On India Visit, US Defence Secretary Austin Will Have to Deal With CAATSA Among Pigeons

India will become vulnerable to CAATSA, which applies to all Russian military and defence-related entities, later this year when deliveries of the S-400 missiles to the Indian Air Force begin.

New Delhi: When US Defence Secretary Lloyd J. Austin III visits India next week, he will need to confront the awkward issue of Washington sanctioning New Delhi – or not – over its import of five Russian Almaz-Antel S-400 Triumf air defence systems in his deliberations, aimed primarily at furthering bilateral military and strategic ties to counter China’s hegemonic ambitions.

Ever since India formally signed up for the $5.5 billion S-400 purchase in October 2018, it has been under the incipient threat of being penalised under the US’s Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA).

This Act, which has neither international legitimacy nor sanction from the United Nations (UN), applies to all Russian military and defence-related entities. It became law in 2017 after being passed by the US Congress in response to Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, and Moscow’s alleged meddling in the 2016 US presidential elections. It is also applicable to Iran and North Korea, albeit for different reasons.

The Act, which also covers other Russian sectors like data processing, petroleum and crude oil, has so far been invoked against China, and more recently Turkey, for receiving two S-400 systems each, similar to the five ordered by India. CAATSA, however, does not incorporate provisions for sanctioning any country simply for ordering the S-400s; it embargoes them once system deliveries begin, going by the Chinese and Turkish instances.

Hence, by this yardstick, India too will become correspondingly vulnerable to CAATSA later this year when S-400 deliveries to the Indian Air Force (IAF) begin. Russian and Indian officials confirmed as much last April, stating that the global spread of the coronavirus would not impact the timely delivery of either the S-400 or other Russian materiel on order from Delhi.

“I don’t think there will be any impact [of the virus on Russia’s S-400 delivery schedules],” India’s ambassador to Russia Bala Venkatesh Varma told TASS news agency in Moscow. He said that although there had been a ‘slight dislocation’ of a couple of weeks due to the pandemic, all major contracts for India would be completed on schedule, which included the air defence systems.

Also read: India Ready To Sell BrahMos, but Exports Remain Hostage to Concerns Over CAATSA

Two months earlier in February, Deputy Director of Russia’s Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation (FSMTC) Vladimir Drozhzhov too had declared that Moscow would begin delivering the S-400 SAM systems to the IAF on schedule by end of 2021. “We will fulfil our delivery commitments” he had categorically declared at the time.

In keeping with this timetable, the first IAF team of specialists and technicians left recently for Khimki near Moscow, where the S-400’s are integrated, to be trained on the operation and maintenance of the advanced air defence system. Hosting this squad at the Russian embassy in Delhi before their departure in January, the Russian Ambassador Nikolay Kudashev had, in an indirect reference to CAATSA, declared that India’s S-400 purchase was within the tenets of international law and the UN charter and hence un-sanctionable.

Over the past two years, India has also inked deals for four Russian stealth frigates, varied ammunition, missiles and ordnance and leased an attack nuclear-powered submarine. It is also in advanced negotiations for 33 combat aircraft, 200 light utility helicopters and over 700,000 assault rifles, all of which have mysteriously evoked not even a casual mention from the US with regard to CAATSA. Some analysts take this to indicate that the threat of CAATSA emanates principally from Washington’s ‘pique’ over the IAF opting for the S-400 instead of rival systems like Lockheed Martin’s Patriot Advanced Capability PAC-3 or the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system,

US defence secretary Lloyd Austin. Photo: Reuters

“In talks with Defence Minister Rajnath Singh and other security officials, Austin needs to clearly indicate whether CAATSA is likely or unlikely to be invoked against India over the S-400s,” said Amit Cowshish, former Ministry of Defence (MoD) acquisitions advisor. Leaving matters in the twilight zone is troubling and unsettling, as the US sanctioning India will prove to be disastrous, not only for Delhi but equally for the US, he warned.

Over the past two years, public debate over CAATSA has been at best sketchy, ambiguous and woolly.

While India has maintained a studied silence over it, US officials in Washington and at their embassy in Delhi, have resorted to doublespeak on this delicate issue, primarily dancing nebulously around the subject, almost to the point of incomprehensibility.

