coal blocks

What the Government’s Powers to Allot Coal Blocks to Lone Bidders Mean

Documents reviewed by The Reporters’ Collective show the Adani group cornered the block even when the auction failed because the government had quietly changed the coal auction rules.

New Delhi: On August 17, 2022, the Union coal ministry declared the Adani Group as the successful bidder for a 250 million tonne coal block in Madhya Pradesh’s Singrauli forests. The auction for the Gondbahera Ujheni East coal block was unusual. Adani Group was the lone bidder.

Documents reviewed by The Reporters’ Collective show the Adani group cornered the block even when the auction failed because the government had quietly changed the coal auction rules, making it easier for companies to grab coal blocks even in the absence of competition.

The documents reveal that the government has given itself the discretionary powers to allot coal blocks to lone bidders even when auctions fail to deliver competitive bids.

The rules also contradict the assertive claims of transparency made by the Narendra Modi government, which amid much hype, introduced new laws and regulations to auction coal blocks. Seven years later the promise of ending discretionary allocation and replacing it with fair competition are tossed aside when auctions fail.These rules have also undermined the spirit of the landmark 2014 Supreme Court order that struck down arbitrary and discretionary allocations of coal blocks, an order that annulled 204 such allocations by the previous UPA government that were dubbed by the media as ‘Coalgate scam’.

Records show the Adani group is not the only beneficiary of these discretionary powers the Union government has handed itself. The government has resorted to such discretion in at least 12 cases and allocated coal blocks to private companies after failing to attract competition. The firms that have bagged these blocks include Vedanta-owned firms, JSW Steel, Birla Corporation and other lesser-known companies.

In part one of the investigative series, The Collective revealed how the power industry lobby got the government to open up sensitive forest patches in Madhya Pradesh for coal mining. The lobby eyed two blocks in particular. Adani Group, a member of the lobby, was the lone bidder for one of the two blocks the government opened up after overturning years of advice from the environment ministry against such a move.

Part two of the series reveals how the government gives away coal blocks to private companies through a discretionary government allotment route when only a single bidder turns up for the auctions. The fire sale of coal mines comes despite the country not needing additional coal supply now, and having allocated enough coal blocks to take care of the country’s power requirements for the next decade.

This report was originally published by The Reporters’ Collective. Read the full report here. Read part one of the series here.

‘Repressive’: Teachers’ Group Condemns Arrest of Deocha Pachami Coal Mine Protesters

“In these intolerant times we are living through, is that the intolerably long process of seeking justice itself becomes the punishment,” said Teachers Against the Climate Crisis.

New Delhi: A collective of teachers has condemned the arrest of nine activists who were protesting the Deocha Pachami coal mining project in Birbhum district of West Bengal, saying legitimate concern about the harm coal mining may cause to agriculture and related livelihoods should be addressed with sympathy.

Teachers Against the Climate Crisis (TACC) said, “In these intolerant times we are living through, is that the intolerably long process of seeking justice itself becomes the punishment. There are innumerable cases in this country of unnamed resisters languishing as undertrials in jails on trumped-up charges.”

TACC is a group of college and university teachers who believe that the climate crisis has become one of the most pressing concerns of our time.

TACC also questioned the wisdom of initiating such a massive expansion of coal use when equally affordable energy options are now widely available. “Repressive response to those who interrogate the wisdom of such projects seems foolhardy, in both the short and long term,” TACC said in a statement.

The full statement is reproduced below.

Teachers Against the Climate Crisis (TACC)

23 February 2022

Public statement on arrests of activists opposing the Deocha Pachami coal mining project

Teachers Against the Climate Crisis (TACC) unequivocally condemns the arrests of nine activists on 21 February protesting the Deocha Pachami coal mining project in Birbhum district of West Bengal. We are dismayed by the gravity of the absurd charges against them, including under section 307 (attempt to murder) and section 364 (kidnapping or abduction of a person in order to murder) of the IPC. It is shocking that two of them, both local activists, have been remanded to police custody.

The context for this unfortunate development is the growing resistance to coal mining in the area. Local Santhals and members of other communities have recently organized themselves under the banner Birbhum Jomi, Jeebon, Jeebika o Prokriti Bachao Mahasabha (Platform to save land, lives, livelihoods, and the environment). The two local activists in police custody are active members of this organization. Many people in the area are justifiably concerned about the harm coal mining may cause to agriculture, related livelihoods, water bodies, and other environmental damage in the area. They are also worried about the loss of their lands to the coal mining project. It has been reported that thousands of people across a number of villages would be potentially affected.

