BRICS Leaders ‘Gravely Concerned’ By Israeli Offensive, Call For Ceasefire and Aid to Gaza

Addressing the summit, Prime Minister Narendra Modi also called for the views of the BRICS’s founding members to be respected within the grouping.

New Delhi: Leaders of the BRICS countries on Wednesday (October 23) expressed “grave concern” at the escalating violence in Palestine – which they attributed to the Israeli military’s operations – and called for an immediate ceasefire in Gaza.

Saying that the “Israeli military’s offensive” has led to the “mass killing and injury of civilians, forced displacement and widespread destruction of civilian infrastructure”, the world leaders “stress[ed] the urgent need” for an “immediate, comprehensive and permanent ceasefire in the Gaza Strip”.

Apart from underscoring the need for either side in the Israel-Hamas war to release those illegally detained and for aid to reach Gaza unhindered, the BRICS leaders in their ‘Kazan Declaration’ also condemned Israel’s attacks on UN personnel, calling on Tel Aviv to “immediately cease such activity”.

Held in Kazan, Russia, the 16th BRICS summit ended on Wednesday and featured for the first time in 14 years participation by new member states, who were invited to join the grouping last year.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi attended the summit, where among his other counterparts he met Chinese President Xi Jinping in their first bilateral meeting in five years, marking a thaw in ties that were frozen since the border clashes in 2020.

Speaking as the Israel-Hamas war as well as the Russia-Ukraine war still raged on, Modi said during his remarks at the summit on Wednesday that the BRICS countries “support dialogue and diplomacy, not war”.

Modi endorses ‘respect’ for views of founding members, reform of institutions

India stood ready to welcome the new countries in BRICS as partner countries, Modi said, adding that “in this regard all decisions should be taken by consensus, and the views of BRICS founding members should be respected”.

Initially comprising Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, the grouping invited Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to join it last year.

While Argentina declined and Saudi Arabia is yet to join, the other countries have become BRICS members.

Modi said at the summit’s ‘closed plenary’ that the BRICS countries needed to “give the world the message that BRICS is not a divisive organisation but one that works in the interest of humanity”.

He also endorsed a reform of global institutions such as the UN Security Council and the World Trade Organisation, saying that BRICS ought to “move forward in a time bound manner” in this regard.

However, BRICS must be careful not to “acquire the image of [an organisation] that is trying to replace global institutions” as opposed to one that “wishes to reform them”, he added.

During his address to the closed plenary session Modi spoke of the need to counter terrorism, saying there is “no place for double standards” on the issue. He advocated for the adoption of a Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism in the UN.

India first suggested a draft anti-terrorism convention in 1996, but its proposal has remained frozen due to the inability of the international community to reach a definition for ‘terrorism’.

Modi also touted the New Development Bank, which is also known as the BRICS Bank and was established in 2015 as an alternative to the World Bank and the IMF, as an “an important option for the development needs”.

The bank’s India regional office operates from the GIFT City in Gandhinagar, Gujarat.

The Indian prime minister also said at the BRICS’s open plenary that “multipolarity” was a strength of the nine-member grouping.

After 5-Year Gap, Modi, Xi Hold Bilateral Meeting, Agree to Restart Special Rep Talks

India said on Monday that a patrolling agreement was reached on the two remaining friction points in Ladakh. China confirmed this the next day.

New Delhi: After a five-year hiatus marked by clashes between and the loss of lives among Indian and Chinese soldiers in the Himalayan heights, Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping met and agreed to restart Special Representative talks, as they set the stage for resolving the eastern Ladakh military stand-off and normalising relations.

In his opening remarks at the talks held on the sidelines of the BRICS summit in Russia, Modi noted that they were meeting after five years and welcomed the agreement reached to resolve the border issues.

“Maintaining peace and tranquillity over the border should remain our priority, and mutual trust, mutual respect and mutual sensitivity should remain the basis of our relationship. I am confident that we will hold talks with an open heart and our discussions would be constructive,” he said.

Earlier, Xi also referred to the lengthy gap. “Both the people in our two countries and the international community are paying great attention to our meeting,” he remarked.

Xi underlined that it was “important for both sides to have more communication and cooperation, properly handle differences and disagreements, and to facilitate each other’s pursuit of development aspirations”.

“It’s also important for both sides to shoulder our international responsibility, set an example for boosting the strength and unity of developing countries, and to contribute to promoting multipolarisation and democracy in international relations,” he added.

India was the first to announce on Monday that a patrolling agreement had been reached regarding the last two remaining friction points in eastern Ladakh. The following day, said that it “commends the progress” made by the two countries recently on “resolutions on issues concerning the border area following close communication through diplomatic and military channels.”

India’s readout of today’s bilateral talks added that the two leaders agreed that the special representatives on the India-China boundary question will meet at an “early date”.

Their mandate as described in the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA)’s press release was to “oversee the management of peace and tranquility in border areas and to explore a fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable solution to the boundary question.”

The press release also said that dialogue mechanisms – at the level of foreign ministers and other officials – will also be utilised to “stabilise and rebuild bilateral relations”.

It stated that a “stable, predictable and amicable” relation between India and China will not only have a positive impact geo-politically, but also contribute to “a multi-polar Asia and a multi-polar world”.

“The leaders underlined the need to progress bilateral relations from a strategic and long-term perspective, enhance strategic communication and explore cooperation to address developmental challenges,” it said.

The Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson’s readout, posted on her X account, had striking differences.

The Indian press release had mentioned the “agreement for complete disengagement and resolution of issues that arose in 2020 in the India-China border areas”.

Echoing China’s foreign ministry on Tuesday, the Chinese spokesperson noted simply that the “the two leaders commended the important progress the two sides had recently made through intensive communication on resolving the relevant issues in the border areas”.

The same talking points had been also posted by the Chinese ambassador. Neither of the Chinese officials used the term “agreement”, which was used specifically by India.

On the next steps, China said that they “agreed to make good use of the Special Representatives mechanism on the China-India boundary question, ensure peace and tranquillity in the border areas and find a fair and reasonable settlement”.

There was also mention of bringing “the relationship back to sound and steady development at an early date”.

The additional point mentioned by China was that the two countries had agreed to to strengthen communication at multilateral fora. In contrast to the Indian readout, the Chinese statement referred backed multipolarity solely in a global context.

At a media briefing before Modi’s departure from Russia, Indian foreign secretary Vikram Misri said that the “the process to restore normal relations and bring them back to a regular path has begun”.

“What I was saying about ‘the restoration of peace and tranquility in border areas creating space for returning towards the path of normalisation’, my point was that the recent agreement has opened the way. Both sides need to walk on this path,” he said.

Asked whether China could be trusted, he replied, “As for the question of trust, with the process that both sides will move forward with, we hope that trust will increase further in the future.”

The last time Modi and Xi met in either of their countries was in October 2019, against the backdrop of the rock-cut temples of Mamallapuram, for the second India-China Informal Summit.

During that meeting, the strategic economic dialogue between the two nations was elevated to a ‘high-level economic and trade dialogue’.

The following year, 2020, was set to commemorate 70 years of diplomatic relations, with 70 events planned, including a symbolic ship voyage.

They again met on the sidelines of the BRICS summit in Brasilia in November 2019, a meeting that Modi asserted “add[ed] new vigour to India-China relations”. A month later, the special representatives met in New Delhi.

