West Bengal Police Seals GJM Head Office

The Singhmari office here, located close to Gurung’s residence at Patlebas, was where protesters and security forces clashed on several occasions during the GJM-led 104-day long agitation in the Darjeeling hills.

GJM chief Bimal Gurung. Credit: PTI/Files

GJM chief Bimal Gurung. Credit: PTI/Files

Darjeeling: The police today sealed the head office of the Gorkha Janmukti Morcha (GJM) at Singhmari, a stronghold of GJM supremo Bimal Gurung, a senior official said.

The Singhmari office here, located close to Gurung’s residence at Patlebas, was where protesters and security forces clashed on several occasions during the GJM-led 104-day long agitation in the Darjeeling hills.

During the heydays of Gurung, it was seen as the nerve centre of the hills.

“We have sealed the head office of the GJM at Singhmari under the instructions of the district magistrate. The land on which the office has been constructed is government land. The land had been illegally encroached upon by the GJM as per records. So we sealed the office,” Darjeeling police superintendent Akhilesh Chaturvedi said.

Gurung has been on the run since August after the West Bengal government lodged cases against him under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act for his alleged involvement in several bomb blasts in Darjeeling and adjoining areas.

An FIR was also lodged against Gurung for his alleged involvement in the death of a sub-inspector who the police said was killed during an ambush by Gurung’s supporters on October 13.

Meanwhile, three people were arrested by the police from the Bijanbari Bazaar area of Darjeeling last night for alleged involvement in the violence and arson that took place during the shutdown over the demand for a separate Gorkhaland state.

Photo Feature: The Struggle for Gorkhaland in Kalimpong

A look at the ongoing struggle for separate statehood in Kalimpong.

A look at the ongoing struggle for separate statehood in Kalimpong.

Police stand guard in Kalimpong.

Police stand guard in Kalimpong.

The century-old demand for Gorkhaland has regained momentum, this time when the government of West Bengal made Bengali one of the compulsory languages in the schools of Darjeeling and Kalimpong districts. As people started protesting about it, the situation quickly turned critical when CRPF personnel deployed in the hills started conducting raids in the houses of party activists, including chief of the Gorkha Janmukti Morcha Bimal Gurung. This made the crowd furious, which resulted in the ongoing indefinite strike in the hills. This time, the common people are leading the Gorkhaland movement, unlike other times when party leaders led the masses. As of now, six people have lost their lives and there is a ban on internet services and the local media.

The shields, batons and helmets of the police resting before the arrival of a mass rally.

The shields, batons and helmets of the police resting before the arrival of a mass rally.

The police watch as the mass rally of Gorkhaland supporters arrive.

The police watch as the mass rally of Gorkhaland supporters arrive.

Students return home from the boarding school after indefinite strike has been called in the hills of Kalimpong and Darjeeling.

Students return home from the boarding school after indefinite strike has been called in the hills of Kalimpong and Darjeeling.

People wait for the NBSTC ( North Bengal State Transport Corporation ) bus to travel to different places.

People wait for the NBSTC ( North Bengal State Transport Corporation ) bus to travel to different places.

Public speech by a party activist.

Public speech by a party activist.

Sabitri Giri, 56, a loyal party member of GJM, waving the national flag after a protest rally.

Sabitri Giri, 56, a loyal party member of GJM, waving the national flag after a protest rally.

A silent candle rally organised by the students of Kalimpong.

A silent candle rally organised by the students of Kalimpong.

A lady prays for the martyrs during the silent candle rally.

A woman prays for the martyrs during the silent candle rally.

A man arranges the candles after the silent candle rally.

A man arranges the candles after the silent candle rally.

The deserted street turns into a playground for the kids.

The deserted street turns into a playground for the kids.

Farmers brought agricultural tools into the protest to showcase their support towards the movement. The state and the media terming these ‘weapons’ was disrespectful to these traditional farmers.

Farmers brought agricultural tools into the protest to showcase their support towards the movement. The state and the media terming these ‘weapons’ was disrespectful to these traditional farmers.

A little boy cries while his mother rushes to get a seat in the NBSTC bus.

A little boy cries while his mother rushes to get a seat in the NBSTC bus.

A person's thoughts on the movement.

A person’s thoughts on the movement.

People gathered to watch the burning down of the Gorkhaland Territorial Administration ( GTA. ) Accord. The GTA Accord was signed on June 18, 2011 between the Centre, state and GJM

People gathered to watch the burning down of the Gorkhaland Territorial Administration ( GTA. ) Accord. The GTA Accord was signed on June 18, 2011 between the Centre, state and GJM

G.T.A. Accord burning.

GTA Accord burning.

A lady shouting slogans supporting the formation of a separate statehood of Gorkhaland.

A lady shouting slogans supporting the formation of a separate state of Gorkhaland.

A man praying for the unrest happening in the hills.

A man praying for the people in the hills.

Students lead the rally by shouting slogans in favour of the formation of a separate state of Gorkhaland.

Students lead the rally by shouting slogans in favour of the formation of a separate state of Gorkhaland.

Smoke ascends from a government office which was set to burn during protests.

Smoke ascends from a government office which was set to burn during protests.

The national flag flies in Kalimpong.

The national flag flies in Kalimpong.

Images and text credit: Brihat Rai. Brihat Rai is a Kalimpong-based photographer.

At Least Three Killed as Fresh Protests Erupt in Darjeeling, Army Called Back In

The Gorkha Janmukti Morcha has refused to engage in talks with the state government, saying they will talk only to the Centre.

The Gorkha Janmukti Morcha has refused to engage in talks with the state government, saying they will talk only to the Centre.