Both the law and justice would suggest that such concerns be addressed with sympathy and transparency. However, there is little reason to believe that due process has been followed so far, including the provisions of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation, and Resettlement Act, 2013. There has been no social impact assessment (section 4), or public hearings for social impact assessment (section 5) that this land acquisition makes mandatory on “the appropriate government”. Instead the West Bengal state government – in keeping with authoritarian responses by governments elsewhere in the country – has planted grave, false cases on leading activists at the slightest hint of resistance to such projects. Our concern, in these intolerant times we are living through, is that the intolerably long process of seeking justice itself becomes the punishment. There are innumerable cases in this country of unnamed resisters languishing as undertrials in jails on trumped-up charges.

The Deocha Pachami mining project is part of one of the largest coal blocks and projects in the country. We question the wisdom of such a massive expansion of coal use when equally affordable energy options are now widely available. Data from the Central Electricity Authority suggests that there has been an impressive expansion of solar power in the country in recent years. However, much else can be done to meet people’s basic energy needs by promoting wind power, decentralized solar, biogas, and small hydropower, all of which, this official data indicates, are stagnating or at best growing very slowly. At the state level, expanding solar projects of varied kinds – to meet agricultural demand, decentralized solar, grid-connected solar – and wind power along West Bengal’s 158-kilometre coastline – would not just generate cleaner energy, it would also create jobs in large enough numbers to more than compensate for the loss of employment from coal projects halted at their inception. Which is why the Birbhum Jomi, Jeebon, Jeebika o Prokriti Bachao Mahasabha has requested the government to set up a solar plant in the area instead of a coal mining project.

Given how vulnerable West Bengal is to the ravages of climate change, one would expect that the state government would respond with more sympathy to such demands. Due to its unique landmass, the West Bengal Sunderbans is already facing the highest rate of sea level rise in the country and possibly in the world. The IPCC’s latest, Sixth Assessment Report suggests that sea level rise will continue inexorably for centuries. Millions of farmers, fishers, and other communities along West Bengal’s and India’s coastline will also be affected by erratic rainfall, heat stress, more intense cyclones, and other effects predicted by the 2020 climate change report of the Indian Institute of Tropical Meteorology, Pune. In the face of the looming climate, pollution, and other ecological crises, a conventional reliance on coal power and a knee-jerk, repressive response to those who interrogate the wisdom of such projects seems foolhardy, in both the short and long term.

In this context, TACC demands that:

All the nine detained activists be immediately released.
All the charges against them be unconditionally dropped.
The West Bengal state government engage in a transparent dialogue with those opposing the coal mining project, and follow due process laid down in the relevant land acquisition laws.
The central government speed up the expansion of solar, wind, biogas and other renewable energy, prioritize people’s basic energy needs, and engage meaningfully with farmers, workers, trade unions, and other concerned bodies in civil society around a just energy transition.

Watch | Hasdeo Aranya Protests: 10 Long Years of Resistance Explained

In the past 10 days, members of tribal communities in Chhattisgarh have covered more than 300 km on foot to save the forests of Hasdeo. But the movement has a history spanning many years.

In the past 10 days, members of tribal communities in Chhattisgarh have covered more than 300 km on foot to save the forests of Hasdeo.

This movement to save the forest land and prevent the opening of coal mines did not start today or a few weeks ago, but has been going on for the past decade. In this video, The Wire explains the history of the movement and why members of tribal communities are struggling to save their land, water and forests.

India’s Solar Sector Bearing the Costs of a Poorly Designed Market

Obsolete market designs and dysfunctional policy making are slowing down growth.

A strange dysfunction characterises India’s solar policy. It shows in arbitrary policy making. As CarbonCopy has reported over the past week, the country abruptly hiked its targets for rooftop solar without readying DISCOMs. Similarly, the target for the National Solar Mission was quintupled without factoring in the country’s indigenous solar manufacturing sector. Imports soared.

More recently, India has begun pushing ‘atma nirbharta’ (self-reliance) in solar equipment, despite concerns the cost of solar equipment might rise. “The government changes its policy [and subsidy] regime too quickly and throws everything into chaos,” said a former official at Solar Energy Corporation of India (SECI), the body implementing the National Solar Mission. “That is not how things should be done. You declare a policy and then you stay with it for five years. If you must, you slowly phase it out,” he said. “Our policymaking is whimsical.”