Within a couple of months, the world was in the grip of the COVID-19 pandemic. Meanwhile, in the icy heights of eastern Ladakh, Chinese troops were amassing at the border with India, pushing their patrols far beyond their usual pattern.

While localised confrontation began in the first quarter of 2020, the then-army chief had said they were not a point of major alarm. Two weeks later, defence minister Rajnath Singh said that a “sizeable number of Chinese people have also come” to the border.

Despite these reverberations, it was a shock when the Indian army announced on June 16 that 20 Indian soldiers had died in a “violent face-off” with Chinese troops in the Galwan Valley. It took China another eight months to acknowledge the death of four Chinese soldiers.

The fatal Galwan clash froze political ties but also triggered diplomatic and military talks between India and China. These talks led to de-escalation at four points – the north and south banks of Pangong Tso, Gogra-Hots Springs and PP 15. The last one took place in 2022. 

As part of de-escalation, these friction points saw the creation of buffer zones, which included areas where India had previously conducted patrolling.

For the past two years, the situation in the remaining areas of Depsang and Demchok have been difficult to resolve. The stalemate continues, with China claiming that the Depsang Plains and Demchok are legacy issues, while India insists they are part of the ongoing stand-off.

Also read: Why Mutual Trust Will Elude India, China Despite Patrolling ‘Deal’, Modi-Xi Meeting

In August 2023, a renewed effort was made to resolve these disputes through intensified military-level talks, but no breakthrough was achieved.

Around that time, there was speculation about a thaw in relations, possibly paving the way for Xi’s visit ahead of New Delhi hosting the G-20 summit. However, the momentum faded when the Chinese president chose to skip the event in the Indian capital.

Still, the signs of a forthcoming change were already emerging.

In November 2023, India relaxed visa approvals for Chinese professionals whose expertise is required by vendors under the production-linked incentive scheme. China finalised the name of its new ambassador, Xu Feihong, who finally arrived in New Delhi to fill a vacancy that lasted for 18 months.

Before the general elections, the Indian prime minister had said in an interview that relations with China were “important and significant” and hoped that the multiple rounds of talks would “restore and sustain peace and tranquility in our border”.

But post-election signals had not been as promising for India-China rapprochement. When Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te congratulated Modi on X for his electoral victory, Modi publicly thanked him. Shortly after, a bipartisan US Congressional delegation visited India to meet with the Dalai Lama.

While meetings between US politicians and the Dalai Lama on Indian soil were not new, their public pronouncements raised eyebrows. China publicly protested both incidents, which took place in the early weeks of Modi’s third term.

Modi also skipped the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit that month, where he had been widely expected to meet Xi. Their last encounter had been at the BRICS dinner in South Africa in August of the previous year.

Moreover, six weeks after the elections, Xi was still the only world leader who had not extended congratulations to Modi.

According to think tank Global Trade Research Initiative, while political relations between India and China deteriorated, trade between the two countries remained relatively unaffected as trade is driven by private business interests, with minimal direct government involvement.

“This ballooning trade imbalance has left India with a cumulative trade deficit of over $334 billion over the past five years, reflecting a growing reliance on Chinese goods,” the think tank said.

But, the state of political ties was certainly a barrier to investment from Chinese companies. The economic imperatives for a return to normal India-China relations was clearly weighing heavily on a section of the Indian government.

The Indian corporate sector was already chomping at the bit. The invitation extended to the Chinese ambassador for the wedding of the youngest son of India’s leading billionaire industrialist garnered attention from various circles.

The finance ministry’s Economic Survey 2023-24 stated that allowing foreign direct investment from China could help boost India’s exports to the west.

“The questions that India faces are: (a) Is it possible to plug India into the global supply chain without plugging itself into the China supply chain? and (b) what is the right balance between importing goods and importing capital from China?,” the survey said.

The engagement visibly gathered momentum from early July, when external affairs minister S. Jaishankar met with his Chinese counterpart Wang Yi at the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit in Astana. Just three weeks later, they reconvened in Vientiane during the ASEAN foreign ministers’ meeting.

The foreign office-led Working Mechanism for Consultation & Coordination on India-China Border Affairs held back-to-back meetings on July 31 and August 30. On September 12, the National Security Adviser met with Wang.

A week later, Chinese ambassador Xu stated that India-China relations had reached a “crucial stage of improvement and development” and an increased frequency of high-level meetings. The Chinese defence ministry added, on September 26, that discussions had helped both sides reduce differences and build consensus.

Modi Reiterates Call For Peaceful Conflict Resolution in Talks With Putin

Modi said India that believed “the resolution of issues should be achieved through peaceful means only”.

New Delhi: Three months after making Russia the first foreign destination of his third term, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi hugged Russian President Vladimir Putin and told him that conflicts should be resolved solely through peaceful means.

Modi arrived in Kazan, a southwestern Russian city, on Tuesday (October 22) to participate in the 16th BRICS summit scheduled for the following day.

His first engagement was with his host Putin at the Tatarstan governor’s palace. After a handshake and embrace, they had a delegation-level bilateral meeting, which began with Putin’s remarks welcoming Modi.

“Large projects are consistently developing, and we welcome your decision to open a consulate general of India in Kazan. Expanding India’s diplomatic presence in Russia will contribute to the further development of bilateral relations,” he said.

In his response, Modi raised the Ukraine war. Stating that both India and Russia had been in “close contact” regarding the conflict, he reiterated that India believed that “the resolution of issues should be achieved through peaceful means only”.

“We fully support the establishment of peace and stability as soon as possible. In all our efforts, we give priority to humanity, and we are ready to provide any possible assistance in the future,” he said.

At a briefing on Tuesday night, Indian foreign secretary Vikram Misri stated that Modi “reiterated that dialogue and diplomacy was the way forward to achieve resolution of the conflict”.

A month after his earlier visit to Russia, Modi travelled to the Ukrainian capital of Kyiv to meet with President Volodymyr Zelenskyy.

“He briefed President Putin [on Tuesday] about his discussions with the Ukrainian leadership and emphasised that India was prepared to contribute to achieving peace in the region,” Misri noted.

Modi had already shared details of his visit to Kyiv with Putin during a phone call. National security adviser Ajit Doval had also personally briefed the Russian leader.

India is among a handful of major countries that have not directly criticised Russia for invading Ukraine. It has consistently abstained on resolutions condemning Moscow for the Ukraine war at various UN forums.

Misri stated that Modi reiterated that the “battlefield would not yield any solutions” and again called for direct engagement between the two parties.

“In this context, starting with the prime minister’s visit to Moscow in July this year and continuing with his visit to Kyiv in August, he has engaged with the leadership of both countries, as well as other regional powers and nations interested in the situation,” he said.

He mentioned that India was gauging the “possibility of finding a peaceful path to end the conflict and also looking for alternative approaches that may not currently be on the table or considered.”

“The prime minister also indicated his understanding of Russia’s perspectives on the current state of affairs,” added Misri.

The Indian side raised concerns about Indians working in the Russian army, whom Moscow in July had promised to discharge soon.

“This issue was discussed by both sides, and with the support of the Russian side, several Indian nationals have been able to return to India in recent months. We understand that the embassy is currently pursuing around 20 cases with the Russian side, and we hope that all these individuals can be released and repatriated to India very soon,” he said.