“We have not made any waiver determination with respect to Indian transactions with Russia,” US Embassy charge d’affaires in Delhi Don Heflin declared recently, ahead of the Aero India 2021 defence exhibition in Bangalore, in early February. He was referring to a provision CAATSA incorporates for a case-by-case waiver of sanctions, and one that can only be determined by the US President. Amongst other assorted considerations, such a provision is largely predicated on whether a waiver for a specific country buying Russian materiel furthers – or not – Washington’s national security interests.

Also read: Will They or Won’t They? US Leaves Issue of Sanctions on India Under CAATSA Open-Ended

Earlier, outgoing US ambassador Kenneth Juster also bafflingly stated in his farewell address in early January that CAATSA sanctions were ‘never designed to harm friends and allies’ of which India was definitely one. But in the same breath, he issued a veiled warning by ‘advising’ India to determine how much it wanted to diversify its sources of materiel procurement. In short, Juster too cautioned Delhi over its S-400 acquisition, but without elaboration.

Meanwhile, Indian military officers and defence analysts believe that CAATSA is being ‘leveraged’ by Washington to sell Delhi additional US weaponry to swell the $18 billion worth of materiel it has already supplied since 2001. In February 2021, analysts from the Delhi-based Observer Research Foundation (ORF) had claimed that the ousted Trump administration had reportedly proposed a CAATSA waiver in 2018 in exchange for the IAF acquiring F-16’s, but the offer never progressed and the sanctions bogey endured. And, in yet another placatory gesture the same year, the MoD, approved the $1 billion import from the US of an upgraded version of Raytheon’s National Advanced Surface to Air Missile System-2 (NASAMS-2) for the IAF, to fortify the missile defence shield over Delhi. This too remains still born.

One three-star IAF officer told The Wire that the US’s typical ‘transactional’ approach towards all its allies and strategic partners could well determine CAATSA’s future with regard to India. “[Washington’s] attitude is dictated by the characteristic American aphorism that ‘There Ain’t No Such Thing As A Free Lunch’ or TANSTAFL,” he said, declining to be named. Eventually, the officer who had dealt with the Pentagon previously, believes it will be a trade-off of some kind for CAATSA not being imposed on India for the S-400s.

Consequently, one recent rearguard appeasement by Delhi to assuage the TANSTAFL syndrome ahead of Austin’s arrival, appears to be its decision to proceed with the $3 billion import of 30 armed MQ-9 Reaper or Predator-B UAVs) that are eventually to divided equally amongst the three services.

Official sources said these intended UAV purchases are likely to be imminently approved by the MoD’s Defence Acquisition Council (DAC) and formally announced during Austin’s two-day Delhi visit till March 21.

On hold for over two years due to its ‘astronomical’ cost, the projected Predator buy follows the leasing in September 2020 of two non-weaponised General Atomics Aeronautical Systems Inc (GA-SAI) MQ-9 SeaGuardian medium altitude, long endurance UAVs by the Indian Navy (IN) initially for 12 months, to monitor the Indian Ocean Region. Despite the flurry of indigenous UAV programmes and the governments focus on ‘atmanibharta‘ or self-sufficiency, the IN is also fast-tracking a proposal to acquire 10 shipborne unmanned aerial systems (UAS) from Boeing for over Rs 1,024 crores that will further swell the US’ materiel kitty.

Also read: How India Walked a Tightrope to Ink the S-400 Missiles Deal With Russia

US vendors are also frontrunners to supply 114 medium multi-role combat aircraft to the IAF for an estimated $18-20 billion. Industry sources in Delhi maintain that this could extend to a possible ‘associated’ order for 57 Multi-Role Carrier Borne Fighters for the IN worth another $10-12 billion.

“Other than using CAATSA as leverage over the S-400 purchase, it would be illogical and absurd and for the US to take matters further and sanction Indian entities, given its burgeoning strategic and commercial military ties with Delhi,” said Brigadier Rahul Bhonsle of the Delhi-based Security Risks Asia defence management consultancy. Besides India emerging as a frontline state for Washington in its bid to contain Chinese militarism, he declared, Delhi is also one of the principal buyers of American defence equipment. “Jeopardising this entire edifice through CAATSA would be imprudent and in no way further Washington’s aim of beggaring Moscow via sanctions,” Bhonsle added.