The dysfunction also shows in how poorly India’s solar markets are designed. Apart from rooftop solar, ground-based solar is the other big part of India’s solar sector. Its growth, however, entirely depends on tenders from government bodies like NTPC and SECI.

Let that sink in. The rate at which India adds fresh solar capacity is determined not by demand (DISCOMs’ demand for solar power) or supply (investors wanting to put money into solar projects), but the rate at which NTPC and SECI produce tenders. “We need a SECI that is 10 times larger,” said a senior financial officer at Mumbai-headquartered conglomerate Shapoorji Pallonji. Or, better yet, a liberalised solar market.

This dysfunction doesn’t merely introduce inefficiency into India’s solar sector. Despite strong underlying fundamentals such as cheap global capital wanting to invest in the sector and dropping prices of solar equipment, it slows the sector and reduces solar’s competitiveness against coal.

Obsolete market designs

How does one understand this dysfunction? Some of it is policy that has outlived its useful life.

Take SECI. One reason it was created was because international funders were wary of investing in state government projects – they wanted counter-guarantees from the Centre. And so SECI was created–to float tenders, find bidders and then negotiate with state governments.

The size of its tenders was linked to India’s carbon mitigation targets. DISCOMs were told the percentage of green energy they should buy. The model worked fine as long as solar’s share in the energy mix was small. In 2010, for instance, solar cost more than Rs8/unit. Fresh capacity installed that financial year? Just 25 MW.

Things are very different today. “In the last 1.5 years, SECI has conducted three auctions, adding up to 6,500-6,600 MW,” said a senior official at Renew Power, on the condition of anonymity. “The bids netted prices of Rs2.91, Rs2.51 and Rs2.36. And so, they offered a blended price of Rs2.67 to DISCOMs asking them to buy,” he added. “DISCOMs, however, want all power at Rs2.36 or they want to wait for the next round to see if prices will fall even lower.”

DISCOMs have their own fiscal constraints. They are coming under load as SECI tenders for fresh capacity each year. They, ergo, are slow to sign these PPAs.

At the same time, the pool of capital waiting to invest in India’s solar sector has increased.

And yet, DISCOMs have neither been retooled for renewables (their need to protect their cross-subsidising model resulted in their crackdown on rooftop solar) nor has SECI been revamped to process as many tenders as it needs to.

India needs a better market design, said a senior manager overseeing Macquarie’s renewable investments from London. “Demand shouldn’t come from government targets but from retail customer demand.” Rooftop fitted that bill but ran afoul of the cross-subsidisation architecture that holds up India’s electricity market. The state, for its part, supported the legacy architecture.

Representative image of rooftop solar panels. Photo: Susan Sermoneta/Flickr CC BY NC ND 2.0

A wider sclerosis

The reason for the other part of the dysfunction – the abrupt hikes in targets and the swerves in government priorities – lies elsewhere. As CarbonCopy reported in the middle of 2020, India’s energy policy itself is muddled.

At a time when the world is going through a large energy transition, India’s backing fossil fuels and renewables. The costs run deep. “Renewable targets are not enough,” said the MacQuarie manager. “We need a roadmap on how a country is planning to decarbonise, a broad policy framework that can guide investment. What is the path towards net zero, essentially? That is what creates a stable predictable market.”

The country did have a roadmap called the Integrated Energy Policy. It was drafted by the erstwhile Planning Commission and released in 2006. The report, which had projections till 2030 on India’s possible energy trajectories, spoke about the need to reduce coal, boost gas, push hydro, promote solar and wind, and nuclear.

“If you create such a policy, you need an agency to implement it,” said the former SECI official. “And then, if you look at the entire country, what is the best agency to implement something like this?” According to him, that was the Central Electricity Authority (CEA). “It was supposed to coordinate state generation, transmission, all planning, at one location. If you empower it, it can reject or approve proposals.” But what has happened, he said, is the authority was weakened into a back office. “The CEA is now used only for data crunching.”

One part of the answer lies in line with ministries’ unwillingness to relinquish power. We have seen this elsewhere as well. The environment ministry dragged its feet on creating a National Environmental Protection Authority. This is partly about rent extraction. The environment ministry didn’t want to lose control over project clearances. A similar dysfunction can be seen in the energy ministries.

