin Towers were no doubt a particularly ghastly terrorist strike with a vast number of victims. The sequel to the attacks was even deadlier, because by announcing that 9/11 had changed everything – the US did change everything.

Also read: ‘Operation Valkyrie’: The Failed Plot to Kill Adolf Hitler

Former US President George W. Bush declared war on Saddam Hussain (who was not an actor in the 9/11 drama), much of West Asia was plunged in the most violent chaos, perhaps for all of foreseeable future, vast swathes of Iraq and Afghanistan were laid waste, the ISIS was born and thrived, millions of ordinary men, women and children were killed and some other parts of the region – notably Syria and Yemen– were also mutilated beyond recognition. 

There is no gainsaying all of that – but what happened on that fateful November morning in Munich belongs in an altogether different league. For, if the world has ever found itself staring at the apocalypse, it was thanks to the extraordinary train of events set in motion that day.

History’s bloodiest war – consuming no fewer than 80 million lives; the unspeakable bestiality of the Holocaust; the forced migration, in Europe alone, of 75+ million humans; the horrors of the atomic bomb blasts over Hiroshima and Nagasaki. These and other spectacular abominations make up the grisly harvest of what November 9, 2023 sowed on German soil.     

Munich city council members being taken hostage by the puschists. Photo: Author provided

So what happened? In the early afternoon that day, Hitler led about 2,000 of his Kampfbund acolytes, all variously armed, on a violent and raucous march to Munich’s city centre. Hitler’s original project had been more grandiose: a march on Berlin to seize political power by throwing out the ‘vile, Jewry-infested’ Weimar Republic. He was hoping to mimic Benito Mussolini’s triumphant march on Rome of one year prior, the march that catapulted the Fascist supremo to the position of the Italian Il Duce.

However, Hitler’s wildly fanciful plan had fallen through when he failed to get Bavaria’s far-right state commissioner and its military and police chiefs – who had at some point been co-conspirators – on board his plot. The night before had been tumultuous. In a scene straight out of a knockabout farce, Hitler’s men waylaid a large political rally ongoing in Munich’s Burgerbraukeller beer-hall, shooed the speakers off the stage and held them hostage, leaving the floor open for Hitler to make a dramatic entry.

He fired pistol shots in the air and proceeded to harangue the 3000-strong gathering on the ‘illegitimacy’ of the Berlin government, announce the death of the Weimar Republic and the beginning of the ‘national socialist revolution’. Later that night, Hitler’s men occupied the war ministry complex, raided arms caches, plundered currency-printing presses, vandalised Jewish businesses and a prominent newspaper’s office and kidnapped Munich’s mayor and his council members. But as dawn broke on November 9, support for the ‘revolution’ evaporated and the regular army and the police came out in strength to put it down.

At a loss what to do and increasingly listless, Hitler, “a little man in an old waterproof coat with a revolver at his hip”, as the New York Times’ Munich correspondent wrote in his despatch, “scarcely seemed to fill the part” of the strapping young leader of a coup d’etat. 

Also read: How Fear of Communism Led to the Rise of Hitler, Nazism and World War Two

The army had meanwhile driven Hitler’s men out of the war ministry. Something had to be done quickly, and when someone suggested a march on the city centre, Hitler, aware that it was a desperate, possibly fatal, gamble, agreed. The marchers set off on their outrageous last-gasp mission. Inevitably, there ensued a deadly showdown with law enforcement near Odeonplatz. In the mayhem that followed, four Bavarian policemen and fifteen Nazi marchers – besides an ill-fated bystander – were shot to death. Hitler fled the scene (with only a dislocated shoulder), leaving his dead and dying comrades to their own devices, and hid for two days inside the loft of a friend’s house at some distance from Munich. His injured arm in a sling, the future arbiter of Germany’s destiny was disconsolate with despair and considered suicide. On November 11, 1923, the police arrived to pick him up. Dressed in no more than a borrowed, loose-fitting bathrobe, Hitler gave himself up. He knew that, at a minimum, a sizeable prison sentence, even a likely deportation, awaited him. Hitler reckoned it was the end of the road for him and his revolution. 

Hitler and the other leaders of the ‘revolution’. Photo: Author provided.