Darjeeling: Army  redeployed after fresh violence erupted in Darjeeling hills where Gorkhaland supporters torched a police outpost, a toytrain station and clashed with the police at two places in Darjeeling on Saturday. Credit: PTI

Army redeployed after fresh violence erupted in Darjeeling hills where Gorkhaland supporters torched a police outpost, a toytrain station and clashed with the police at two places in Darjeeling on Saturday. Credit: PTI

Fresh violence erupted in the Darjeeling hills on Friday night and Saturday (July 8) prompting the state government to call the army back to the streets as Gorkhaland supporters torched a police outpost, a toy train station and clashed with the police at two places.

According to a report in the Indian Express, at least three people were killed in the violence on Saturday.

The Gorkha Janmukti Morcha (GJM), spearheading the agitation for a separate state carved out of West Bengal, rejected chief minister Mamata Banerjee’s offer of talks.

Banerjee called for peace and said that the government was ready for talks with the hill parties, but peace has to be restored first.

In a statement on Saturday night, the GJM, however, said the doors for talks with Banerjee and the state government are “closed forever”.

It said it was willing to hold talks with the Centre on the issue of Gorkhaland. “If the Centre calls for talks on Gorkhaland, we will go,” it said.

The GJM also said while the Basirhat riots had drawn the attention of national parties, the month-long unrest in Darjeeling had failed to attract them. “We sincerely ask the leaders of the political parties are we in India,” the statement said.

The police burst teargas shells and baton-charged activists of the GJM and the Gorkha National Liberation Front (GNLF), who attacked the security personnel at Sonada and Chawkbazar in the hills.

Two columns of the army comprising around 100 personnel were deployed at Sonada and Darjeeling in the wake of fresh violence, defence sources said.

The chief minister said, “The government has shown enough restraint in the interest of the people of the hills.”

A police vehicle damaged during violence following the death a youth allegedly in police firing in   Darjeeling, West Bengal on Saturday. Credit: PTI

A police vehicle damaged during violence following the death a youth allegedly in police firing in Darjeeling, West Bengal on Saturday. Credit: PTI

She accused the Centre of “deliberate and total non-cooperation” and alleged that it’s refusal to send CRPF personnel, as demanded by the state government, had led to the present situation in the Darjeeling hills, where the indefinite shutdown entered its 24th day.

In New Delhi, Union home ministry sources said 11 companies of paramilitary force personnel were sent to Darjeeling by the Centre, including one company consisting of women.

The West Bengal government has its own security forces like the Eastern Frontier Rifles and the State Armed Police and both have several battalions, they said, adding that it was not deploying these forces and instead blaming the central government.

GNLF spokesperson Neeraj Zimba claimed that a youth, Tashi Bhutia, was shot dead by the security forces last night when he had ventured out to purchase medicines at Sonada. But a police officer said, “We don’t have any report of police firing as of now. We are looking into the incident. We can give you details later.”

Inspector general of police Javed Shamim, when asked about the firing, said, “It will be known only after the inquiry.”

The GJM and other hill parties have lodged a police complaint accusing the force of killing the youth.

“The youth was killed by the police without any reason. His body has bullet injuries. We demand that the policemen involved be punished,” GJM leader Binay Tamang said.

As news of the death spread, hundreds of Gorkhaland supporters came out on the streets and raised slogans against alleged “police atrocities”.

They clashed with the police and set on fire a police outpost at Sonada and the toy train station of the Darjeeling-Himalayan Railways, a UNESCO world heritage site.

A GJM leader claimed that another youth identified as Suraj Sundas was killed in police firing during clashes between the police and protestors at the Chowkbazar area of Darjeeling on Saturday. The police, however, denied the charge.

Tamang claimed that Suraj was caught in the midst of the clashes and was killed when the police fired on the protesters.

The Centre had said yesterday that it was keen to hold tripartite talks with the GJM and the West Bengal government to end the agitation.

With food supply severely hit due to the indefinite strike, the GJM and various NGOs distributed food amongst the people. Barring medicine outlets, all shops, schools and colleges remained closed. Internet services remained suspended for the 21st day.

(With PTI inputs)

NE Dispatch: BJP Wins Karbi Anglong Council in Assam; Sikkim to Sue Bengal over Gorkhaland Agitation

A round-up of what’s happening in India’s Northeast.

A round-up of what’s happening in India’s Northeast.

Tuliram Ronghang voted chief executive member. Credit: Facebook/Tuliram Ronghang

Assam: BJP wins Karbi Anglong Autonomous Council; party’s decision to elect ex-Congress leader accused of corruption as council head irks public

The BJP grabbed power in the Karbi Anglong Autonomous Council (KAAC) for the first time. The BJP pocketed 24 of the 26 seats while the Congress and Asom Gana Parishad (AGP) drew a blank.

The June 12 election to the KAAC, which administers Assam’s Dima Hasao district with Diphu as its headquarters, also saw the Karbi Anglong Democratic Forum (KADF) winning two seats. The KADF was formed by disgruntled politicians who were denied tickets by the BJP. The KADF also backed 13 independent candidates.

Though the BJP has made it to the council through an election for the first time, it has been ruling it for nearly a year now after most of the elected members of the then Congress-led council defected to the BJP, including the chief executive member (CEM) Tuliram Ronghang.

Though the council’s term was to end on January 13 after completing five years in office, state governor Banuwarilal Purohit extended its term by six months on January 18. The state election commission then reportedly said elections wouldn’t be “practicable” due to “unavoidable circumstances arising out of publication of the electoral roll on December 12, 2016.” Interestingly, the June 12 elections were held without updating the electoral roll. On April 21, hundreds of Karbi young men belonging to 24 student and civil society organization  carried a nude rally through the Diphu town demanding an updated voters’ list for the district as per the sixth schedule of the constitution and demanded that the next KAAC election not be held without it.

Though the BJP was chosen by the voters this time, many expressed anger with the party for re-electing Ronghang, accused of massive corruption as a Congress leader. In the run up to the elections, media reports quoting sources in the BJP said there were two other contenders to the post of CEM, apparently raising public hope against selection of a leader accused of corruption.