He stated that the India-Russia Intergovernmental Cooperation Operation Group on Defence Cooperation would be meeting soon.

“It was agreed that the Department of Atomic Energy and the Russian agency Rosatom would continue to coordinate to adhere to the mutually agreed schedule for the installation of the remaining units – units 3 to 6 – of the Kudankulam nuclear power project,” said Misri.

The Indian foreign secretary noted that the two sides “discussed the possibility of further cooperation in the financial sector”.

“Sustaining supply chains for the steady and regular sourcing of fertilisers and coal from Russia was also discussed, with President Putin promising assistance in this regard,” added Misri.

Additionally, they agreed that the India-Russia Intergovernmental Commission on Trade, Technical, Economic and Cultural Cooperation would meet in New Delhi on November 12.

Turkey’s Unexpected Bid to Join BRICS Sparks Concern for NATO and the West

Turkey’s application to join the BRICS bloc highlights the geostrategic shifts straining the post-war order at a time of heightened international tensions.

On June 11, as Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky was appealing for help at a conference in Berlin at the start of a week of intense diplomacy in western Europe, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan was in the east, holding talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow.

The Kremlin meeting went “fantastically well”, Fidan told Turkish state media. Putin also sounded pleased. “We welcome Turkey‘s interest in the work of BRICS,” Turkish media quoted the Russian leader as saying. “Undoubtedly, we will fully support this aspiration.”

The aspiration inched towards fruition this week when Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) confirmed that Turkey had formally applied to join the BRICS bloc of emerging economies.

“Our president has expressed multiple times that we wish to become a member of BRICS,” AKP spokesman Omer Celik told journalists in Ankara on Tuesday. “Our request in this matter is clear, and the process is proceeding within this framework.”

Turkey’s BRICS candidacy marks the first time a NATO member and candidate for EU membership has applied to join a group dominated by Russia and China that views itself as a counterweight to the Western-led global order. The move, by a member of the world’s most powerful military alliance, highlights the geostrategic shifts straining the post-war order at a time of heightened international strains.

A banking jargon that ‘absolutely exploded’

The BRICS bloc has long been dismissed as a talking shop, a loose grouping of countries that are sometimes at odds and even engage in fierce border skirmishes, without a defining purpose.

The origins of the grouping itself are unorthodox, contributing to the muddle over its mission. The acronym “BRIC” was coined by British economist Jim O’Neill in 2001 while he was research chief at Goldman Sachs to categorise Brazil, Russia, India and China – countries with large populations and economic growth potential.

Over the next few years, the investment banker’s concept “absolutely exploded”, explained O’Neill – nicknamed “Mr BRIC” – in a 2009 interview. It was the year the leaders of the four countries formed a political grouping at the first BRIC summit in Russia.  South Africa joined the grouping in 2010, expanding the acronym to BRICS.

Nearly 15 years later, the grouping has nearly doubled to include Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) as official members.

The acronym no longer covers all its members. Neither does the “emerging economies” suffix employed to describe the bloc. While economists note that some BRICS economies have long “emerged”, they continue to use the explainer for lack of an alternative.

And yet, the number of nations queuing for BRICS membership keeps growing.

In addition to Turkey, nearly 20 other countries have applied for membership, forcing the bloc to institute expansion procedures. The line of aspirants has also sparked divisions within the original BRIC members, with Russia and China pushing for expansion while Brazil and India are more wary of adding members.

Meanwhile membership to the bloc’s New Development Bank (NDB), established in 2015 as an alternative to the World Bank and IMF, is also growing. Algeria was approved for NDB membership earlier this week, joining Bangladesh and Uruguay in addition to BRICS member states.

Hedging bets

Turkey’s latest bid to join the bloc has raised eyebrows in Western capitals.

NATO’s only Muslim-majority member nation straddles Europe and Asia, with coastlines hugging the Mediterranean and Black Seas and straits connecting the two. It’s a geography of vital strategic interest as the Ukraine war rages across the Black Sea to Turkey’s north while the Gaza war threatens regional stability in the Middle East, to Turkey’s south.

“This is something to which the transatlantic community should definitely pay attention,” said Asli Aydintasbas from the Washington DC-based Brookings Institute. “Turkey is seeking alternatives. It does not want to leave its NATO membership. It does not want to shed its European aspirations. But it wants to diversify its set of alliances, hedge its bets, so to speak. It no longer sees its NATO membership to be the sole identity, its sole foreign policy orientation.”

A NATO member joining the queue for BRICS membership may be unprecedented but it does not contravene the military alliance’s rules, notes Michel Duclos, a former French ambassador to Syria and a special advisor to the Paris-based Institut Montaigne.

“Legally, of course, there are no brakes. BRICS has no treaty obligations, there is no operational mechanism, it’s a very loose organisation,” said Duclos. “At the same time, the spirit of NATO as an organisation is that when you sit at the same table, you exchange views in a very, you know, confidential way. There is an atmosphere of trust,” he noted, adding that Turkey’s bid to join the BRICS is “a bit of a contradiction with being an ally in NATO”.

Pushing a geopolitical balancing act ‘too far’

Discrepancy and disagreement have long marked Erdogan’s dealings with the West, a truculence the Turkish president sometimes proudly displays on the international stage.

“President Erdogan defines a strategic success as one in which he can have a foot in different camps. He wants to have a foot in each camp and be able to play off the West against Russia, the West against China. I think that he has come to skillfully play this geopolitical act,” said Aydintasbas.

But at times, “President Erdogan has pushed his geopolitical balancing act too far, testing the waters and going a bit overboard,” Aydintasbas added.

Turkey’s ties with its Western military allies have been particularly strained in recent years over Ankara’s purchase of Russian S-400 air defence system that was designed to down NATO planes.

Amid concerns that Turkey’s deployment of the S-400 could expose classified features of NATO hardware to Russian intelligence, the US sanctioned Ankara by removing Turkey from an F-35 jet programme.

The US also withheld its sale of 40 F-16 fighter jets to Turkey following Erdogan’s S-400 fiasco. The F-16 sale was only approved in January, after Turkey ratified Sweden’s bid to join NATO.

The US response to Turkey’s BRICS membership bid has been muted so far, and is very likely to stay that way, Aydintasbas believes. “Washington is keeping quiet. It does not want a public, high-profile spat with Turkey, and it knows that President Erdogan is unpredictable,” she explained.

“There is also the assumption [in Washington DC] that this may not amount to much. BRICS is not really a hugely functional entity. It is an entity of the non-Western world and it is trying to develop economic muscle,” said Aydintasbas.  “But BRICS does not have a military force, special forces, a rapid reaction force, etc. It doesn’t have the same set of interests and values that you see within the transatlantic community.”

Gaza war triggers ‘double-standards’ complaints

The value that binds BRICS aspirants is a commitment to multipolarity amid mounting frustration with the US-led unipolarity that has dominated the international stage.

Duclos, whose latest book, “Diplomatie française”, hit the shelves in France earlier this year, notes that there is a tendency among observers in some Western countries such as France to dismiss BRICS as a “talking shop with no teeth”.

“I differ with these views because, for me, the simple fact that these countries feel the need to meet together is a very strong signal that the West is not as dominant and as attractive as it used to be. And the very fact that there are so many countries which are BRICS candidates is a clear indication of the vanishing prestige of the Western world,” he noted.