He was not alone in thinking thus. The world outside more than agreed with him. On November 10, The Manchester Guardian reported how “(t)he German reactionaries have struck and failed”. The New York Times did not disagree. ‘Reichswehr Troops Crush Bavarian Revolt’, ran the most prominent headline of the newspaper’s front page. In an opinion piece, the NYT commented:’The Burgerbrau’ coup d’etat was the craziest farce pulled off in memory’.

Much of German and continental press was often more dismissive, rubbishing the uprising as a ‘Beer Hall Putsch’. The Berliner Tagleblatt called it a childish prank. Le Petit Parisien dubbed the performance sheer vaudeville. Le Matin compared it to a carnivalesque adventure. Vossische Zeitung opined that the end had come for ‘charlatan Hitler’. Frankfurter Zeitung actually ran an obit on the Nazi Party. In his defeat, Hitler looked ludicrous and nowhere near menacing.

In one of history’s great ironies, however, his weakest moment metamorphosed swiftly into Hitler’s moment of triumph. The disgraced leader of a thuggish band of no more than a few thousand men had a fairy-tale image makeover. The circumstances that combined to create that miracle make for an absorbing read. 

One, there was a great outpouring of public support for Hitler and the Nazis in Bavaria and elsewhere in Germany, where antisemitism and anti-republicanism already ran rife. Hitler’s arrest and ensuing trial were noisily celebrated in and around Munich as a martyr’s oblation to his fatherland, thus turning a little-known rabble-rouser into a serious political actor.

Two, the abortive march and the trial focussed on Hitler such public attention in and outside Germany as he couldn’t ever have dreamed of. Three, the Bavarian authorities themselves were more than keen to downplay the criminality of the Nazi misadventure. They had much to fear for, including a possible unveiling of the close links that top men of the state administration maintained with Hitler till just before the coup.

This proximity ensured that Hitler and the others were arraigned only for ‘high treason’. The five policemen killed, many Jewish establishments vandalised, government officials kidnapped, arms and cash plundered, a prominent newspaper office burnt to the ground – all these serious charges were ignored in the indictment. 

Finally, and most importantly, Hitler’s trial turned out to be not merely a travesty of justice but also a moral outrage: it provided him with the ideal platform for broadcasting, virtually unchecked, his odious views on nearly everything on earth, from ‘the numberless vices of Jewry’ through the ‘evil machinations of Marxists and Bolshevists’ to how Germany had been stabbed in the back by ‘the November criminals’ and forced to sign a dishonourable peace in the first World War. In his long, shrill defence arguments, Hitler cynically but adroitly whipped up antisemitic and anticommunist sentiments which found echoes inside the courthouse and outside it.

Adolf Hitler serving the ‘prison sentence’. Photo: Author provided

The choice of the trial court – as unusual as it was baffling – contributed in no small measure to the trial’s eventual outcome. Logically, Hitler should have been tried at the federal-jurisdiction Leipzig special state court, which would likely have handed down the death sentence, or at any rate deported Hitler, an Austrian national, to his home country.

But the rightwing Bavarian administration defied the federal government and had Hitler tried at Munich’s ‘People’s Court’, which featured a mixed bench of two professional judges and three lay judges and disallowed any appeals against its judgements. All the judges had unabashedly far-right, ultranationalist sympathies and allowed Hitler full play of his demagogical skills.

Hitler insisted he was ‘out-and-out a German patriot’ and the judges couldn’t agree more, thereby ruling out his deportation. At the end of that charade of a trial, the judges sentenced Hitler to a mere five-year jail term. Even more incredibly, he was to be paroled after only eight months of prison-time on account of ‘exemplary conduct’! On December 20, 1924, Hitler walked out of jail to a hero’s welcome. The convicted criminal had transmogrified into the Fuehrer.

All his disappointments and failures behind him, he would now march relentlessly towards his hideous goals. The icing on the cake was that he penned his convoluted, obnoxious opus – Mein Kampf – in the safe haven of his comfortable Festungshaft prison-house, one of the mildest jail sentences under German law.