After the BJP took the decision on July 6 in favour of Ronghnag, there was a public demonstration in Diphu.

“We wanted a change and voted for the BJP but what is the use when the same person was chosen to head the council? We feel cheated by it,” a protester was heard saying it on an Assamese news channel.

The Congress ruled the council from 2001 to 2015.

BJP leader Haren Singh Bey was elected the council chairman. A former militant who contested the last council elections as an independent candidate, Bey joined the BJP along with many others last year. Interestingly, in the last 12 years, there have been 26 chairmen, which highlight the continuous power struggle in the council.

Gorkhaland protest

Activists of Gorkha Janamukti Morcha demanding Gorkhaland in Darjeeling. Credit: PTI

Sikkim: State government alleges harassment by West Bengal government for supporting the demand for Gorkhaland; to file petition in SC

The Pawan Chamling government in Sikkim has accused the West Bengal government of creating “unconstitutional circumstances” for its extension of support to the agitation in the Darjeeling hills demanding a separate state of Gorkhaland, adding that it is likely to file a petition in the Supreme Court against it.

As per media reports, the Sikkim government would file a petition in the apex court against the Bengal government’s in the coming week.

Reports said the Bengal government, through its police force, “have deliberately prevented” the supply of goods to Sikkim by stopping trucks from entering the state “because of support” offered by Chamling and his government to the ongoing unrest and bandh in the Darjeeling hills. The only road route to Sikkim is through Siliguri in North Bengal through the national highway 10.

“We are planning to approach the Supreme Court next week. The circumstances which have been created are unconstitutional. Our food supplies and all other essential goods coming to Sikkim have been stopped. In Siliguri, many of our trucks carrying essential goods have been stopped by police in civil clothes, while uniformed police have looked on. Just because we have a particular stand, which has been a known stand for many years, this is being done,” the state’s lone Lok Sabha member P.D. Rai told The Indian Express.

Rai said such “disruptions” happening for the last 20 days had caused a loss of Rs. 200 crores to Sikkim, adding that the state in the last three decades has incurred “losses worth Rs. 60,000 crores” due to such disruptions (by Bengal government).

On June 20, the ruling Sikkim Democratic Front government expressed support to the protest in the Darjeeling hills. In March 2011, the state assembly had passed a resolution supporting the state of Gorkhaland.

On June 29, transporters in Sikkim began an “indefinite strike” after some of their trucks were vandalised and looted by miscreants in the Siliguri-Sikkim border on June 28. State truck drivers’ association president Mingma Sherpa told reporters, “Our trucks plying to Siliguri in West Bengal to ferry goods are being attacked and drivers’ lives are in threat.” Sherpa said the strike would continue till the Bengal government gives an assurance about the safety of their drivers and vehicles. The associated has submitted a memorandum to the Sikkim chief secretary, transport secretary, the home secretary and the director general of police, urging them to speak to their counterparts in Bengal to take “appropriate action” and “arrest the culprits”.

The NH 10 also passes through Darjeeling and Kalimpong districts. Some time ago, the state government had urged the protesters and political parties in the Darjeeling hills to keep the highway open as it is the only road link to Sikkim.

A popular tourist destination, Sikkim attracts a huge number of domestic and foreign tourists. According to state government officials, the ongoing unrest, leading to “disruptions” by Bengal police, has affected business and also supply of food items and medicines in different parts of the state.

A Gangtok-based reporter, who didn’t want to be named here, told The Wire, “The Bengal government’s action against trucks bringing supplies to Sikkim may also be an attempt to dry up the channel of essential goods reaching the Darjeeling hills. The stock of everyday things is beginning to get over there. It may help the Bengal government break the indefinite bandh.”

Mizoram governor Nirbhay Sharma. Credit: PTI

Mizoram: Governor dissolves Congress-ruled Chakma Autonomous District Council days after BJP urges him to dissolve it and hold fresh elections

Mizoram governor Lt Gen (Retd) Nirbhay Sharma suspended the Chakma Autonomous District Council (CADC) on July 5 and placed its administration under his rule.

A notification to that effect was issued by Raj Bhavan, which stated that the governor appointed the deputy commissioner of Lawngtlai district as the caretaker head of CADC to exercise the day to day functions of the departments under the council. It said the governor has asked the chairman of the council to hold a floor test within a week’s time.

The CADC was set up under the sixth schedule of the constitution in 1972 to exercise execute powers over a range of departments specially allotted to it. According to the 2011 Census, there are about 43,528 people of Chakma tribe live within the district council.

Trouble began when six of the 17 executive members of 20-member council run by Congress rebelled against the chief executive member (CEM) Kali Kumar Chakma (Tongchongyia) and thereafter resigned from it. Thereafter, six others also resigned. The council, which controls 27 departments from its headquarters in Kamalanagar (or Chawngte-C) besides 73 village councils, has 24 seats, out of which four are nominated.

Kali Kumar, elected to the council in 2013, took over as the CEM from Buddhalila Chakma in September 2015 after a bout of violence in Kamlanagar area which led to the death of a student.

Interestingly, the governor’s action has come five days after a delegation of the Mizoram unit of the BJP submitted a memorandum to him urging him to dissolve the Congress-ruled council. In a press statement, the BJP said its party leaders submitted the memorandum keeping in mind “the constitutional crisis” in the CADC after resignation of the executive members. It reportedly said the resignations were “a clear case of no confidence against the executive council headed by CEM”.

According to unconfirmed sources, some of the executive members who resigned from the council “are set to join the BJP soon.”

NorthEast Hill University in Shillong. Credit: NEHU website

Meghalaya: CBI files charge sheet against NEHU professor, three researchers

The Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) has filed a charge sheet in the court of CBI special judge in Shillong against a professor and three researchers of the prestigious North Eastern Hill University (NEHU) for allegedly misappropriating central funds. The incident has shocked the local community.