In the aftermath of Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the neutral position of many Global South countries drew criticisms from Kyiv’s allies and supporters.

But two years later, as the Ukraine war drags on, the view is more nuanced. “A lot of these countries [in the Global South] do not approve the Russian aggression against Ukraine. They also feel comfortable to sit with Russia in the same club. This is a strong message for us I think,” said Duclos.

The message, for Duclos, is clear. Many Global South countries may not be anti-Western, “but they hate the policy of sanctions. The Brazilians, the Saudis and many others are not against Washington, but they are against sanctions. That’s very clear”, he noted.

The Gaza war and Washington’s unwavering support for Israel as the death toll in the besieged Palestinian enclave exceeds 40,000 has also reignited criticisms of Western hypocrisy and double standards – which are echoed in Moscow and Beijing.

“All my friends in the Global South share this opinion, they consider that the Gaza war is the last nail in the coffin of Western prestige,” said Duclos. “It’s clear that it’s perceived as Western double standards. The partiality of the West towards Israel is not understood in the Global South.”

Erdogan has long sought to style himself as a leader of the Muslim world. But apart from the Turkish leader’s incendiary bluster, his failure to effect any change or pause in Israel’s relentless assault on Gaza has weakened his standing in Turkey.

In the April local elections, Erdogan’s AKP lost mayoral races in the country’s five largest cities and saw a significant decline in its votes nationwide. The surprise winner was a tiny, hardline Islamist party, the YRP, which ran on a platform criticising Turkey’s growing bilateral trade ties with Israel.

In addition to the Islamist right, the Gaza war is also stoking anti-NATO sentiments among Turkey’s hard-left secularists.

On Wednesday, two US Marines in the western Turkish city of Izmir were attacked by members of the Turkey Youth Union (TGB), a youth branch of the nationalist opposition Vatan Party, according to local officials.

The Marines were on a port visit as the USS Wasp warship patrols the eastern Mediterranean in a show of support for Israel.

 

Turkish police arrested 15 suspects in the attack and the White House said it appreciated the actions of Turkish law enforcement officials. But the assault underscored the geopolitical strains triggered by the Gaza war.

“Erdogan’s hand is much weaker today than it used to be a few years ago. The Gaza war has demonstrated how little leverage Ankara has on an issue that deeply affects most Turks,” said Duclos. “In a way, Turkey’s BRICS bid is a way to distract the attention of the current weakness and to try to find something else because Erdogan has not been very successful in recent months.”

Leela Jacinto is a senior editor at France24.com

This article was originally published on France 24

India Belongs to Global South and That’s Where It Should Be, Not the Frontlines of New Cold War

Is India’s foreign policy making the most of the once-in-a-century geopolitical opportunity to help its 1.4 billion people?

Explaining India’s worldview at the Asia Society in New York on September 24, India’s external affairs minister, S. Jaishankar, showed remarkable ignorance of two key factors at the heart of the re-balancing of the global order.

First, global geopolitics is being re-shaped by two global visions that are as different as chalk and cheese. And second, the unabating technology war between the United States and China will compel nations soon to choose between the technologies of the two global visions for everything from cost-effective and secure digitisation and network-based services to transformation to artificial intelligence (AI) in economics, development and social sectors. Not doing so will create compatibility problems for consumers.

If Jaishankar had understood these two factors, he would not have responded to the moderator’s question of how India could be in the Quad as well as BRICS or the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) by saying – as the moderator subsequently paraphrased him – that India can “chew gum and walk at the same time”.

The minister added that India, like the UAE, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, had the ability to operate in different spaces. Pushed further, he spoke of the utility of Quad and of the two ‘non-Western’ groupings in such a way that the moderator pointed out his references to the former were in the future tense and to the latter in the past tense.  

Let’s understand the two factors to assess whether India’s foreign policy is making the most of the once-in-a-century opportunity of global geopolitical transformation to help the development and prosperity of its 1.4 billion people.

Now, it is universally agreed that the rise of China is the most important factor that has brought global geopolitics from the Euro-Atlantic to the Asia-Pacific. It is also known that the US has identified China as its biggest challenge in this century. What is little known is that the two global visions that have been shaped by the US’s and China’s history, experiences and strengths are dissimilar.

The US vision rests on its three strengths: (i) unmatched military power, (ii) allies and strategic partners that add to its military power, and (iii) the supremacy of the US dollar and the dollar payment system.

Second Cold War and US endgame

The US won the Cold War, enjoyed unparalleled global supremacy during the unipolar years from 1991 to 2017 when it arrogantly declared the end of history, and now believes the world has entered a second Cold War, which it is determined to win the way it won the first Cold War – based on balance-of-power politics.

Since balance-of-power politics does not work in the present multipolar world with numerous independent decision-making centres, the US hopes to bring stability using plurilateral blocks like the Quad, AUKUS and so on.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi at the Quad summit. Photo: X/@Narendramodi

The key features of this vision are that it is US-led, based on a zero-sum game, rests on the belief that the US-led ‘rules-based order’ and its ideology of liberal democracy are the best for global stability and is supported by US allies (industrialised nations), which constitute 20% of the global population.

India, a developing nation, too supports this vision since it assesses the Quad to be its future and the Indo-Pacific (the name given to the Asia-Pacific by the Trump administration in May 2018) as, according to Jaishankar, the vindication of its Act East policy.

While the US had no experience of partnership with nations, in 2009, it had offered a G-2 (Group of Two) partnership to China, hoping that it could be integrated into the US-crafted global system. That China politely spurned the US offer was evidence that it, as a civilisational state, had an entirely different global vision in mind.

This has not been officially stated but the US’s China policy suggests two objectives: first, to prevent China from getting ahead of the US in the fourth industrial revolution through the denial of hardware and software technology by a ‘small yard and high fence’ strategy. This is because the US fears that technology will make China richer than it, thus replacing it as the global hegemon.

And second, to constrain, if not contain, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in the west Pacific Ocean and prevent it from acquiring power-projection capabilities across the Indo-Pacific region straddling two oceans – the west Pacific and the Indian Ocean.

Rival vision for world order

The other global vision is about connectivity, trade and development where two major powers – China and Russia – have aligned their plans for the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) further expanded to Greater Eurasia. Of the two major powers, China has the economic heft, technology ecosystem, manufacturing base, comprehensive mechanism and civil-military integration to match and even leapfrog the US in the fourth industrial revolution and modern war, since the software-driven new technologies are dual-use.

Unlike the US-led vision of a zero-sum game, this vision believes in a win-win game. It seeks relative or indivisible security instead of absolute security. This vision talks of equal and cooperative partnership rather than being led by the US in balance of policy politics; and it speaks of the UN-based order and UN-based international law, instead of the rules-based order created by the US.

Most importantly, this vision does not support any ideology but is driven by pragmatism. It flows from Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping’s famous saying that it does not matter whether the cat is black or white so long as it catches mice.

This vision is being pursued through various platforms like the BRI, the Digital Silk Road (DSR), the Global Development Initiative, the Global Security Initiative, the Global Civilisational Initiative and the Global AI Governance Initiative (GAIGI) underpinned by new institutions like BRICS Plus (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), the SCO, the G-20, the New Development Bank, the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank and of course the United Nations.