It’s perhaps not idle to speculate what might have happened if

  1. Hitler was to get killed on November 9, 1923 at Munich’s Odeonplatz. (After all, the man he had locked arms with as they marched, Scheubner-Richter, had been shot through his lungs and died instantly.) Or;
  2. The trial that magically changed his, and Nazism’s, fortunes were to be somewhat less perverse than it actually was.

Counterfactuals are, of course, passé in historical inquiry, but it is hard to smother the thought that, had November 9 not played out as insanely as it did, we might have been living in a different world than what history bequeathed to us. And it may not thus be inapposite to trace Nazism’s take-off moment to that bleak, early-winter day in Munich one hundred years ago. 

Anjan Basu is a literary critic, commentator and translator based out of Bangalore. He can be reached at basuanjan52@gmail.com.

Operation Bagration: A June 22 Hitler Had Not Bargained for

Operation Bagration kicked off on the third anniversary of Operation Barbarossa, and it marked the beginning of the end for Nazi Germany.

Stalin had long been asking that his Western allies open the second front in Europe so that the humongous pressures on the Red Army slackened somewhat. Finally, with the Allies landing in Normandy on June 6, 1944 the European front materialised.

Scarcely any episode of the Second World War has received as much attention – and adoration – as Operation Overlord. After all, it marked the Allies’ getting a foothold on the continental mainland, and Berlin, the capital of Hitler’s Third Reich, was just about 1,200 km from the beachhead via a road that ran through Paris. And the mystique surrounding the largest seaborne invasion in history gives Overlord the heft to be called ‘D-Day’, the day on which the gigantic Nazi war machine apparently began to  unravel.

But barely two weeks later, on June 22, 1944 began what turned out to be the largest Allied operation of World War II, a campaign that dwarfed not only Overlord but even the epic battle of Stalingrad, widely believed to have been the War’s turning point.

Also read: When Hitler Realised the End of the War Was Upon Him

Indeed, in the scale of its operations, Bagration (pronounced baag-raat-see-ohn)– the Red Army’s counteroffensive through Byelorussia – towers over every other engagement of the War (with the possible exception of Barbarossa, the German invasion of the Soviet Union on 22 June, 1941) – including those in Moscow, Leningrad, Kursk, the Ardennes and Berlin. In under two months, Operation Bagration wiped out about a quarter (roughly 500,000 troops) of Germany’s Eastern Front manpower.

Of the four armies comprising the vaunted Army Group Centre, one, the 4th, was decimated and two other – the 9th and the 3rd Panzer – very nearly so. Thirty one of the 47 German divisional or corps commanders (of the rank of General) involved in the battle were either killed or captured. The Wehrmacht’s back was broken.

Bagration also restored the Soviet Union to her pre-1939 borders by throwing the Germans out of Soviet territory, and launched the Red Army on a crushing offensive that was to culminate in the battle of Berlin and the dissolution of the Third Reich.

In comparison, D-Day looks almost like a side-show: German deployment here added up to only 11 divisions (the Eastern Front had 228), and Germany lost no more than 9,000 troops here.  The Allied forces were mired on the beachhead far longer than they had anticipated, progress inland was painfully slow, and the port city of Caen, a major objective only about 50 kms from the Omaha beach, was not captured before July 21, or a full 45 days after D-Day.

Bagration, on the other hand, took a little over ten days to punch a hole 400-km wide and 160-km deep in the German frontline. By the middle of August, the Red Army was knocking at Warsaw’s doors, less than 600 km shy of Berlin.

And yet, in most histories of the Second World War, Operation Bagration gets mentioned only in passing. It is only in recent years that critical attention has begun to be directed at this important episode of the War.

Also Read: As in Life so in His Death, Hubris and Delusion Defined Adolf Hitler

The 76th anniversary of Bagration is as good a time as any to go over the ground it covered and recapitulate how it panned out in those crucial two months.

In Yalta in December 1943, Britain, the US and the Soviet Union had agreed to orchestrate the Allies’ future campaigns against the Axis. Churchill and Roosevelt informed Stalin that the Allies planned to open the second front by landing in France in May the following year. In turn, Stalin promised to support that operation by launching a massive strategic offensive around the same time. Bagration – named after the Georgian general of the Tsarist army who died fighting Napoleon’s troops in Borodino near Moscow in 1812 – was the result of that commitment.

