Russia Stops Gas to Poland and Bulgaria, Opens New Front in Economic War

The state-controlled gas pipeline monopoly supplies Europe with about 40% of its gas needs.

Sofia/Warsaw: Russia’s Gazprom halted gas supplies to Poland and Bulgaria on Wednesday over their failure to pay in roubles, cranking up an economic war with Europe in response to Western sanctions imposed for Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine.

The state-controlled gas pipeline monopoly, which supplies Europe with about 40% of its gas needs, said transit via Poland and Bulgaria – whose pipelines supply Germany, Hungary and Serbia – would be cut if fuel was siphoned off illegally.

Fears that more states could be hit, in particular Germany, Europe’s industrial powerhouse which relied on Russia for more than 50% of its gas imports in 2021, sent gas prices soaring and added to jitters about the global economic impact of the war.

President Vladimir Putin’s demand for rouble gas payments is the centrepiece of Russia’s response to sanctions which include freezing hundreds of billions of dollars of Russian assets.

The European Commission accused Moscow on Wednesday of blackmail. But it has said Russia’s payment system could be used without breaching European Union sanctions. Uniper, Germany’s main importer, said it could pay without violations.

The Kremlin, which casts sanctions by the United States and Europe as acts of economic war, said on Tuesday that Gazprom was implementing Putin’s decree on rouble payments.

“Payments for gas supplied from April 1 must be made in roubles using the new payments details, about which the counterparties were informed in a timely manner,” Gazprom said.

It said it was halting supplies to Bulgaria’s Bulgargaz and Poland’s PGNiG “due to absence of payments in roubles.”

Warsaw, which has been at the forefront of efforts to keep Ukraine’s military supplied with equipment to fight Russian forces, and Sofia said the halt was a breach of contract.

Few options

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said Russia’s action was “unjustified and unacceptable” and said the EU would seek alternative supplies, aiming to refill the bloc’s depleted stores before next winter.

But Europe has few options given the global market for gas was tight as a drum before the crisis escalated. Europe relies on pipelines for most of its gas, and European or North African producers connected to the grid cannot add much more output.

Shipments of liquefied natural gas (LNG) from suppliers further afield are usually booked up in long-term contracts. The United States, which long criticised Europe for relying on Russia, has offered Europe more LNG, but U.S. supplies are not adequate. Even if Europe can secure more LNG, it does not have enough plants to convert the super-cooled liquid back into gas.

Germany plans to build such plants but, for now, has none.

The European Commission has said companies should pay in the currency agreed in existing contracts with Gazprom – almost all of which are in euros or dollars.

But it said companies could still make payments without breaching sanctions under Russia’s new system. One option would involve companies confirming contractual obligations were completed when they deposited dollars or euros with Gazprombank – which handles payments – before any conversion to roubles.

Uniper, which said its payments would still comply with sanctions, said German supplies remained safe despite the halt to Poland and Bulgaria. Hungary, meanwhile, said this month it was prepared to pay in roubles.

But one of the Kremlin’s most loyal lawmakers suggested Moscow could expand action beyond Poland and Bulgaria.

“The same should be done with regard to other countries that are unfriendly to us,” said Vyacheslav Volodin, the speaker of Russia’s lower house of parliament, the Duma.

Rationing looms

For now, Austria, Germany, Czech Republic, Italy and Hungary said Russian gas supplies were still flowing.

Bulgaria and Poland are the only two European countries with Gazprom contracts due to expire at the end of this year, which meant their search for alternative supplies was well underway.

“They were therefore less likely to compromise on Russia’s rouble payment request than others in Europe,” said James Waddell, head of European gas at consultancy Energy Aspects.

But he said that, with global supplies so tight, losing Russian gas meant “either the market shoots up to make industrial gas use uneconomic or governments intervene in rationing supply. At a certain point, rationing is unavoidable.”

Germany has already activated the first stage of an emergency plan, which by its third stage involves the regulator deciding how to distribute supplies to industry, which accounts for a quarter of German gas demand.

Carmaker Mercedes-Benz warned that an abrupt halt in deliveries in Germany would impact production in its home market.

Poland, alongside the United States and some other European states, had long been critics of its European neighbours which had been steadily deepening a reliance on Russian gas that was first pumped to Europe in the 1970s, during the Soviet era.

Poland’s contract with Gazprom is for 10.2 billion cubic meters (bcm) per year, covering about 50% of its demand. Bulgaria, which relies on Russia for about 90% of its gas imports, said it would not hold talks to renew its Gazprom deal.

In the European gas market, the benchmark Dutch front-month gas contract at the TTF hub jumped around 20% to as high as 118 euros ($125.14) per megawatt hour (MWh) in earlier trade, before trading at 106.20 euros/MWh by 0938 GMT.

Russia-Ukraine: If Biden’s Sanctions Produce Inflation, Nehru Could Have the Last Laugh

Both the Centre and RBI will have to keep a hawk’s eye on food and energy price inflation in the next few quarters.