“The political economy of the [energy] sector tries to maximise interactions between developers and various arms of the state,” said IIT-Delhi professor Rohit Chandra. “If you need land, come to us. If you need a PPA, come to us. If you need to be connected to the grid, come to us. If you want to be paid on time, come to us. The actors are all very different [Central ministries, DISCOMs, etc.] but each of these frictions is an opportunity for political or bureaucratic rent-seeking.”

The outcome is one where, in the absence of a roadmap, each ministry works on its own. Each pushes the fuels it is meant to manage.

What adds to the ongoing mess is the government’s failure to integrate these views under a broader roadmap. “There is no comprehensive thinking in this government,” former finance secretary Arvind Mayaram told CarbonCopy last year. “No one thinks 20 years ahead. Every ministry is pretty much working on its own.”

If anything, the current centralisation of power at the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) introduces a fresh wrinkle. Its decisions go unopposed, even when it changes priorities abruptly.

The costs of dysfunction

In April this year, CarbonCopy took a closer look at coal-based power. With solar power cheaper than what thermal power plants produce, the sector had slipped into a Darwinian world. Large players were integrating vertically to boost their competitiveness – trying to house everything from coal blocks to power projects to transmission lines to DISCOMs in their organisation. Standalone power plants appeared to be doomed.

The pecking order in electricity seemed clear. Power from solar plants would be the cheapest, followed by that from vertically integrated majors, followed by standalone players.

How long could vertical integration keep thermal power projects cost-competitive against renewables, that series asked. One answer lies in how fast India’s solar sector itself grows. But, as this series shows, pending a set of critical domestic corrections, India’s solar market will grow at a slower pace than what the planet needs.

This is the final article in CarbonCopy’s four-part series on India’s solar sector.

Contracts for Coal Blocks Should be Made Public, Orders Chhattisgarh Panel

The panel rejected the state government-controlled power generation company’s contention that disclosing the documents would serve no public purpose.

New Delhi: The Chhattisgarh State Information Commission has ordered that the mining development and operations (MDO) contract for coal blocks signed by the state power company should be made public. The commission rejected the state government-controlled power generation company’s contention that disclosing the MDO would serve no public purpose.

The commission passed its orders after the Chhattisgarh Rajya Vidyut Nigam Limited (CRVNL), the state-owned power generation company twice refused to share copy of the contract and government records pertaining to the formulation and acceptance of the MDO agreement.

CRVNL had signed an MDO contract with Adani Enterprises Limited and its 100% subsidiary Gare Pelma III Collieries Limited for development, operation and mining of coal from 232 MT Gare Pelma Sector III coal block.

A Chhattisgarh-based activist, Alok Shukla had asked for a copy of this specific MDO contract and all government records pertaining to this contract first in February 2018 and then followed it with appeals as his RTI application was repeatedly rejected.

The Chhattisgarh state information commissioner’s orders could now set precedent for MDO contracts signed by all state governments as well as Coal Indian Limited to also be made public under the RTI Act. Several state governments, including Rajasthan and Maharashtra have so far refused to divulge them.

But, a retired central information commissioner explained, “The order of the state information commission is not binding on other states but it holds ‘great persuasive power’.” He explained that the state authorities as well as the involved companies have the option to appeal against this order in the high court and then in the Supreme Court. The Central Information Commission does not have appeal powers over state information commissions.

Also read: A Successful Protest Against a Chhattisgarh Mine Highlights the Failure of India’s Coal Auctions

The Chhattisgarh state power generation company had denied the information at the time that BJP was in power. But, Bhupesh Baghel, before he took over reigns of the state government as Congress chief minister in December 2018, had accused state power companies of signing such MDO contracts to buy coal from private companies at a higher than market prices. Therefore, the likelihood of Baghel’s government appealing against the order is low.

After the Supreme Court cancelled allocation of 204 coal blocks, the National Democratic Alliance government brought in a new law to deal with them. Under it, the Union government auctioned as well as allocated coal blocks. The allocations were made to state and central power generation PSUs. Many of them have signed or are in the process of signing MDO contracts with private companies.

By December 2018, the Union government said 15 MDO agreements had been signed but they had not maintained copies of these agreements as required by law.

In August 2018, then a member of Parliament Congress’ Digvijay Singh asked the government to clarify whether MDO agreements could be accessed through RTI applications or to disclose the “details of the key commercial terms of all such agreements”.