The Soviet armies involved in bloody fighting in the winter and early spring of 1943-44 had made spectacular advances, particularly in the south, in Ukraine and the Caucasus. They had also managed to lift the crippling siege of Leningrad (now St Petersburg) that had lasted nearly 900 days. At that point in the war’s eastern theatre, the Soviets had over 6.5 million troops spread over 12 fronts (or army groups) aligned along a 3,200-km front facing four German army groups and an independent army, which together numbered 2.25 million men. Of the 12 Soviet army groups, four, namely the First Baltic, and  the Third, the Second and the First Byelorussian, would come into play in the operation.

Of the four German army groups, the one directly in front of these Red Army formations was the famed Army Group Centre commanded by Field Marshal Ernst Busch, not a particularly capable commander, but a favourite of Hitler’s because of Busch’s obsequiousness to the Fuehrer.

Numerically the strongest army group on the Eastern Front – it had around 700,000 troops in 51 divisions – Busch’s group had two major weaknesses other than being led by an unenterprising leader. Spread over a 780-km front, its was a thinly-held line; and  its forces occupied a somewhat awkward salient: a bulge extending substantially eastwards north of the inaccessible Pripyat Marshes close to the headwaters of the Dvina and Dnieper rivers east of Vitebsk (please see map), making the flanks vulnerable to spirited enemy attacks. STAVKA (the Soviet High Command) now settled on striking at Army Group Centre in a series of surprise ‘deep operations’ manoeuvres that would destroy this jewel in Hitler’s crown.

But the Soviet decision had not been made with an eye on Marshal Busch’s vulnerabilities, personal or strategic. STAVKA had determined that the demolition of Army Group Centre would bring the Red Army to the borders of Poland and East Prussia and facilitate future operations hugely. Equally importantly, the best – and perhaps shortest – road to Berlin from the East ran through Warsaw, which sat on a straight line from General Rokossovsky’s First Byelorussian Front through the deep defences of Army Group Centre.

Besides, other options open to the Red Army at that point had been considered and dropped: for example, a strike into the Balkans by one or more of the northern spearheads (viz., the Third Baltic and Leningrad fronts) – rejected because it would still leave much of western Russia in German hands; or the option of a northwest strike from northern Ukraine across Poland to the Baltic Sea – not pursued because it would mean a long and perilous drive with dangerously open flanks.

Having thus decided on the broad contours of the offensive, the Red Army set about filling in the tactical and operational details, a project of astonishing ingenuity and skill, the like of which has been seen only rarely in the history of modern warfare.

First, the Soviets launched an elaborate tactical programme of deception – maskirovka in Russian. In April, the entire Soviet army assumed a defensive posture, and kept up the appearances with great verve, so that German intelligence was inclined to discount the possibility of an imminent, large-scale operation. But more importantly, the Red Army build-up managed to deflect attention to the south-western part of the front, to Ukraine, giving out clever and seemingly bona-fide signals, which the Germans picked up with alacrity, of an impending operation against Field Marshal Walter Model’s Army Group North Ukraine.

Somehow, the Germans had also persuaded themselves that a Ukrainian offensive would best serve the Red Army’s operational objectives, and when reports of a large Soviet build-up in the front opposite Army Group Centre started to come in beginning early June, the German High Command viewed that build-up as a deception, thus playing fully into Soviet hands.

The deception was so complete that the Germans, incredibly, started shifting a lot of their fire-power, and a whole Panzer corps, from Busch’s command to Model’s. Thus, as the Red Army was rearing to go, Army Group Centre lost 15% of its divisions, 23% of its assault guns, and a staggering 50-88% respectively of its artillery and tank strength.

Hitler had no answer to the Red Army’s T-34 tank.

And the Soviet build-up on the eve of Bagration was the War’s most massive – 4,000 tanks, 5,300 aircraft, and over 25,000 pieces of mortars, assault guns and other indirect-fire weapons gave the Red Army armour, artillery and air superiority of 10:1 at the assault point, even as two million troops faced off with about 500,000 German combatants.