After all, it’s no secret that a majority, over 65%, of Indian military platforms in all three services, are of Russian origin. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute or SIPRI estimates that Russia has supplied India with materiel worth over $40 billion since 1991, while other senior Indian military planners said military hardware worth an analogous amount had been provided by Moscow in the preceding decades from the mid-1960’s.

Lockheed Martin F-16 fighter jets. Photo: Reuters

Meanwhile, some analysts said that the US could resort to one of CAATSAs provisions to provide it with a tactical reprieve and face-saving withdrawal from imposing sanctions on Delhi for the S-400s. The Acts Section 231 states that a sanctions waiver can be granted if the concerned country – in this case India – is ‘taking or will take steps to reduce its inventory of major defence equipment and advanced conventional weapons produced by the defence sector of the Russian Federation…over a specified period’ A follow-on clause requires that particular country to cooperate with the US on other security matters critical to its interests.

India qualifies on both counts.

According to SIPRI, India’s share of Russian materiel buys had declined from 70% in 2010-2014 to 58% in 2014-2018 while conversely, between 2008-2017 Indian military platforms and defence kit procurements from the US had increased a whopping 557%. Additionally, India had substantially increased defence procurements from the US’s strategic partners France and Israel.

And on the related parameter, there is little room for reservation or misgivings regarding India’s collaboration with the US on multiple strategic, military, diplomatic, political and commercial fronts, thereby combining hypothetically to fortify Washington’s alibi to hand Delhi a CAATSA waiver.

Also read: As Trump Goes, Indian Military Wonders If Biden Will Bell the CAATSA

CAATSA, however, has not entirely been without consequences elsewhere with other US allies.

It is believed to have been instrumental in ‘dissuading’ Washington’s close affiliate Indonesia from buying 11 Sukhoi-35 Su-35 ‘Flanker-E’ combat aircraft from Moscow in 2018 for $1.1 billion, under a barter deal. A host of news reports and think tank analyses have revealed that CAATSA was unsubtly employed to ‘persuade’ Jakarta to buy Lockheed Martin F-16 Viper fighters instead of the Su-35’s.

Indonesia scrapped the Su-35 deal and instead expressed interest in acquiring Lockheed Martin’s F-35 Lightning II fighter, but the US appears to have turned down its request. Alternately, Indonesia has opted for 36 Dassault Rafale fighters and eight Boeing F-15EX Advanced Eagle fighter which, ironically, are also on offer to the IAF and under serious consideration by it.

“The aim is clear – to make these countries (like Indonesia) refuse to get arms from Russia and turn to Washington instead,” Russia’s ambassador to Indonesia Lyudmila Vorobieve told Bloomberg. “It’s unfair competition that violates rules and norms of transparent and legitimate business,” he added.

Bloomberg further quoted an unnamed official who declared that Indonesian President Joko Widodo’s government ‘risked being penalised for purchasing Sukhoi fighters under the CAATSA. It also cited a US State Department official declaring that it was a ‘goal of American policy to deny Russia the revenue it needs (through arms sales) to continue its malign influence.

Austin’s visit could well decide CAATSAs eventual outcome for India, and whether it too risks being penalised at its peril by President Joe Biden’s new administration.

India Ready To Sell BrahMos, but Exports Remain Hostage to Concerns Over CAATSA

Even though the US Act does not have international endorsement, it has the ability to impose arbitrary embargoes and covers the Russian defence entity NPO Mashinostroyenia that forms the joint venture with India’s DRDO.

Chandigarh: The ominous shadow of US sanctions on Russian defence entities looms ominously over India’s plans to fast-track the export of BrahMos cruise missiles which are being locally manufactured in collaboration with Moscow.

India is in advanced talks with several countries, especially the Philippines, Vietnam and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), amongst others like Argentina, Brazil, Indonesia and South Africa to sell them the BrahMos missile system. But its export remains hostage to unresolved concerns over the US’s Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions or CAATSA, which has the potential to hobble all such sales via arbitrary embargoes.