This rival vision has found overwhelming support among Global South nations which are aspirational, shun exploitation, seek autonomy in dealing with the world’s powers and have amongst them a few fast-growing economies. These nations spread across Eurasia, Africa, Latin America and Oceania are less developed or developing and constitute 80% of the world population.

Interestingly, while both visions talk of ASEAN’s centrality, China has annual trade approaching $1 trillion with this ten-nation group, which is much more than US-ASEAN trade. Starting 2022, it has been working on upgrading the ASEAN-China free trade area pact for e-commerce, and the transfer of technology that supports it. And then there is Africa, where 53 out of 54 nations openly support China’s vision of greater development leading to prosperity (I saw this at the 11th Beijing Xiangshan Forum from September 12 to 14).

What is the endgame that China is seeking against the US’s second Cold War notion? The ‘China Dream’ seeks to modernise China and build a global community with a shared future. The latter implies getting the first-mover advantage in the industrialisation of Global South nations by what Xi Jinping calls ‘new productive forces’, which are green industries and industrial internet (AI-supported industries).

Since the US is doing nothing of this sort, China is not competing with the US but with itself. This explains Xi’s offer of a ‘New Type of Major Power Relationship’ to the US and his exhortation to Washington that the world has enough space for the peaceful development of both nations.

The two visions thus can be summed up as the US seeking global dominance versus China wanting global deference or respect and sensitivity towards Beijing’s core and sensitive matters.

Let’s now consider Jaishankar’s pronouncement at the Asia Society that the parallel rise of India and China, each with a population of over one billion, is a complicated issue. And that Asia must be multipolar for the world to be multipolar. These statements underscore India’s belief of being in a regional geopolitical competition with China.

India has decided to not normalise relations with China as it helps create an illusion of competing with China. Photo: A WMCC meeting. Credit: in.china-embassy.gov.cn/.

We should consider this exceptional assumption from various angles. Now, if the US is in a global geopolitical competition with China for which it has sought India’s support in the region, can India be big enough to compete with China on its own in the region?

Explained in strategic terms, since China’s rise has brought turbulence in global geopolitics, it means it has emerged as a geostrategic player. The world today has three geostrategic players – the US, China and Russia – which are nations with the capability, capacity and political will to influence events anywhere in the world.

To do so, geostrategic players need regional nations called geopolitical pivots to accomplish their agenda in a particular region. Thus, India, given its geography and huge population, is an excellent geopolitical pivot sought by all three geostrategic players. The US needs India to be its military bulwark in the Indian Ocean region against China, while China and Russia need India to strengthen BRICS and the SCO for quicker stability in the world order.

India, given its hard power (comprising economic, technology and military powers), which matters the most in turbulent global geopolitics, is no match to China’s hard power, and the gap between the two, for various reasons, will remain unbridgeable.

Jaishankar knows this. Since India, like the US, cannot compete with China, and cooperation with China would expose its hard power shortcomings, India has decided to not normalise relations with China. This helps create an illusion of competing with China. 

Cooperation with China as both Modi and Xi had agreed to at the 2018 Wuhan informal summit under the China-India Plus model does not suit Modi’s image. This model implied that both India and China would help smaller nations in South Asia and then elsewhere with connectivity and infrastructure building, which being China’s strengths would automatically propel it to the leadership role.

Thus, by not normalising ties with China, India gains in three ways: (i) it helps create an illusion of competition with China; (ii) the US is not displeased. Normal ties between India and China would gravely impact India-US ties; and (iii) it provides India with the opportunity to project itself as the voice or leader of Global South nations that could be the bridge between the Global North and Global South nations.

This backdrop explains India’s G-20 success at the New Delhi summit in 2023, where it managed to produce a joint statement, since all these geostrategic players need India.

What is overlooked in India’s proposition of being the bridge is the fact that the Global South, unlike the Global North, does not need a leader. The Global South’s vision is based on mutual respect and mutual support irrespective of whether a nation is as big as China or Russia or as small as Gabon in Africa.

And there is no evidence to show that Global South nations are keen to reach out to Global North nations. On the contrary, when the US rejected Chinese electric vehicles (EVs) on grounds of ‘overcapacity’, Nigeria said they wanted Chinese EVs. At the G-20 summit, India could get the African Union as the 21st member, since the forum has both Global North and South member nations.

Let’s now consider Jaishankar’s boast that India can be in both the Quad and BRICS/SCO at the same time. There are two technological issues that have not been considered by India.

Photo: BRICS leader in Johannesburg. Credit: BRICS2023/Flickr.

The first concerns the security of cyberspace, which is critical for secure digitisation and all network-based services. In 2018, the Trump administration started the splinternet or the separation of the internet into eastern (Chinese) and western technologies. For example, before 2018, the Pacific Light Cable Network was a joint venture of high-capacity fibre optics cables between Google and Facebook with a Chinese company called Dr Peng Telecom & Media Group to lay a 13,000 km-data route between US and Hong Kong. In 2018, the Hong Kong route was dropped, and the cables instead were linked to Taiwan and the Philippines.

The splinternet picked up speed under the Biden administration, with the Quad given the responsibility of secure cyberspace and regional cyber governance issues like digital sovereignty and data flow between Quad members.

At present, in South Asia, nations onboard the BRI have submarine cables laid by Chinese companies, while India’s submarine cables have been laid by Western companies. Beyond the submarine and fibre optic cables, for wireless communications, Huawei 5G was rejected by India, but has been welcomed in BRI nations.

China hosts the world’s largest 5G network and is a global leader in 5G standards and technology. For the global penetration of 5G, China has updated the IPv6 from the earlier IPv4 to accommodate more addresses to support new technologies and applications such as AI and the Internet of Things.

Having laid 5G and updated to IPv6, which are the backbone of the industrial internet, China at the third Belt and Road Forum in October 2023 announced the GAIGI to assist Global South nations with new AI-based industries. Besides offering its AI technologies and services, China has adopted a two-prong approach: to help jointly develop and improve the scientific and technology level of BRI nations, and to help them develop their own rules, regulations and norms regarding cyberspace and industrial internet technologies.

What all this means is that in a few years, most Global South and South Asian nations will have Chinese technology standards, while India will be on Western technology standards, which will create potential challenges in e-business for India within the Global South.

The second issue concerns e-commerce between BRICS Plus nations. The BRICS Plus summit this month in Russia is expected to be an exceptional one with many announcements, especially one on a new payment system that bypasses the US dollar and US dollar payment system.

While a BRICS Plus currency will not happen anytime soon, a digital currency based on member nations’ Central Bank Digital Currency (CDBC) supported by blockchain technology is on the cards for discussion.

Xi had in October 2019 declared blockchain (a distributed ledger that creates an online database where every participant can share and authenticate information) as a strategic technology meant to play an important role in industrial transformation.

Then, in April 2020, China launched the Blockchain Services Network (BSN) to include many blockchain frameworks and make them accessible under one uniform standard on the BSN platform. This technology is likely to be considered by BRICS Plus nations. The BSN would also come handy in the DSR (offshoot of the BRI for cyberspace hardware and software connectivity), which brings advanced IT infrastructure to the BRI nations such as broadband networks, e-commerce hubs and smart cities.

As more nations join BRICS Plus and DSR reaches more nations, the BSN technology would be considered a secure and resilient vehicle for the digital economy by member nations.