The then coal minister, Piyush Goyal replied stating, “The provisions of Right to Information Act, 2005, and disclosure requirements specified in Model Contract Agreement are applicable on such agreements.”

But in the model contract document he cited, the Union government had advised states to not provide the MDO contracts under RTI Act if they so wished.

The Chhattisgarh state information commission cited this reply in its order favouring release of the MDO contract to the applicant.

In its order it said that because the information pertained to natural resources of the country, it was of great public interest. It gave the state authorities 30 days to provide a copy of the MDO agreement and the official files pertaining to the contract.

It overruled the state’s three key arguments against sharing the contract details. The state had contended that there was no public purpose to be served by providing the details under RTI. It had said that the contract was private information of the state PSU and the contracted companies, Adani Enterprises and its subsidiary, and the latter had refused permission to share it with public. It also contended that the contract and other government records contained commercial information of these companies and therefore were exempt under RTI.

By arrangement with Business Standard.

Coal Auctions, Allocations Get Far, Far Less Than What Modi Govt Estimated

This gives credence to the suspicion that the Modi government had exaggerated its revenue estimates to support former CAG Vinod Rai’s controversial theory that the allocation of captive blocks by the previous UPA government to private players without following the auction route had led to Rs 1.86 lakh crore of notional loss to the exchequer.

New Delhi: The Narendra Modi government had claimed that coal-bearing states will together earn revenue of Rs 3.35 lakh crore from 67 captive coal blocks allocated by it during February-March 2015, of which 33 were auctioned. Against that, they have received just Rs 5,684 crore in the 3.5 years between February 2016 and July 2018, according to a report in Business Standard.

This gives credence to the suspicion that the Modi government had exaggerated its revenue estimates to support former Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) Vinod Rai’s controversial theory that the allocation of captive blocks by the previous UPA government to private players without following the auction route had led to Rs 1.86 lakh crore of notional loss to the exchequer.

“Potential revenue of more than Rs 3.35 lakh crore to flow to the states from auction and allotment of coal blocks,” then coal secretary Anil Swarup had tweeted in March 2015. The projection of Rs 3.35 lakh crore revenue flows is over 30 years.

The Centre also issued a press release to amplify what Swarup had claimed in his tweet.

“India has hit a gold mine with the recently concluded auction of 29 coal mines in two phases. The public exchequer continues to swell on revenue from coal block auctions. The total proceeds from the coal mines auctions have crossed Rs 1.93 trillion surpassing CAG’s estimate of Rs 1.86 trillion losses on account of allocation of 206 captive coal blocks without auction since 1993,” the release said.

Moreover, Prime Minister Narendra Modi was also quoted in the release as saying, “Fetching of over Rs 2 trillion from auction of just 33 coal blocks has shown that policy-driven governance can rid the system of corruption.”

In August 2014, the Supreme Court cancelled the allocation of 204 coal blocks made to the public and private sector, citing irregularities in the procedure followed by the coal ministry. This left the industry staring at an impending fuel crisis.

However, the NDA government speedily brought the Coal Mines (Special Provisions) Act 2015 to handle the reallocation of cancelled coal blocks. The action of producing coal blocks was also held expeditiously, which helped stave off the looming fuel crisis.

While private players had to participate in an auction to bag captive coal blocks to meet the fuel requirements of their power and metals plants, allocations were made to Central and state government utilities on a nomination basis.

The coal ministry used the reverse bidding route to allocate coal blocks to private players.

Has reverse auction benefited electricity consumers?

Following judicial intervention in the 2G and captive coal block allocations during the UPA regime, it was decided that all natural resources should be auctioned to ensure transparency and fairness in allocation.

When coal minister Piyush Goyal introduced reverse bidding in the allocation of coal blocks and linkages – where the bidder who promises to charge the least from the consumer wins the block – it was with the stated aim of ensuring that consumers get the benefit of low coal prices.

For example, in a press conference in mid-2017, Goyal said that Shakti (Scheme for Harnessing and Allocating Koyala Transparently in India) would be a transformational policy for auction and allotment of coal linkages, and will lead to affordable power, access to coal and accountability in the allocation of coal.

However, reverse auction may not have lived up to those promises. For example, while private power producers have benefited immensely from the allocation of coal through a reverse auction held under the Shakti scheme recently, electricity consumers have been fobbed off with token tariff concessions.