Though the state police and the CBI are tight-lipped about the case and have not yet shared any details about the charge sheet filed on July 4 with local media, newspaper reports quoting informal university and police sources said the professor, S.K. Jha, has been accused of misusing funds of a project of the regional centre run jointly with the national afforestation and eco-development board and the ministry of environment and forests. Though three researchers were also named in the charge sheet, their names have not been made public yet.

The university, considered a premier institution in the northeast, has been in news since this past April. Though the final results were declared by the university in February, the students had to wait for two months for the university to hold a convocation day to confer their degrees. Students accused the vice chancellor S.K. Srivastava of “playing politics” and deferring the convocation for want of “the guest of choice”.

On April 28, when the convocation was finally held in the NEHU campus, the NEHU Students Union carried out a demonstration in protest against the authorities’ “adamant attitude” as many students missed out on job and further studies opportunities for lack of their degree certificates on time.

Out of the 9,000 students conferred degrees by Niti Aayog member Vijay Kumar Saraswat amid slogan-shouting and protests outside the convocation hall, 7,495 of them didn’t attend the function.

In Language Movements of West Bengal and Assam, a Parallel in Governments’ Responses

The movements for Nepali in West Bengal and Bengali in Assam have faced an uphill task, both finding their first success in 1961.

The movements for Nepali in West Bengal and Bengali in Assam have faced an uphill task, both finding their first success in 1961.

The similarities in the pattern of responses between the two state governments is quite uncanny. Credit PTI/Wikimedia Commons (CC BY-SA 3.0)

The similarities in the pattern of responses between the two state governments is quite uncanny. Credit PTI/Wikimedia Commons

New Delhi: Anyone who de-boards at Assam’s Silchar railway station cannot miss the life-size memorial erected just outside the station in the memory of the town’s dead.

The dead – 11 of them – fell to the bullets of state police guarding the station on May 19, 1961, during a public protest that turned violent.

Tarani Debnath, Satyendra Deb, Sunil Sarkar, Sachindra Nath Pal, Sukumal Purkayastha, Kamala Bhattacharya, Kumudranjan Das, Kanailal Niyogi, Hitesh Biswas, Chandi Saran Sutradhar and Birendra Sutradhar were among several protesting the then Assam government’s decision to introduce Assamese as an official language for administration and medium of instruction in schools across the state.

Bengalis – mostly Hindus – forced to migrate to Assam’s greater Cachar district from the Surma Valley in East Pakistan post partition, were abruptly stripped of their home and hearth. It was their language that they wanted to hold on to in their new homes. Most of those who died that day in May 1961 at the Silchar railway station were born in Sylhet, a large part of which was truncated from India (the present Karimganj district of Assam was part of the Surma Valley, which was included in the Cachar district post independence).

Fifty-six years after that violent agitation, remembered as Bhasha Dibas every May 19 by those living in Assam’s three Bengali majority districts of Cachar, Hailakhandi and Karimganj – the latter two were sliced out of the greater Cachar district and together they comprise Assam’s Barak Valley named after the river Barak – the ongoing unrest in West Bengal’s Darjeeling hills reminds one of some of the stark resemblances between the two language movements – in terms of government response.


Also read: Here’s What the West Bengal Government Must do to Resolve the Darjeeling Hills Unrest


That both Nepali and Bengali became the official language of a part of Bengal and Assam respectively in the same year – 1961 – has probably a connection that one would care to think of now.

The then West Bengal chief minister Bidhan Chandra Roy relented to the Gorkha demand for Nepali as an official language of the state’s Darjeeling district probably keeping in mind the interest of the Bengali speakers of Assam’s Barak Valley who were also battling their state government for the same right at that time. The agitators in Barak Valley received considerable moral support from Bengal then.

Interestingly, in the post-partition majoritarian linguistic politics played by the two state governments, the same language became “oppressed” in one situation and an “oppressor” in another.

The similarities in the pattern of responses between the two state governments is quite uncanny. Or perhaps falling perfectly to the script of majoritarian chauvinism.

Banking on the post-independent map of the state, then Assam chief minister Bimala Prasad Chaliha tried asserting the linguistic jurisdiction of the mainstream Assamese language on the Bengali-speaking people of Barak Valley by bringing in an official language bill in June 1960. The B.C. Roy government tried doing the same with the majority Nepali speakers of Bengal’s Darjeeling district around the same time.

In March 1958, a bill was proposed in the Bengal assembly to make Bengali the official and administrative language of the entire state. Demanding autonomy from Bengal since the time of the British, it was a raw nerve of the Gorkhas that the government had touched.

Like the violent protest seen in the Barak Valley, the Darjeeling hills too erupted in a language movement, pushing the Bengal government to move an official language bill to accept Nepali as the official language of the three sub-divisions of Darjeeling. Chaliha too stepped back after the then home minister Lal Bahadur Shastri propounded the same language policy for Assam.

If you go by a recent lecture – by Ajoy Kumar Roy, general secretary of a Silchar-based civil society organisation, Sammilita Sanskritik Mancha – at a seminar in the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library in New Delhi, yet another interesting parallel springs up.

Roy said, “One of the biggest evidence of conspiracy of then Assam government, in case of manipulation of [the] population pattern, was the census report of 1951. The population of Assamese speaking people in Assam, according to 1931 census, was 19,92,846; but in [the] 1951 census showed it as 49,66,159 – a miracle increase. The then census commissioner of India, Mr. Bhagaiwala, described it as [a] biological miracle.”

The well-regarded book Politics of Autonomy: Indian Experiences (2005, edited by Ranabir Samaddar), speaks of a similar accusation made by the Nepalis against the then Bengal government.