Note: This piece was first published on The India Cable – a premium newsletter from The Wire & Galileo Ideas – and has been republished here. To subscribe to The India Cable, click here.

After much debate about its desirability, the US bit the bullet and removed some leading Russian banks from the SWIFT (Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication) messaging system. SWIFT connects over 11,000 banks in over 200 countries on a common transactional information platform.

This is possibly the harshest economic sanction against Russia to date.

Being removed from this system will cause much pain and disruption in Russia’s international trade conducted through its prominent banks. It is like SBI, Canara, HDFC and ICICI Bank – holding nearly 50% of Indian bank assets, including regular credit to large and small exporters – being suddenly thrown out of the global banking information system.

Iran is believed to have lost over 30-40% of its trade, including in oil and gas exports, when it was removed from SWIFT in 2012 after being sanctioned by the US.

News reports say President Joe Biden had to convince some key European Union nations before imposing the latest measure. Germany, which depends on Russian gas for over 30% of its needs, had legitimate concerns about the scale of disruption to energy exports from Russia. In a way, this was Putin’s trump card, which could potentially split the US and EU on the nature of sanctions. The US is nearly self-sufficient in energy.

Also watch: ‘Nightmare Scenario for India If US Decides Russian Threat Means Easing Up On China’: Shyam Saran

However, the US managed to find a middle ground with the EU, which is to punish Russia enough without totally incapacitating its energy trade. Throwing key Russian banks out of the SWIFT system will create ripples in markets, leading to further hardening of oil prices from the present elevated level. Crude has surged to $105  in response to Russian banks being removed from SWIFT, and the rouble is down 30% against the dollar.

Earlier, as global oil prices moved up, it produced the perverse outcome of Russia earning higher revenues for its oil/gas exports! So some calibrated cost had to be imposed on Russia. Throwing large Russian banks out of SWIFT will partially achieve that aim, hitting Russia’s oil revenues considerably. Oil, gas and related products account for nearly 50% of Russia’s exports and 35% of its GDP. The Western alliance would want to strategically target this but is also calculating the blowback to the global economy.

Putin may have anticipated this and created parallel trading and banking arrangements via China and other non-hostile countries, which are very few at present. Even North Korea has such subterranean arrangements to export its mineral resources. This is closely controlled by the political elite.

Putin had also been de-dollarising the Russian economy, with some help from China. This gathered pace after the 2020 pandemic when close to 45% of trade between China and Russia was non-dollar denominated. China has also been consciously conducting non-dollar trade with some countries. Partially de-dollarising mutual trade by conducting large transactions in local currencies was also actively discussed at the BRICS forum a few years ago.

Russian President Vladimir Putin arrives for a meeting with representatives of the business community at the Kremlin in Moscow, Russia February 24, 2022. Photo: Sputnik/Aleksey Nikolskyi/Kremlin via Reuters

Russia last year denominated the largest share of its foreign currency reserves in gold. It was the first country to have more official forex reserves in gold rather than in US dollars. Most large economies keep the largest chunk (over 50%) of their reserves in US dollars. It is seen as the safest hedge. However, it is yet to be seen how prepared Russia is to counter the overall impact of multiple sanctions. Russia’s stock market has fallen 35%, which may be an indicator of what lies ahead. We will know the full extent of damage to Russia’s economy in a few months, if no diplomatic solution is found. If Russia is badly hurt, higher energy costs will inflict pain on global markets. Food grain prices might also move up as Russia and Ukraine account for over 25% of global wheat production. The region is seen as Eurasia’s breadbasket.

From India’s perspective, both energy and food are very sensitive segments of the political economy. The first big hit will come after the Uttar Pradesh elections when the Modi government will be forced to adjust domestic petrol and diesel prices against international levels.

The last domestic price adjustment occurred on November 4, when crude was $75 per barrel. Since then, no domestic price increase has happened, primarily because of UP elections. After the UP polls, the Centre will either have to increase domestic petrol/diesel prices by 33% to align them with global crude prices or cut excise duty proportionately. Cutting excise will throw the government’s revenue assumptions out the window. If US sanctions on Russia last even two quarters, inflationary forces might spiral out of control. The rupee’s exchange rate could also decline sharply if global investors seek the safety of US treasury bonds.

Besides, global financial market disruptions could make it difficult to raise money. A former RBI governor told me that whenever there is panic and uncertainty in global financial markets, investors rush to the safety of US government bonds. This is not good news for stock markets in the developing world. Appetite for foreign direct investment or foreign participation in India’s divestment or asset monetisation programme may be tepid this year. Both the Centre and RBI will keep a hawk’s eye on food and energy price inflation in the next few quarters. Fiscal 2022-23 could well be about mere crisis management for most major economies.

In his reply to the President’s address, Prime Minister Narendra Modi mocked Nehru for citing the Korean War of 1952 as the reason for inflationary pressures in India. It will be no surprise if Modi ends up blaming the war over Ukraine for India’s economic woes in due course.