India, a founding member of BRICS, would be eyed with suspicion. On the one hand, it would become increasingly difficult for India to stand on the two stools of the QUAD and the BRICS/SCO, and on the other hand, India will get strategically isolated in its neighbourhood.

It is India’s misfortune that at this critical time of great geopolitical opportunity, Indian foreign policy is being driven by jealousy of China, hatred for Pakistan and an irrepressible urge to project the prime minister as a world statesman. India should have cared for its 1.4 billion – mostly poor – people who deserve a better life, which would be possible if India was on the right side of global geopolitics and understood the criticality of peace in South Asia, where we belong.

The writer’s latest book is The Last War: How AI Will Shape India’s Final Showdown With China.

 

 

 

The Birth Pangs of a New World Order: Is BRICS the New Golden Child?

This shift in global perception is because of the rapid transfer of the economic centre of gravity from the West to Asia, with India and China playing leading roles.

Anyone paying the slightest attention to international news would have noticed the surge in reporting on the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) group, with each month bringing news of yet another country that desires membership in this new club. At the same time, there is increasing mention of a re-energised Global South, a somewhat misleading catch-all geo-political category, which seems to denote every country outside the western world. 

These articles highlight a growing sense of disquiet on the part of countries in the developing world – a dawning recognition that the system of rules that undergirds global governance is not serving them well. 

Even without the two ongoing wars, in Ukraine and Gaza, the churn in the global political and economic environment has been evident for some time, underscoring concern about the business as usual, “western-dominated” model, be it regarding the structure of global economy or finance, security architecture, international disputes and conflict resolution, or the operations of multilateral institutions. 

But, why is the recognition growing in importance today? What kind of realignment and what alternative structures are being imagined or incubated?

The primary factor responsible for this shift in global perception is the rapid transfer of the economic centre of gravity from the “West” to Asia, with India and China playing leading roles, and whose significance is actually understated by standard official data.

India is the fifth largest economy in current dollar terms, but by other metrics it is much larger. Benchmarking the total economic output of countries in dollars has a long tradition. There are alternate measures for the overall value generated by an economy (GDP) such as purchasing power parity (PPP ), which take into account that some goods and services cost much less in India and other developing countries than in western countries, and their contribution to GDP can be underestimated if measured at current exchange rates. 

But PPP adjustment can be hard to understand and may not fully convey the economic size and heft of a host of countries in the BRICS and Global South, including China, India and Brazil. 

A simpler metric – actual physical production, shorn of pricing – can sometimes demystify economic-statistical obfuscation. For example, we can take a look at the leading countries by electricity production, widely recognized as being the most important proxy for an economy’s size. Economists also recognise the importance of certain tangible goods which are used as inputs in the entire later production process, and therefore constitute critical elements of the structures of our everyday lives at present. These include steel, cement, plastics, ammonia – products that are commonly referred to as the four “pillars” of an economy. As data shows, much of the “real” stuff is made in the Global South, (with India and China coming out very well indeed), well outside of the erstwhile metropoles of industry – UK, Germany, France. None of the latter, incidentally, are any longer in the top five countries by PPP GDP, with the latest World Bank  data listing China, US, India, Russia, and Japan as the five leading economies, in that order. 

The story extends to other vital goods and products that are the indispensable core of a modern economy –  auto production, grain output, and the construction of bridges, housing, highways, train lines, and overall infrastructure among others.

The awareness of their increased, even dominant share in many vital sectors of the global economy contributes to the pervasive grievance in many countries outside the western ambit,  that their voices and concerns are not being “taken into account” commensurate with their newly earned place in the global hierarchy. 

Beyond the leadership, even common citizens of these countries view reports of G7 as the world leaders with considerable bemusement given that the group includes countries such as Italy and Canada, which are not even in the top ten list of economic powers.

As of 2018, the BRICS formation, as a whole, has overtaken the G7 (see figure) in economic output. A lesser known story is the huge increase in intra-global south/intra-BRICS trade and economic activity –  i.e. trade and economic interdependence among themselves, vis-a-vis the western partners –  with even greater potential for growth.

The persistent perception, that in the so-called rules-based-order the “order” is one-sided and the  “rules” themselves seem arbitrarily imposed, has led to an enhanced appreciation of the sovereignty of nation states. This rethinking is not restricted to the elites in the BRICS or by those in the rest of the world who are looking for a larger share of the pie. Rather, it also points to the coming of age of the growing middle classes of the developing world – an educated, engaged, and well informed force.

The structural and secular trends outlined thus far have resulted in a compelling urge to redo some of the rules, practices, institutions and laws that underpin the existing world order, especially those that relate to economic relationships, payment and currency mechanisms, and political and security arrangements. Part of the motivation stems from watching the entire western bloc act as one.

In the colonial era, colonised subjects had at least some room for manoeuver – they could take advantage of the fact that the colonising powers fought with each other in their campaigns of conquest. Thus, one could expect the English to battle the French, or the Spaniards to fight the Dutch. The Marathas and Tipu Sultan, among others, took shrewd advantage of this opportunity from time to time. The realisation of the power of the unity achieved by the western bloc and its impressive demonstration effect has now spurred at least some countries in the rest of the world to work together.

Paraphrasing and extending the poet Ameer Qazalbash’s evocative phrase – Usi ka shahar, wahi muddai, wahi munsif, hamen yakeen tha hamara kusur niklega (Its his city, he is the accuser, he is the judge; I knew I would be declared the guilty party) – captures the emerging collective view of the countries of the Global South:  

Agar, unhi ka shaastra, unhi ka astra, unhi ki awaaz, unhi ka andaaz, unhi ke shadyantra, unhi ke mantra, unhi ke aadesh, unhi ke updesh, wahi muddai, wahi munsif…to phir haar kiski aur jit kiski hogi? (If its their rules and their tools, their voices and their choices, their machinations and their invocations, their admonitions and their conditions, if they are the judge and the accuser, who will end up the loser?)

What are the prospects, and what is the outlook, for this nascent attempt at realignment? The Global South is shot through with conflicting interests, dispersed geography, patchworks of alliances and little history of coordination. If wishes were horses, BRICS would gallop; but the festering discontent has not yet resulted in a coordinated, systematic approach. What exists, at present, is a plethora of trade, finance and security initiatives which are defined more by what various groupings of developing countries do not want rather than by the concrete building blocks of an alternative structure. 

In the coming years, Global South’s leaders will face a number of choices: Do they play by the old rules and try gradual reform or do they throw the baby out with the bathwater and set up, for example, an alternative currencies and payments system? How should they coordinate and line up sequencing of policies without jeopardising seriously the delicate web of relations holding these countries together, while winning over those groups within every country that are interested in preserving the status quo?

The existing order is the result of centuries of initial conflict among the leading powers, and their later reconciliation among themselves. Could the participation of the Global South – with no history of overseas colonial expansion, and a long tradition of cross-civilisational engagement – manage to avoid conflict and present a path of rapprochement with the dominant powers of today? It would require sagacity on the part its leaders, who may want to heed the advice from a classic of pragmatic statecraft, the Arthashastra, on how to deal with interlocutors, whether allies, competitors or adversaries – praise their qualities, develop harmonious relationships, point out mutual benefit, show vast future prospects and stress identity of interests.

Ashok Bardhan is an independent economist.