Even though CAATSA has neither international nor United Nations endorsement, it was unilaterally approved by the US Congress in 2017 in response to Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, and Moscow’s alleged meddling in the US presidential elections two years later. The Act covers, amongst numerous other sectors, all major Russian defence entities including NPO Mashinostroyenia (NPOM) that forms the joint venture (JV) with India’s government-run Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) to design, upgrade and manufacture BrahMos. The DRDO has a 50.5% stake in BrahMos Aerospace, headquartered in New Delhi, while NPOM owns the remaining 49.5% in the JV.

The two-stage cruise missile with a 292km strike range recently got top billing as the DRDOs and Department of Defence Production’s (DDPs) potentially ‘hot selling’ weapon system. It features prominently in their list of 230 indigenously developed and licence-built military platforms, weapons and other defence systems for possible sale to ‘friendly countries’, like the Philippines and Vietnam to boost India’s materiel exports fivefold to $5 billion by 2025.

But one tangible drawback or hitch, with regard to exporting BrahMos that is series built at a ‘dedicated’ facility in Hyderabad, is its dependence on critical Russian components: the missile systems ramjet engine and radar seekers, both of which are provided by NPOM and hence technically liable to sanctions under CAATSA. Industry officials told The Wire that Russia supplies around 65% of the components for the 3.9 tonne BrahMos, and that both sides had only recently resolved longstanding issues over the missile systems intellectual property rights, rendering it eligible for export. But neither side seems apparently to have factored in CAATSA.

“Enforcing CAATSA on the potential export of BrahMos by the US would be disastrous for the Ministry of Defence’s plans, in addition to adversely impacting other critical aspects of bilateral ties strategic and security between Delhi and Washington,” said Amit Cowshish, former defence ministry acquisitions advisor. Washington’s position on CAATSA needs to be stated unambiguously and not remain in the twilight zone, he declared, adding that if not clarified, the threat of sanctions would continue to hang over India like the proverbial Damocles sword.

BrahMos Aerospace at the Defexpo India in 2020. Photo: brahmos.com

Shrouded in ambiguity

There has not been official discussion or reaction to this possibility in either Delhi or Washington, as CAATSA’s possible invocation by the US remains shrouded at best in ambiguity and opacity. It’s also a concern that keeps India guessing, almost as if Washington’s doublespeak regarding CAATSA is aimed at keeping Delhi deliberately on edge. Some analysts believe that CAATSA, which otherwise has had little or no impact on Russia, is being ‘leveraged’ by Washington to ‘persuade’ India to import additional US materiel like fighters for its air force and navy for over $20 billion.

Over the past decade, India has emerged as one of Washington’s largest arms imports, acquiring assorted platforms like maritime reconnaissance and transport aircraft, attack and heavy-lift helicopters and light-weight howitzers, amongst other materiel worth an estimated $18 billion. Other acquisitions apart from combat aircraft, like armed unmanned aerial systems (UAS) and air defence systems worth another $20 billion are in an advanced state of negotiation.

In recent months, US officials have obliquely warned India against acquiring Russian defence equipment, particularly five Almaz-Antel S-400 Triumf self-propelled surface-to-air (SAM) systems for the Indian Air Force (IAF). To further confound matters, Pentagon and State Department personnel in Washington and the US embassy in Delhi have periodically hinted that CAATSA included a provision for a ‘case-by-case’ waiver, but hastened to add that India had not yet received any such renunciation. This indeed is reminiscent of a popular US comic character’s famous quip: “Now I see it, now you don’t”, leaving the entire CAATSA issue unresolved.

Also Read: Will They or Won’t They? US Leaves Issue of Sanctions on India Under CAATSA Open-Ended

So far, the US has invoked CAATSA against China and Turkey for acquiring two S-400 systems each, but sanctions against India could be forthcoming, as delivery of similar air defence systems to the IAF are scheduled to begin around end-2021. In the meantime, there also remains the possibility of the US sanctioning not only BrahMos’s export, but a host of other Russian military platforms and defence equipment that India has acquired recently and whose delivery is imminent. These include frigates, combat aircraft, assault rifles and even the lease of a nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN), in addition to assorted missiles and ammunition.

The Philippines announces deal, but CAATSA hovers

Meanwhile, earlier this week the Philippine’s defence secretary Delfin Lorenzana, was quoted by local news agencies as saying that his country was buying BrahMos missiles. He made the announcement after witnessing the inking of the ‘implementing agreement’ by Raymundo Elefante, undersecretary in the Philippine Department of Defence (DND) and Shambu S. Kumaran, India’s envoy in Manila.