The book notes:

In 1955, N.B. Gurung, an independent MLA from the district (Darjeeling) submitted in the Assembly, that the government of West Bengal and the Congress Party had adopted an unfriendly attitude towards the people of Darjeeling. He noted that a Congress Party in a supplementary memorandum to the States Reorganisation Committee, when it visited Darjeeling, stated that “Nepali speaking population is 20%, Bengali speaking 14.3%, Hindi-speaking 6.8%, Lepchas and Bhutias being 4%”; the total comes to 45.1%. It is not understood who constituted the rest of the population, viz., 54.9 %. I hope they are not Chinese.”

The book, a critical political inquiry into the conditions and dimensions of the Gorkha autonomy movement among other such movements, added, “He [N.B. Gurung] also quoted from the report of the States Reorganisation Committee that if an area within a state had more than 70% people belonging to one ethnic or linguistic group, then they would constitute a minority within the province and the language of that minority group should be the official language in that area.”

Finally, such a decision, adhering to the committee’s norms, was taken by both the Assam and West Bengal governments.

However, thereon too, attempts at tinkering that 1961 decision continued in both the states.

“The saga of oppression continued. It should be remembered that all higher educational institutions of Cachar was under Gauhati University as there was no university in Cachar at that time (it now has the centrally run Silchar University). On June 12, 1972, the academic council of the university took a decision that the medium of instruction in all colleges under it will be Assamese, and English would continue simultaneously for the next ten years. Again the situation in Cachar got heated. Agitation started… Assam government tried to suppress it by all means… two people died, ultimately the central government intervened again and a temporary solution was imposed. According to this, English would continue as the alternative medium of instruction in the colleges of Cachar district,” said Roy at the seminar, organised by Delhi-based socio-cultural organisation Jookto.


Also read: Understanding the Demand for Self-Rule in the Darjeeling Hills


He also spoke at length about the Assam government “oppressing the Bengali people of Assam, particularly Cachar” again in 1986 through a circular issued by the Board of Secondary Education, Assam (SEBA).

“All the high schools of Assam are run academically by SEBA. On February 28, 1986, this SEBA issued a circular regarding the educational curriculum. This circular is known as the notorious SEBA circular. It said that non-Assamese students from class V onwards would have to learn Assamese as [a] third language in place of Hindi till class VIII and from class VIII onwards Assamese would be a mandatory subject. Though it appears that there is not much of contention, it should be remembered that it is said in the circular that Assamese students would learn Hindi as their third language, which means the number of learnable languages for Assamese students would be two whereas for Bengali students it would be three.”

Roy recalled that “agitation started, students jumped into it…violence erupted” where a student died, ultimately leading SEBA to withdraw the circular.

Though the Nepali speakers had to wait 31 years for the parliament to recognise the language as one of the official regional languages of India (in August 1991) to be able to include Nepali in schools, the subsequent Bengal governments seemed to have continued trying to impose the majority language on them in a fashion quite similar to that of Assam.

“Nepali may be the second official language of Bengal but the Bengali hegemony continues. For instance, our people still can’t write the state public service commission exams in Nepali though it can be done in Bengali. It is the reason why most of our people don’t get qualified for state service jobs. They get deprived of government jobs. It is the reason that people have to deal with public servants in the Gorkha Territorial Administration (GTA) area who can’t speak the local language,” said Swaraj Thapa of Gorkha Janamukti Manch, the party spearheading the ongoing protest in Darjeeling.

He stated, “Imposition of Bengali is tried out by the government surreptitiously. Knowing well that people can’t speak Bengali, the chief minister will still address the public in Darjeeling in Bengali. The first trigger of the present unrest was the public outrage at posters written in Bengali that announced the state government’s achievements. When the local public objected to it, the administration replaced them with posters in Bengali by using the Roman script. It confirmed the intentions of the majoritarian state government, the message it tried to convey, that it has a problem accepting Nepali as a language of the state.”

What the present Bengal government did on the night of May 15 was similar to what the Prafulla Kumar Mahanta government in Assam tried doing to the people of Barak Valley in 1986.

State education minister Partha Chatterjee announced in Kolkata, “From now on, it will be compulsory for students to learn Bengali in schools. English medium schools will have to make Bengali an optional subject from class I so that the students can study it either as a second or third language.”

Some political observers in the state have also looked at the state government’s action as a “reaction” to, or “precaution” against, the BJP’s growing attempt at “imposing” Hindi on non-speakers across the country by recognising it as a national language (India doesn’t have one).

Prior to Bengal, similar decisions were taken by the Kerala and Karnataka governments. (The Assam government, instead, announced making Sanskrit compulsory in schools, which was met with huge protest, leading the government to put it in cold storage for now).

Thapa agreed but added, “The composition of people in Bengal is not as homogenous as in Kerala. I can understand the fear of Hindi among the non-Hindi speakers but it could have been done by clearing the air at the same press conference by the education minister. He could have said it would not be applicable in the GTA. Nothing would have happened. No lives would have been lost. But it was not.”

Though chief minister Mamata Banerjee did say it later, years of distrust of the Gorkhas towards the Bengal government – looked at more as Bengali government – turned into a fresh bout of violent protest.

Ranabir Samaddar, distinguished chair in Migration and Forced Studies at the Calcutta Research Group, underlined, “More than majoritarian politics [played by the government] here, the crucial issue is the politics of autonomy, its contentious nature and the relation with the language rights of the people.” Herein, Samaddar tried to highlight the arterial link of a public movement for autonomy with language rights.

How the two movements differ

It is in the question of autonomy that the similarities between the two language movements of Darjeeling and Barak differ. Unlike the people of Darjeeling sticking to their longstanding demand for autonomy, the people of Barak Valley harbour no such sentiments. However, Roy did speak of yet another longstanding “struggle”.

“For years, Sanmilita Sanskritik Mancha and Barak Upatyaka Banga Sahitya O Sanskriti Sammelan have been following up the legacy of the 1961 movement. Though we have put up boards stating the railway station as Bhasha Shahid Station, it is not officially accepted yet. So we have been urging both the state and the central governments to formally change the name. The earlier Tarun Gogoi government and the UPA at the Centre promised to do so, still it didn’t happen,” he said.