During Malaysian PM’s India Visit, Talks Held on Trade, Labour, Religious Harmony

Anwar Ibrahim’s visit to India was the culmination of a a flurry of ministerial visits in the last couple years, which in turn came after relations hit rock bottom in 2019.

New Delhi: Five years after their relations hit rock bottom, India and Malaysia have taken steps to reset ties with the visit of Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim to New Delhi, during which they reportedly emphasised the importance of “racial tolerance” and “religious harmony”.

Ibrahim arrived on Monday (August 19) evening for a two-day visit, which was his first visit to India after taking over as prime minister in 2022.

The last visit by a Malaysian prime minister was by Najib Razak in 2018. Relations soured the following year when former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad made disparaging remarks about Kashmir and the Citizenship (Amendment) Act in 2019.

In the last couple of years, there has been a flurry of ministerial visits, culminating in the current state visit.

“We have decided that we will elevate our cooperation to the level of [a] ‘Comprehensive Strategic Partnership,” said the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi in his press remarks on Tuesday after talks at Hyderabad House.

A total of eight agreements were signed, and several announcements were made following formal discussions that exceeded the scheduled time, lasting over an hour and a half.

“Yes, Malaysia and India from the days of Jawaharlal Nehru and Tunku Abdul Rahman had established good relations. But we realised, under our generation, that this must be further strengthened in the multitude areas which as Prime Minister Modi said includes digital investments and trade, construction and modern agriculture, education, research in all fields, including military collaboration in terms of joint operations to safeguard our borders,” said Ibrahim.

In recent years, the Indian media has periodically raised concerns about the presence of Indian Islamist preacher Zakir Naik in Malaysia, who obtained permanent residency in that country. His organisation, the Islamic Research Foundation, was banned by India in 2016.

India had formally asked Malaysia to extradite him for inciting terrorism, but Kuala Lumpur had demurred. Last year, when Naik travelled to Oman, the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) stated that his extradition had been raised with the Gulf country as he was considered a “fugitive from justice”.

However, Naik was conspicuously absent from Tuesday’s written public statements by either side.

But the Malaysian PM had to address the issue when a question was posed after his speech at the Indian Council for World Affairs. “We are open to any ideas and if evidence is submitted … we will not condone terrorism, but one has to produce a compelling case to support,” said Ibrahim.

Despite multiple questions about whether Naik’s issue was raised, the MEA’s media briefing on the visit offered no direct response.

MEA secretary (East) Jaideep Mazumdar stated that while he “didn’t want to go into specifics”, both leaders had a discussion on extremism and radicalism. He claimed they saw “eye to eye” on the two issues.

He added that both leaders discussed “the importance racial harmony, of religious tolerance and religious harmony”.

“And as you know, Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim has himself been a very great advocate of harmony and inter-religious harmony [and] inter-ethnic harmony, and therefore it was in that context that both leaders discussed these issues,” said the senior MEA official.

Earlier at the joint press appearance, Ibrahim said that India and Malaysia mirrored each other. “India is multicultural and multi-religious. Malaysia [is] a much smaller country but very proud of our civilisation and culture, and [is] also multicultural, multi-racial and multi-religious. And therefore we have a lot of commonalities, which extend beyond just trade and investments”.

Among the agreements, the Indian side highlighted the memorandum of understanding for the “Recruitment, Employment and Repatriation of workers”.

Malaysia allows for the recruitment of workers from 15 countries, including India. Currently, there are 1,40,000 Indian workers in Malaysia, which also hosts the third largest population of the Indian diaspora.

“The agreement is important because it also annexes a model contract between employers and employees, which should be really like a lodestone, like a guiding post on how such [a] model contract should be for foreign workers. So, we are very happy with that. It also lays down the obligations of employers and employee[s], and welfare measures that are required to address issues of employees,” said Mazumdar.

With Malaysia having become India’s third-largest trade partner in ASEAN and the total value of trade between the two countries standing at around $40 billion, there was considerable time spent on the need to further enhance the volume of trade, indicated officials. The trade has been largely in favour of Malaysia due to its exports of palm oil.

In his remarks, Modi stated that Malaysian investment in India was $5 billion in 2023, covering semiconductors, financial technology, artificial intelligence and the defence industry.

According to India’s ambassador to Malaysia B.N. Reddy, both countries started to settle trade in their own rupee and ringgit currencies starting last year.

While stating that the popularity of this practice was still “in [the] early stages”, Reddy said it was gaining traction among businessmen. “Our commerce and industry ministry has urged the Indian exporters who are dealing with Malaysia to take this particular route,” he said.

During the visit, it was announced that India would make a stand-alone export of 200,000 metric tons of non-basmati rice to Malaysia, granting an exception to its existing ban on such shipments.

The Indian side also revealed that the South China Sea was discussed, but in the “context of the importance of free and open sea lines of communication, navigation, commercial shipping and overflight”.

There was also an exchange of views on enhancing defence cooperation.

“It was discussed between the two prime ministers, both in terms of the compatibility of equipment that we have and how we can co-operate in that area … [of] maintenance and extending the service life of such equipment and also in terms of India being a source country for defence exports,” said Mazumdar.

The Malaysian prime minister has shown strong interest in seeking membership in the BRICS bloc of developing countries, making it a top priority during his visit to India.

India did not officially endorse the bid but expressed its openness to “considering” it. 

“Malaysia is keen to become a member of BRICS. We conveyed that we have no hesitation in considering that request and that it will be discussed when the other BRICS countries meet,” said the MEA secretary (East).

BRICS Nations Condemn Israel’s Rafah Attacks, ‘Blatant Disregard of International Law’

The joint statement issued after the meeting in Russia makes no bones of the group’s criticism of Israel’s actions. India is a founding member.

New Delhi: The BRICS bloc of developing countries, including India, on June 10 condemned Israel’s operation into Rafah in southern Palestine and expressed concern at Tel Aviv’s “disregard” of orders of the International Court of Justice.

The foreign ministers of the expanded BRICS grouping met at Nizhny Novgorod in Russia on Monday. Since cabinet ministers’ portfolios were yet to be announced when the trip began, India was represented by secretary (economic relations), Dammu Ravi, at the meeting. 

India is one of the founder members of the BRICS along with Brazil, Russia and China and South Africa. After the bloc doubled its membership at last year’s summit, Egypt, Iran, UAE, Saudi Arabia and Ethiopia joined. These countries participated in the first major meeting of the expanded summit on Monday.

Following the start of the Gaza war, India has called for cessation of violence in Gaza, but has stopped short of condemning Israel publicly.

However, the joint statement issued after the meeting in Russia makes no bones of its criticism of Israel’s actions.

Expressing concern at the increasing attacks in Rafah, the joint statement said:

“The Ministers further condemned the Israeli military operation in Rafah and its ramifications that directly impact the civilian lives, especially in view of the high density of Palestinian civilians in this location, and the humanitarian catastrophic results due to the suspension of the Rafah crossing from the Palestinian side”.

On October 7 last year, Palestinian militant group Hamas stormed into southern Israel, killing around 1,200 people and took over 250 hostages into Gaza. Israel launched an invasion of Gaza, bombarding the narrow territory and reducing most of the buildings t0 rubble. As per Gaza’s health ministry, more than 36,000 people have been killed in the last nine months.