Lorenzana did not provide details but indicated that this ‘implementing arrangement’ would serve as a roadmap in support of the planned BrahMos acquisition by the Philippines, and as “legal framework” for the weapon system that was potentially being executed via a government-to-government deal between Delhi and Manila.

But UK’s Jane’s Defence Weekly reported on March 3 that while the BrahMos procurement had been prioritised by the Philippines Armed Forces ‘second horizon’ modernisation programme, the country’s DND has been ‘wary of the (BrahMos) purchase for fear of incurring penalties under CAATSA which seeks possible penalties on Russian defence customers’.

For Manila, acquiring the BrahMos missile system is a priority in light of growing concerns over Chinese assertiveness in its territorial waters. In December 2019, Indian and Philippine officials had determined that Manila would procure two BrahMos batteries or six mobile autonomous launchers, with two or three missile tubes each. At the time, both sides had planned on concluding the deal in 2020, but this was delayed due to the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic.

After sale logistics to induct BrahMos and instruct the Philippines Army’s first Land Based Missile System Battery (LBMSB), raised in October 2019 to activate, maintain, and operate the cruise missile too were discussed. Indian industry sources said that though India had offered a $100 million line of credit to the Philippines to fund the BrahMos and other indigenous materiel purchases, Manila was ‘exploring’ the possibility of making the buys with its own resources which, however, was proving somewhat demanding.

Delhi has recently reinforced diplomatic and strategic ties with the Philippines. During his Manila visit in October 2019, Indian President Ram Nath Kovil pledged to boost bilateral defence and maritime relations between their two countries, nervous over China’s growing hegemony. Some two years earlier, Narendra Modi became the first Indian prime minister in 36 years to visit the Philippines in November 2017, where he too signed several agreements to strengthen defence and security ties following talks with Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi with Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte. Photo: Twitter/@narendramodi

And while the Philippines believes that BrahMos will strengthen its ability to deter China in disputed waters, India too hopes to gain strategically by arming a country seeking to oppose Beijing, by countering the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) assertiveness in the South China Sea and surrounding waters. India had also been in dialogue with neighbouring Vietnam since 2014 to also supply it the BrahMos, but faintheartedness on Delhi’s part and fear of Beijing’s reaction, had interminably delayed it. However, even for sale of the missile system to Vietnam or any other country, apprehensions of CAATSA’s application persist.

Extended range?

Named jointly after the Brahmaputra and Moskva rivers, BrahMos was first successfully tested in India in 2001. Configured on the Russian anti-ship 3M55 Oniks/Yakhont system (NATO designation SS-NZX-26), BrahMos is designed for launch from land-based mobile platforms, ships, combat aircraft and also submarines. For over a decade it has been in use with the Indian Army and frontline Indian Navy (IN) warships and more recently was mated with the IAF’s Sukhoi Su-30MKI multi-role fighters. BrahMos’ submarine-launched versions are presently undergoing trials.

The DRDO is also working on extending BrahMos’ range from 400km to 500km. “We have already confirmed (a range of) 400km and in order to increase it to 500 km it is needed to increase speed”, declared Alexander B. Maksichev co-director with the BrahMos JV in April 2019. Currently, the missile flies at a speed of Mach 2.8, but through modernisation, it will achieve the hyper sound speed of 4.5M, he added.

Other official sources said the proposed Extended Range (ER) BrahMos variant has been fitted with a Russian-designed seeker and would also be capable of being employed from land and sea-based platforms to strike ranges of nearly 500 km. The ER version is expected to carry the same amount of fuel as the earlier versions but will be fitted with an enhanced computer-controlled injector system to better regulate this supply into its engines’ combustor, greatly improving efficiency.

This ER BrahMos development became possible after India formally joined the multinational Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in mid-2016, permitting it to co-develop missile systems with ranges of more than 300 km in collaboration with another country. MTCR restrictions had earlier prevented Russia from transferring critical systems to India to extend BrahMos’ 292 km range and 500 kg payload, rendering it one of the world’s fastest and most effective cruise missiles which meets many countries purse and requirements – CAATSA permitting.