Under the much-hyped policy, Coal India (CIL) allocated long-term linkages of over 27 million tonnes of coal to ten private power plants following an auction conducted in September last year. Bidders made token concessions by offering to reduce the existing electricity tariff by 1-4 paise. In return, they were assured coal supply of over 27 million tonnes per annum for 25 years at CIL’s notified price, which was about Rs 726 per tonne cheaper than the price they were paying at the time for the spot e-auction coal to fire their plants.

Final Number of Inviolate Coal Blocks Down From 206 to Less Than 35

The environment ministry has figured that the government does not have mapped data of where India’s perennial rivers, its hydropower and irrigation projects are located.

The environment ministry has figured that the government does not have mapped data of where India’s perennial rivers, its hydropower and irrigation projects are located

Open cast miniing in Jharia. Credit: IAC/Flickr, CC BY 2.0

To be finalised soon by the government, the number of inviolate coal blocks where mining will be banned is likely to be reduced from the originally identified 206 to less than 35. The environment ministry has decided to again dilute the parameters for identifying which of India’s 793 blocks are located under healthy and important forest patches, not to be chopped down.

Beside other parameters, the ministry was to map which forests are important as catchments for perennial rivers and water bodies, irrigation and hydroelectric projects. Mining of coal in these forests was also to be restricted under the inviolate forest policy.

But documents reviewed by Business Standard show the coal ministry repeatedly warned this would severely impact many blocks.

Documents also show that after more than a year of deliberations between different agencies, the environment ministry has figured that the government does not have mapped data of where India’s perennial rivers, its hydropower and irrigation projects are located. So, the ministry has decided to dispense with the parameters measuring the importance of forests that are essential for these features. This conclusion by the ministry will now limit the inviolate coal blocks to merely 35 for good. Of these, too, the already operational blocks are expected to be taken off the list.

The 35 coal-bearing zones constitute 7.86% of the area of all the blocks. The coal ministry has noted that three of these 25 blocks, namely Lekhapani, Vijay West and Durgapur Extension in Assam, Chhattisgarh and Maharashtra, respectively, are already operational. These too, it has recommended be taken off the list.

Many environmental organisations had earlier criticised the T.S.R. Subramanian committee report for recommending a dilution of the inviolate norms, which the government is now close to achieving. The committee had been formed to review environmental laws, and, among other things, had suggested a limited scope of the inviolate policy to free up mining.

“A transparent, scientifically rigorous and inviolate forest policy was the right thing to do, in order to rearrange coal mining in such a way that it had less impact on forests, tribal communities and wildlife. At the same time, this would have ensured greater certainty for investors and project developers. But the ministry of environment has showed it is unable – or unwilling – to protect some of India’s last remaining forests from mining,” said Nandikesh Sivalingam from Greenpeace India.

The policy for inviolate forests was first mooted as “No-Go” areas policy by then environment minister Jairam Ramesh, under the earlier United Progressive Alliance government. That policy, which stopped mining in 47% of the areas in identified coal blocks, was opposed by others in the UPA. This began the process of dilution.

Under Jayanthi Natarajan it was named the inviolate forest policy. Though the initial set of parameters decided by an expert committee to identify such forests were comprehensive, the UPA, and then the NDA government put pressure to repeatedly dilute them. The coal ministry advocated the dilution and records show that under both governments, the environment ministry repeatedly tinkered with the parameters and consequently kept bringing down the area kept out of mining.

Business Standard had earlier reported how some of the other parameters to identify good forests were watered down.

Now, documents show that the coal ministry also warned that a large chunk of coal blocks near water bodies would be ‘sterilised’ if the parameters recommended by experts to identify the hydrological value of forests were followed. Forest Survey of India (FSI), an arm of the environment ministry, was asked to conduct detailed studies as to the nature of rivers. They requested information from the Central Water Commission (CWC).

After repeated back and forth communication between the environment ministry, FSI and CWC, it was declared that “information on nature (perennial/non-perennial) of first-order streams are not available”, with any of the stakeholders. It also concluded that the details of hydropower and irrigation projects were not available on a map.

The environment ministry then asked CWC to provide in writing their inability to gather data. Subsequently the ministry on March 11, 2015, decided to amend the parameters altogether in a meeting attended by top forest division officials.

This final dilution of the parameters related to hydrological data only adds to the tweaking already done by the ministry, which collectively has helped reduce the number of coal blocks where mining would have to be banned.