Last month, Israeli forces launched an operation in Rafah, which they claimed was the last stronghold of Hamas combat units. The international community expressed concern that a military operation in Rafah would exponentially increase civilian casualties, as most of the Palestinians had fled there to escape the fighting.

“They acknowledged the provisional measures of the International Court of Justice in the legal proceedings instituted by South Africa against Israel. The Ministers expressed serious concern at Israel’s continued blatant disregard of international law, the UN Charter, UN resolutions and Court orders,” said the statement.

Expressing concern at the deterioration of the situation in Palestine due to Israeli military operation, the joint statement also called for implementation of UN resolutions that demand an immediate ceasefire and unhindered delivery of aid to Palestine. “They equally called for the immediate and unconditional release of all hostages and civilians who are being illegally held captive”.

The joint statement also affirmed support for Palestine’s full membership of the United Nations and for the two-state solution for the intractable Israeli-Palestinian dispute.

As South Africa Points to Gaza ‘Genocide’, Differences Between India, Other BRICS Members Clear

India, represented by external affairs minister S. Jaishankar, reiterated the need to send urgent humanitarian aid but did not speak of the actions of the Israeli state.

New Delhi: The BRICS “Extraordinary Joint Meeting on the Middle East situation” on Tuesday (November 21), called by current chair of the grouping South Africa, has served to highlight the difference in opinion between India and other BRICS-plus members on the current situation in Israel-Palestine.

South African President Cyril Ramaphosa, in his opening remarks, used strong words to call for an immediate ceasefire and described the situation in Gaza as a genocide. He also held Israel responsible for committing war crimes. Chinese President Xi Jinping too made similar remarks, speaking of the “collective punishment of people in Gaza” and the need for a ceasefire.

India, meanwhile, represented by external affairs minister S. Jaishankar, reiterated the need to send urgent humanitarian aid.

While Ramaphosa started his speech with a reference to Hamas’s October 7 attack in Israeli that killed more than 1,200 people, the rest of his address focused on the ongoing devastation in Gaza, where over 11,000 people have been killed by Israeli forces since.

Both Israel and Hamas, Ramaphosa said, have violated international law: “The actions by Israel are in clear violation of international law, including the UN Charter and the Geneva Convention read together with its protocols. In its attacks on civilians and by taking hostages, Hamas has also violated international law and must be held accountable for these actions.”

Using strong words, he continued, “The collective punishment of Palestinian civilians through the unlawful use of force by Israel is a war crime. The deliberate denial of medicine, fuel, food and water to the residents of Gaza is tantamount to genocide.”

The South African president also situated the current situation in the history of occupation of Palestine. “The atrocities that we have witnessed are the latest chapter in a painful history of suffering, oppression, occupation and conflict going back more than 75 years. The root cause of this conflict is the illegal occupation of Palestinian territory by Israel as reflected in UN Security Council Resolution 2334, which states that “Israeli settlements constitutes a flagrant violation under international law.” We therefore urge the international community to agree on urgent and concrete actions to end the suffering in Gaza and establish a path towards a just and peaceful resolution of this conflict,” he said.

Ramaphosa demanded an immediate ceasefire, the opening of humanitarian corridors, the release of civilian hostages, a comprehensive dialogue owned by Palestinians and Israelis, and International Criminal Court prosecutions on war crimes.

Indian external affairs minister S. Jaishankar reiterated India’s longstanding policy that Palestinian concerns must be addressed and that a two-state solution is the answer to the difficulties in the region. However, even while speaking of the “immense human suffering” in Gaza, he followed the Narendra Modi regime’s decision not to hold Israel responsible for any deaths over the last five weeks and only spoke of Hamas’s killings.

“The ongoing Israel-Hamas conflict in Gaza is causing immense human suffering, including to civilians, elderly, women and children.We welcome all efforts of the international community towards de-escalation. Right now, there is an urgent need to ensure that humanitarian aid and relief effectively and safely reach the population of Gaza. It is also imperative that all hostages are released. We believe that there is a universal obligation to observe international humanitarian law,” Jaishankar said.

While condemning the attack by Hamas, Jaishankar did not name the Israeli state when talking about the subsequent crisis and civilian deaths. “We are all aware that the immediate crisis was triggered by the terrorist attack of 7th October. Where terrorism itself is concerned, none of us should or can compromise with it. Hostage taking is equally unacceptable and cannot be condoned. Subsequent developments have deepened our concern even more as we witness large scale civilian casualties and a humanitarian crisis. We strongly condemn any death of civilians,” he said.

Speaking of India’s position on Palestine, he said, “We believe that the concerns of the Palestinian people must be addressed in a serious and sustainable manner. This can only happen with a two-State solution that is based on peaceful co-existence. We have been consistently supportive of international efforts towards this end.”

Jaishankar also mentioned the humanitarian relief India has already sent to Gaza, and said that such efforts will continue.

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi did not attend the BRICS meeting as he is currently campaigning for the upcoming assembly elections in Rajasthan.

Among the BRICS members, both old and new, India and Ethiopia were the only two to abstain in the voting for the UN General Assembly Resolution that called for humanitarian pause to allow for supply of food, fuel and water to the Gaza Strip. All the other members had voted in favour.

On October 7, Hamas launched a terror attack from Gaza strip into southern Israel and killed more than 1,400 people. Since then, Israel launched counter-strikes into Gaza which has left more than 14,000 people dead, as per last official count.

Xi, Putin to Attend BRICS Virtual Meet on Israel-Hamas War, Modi to Skip

External affairs minister S. Jaishankar will represent India at the meeting convened by South Africa, the current chair of the group.

New Delhi: While the Chinese and Russian presidents will attend the extraordinary virtual meeting of the BRICS grouping to discuss the crisis in West Asia on Tuesday, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi will skip it, apparently due to the ongoing election campaigning.

As per official sources, external affairs minister S. Jaishankar will represent India at the meeting convened by South Africa, the current chair of the group. Modi is the middle of a campaign blitzkrieg in the state of Rajasthan, which goes to the polls on November 25. He is scheduled to address three campaign rallies on Tuesday.

South Africa’s foreign ministry issued a statement on Monday that President Cyril Ramaphosa had convened an “Extraordinary Joint Meeting on the Middle East situation” on November 21.

“Leaders of BRICS countries – Brazil, Russia, India and China – will join the virtual Extraordinary Meeting with invited BRICS leaders of Saudi Arabia, Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran and the United Arab Emirates,” said the press release.  The UN secretary general Antonio Guterres will also take part in the meeting.

A joint statement will be issued at the end of the summit, as per the South African foreign ministry.

The Kremlin confirmed that Russian President Vladimir Putin will be participating at the virtual meeting. He had skipped the BRICS summit held in Johannesburg earlier this year which invited six new countries to join the grouping.

President Xi Jinping is also set to participate in the BRICS meeting, as announced by the Chinese foreign ministry.

Among the BRICS members, both old and new, India and Ethiopia were the only two to abstain in the voting for the UN General Assembly Resolution that called for humanitarian pause to allow for supply of food, fuel and water to the Gaza Strip. All the other members had voted in favour.

On October 7, Hamas launched a terror attack from Gaza strip into southern Israel and killed more than 1,400 people. Since then, Israel launched counter-strikes into Gaza which has left more than 14,000 people dead, as per last official count.