If the situation in Darjeeling is yet to see a sign of progress and peace, Roy hinted at “some positive developments” in their “struggle” lately.

“Recently, the Silchar district commissioner had a meeting with us on the issue. Let’s see. We told him that we want it named in the interest of all the people living in Barak Valley,” Roy told this correspondent from Silchar. He said, “Both the organisations speak for development of all the languages of this region.”

Interestingly, if Bengali speakers of the Barak Valley have been assertive about their linguistic rights, yet another group of people in Assam – albeit smaller and scattered but vital in this context since they ruled Cachar before if fell to the British – are struggling to get wider recognition for their language – the Dimasa Kacharis.

What has made it an uphill task, like many northeastern tribal languages, is that the Dimasa language doesn’t have a script of its own.

Though many votaries of Bengali language in Barak Valley highlight that Bengali was the court language of the Dimasa kings in Cachar to argue and establish the historical claim of Bengali as a dominant language of the region (Roy did it too at the Nehru Memorial), Uttam Bathari, deputy director (regional) at the North Eastern Regional Centre of the Indian Centre for Historical Research – widely considered as knowledgeable on Dimasa history – put it in historical context.

“In the long period of monarchial tradition, use of language in Dimasa kingdom shifted from Sanskrit to Assamese to Bengali in the 18th century. However, these languages remained limited to the transactions of the royal court,” Bathari said.

“Bengali,” he added, “gained predominance in Dimasa royal court for political reasons. By then the monarchy lost the resourceful territories in the Brahmaputra Valley and needed to augment its revenue. Therefore, the monarchy sought expansion of land settlement and migration from Bengal was encouraged. This was done even by the British who wanted the valley to serve as a rice bowl to feed men in uniform to secure their designs in the eastern front.”

“However, this patronage of Bengali didn’t go down well with the Dimasa masses. Schism developed in the society and it proved to be fatal on the monarchy and the people themselves.”

In the History of Upper Assam, Upper Burmah and North-Eastern Frontier (1914), L. W. Shakespeare writes about Dimasa Kacharis fleeing their capital Dimapur (presently in Nagaland) after facing defeat at the hands of the Ahoms and “retiring to Maibong and Cachar.” The Kacharis became “the dominant power in Cachar plains (Surma Valley)” after “driving back the original occupants, the Trippera people (of Tripura).”

It also talks about Ahom king Rudra Singha defeating Kachari king Tamrodhoj and bringing the kingdom set up in Maibang and Cachar again under the Ahom rule. Also about “the whole of Cachar” coming under Raja Manjit from Manipur (It probably explains the presence of a small section of Manipuris in the Barak Valley even today) before the Burmese snatched it from him. The region came to the British from the Burmese who descended on Cachar from Dhaka.

Today, though many Dimasas living in Cachar and Dima Hasao district (earlier North Cachar Hills) still write their language using the Bengali script, and those in Karbi Anglong and Nagaon districts use the Assamese script, there is some amount of resistance to it.

Bathari stated, “The script controversy began in the early 1970s when the first Dimasa primer was prepared in Bengali after much debate and discussion. The younger generation was opposed to it and finally the Roman script was adopted in 1999.”

Understanding the Demand for Self-Rule in the Darjeeling Hills

Historical and geographical flux, a continuous feeling of exclusion and perceived cultural dominance by Bengalis have aggravated the demand for the creation of Gorkhaland.

Historical and geographical flux, a continuous feeling of exclusion and perceived cultural dominance by Bengalis have aggravated the demand for the creation of Gorkhaland.

A protest march organised by the Gorkhaland Janmukti Morcha in the Darjeeling hills. Credit: PTI/Files

A protest march organised by the Gorkhaland Janmukti Morcha in the Darjeeling hills. Credit: PTI/Files

The aspiration for self-rule of the hill people in Darjeeling is more than a century old. To be precise, such aspiration for autonomous rule can be traced back to 1907. The complicated narrative of such aspirations is further complicated by the diverse ethnic identity of the hill people. For instance, the Nepali-speaking hill dwellers of Darjeeling who travel to ‘mainland’ India, are often regarded as ‘Nepalese from Nepal’, putting a question mark on their identity. Such exogenous factors, in addition to a host of other parameters, has often consolidated the aspiration for identity within a community of people. In this case, the hill people in Darjeeling want to be recognised as Gorkhas belonging to ‘Gorkhaland’ – the state they aspire to form.

The geography of this frontier has been in flux for a long time. Originally, Darjeeling belonged to Sikkim, which was acceded to Gorkhali kingdom (present-day Nepal) and thereafter to the British. It was restored to Sikkim only to be ‘gifted’ to the British in 1835 before being merged with West Bengal in 1954 under the Absorbed Areas Act. This mired geographical history often aggravates the feeling of exclusion, which intermittently shows itself in protests – especially when the hill dwellers believe themselves to be dominated by state or non-state actors from the plains.

The institution of the Darjeeling Gorkha Hill Council in 1988 ended the cycle of violence that engulfed the area between 1986-88. However, it failed to deliver any results. Following the unsuccessful experiment, yet another administrative body, the Gorkhaland Territorial Administration (GTA), was instituted in 2011. This provided official recognition to ‘Gorkhaland’. But the GTA too, like its predecessor, lacked sufficient autonomy. It is worth noting that neither successive state governments (until the recent threat surfaced) nor the administrative set-ups in the hills ever felt the need to furnish accounts of public funds disbursed to them. This mutually acceptable lack of accountability was gainful for both the state government and the GTA, until they collided with each other.


