Combined Fiscal Deficit of Centre, States May Reach 14% in FY21: Rangarajan

According to Rangarajan, the fiscal deficit may further go if the government decides to go in for additional borrowings to meet GST compensation part.

Hyderabad: The combined fiscal deficit of states and the Centre during the current year may go up to 14% against the mandated level of 6%, former Reserve Bank of India (RBI) governor C. Rangarajan said on Thursday.

Speaking at a programme organised by the ICFAI Business School in Hyderabad, the former chairman of the economic advisory council to the prime minister said banks should neither be timid nor adventurous while lending as the loans of today should not become NPAs of tomorrow.

“So therefore we are essentially talking about 13.8% or 14% of the gross domestic product (GDP) as the overall fiscal deficit of the states and the Centre. It is obvious this is twice the mandated level. The mandated level for both the Centre and state is 6% of the GDP.

“It is twice or even more than twice of the estimated figure,” he said.

According to him, the fiscal deficit may further go if the government decides to go in for additional borrowings to meet GST compensation part.

Rangarajan said RBI’s monetary policy is “consistent” under the present circumstances and as a result banks have adequate liquidity for more lending.

He opined that governments need to spend more when the economy is in slump and it is essential to spend on healthcare, relief and rehabilitation and on stimulus to spur the economy.

“There are three types of expenditure required. First, expenditure on healthcare; second, expenditure on relief and rehabilitation; and third, expenditure on stimulus. And it appears that the government both at the Centre and states are somewhat slow in increasing expenditures,” he said.

He said the economic growth of the country and other nations has come to a grinding halt due to lockdown to contain the spread of coronavirus.

However, he said capital flows into India was encouraging during the last three months.

Sitharaman Misses the Chance to Exploit the Full Potential of a Higher Fiscal Deficit

IT remains a genuine confusion as to whether invoking “escape clause” to deviate from the fiscal consolidation path is in response to the unanticipated outcome of structural policy announcements or whether it is for increasing capital spending.

Economists often push the idea that strict adherence to fiscal rules is growth-inducing. However, empirical evidence suggests that it is unwise to be a “fiscal hawk” in times of serious economic slowdown. 

After all, there are irreversible economic costs to strict fiscal prudence. This is the significant economic policy prescription that finance minister Nirmala Sitharaman missed to explore to its full potential in her Union Budget 2020, which was supposed to revive demand and reverse the economic slowdown.

The potential of a fiscal tool in triggering the economy is also often better done through the expenditure side rather than lowering rates of taxation. For instance, Budget 2020’s ‘lower tax rates sans exemptions’ policy is complicated. This is not a simplification of tax structure. It is complicated in its nature as it will lead to a concern (“nudge”) in an Indian taxpayer over which is higher, the propensity to “save” using exemptions or “spend”? 

Last year’s announcement of lowering corporate tax rates – the statutory rates – to 15% for those firms who forgo exemptions also may not result in intended benefits as the firms do enjoy an effective tax rate of around 20% even with exemptions. However, it is an empirical question and we need to wait for the evidence on how Indian companies end up acting.

Also Read: Budget 2020 Sidesteps the Question of What the Govt Should Do to Revive the Economy

If the intention of the government is putting more money into the hands of people to revive demand or to boost “sentiments”, it would have been better off by strengthening public expenditure policies. The budgetary allocations of ‘employer of last resort’ policies (MNRGEGA) and wage boost policies are significant among these policy priorities to boost demand.

Is fiscal prudence growth-inducing? 

More often than not, fiscal consolidation is attained by retrenchment of public spending and not increased tax buoyancy. This has severe negative growth consequences. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has recently slashed India’s forecast to 4.8% in 2019-20, a reduction of 1.3% within three months. Against the backdrop of the World Economic Outlook (WEO) released in Davos, Switzerland, IMF chief economist Gita Gopinath said that the economic slowdown in India has pushed down global growth forecast by 0.1%. When there is an increasing recognition that India is a “drag” on global growth, from the position of fastest growing economy a few years ago, it is high time to come out of a mode of “denial” and to float appropriate macroeconomic tools in action. However, the Union Budget has missed the chance to act judiciously to explore the power of appropriate “fiscal policy tools” to revive growth. 

It is interesting to recall here that the IMF Article IV consultation report 2019-20 for India is also equally confusing when India is advised to use monetary policy to address economic growth downturn while strictly adhering to fiscal consolidation path. There is a shadow of these new macroeconomic policy consensus in the Union Budget 2020. This macroeconomic policy uncertainty affects economic growth further – unless we correct for it – and especially when the cuts in policy rates by Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) has consistently failed to trigger economic growth. 