This build-up necessitated reinforcements to the extents of 300%, 85% and 62% respectively in tank, artillery and aircraft strengths. Marshal Zhukov, one of Bagration’s heroes, recalls that the front needed to be supplied with 400,000 tonnes of ammunition, 300,000 tonnes of fuel and lubricants, and 500,000 tonnes of food and fodder before the battle.

It is a tribute to the Red Army’s organisational virtuosity that it managed to amass these enormous quantities of fire-power, accessories and provisions without giving their game away. Battle-hardened veterans Marshal Georgiy Zhukov and Marshal Alexander Vasilevskiy were made responsible for planning, coordinating and directing two fronts each: Zhukov for the two southern fronts (2nd and 1st Byelorussian) and Vasilevskiy for the two northern fronts (1st Baltic and 3rd Byelorussian). The front commanders were Generals Bagramyan (1st Baltic), Chernyakhovskiy (3rd Byelorussian), Zakharov (2nd Byelorussian) and Rokossovskiy (1st Byelorussian, the largest formation, also tasked with covering the most ground).

A vital component of the Soviet plan was parallel partisan warfare. By this phase of the War, Byelorussian partisans, numbering close to 150,000, were a formidable force, capable of paralysing German supply lines virtually at will and demolishing bridges, highways and railway installations whenever required. The wooded and often boggy terrain made parts of Byelorussia ideal partisan country. Now well-armed and well-provisioned by the Soviets, partisans set and carried out their operational objectives in coordination with the Red Army. In the days leading up to Bagration, they stepped up sabotage and demolition very significantly, waylaying all supplies meant for Army Group Centre but taking care to let supplies in the reverse direction pass unmolested.

Also read: ‘Abandon Hope All Ye Who Enter Here’: The Hell-Gates of Dachau

The Soviets’ ‘deep operations’ – a concept borrowed from the ‘Deep Battle’ military theory first formulated by Mikhail Tukhachevsky and Alexander Svechin – worked with deadly effect in Bagration. Breakthroughs were achieved at several points in the enemy line by massive infantry-led attacks with heavy artillery and air support.

When holes had been punched in the German lines, armoured spearheads rushed through them and encircled the communications and supply centres by double envelopments. Waves of such attacks would follow in rapid succession, each spearhead delving deeper than the one before it, overtaking, overwhelming and encircling enemy formations at blinding speed, and keeping the enemy continually guessing which direction the next attack would come from.

All in all, Bagration was to cover a front stretching for more than 1,200 km from Lake Neshcherdo to the Pripyat, and 600 kms deep – from the Dnieper to the Vistula and the Narew. The first avalanche of attacks began on June 22, 1944 and by the morning of the 26th, Army Group Centre appeared to be falling apart. One after another, all the major town and cities occupied by Germany since 1941 were wrested from her control – Vitebsk, Bobruysk, Minsk, Slutsk, Mogilev, Borisov, Stolbtsy, Marina Gorka, Lublin….. All Byelorussia was freed, followed by large parts of East Poland and Lithuania and, in the second leg of the operation, those parts of the Ukraine which were still in German occupation. By 25 July, the Red Army had reached the Vistula.

On the way, it had stumbled upon the Majdanek death camp – the first concentration camp to be discovered – where the Nazis had murdered at least 80,000 people in cold blood. On July 28, the Red Army liberated the historic Brest fortress. Fully, 50 German divisions had been routed, 30 of them destroyed. In the operation’s second leg, after the 1st Ukrainian Front had joined the offensive, the Wehrmacht lost another 30 divisions, eight of which were wiped out.

Konstantin Rokossovskiy and Georgy Zhukov – two of Bagration’s heroes.

The virtual destruction of the Army Group Centre was Germany’s most calamitous defeat in the War. The Soviets could now sit calmly on the Vistula, reorganising and resupplying their forces, confident of their ability to drive to the Oder, the Neisse, and then on to Berlin.

The demoralised Germans, on the other hand – now obliged to fight on two full fronts – could only mount a weak defence along the Vistula. In an irony of history, Operation Bagration, which had begun on the third anniversary of Hitler’s most ambitious military campaign, had now sealed the Fuehrer’s fate.

Anjan Basu can be reached at basuanjan52@gmail.com