Also read: Here’s What the West Bengal Government Must do to Resolve the Darjeeling Hills Unrest


Language has always been a contentious issue in the hills of Darjeeling and the state has ‘used’ the census as a tool to portray Nepali speakers as minority in these areas, even though they happen to be in a majority. The Nepali language movement of the 1960s in the hills has been a manifestation of this cultural trend. The West Bengal government, along with the central government, played the politics of census enumeration in identifying Nepali as a non-majority language so that they could avoid making Nepali the medium of instruction in schools in Darjeeling.

Moreover, the perceived cultural dominance of Bengalis in the hills widened the gulf between these two communities. For the last two years, the chief minister of West Bengal has celebrated the birth anniversary of Subhas Chandra Bose in Darjeeling by organising concerts of Baul songs, which is traditional Bengali folk music. According to Swaraj Thapa, a member of the Gorkha Janmukti Morcha, this was perceived as contentious by Darjeeling dwellers. It should also be noted that that most of the premier educational institutions in West Bengal do not offer Nepali as a subject of study.

When the schools in Darjeeling were already offering Bengali as an optional subject, what was the need for the state government to make such a declaration? Was the declaration aimed at consolidating the Trinamool Congress’s gains in the recent civic polls? Political commentators have also speculated that the motive behind such a move was to contain the BJP, fast emerging as a force to reckon with in West Bengal. Did Mamata Banerjee want to leverage the Bengali language in her fight against Hindi imperialism driven by the Hindu-Hindi ideology? But this explanation perhaps falls short when we observe that the governments of Karnataka and Kerala have made similar declarations, making  the languages spoken by the dominant majority in their respective states compulsory in schools.

There are also other critical factors at play. The activists are demanding the inclusion of the hill areas of Darjeeling district, Kalimpong district and parts of Siliguri, Terai and Dooars of Alipurduar and Jalpaiguri districts in the proposed Gorkhaland state. But contradictions arise when we consider the demographic profile of these areas. Gorkhas constitute only 35% of the population, while the rest comprise Adivasis (20%), Bengalis (15%), Rajbangsis (25%) and Totos, Mech and others (5%). Under such circumstances, how can the activists be sure that other population groups and communities who inhabit the region will accept the state of Gorkhaland?

Moreover, the Sherpas, Bhutias, Lepchas and other ethnic communities do not share the Gorkhas’ vision of self-rule. Perhaps these fissures drove the state government to promote 15 different development boards in the hills.

Controversy also arises whenever the Sikkim Democratic Front and the Sikkim Krantikari Morcha extend their support for the creation of Gorkhaland and the merger of Darjeeling with Sikkim. Both points of view are rooted in their shared history, since Darjeeling had originally been a part of Sikkim.

The hills of Darjeeling are at a crossroads today. While there is unequivocal support for the formation of Gorkhaland in the hills, none of the central units of national parties support their cause. Even the BJP, which in its successive Lok Sabha election manifestos between 2009 and 2014 had promised to “sympathetically examine and appropriately consider” Gorkhaland, is no longer sympathetic to the issue. All the district units of these parties in the hills, supporting Gorkhaland, are at loggerheads with their central units. This has further diminished possibilities of a solution.

While for the people in the hills, and their organisations, this appears to be a ‘final’ battle to push for their aspiration of self-rule, a host of other players – including state and central governments, and political parties in the plains – are eyeing electoral possibilities and dividends. It is obvious that in this game of electoral numbers, political parties could well sacrifice the aspirations of the hill people.

Biswanath Saha is senior research fellow at the Institute of Development Studies Kolkata, where Gorky Chakraborty is associate professor. Views are personal.

Here’s What the West Bengal Government Must do to Resolve the Darjeeling Hills Unrest

Rather than deploying more forces to curb the ongoing crisis in Darjeeling, the state government should initiate dialogue with the protesting parties to find a middle ground.

Rather than deploying more forces to curb the ongoing crisis in Darjeeling, the state government should initiate dialogue with the protesting parties to find a middle ground.

Army Personnel patrol near burning vehicles after clashes with supporters of GJM in Darjeeling on Saturday. Credit: PTI

The recent unrest in the Darjeeling hills has come as a shock to the ordinary people of West Bengal and perhaps to the state government as well. Perhaps the Gorkha Janamukti Morcha (GJM) too was surprised at the massive support that its renewed call for Gorkhaland aroused. It is in the nature of politics that the more we believe a situation to be peaceful, the more the situation shows signs of torment and contention. West Bengal chief minister Mamata Banerjee, battle-hardened on the streets, knows this only too well. But power lulls a ruler, and politics has a habit of throwing up nasty surprises.

The Gorkhaland Territorial Administration (GTA) was formed in the Darjeeling hills as a result of the tripartite agreement signed by the GJM with the West Bengal and central governments on July 18, 2011. The GTA succeeded the Darjeeling Gorkha Hill Council in August 2012, through a West Bengal state Act. This was a political process, which required respect for the principle of autonomy and sagacity on the parts of the government as well as the Gorkha political movement. Yet it should not surprise us that within a few years, conflict again flared up between the government and the GJM.

After all, as various instances show, whether in Kashmir or in Nagaland, the principle of autonomy has nothing immovable, static or sacrosanct in it. Much of it is beyond the stated provisions in an agreement for autonomy, which often lacks any joint supervisory arrangement and custodianship of the agreement. In the Darjeeling hills disputes started in no time. The GJM wanted to expand the authority of the GTA, wanted more money, power and control of the hills, to the extent of disciplining and coercing others into submission. The government wanted more accountability, and to limit the hold of GJM and the GTA in the plains of Dooars and even in the hills. The GJM declared strikes and other agitating measures in this period. The government foiled or prevented them.

Squeezing the middle ground

As the political process unfolded, it seemed that the GJM was losing ground as the government took up the policy of setting up development boards for various minority groups in the hills such as the Lepchas, which the GJM opposed. This was seen as an attempt to split the people of the region along ethnic lines, though it was conveniently forgotten by the GJM that the Gorkha movement itself was an ethnic movement, besides also being a movement for territorial autonomy.