From being the fastest growing economy a few years ago, India has now been recognised as a drag on global economy. Photo: Reuters/Rupak De Chowdhuri

Invoking the ‘escape clause’ of FRBM

The finance minister also announced today that India has gone for a fiscal deficit – GDP threshold of 3.5% (instead of 3%) for the next fiscal and that it is strictly within the purview of the new Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management (FRBM) Act, incorporated in the Finance Bill 2018.

She was referring to the “escape clause” embedded in the Act, to have flexible upper bound of deficit-GDP ratio under special circumstances. Sitharaman quoted from the Section 4 (2) of the FRBM Act, which provides for a trigger mechanism for a deviation from the estimated fiscal deficit on account of structural reforms in the economy with unanticipated fiscal implications, and justified why she has taken a deviation of 0.5%. The minister re-confirmed that it is consistent with Section 4(3) of FRBM Act, both for RE 2019-20 at 3.8% and BE 2020-21 at 3.5%. 

Subsequently, the net market borrowing net market borrowings for the year 2019-20 would be Rs 4.99 lakh crore and for the year 2020-21, it would be Rs 5.36 lakh crore. The revised path to fiscal consolidation is incorporated in the ‘Medium Term Fiscal Policy cum Strategy Statement’ which was tabled in the Parliament on Saturday, where one gets a cue that a significant part of the market borrowings for the financial year 2020-21 would go financing the capital expenditure of the government which has been mentioned to have scaled up by more than 21%. 

It remains a genuine confusion as to whether invoking “escape clause” to deviate from the fiscal consolidation path is in response to the unanticipated outcome of structural policy announcements the government has made or whether it is for increasing capital spending for the economy. Nevertheless, the renewed emphasis on capital formation – especially infrastructure investment – is welcome. 

In addition to this announcement, the Union Budget also has mentioned allocation of Rs 22,000 crore for equity to fund certain specified infrastructure finance companies, who would leverage it manifold and provide much needed long-term finance to Infrastructure sector to spurt the economic growth. 

New FRBM and the Anatomy of Revenue Expenditure 

Having said that, it is significant to examine the anatomy of India’s revenue expenditure. If invoking the “escape clause” is linked to forward looking strategies to increase capital formation, then India needs to maintain the “golden rule” of fiscal rules that revenue deficit is zero. The New FRBM 2018–19 mentioned that “in the proposed FRBM architecture, Government will simultaneously target debt and fiscal deficit, with fiscal deficit as an operational target and do away with the deficit targets on revenue account that is revenue deficit (RD) and consequentially, effective revenue deficit (ERD).” 

Also Read: Sitharaman’s ‘Budget of Giveaways’ Will Not Help India’s Broken Economy

This “non-zero Revenue Deficit” is dangerous especially when the escape clause is invoked. The golden rule is to prevent fiscal profligacy and to imply a hard budget constraint on government to prevent the use of borrowed resources for the purpose of recurrent spending including wages and salaries, interest payment, pension and subsidies. However, with the simultaneous situation of invoking escape clause to raise the threshold fiscal deficit ratio to GDP and having a non-zero revenue deficit can be tricky. 

Ex-post to the new FRBM in 2018, with no target, revenue deficit has increased stubbornly high to 2.4% in 2019-20 and would be at 2.7 % of GDP in 2020–21. The anatomy of revenue expenditure reveals that Centre intends to spend on interest ( 23.28 %) and defence (10.62) highest and for other components (refer Table 1). There is also deviation between BE and RE figures (as reflected in the ratio of BE/RE for the year 2019-20) in the components of revenue expenditure. This deviation between BE and RE is referred to as “fiscal marksmanship” and it is perfect only if the value is 1. 