Nehru may yet have the last laugh.

Revolut: Could Allegations of Russian Involvement Sidetrack a Fintech Revolution?

The Revolut investigation is a lesson to handle politically sensitive topics with extreme care.

Revolut has been one of the biggest disruptors to the banking industry in recent years. The fintech company is intent on revolutionising international payments – and it has.

With traditional banks, international payments are monopolised by the Swift system. Customers pay a hefty fee for transfers, which very often do not require any effort on the part of a bank. Instead, Revolut offers an easy-to-use wallet which enables a customer to transfer money between currencies, free of charge. A wallet can include US dollars, UAE dirhams, as well as cryptocurrencies like bitcoin and ethereum.

In the short time since it was founded, Revolut has attracted more than 3 million customers. It now has an EU banking licence, which means it can start offering current accounts and loans to clients across the EU. But politics in Lithuania, where Revolut gained its banking licence, could cause some serious issues for the new bank.

Looking to Lithuania

Founded in the UK in 2015 by Nikolay Storonsky and Vlad Yatsenko, Revolut was originally regulated by the UK’s Financial Conduct Authority. Under its rules, Revolut was not classified as a bank and any money deposited had to be ring-fenced in an account with a regulated bank. But amid the prospects of a hard Brexit, and the opportunities provided by a larger EU banking market, Revolut started looking for a eurozone-based banking license.

Lithuania was an obvious candidate. An EU member since 2003, it started its campaign to attract fintech companies in early 2016 and has made considerable progress in creating a proper environment for the development of the fintech industry.

The Lithuanian government simplified procedures for obtaining licences to operate e-money and payments services. Start-ups can obtain an e-money or payment license in just three months (four if the preparation stage is included), which is two to three times faster than in other EU jurisdictions. Plus, the government passed laws to regulate peer-to-peer lending platforms and crowdfunding. Initial capital requirements for bank licenses are also five times lower than in other EU countries.

With its Lithuanian-issued EU banking licence, Revolut will start accepting deposits and offering retail and business lending in 2019, making it an even bigger rival for traditional banks. Meanwhile, Lithuania benefits from the supply of very well trained IT personnel, stable government policies and digital-friendly society.

The scandal

Soon after Revolut got its banking licence, however, Lithuanian politics started muddying the waters. To grasp what happened next, it’s important to understand the politically sensitive relations between Lithuania and Russia. Lithuania was under the iron fist of the Russian empire for 123 years, and then part of the Soviet Union until its independence in 1990. Russia is therefore perceived as a constant threat to the country’s stability.

This is why claims that Revolut has links with the Russian government are causing controversy in Lithuania at the moment. Stasys Jakeliūnas, chair of the Lithuanian parliament’s budget and finance committee has accused Revolut of being involved with the Kremlin.

This led to calls for an official investigation into Revolut’s activities by Jakeliūnas’s office. Jakeliūnas claimed the “potential existence of persons related to Russian policy among the Bank’s shareholders”. His stated concerns were that the father of Revolut CEO Storonsky was a director at a division of Gazprom, a company with close ties to the Kremlin, and that one of Revolut’s shareholders (DST Global Fund) was owned by Russians.

he investigation could ultimately result in Revolut’s banking licence being revoked. Stoking the fires further in Lithuania, the LRT news channel also reported that Revolut servers might be transferred to Russia. This would put personal data about Lithuanian customers in Russia’s hands.

Revolut’s reaction was a little clumsy. A PR representative of the new bank in Lithuania denied the Storonsky family connection. Soon afterwards, however, she accepted her mistake and confirmed it.

Storonsky went on to release an open letter rejecting accusations of the company’s potential links to the Kremlin. In the letter, he assures customers that Revolut has data servers only in the EU. It states that Storonsky’s father is an engineering scientist for the company Promgaz, without specifying that this belongs to the Russian gas conglomerate Gazprom. It also declares that DST Global Fund’s only connection to Russia was that one of its six partners, Yuri Milner, was born in Russia.

Revolut CEO Nikolay Storonsky dismisses allegations of Russian interference. Web Summit / flickr

In many ways, this is a robust rebuttal of the accusations that Revolut has Kremlin ties – and these are accusations that have not gained much traction outside of Lithuania. But it indicates that an anti-Revolut campaign may be under way in Lithuania. The decision whether to revoke its banking license will definitely determine its fate, and will depend, not only on involvement of Russian politics, but also on the reaction of the Lithuanian population.

At the end of the day, politics play a big role in innovation. The success of a massively disruptive bank, born in the UK under the auspices of a fintech-friendly environment, will depend on its ability to operate in the euro area. This, in turn, boils down to historical and political connections between two nations that were once enemies.

This should not prevent Lithuania from proceeding with building its reputation as a European fintech hub. But the lesson must be learned about handling politically sensitive topics with extreme care.The Conversation

Gerda Zigiene, Professor of Finance, Kaunas University of Technology and Arturo Bris, Professor of Finance, IMD Business School

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.