The government’s development policies in the hills were seen as interference in the work of the GTA. The chief minister’s frequent visits to the hills were declared as unwelcome by the GJM. The chief minister, the GJM alleged, came only to foment trouble. The government took no notice of such signals. It never understood that proximity of ruler and ruled is not always good, and the latter may feel threatened. A bear hug may be considered a death embrace. In any case, the political process opened up new conflicts. Politics in the hills from now on could not but be contentious.

Development boards were set up. A new district, Kalimpong, was carved out in the hills. The ruling party, the Trinamool Congress (TMC), opened its offices, contesting and winning the Mirik municipality seat. Meanwhile, it managed to wean away from the GJM some of its active members, such the erstwhile Kalimpong MLA, Harka Bahadur Chetri. Moderates lost their space. Either you belonged to the TMC or the GJM. The middle ground, by definition, occupying the middle position and thus fragile, was corroded in the process. The TMC and the government, elated at the increase of the vote share of the TMC in the civic elections, forgot that retaining the middle ground was crucial in any attrition battle, for when the battle started in earnest, there was no middle space to cushion the effect of the full fury of aggression.

Complacent with the success of its advance, the government overplayed its hand. It did three unnecessary things – it suddenly declared that Bengali, as the language of West Bengal, was to be made compulsory in all schools. Second, it decided to hold a cabinet meeting in Darjeeling. Third, it ordered a special audit of the GTA. Meanwhile, the term of the GTA was to end in June, with fresh elections to be held in July. The special audit could have been held earlier. In fact, for the last five years, the government had remained silent. As for the second step, there was no need to bring the whole government in Darjeeling in the face of a sulking adversary. But the first step was most erroneous.

If Bengali was to be an optional language (third or fourth language), then there was no need for this sudden declaration by the chief minister that it had to be compulsorily taught in schools. After all, it was an issue of concern not only for the Nepali speaking Gorkhas, but all other linguistic minority groups like the Santhals, who had struggled for long for the right to be educated in Santhali and the al chiki script. Caution, wide consultations and prudence were needed, as is always the case, for a language policy. The least the government could have done was not to announce such a policy in a cavalier manner from an administrative meeting without preparation and seriousness.

Pitfalls of administration in fiat mode

It is in the nature of a government focused on executing welfare projects and certain development measures to run the administration in a mai bap sarkar manner – that is, without dialogue and consultation. Issuing fiats becomes the style. The district administrative meetings become imperial courts, where the officials are summoned, heard, praised or dismissed. They are effective, but only up to a point. They become occasions for the sudden declaration of policies. Such a mode of governing soon shows its limits. This is what happened when the chief minister suddenly declared that in the interest of a peaceful academic atmosphere, rallies and demonstrations on College street in Kolkata would henceforth be banned. Again, on such an issue, which evokes long memories, the intended step could have been taken in a different way, perhaps only partially taken, but through consultations with the educational community at large. In short, the fiat mode of administration had to backfire sooner rather than later.

One day, of course, the unrest in the hills will die down. But at what cost, and with what damage to the government’s legitimacy and to the space for politics in the hills of Darjeeling? Has the government learnt its lesson about maintaining a dialogue mode of governance and nurturing a middle ground?

By now of course, everyone is speaking of the necessity of dialogue. But for the government, the question is how to make the opposition in the hills agree to a dialogue. For this, not only does the state government have to first make up its mind about whether it wants to sincerely take the path of talks, but also on how to de-escalate the situation gradually, so that talks become easier and the opposition finds it difficult to refuse to talk. Invariably, however, the issue of preconditions will arise, as they do in any peace talk. Will the government insist on calling off the general strike in the hills as a precondition for the talks? Or will the GJM insist on the withdrawal of police forces, in particular, the central forces, as a precondition?

The government will have to find intermediaries, all of whom have probably gone to the side of the opposition in the hills. In any case, de-escalation of the situation will be the prime task. The work of the government or the state, if it wants to restore peace and normalise the political process, is always more difficult in such situations. The onus is on the government to walk the extra mile, because it claims to represent the people of the state. The government has to win back the legitimacy it has lost. Similarities with other such cases of civil conflict and this one are striking. These similarities should make the government humble, cautious, and prudent – as Yassir Arafat used to say, “peace of the brave”.

Limitations of populism

Second, if the government thinks that deploying more forces will help the it come out of such a deadlock, it is mistaken. Recall how the deployment of more and more paramilitary forces in the Darjeeling hills by the Jyoti Basu government during the unrest in the 1980s had antagonised the common people there. The presence of paramilitary forces only terrorised the people. From then on, it was a downhill journey for the government.

The West Bengal government today may come out of the deadlock with the help of paramilitary forces and the army, and with the political assistance of the Central government. But in the long run, this may make it dependent on lifelines thrown its way by the Centre. The political price for this is not likely to be a small one.

The most crucial thing is that if the TMC government wants to counter the hard stance or aggression of the adversary in the hills, it must depend on the political support base that it has created there, if at all it has been created, or is still intact. Even in Siliguri, one can notice the absence of any popular mobilisation for peace in the hills. To return to peace, the emphasis on the police, administrative methods and rule by fiat, must go, and political mobilisation must become the preferred way. The government is avoiding both these options, and biding time, hoping perhaps that the worst is over.

Perhaps the worst is over, but the question to remember is – what was the cost of it? What lessons did we learn, or more importantly, what lessons did the government learn? Populism is good at times, but we must be aware of its limitations. When populism over-stretches itself to the point of being clever and short sighted, it thins out. The fault lines of society then expose themselves ruthlessly.

Ranabir Samaddar is Distinguished Chair in Forced Migration studies, Calcutta Research Group. He can be contacted at ranabir@mcrg.ac.in.