Table 1: Anatomy of Revenue Expenditure 

  2018-19Actuals 2019-20BE 2019-20RE 2020-21BE Fiscal Marksmanship 

BE/RE 2019-20

Pension 6.92 6.26 6.82 6.93 0.95
Defence 12.56 10.96 11.72 10.62 0.97
Subsidy – 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  
Fertiliser 3.05 2.87 2.96 2.34 1.00
Food 4.38 6.61 4.03 3.80 1.69
Petroleum 1.07 1.35 1.43 1.34 0.97
Agriculture and Allied Activities 2.73 5.44 4.48 5.09 1.25
Commerce and Industry 1.20 0.97 1.06 0.89 0.95
Development of North East 0.08 0.11 0.10 0.10 1.12
Education 3.47 3.40 3.51 3.26 1.00
Energy 1.96 1.60 1.57 1.40 1.05
External Affairs 0.67 0.64 0.64 0.57 1.03
Finance 0.64 0.72 0.92 1.37 0.81
Health 2.35 2.33 2.37 2.22 1.02
Home Affairs 4.24 3.73 4.60 3.76 0.84
Interest Payments  25.17 23.70 23.16 23.28 1.06
IT and Telecom 0.64 0.78 0.59 1.95 1.36
Others 3.22 2.75 2.85 2.77 1.00
Planning and Statistics 0.23 0.21 0.22 0.20 1.00
Rural Development 5.74 5.05 5.31 4.76 0.98
Scientific Departments 1.07 0.98 1.03 0.99 0.99
Social Welfare 1.89 1.82 1.79 1.77 1.05
Tax Administration 3.00 4.21 5.09 5.03 0.85
of which Transfer to 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  
GST Compensation Fund 2.34 3.63 4.49 4.45 0.83
Transfer to States 5.15 5.58 5.76 6.59 1.00
Transport 6.20 5.65 5.86 5.58 1.00
Union Territories 0.61 0.54 0.56 1.74 1.00
Urban Development 1.75 1.72 1.57 1.64 1.14
Grand Total 100 100 100 100 1.03
Grand Total (in Rs crores ) 2315113 2786349 2698552 3042230

Source: (Basic Data), Union Budget 2020 documents, Government of India 

Financing Pattern of Fiscal Deficits 

The efficacy of invoking “escape clauses” do not remain at levels of deficit, but also at the financing pattern of deficits. Over the years, there has been a shift in financing pattern of fiscal deficits from seigniorage financing to bond financing. With an “escape clause”, there can be a provision for eventual monetisation of a portion of deficits, as it requires a direct seigniorage financing with Reserve Bank of India. Seigniorage is technically the change in high powered money to GDP, which has the potential of inflationary pressures. 

However, such eventual monetisation can happen only if the real rate of growth is less than the real rate of interest (r>g) and results in some unpleasant monetary arithmetic. This also leads an economist to think further what MMT genre of economists who argue whether to go for seigniorage rather than the eventual destruction of the economy through fiscal retrenchment and fiscal rules. Because to them, saying “there is no fiscal space” is a white lie when you have the ability to decide on your seigniorage financing of deficits. Are there any elements of a new macroeconomic thinking towards such “fiscal seigniorage” in the Union Budget 2020?

RBI Agrees to Transfer Rs 28,000 Crore Interim Dividend to Modi Govt

The decision to hand over an interim dividend will help the Centre meet its fiscal deficit target.

New Delhi: The Reserve Bank of India has agreed to transfer an “interim surplus” of Rs 28,000 crore to the Narendra Modi government, a move that will help the Centre meet its fiscal deficit target despite a shortfall in revenue collections.

The interim surplus that will be transferred will be nearly triple of what was paid last year (Rs 10,000 crore) and will take the total dividend from the central bank to Rs 68,000 crore in the current fiscal.

“Based on a limited audit review and after applying the extant economic capital framework, the Board decided to transfer an interim surplus of ₹ 280 billion to the central government for the half-year ended December 31, 2018. This is the second successive year that the Reserve Bank will be transferring an interim surplus,” a RBI statement, put out on Monday evening, said.

Earlier this month, top finance ministry bureaucrat Subhash Chandra Garg told reporters that the budget had factored in a Rs 68,000 crore dividend from the RBI in the revised estimate for the current fiscal year.

Also Read: BJP Wants Expansionary Economic Policy Ahead of 2019 Elections

A dividend is the amount transferred to the Centre by the RBI, which generates revenue from trading in bonds and currencies. While some of this money goes towards building the central bank’s reserves, the remainder is transferred to the Centre.

The RBI typically generates revenue from trading in bonds and currencies, part of which goes toward building reserves, while the remainder is transferred to the government in the form of a dividend.

Tensions over dividend payout had risen during former central bank governor Urjit Patel’s tenure.

According to Bloomberg, the RBI under Patel had declined requests from the Modi government for an additional payment after the dividend payout dropped to a five-year low in 2017-2018.

The payout had dropped from Rs 65,896 crore in FY 2015-16 to Rs 30,659 crore in FY 2016-17 – however, this was due to the costs that the RBI had borne during demonetisation.

In December 2018, the clash over the government wanting to also dip into the central bank’s contingency reserves resulted in a compromise: an expert committee headed by former RBI boss Bimal Jalan was set up to “propose a suitable profits distribution policy taking into account all the likely situations of the RBI…”

The RBI’s press release on Monday did not clarify whether the expert panel had approved the interim dividend, although Reuters recently reported that this decision would be taken by the central bank’s board.