Bhima Koregaon protests

Violence Against Dalits in Maharashtra Is Not New, but Dalit Reaction to It Is Changing

While the state’s approach in dealing with Dalit protests may not change, the changed context in which Dalits are successful in bringing their issues centre stage has the potential to bring out new possibilities.

While the state’s approach in dealing with Dalit protest has not changed, the success of Dalits in pitching their issues at the centre stage of the national agenda has created new political and social possibilities

Members of the Dalit community shout slogans as they block a road during a protest in Mumbai, January 3, 2018. Credit: Reuters/Shailesh Andrade

The commemoration of the battle of Bhima-Koregaon and the events that have unfolded since new year’s eve became national news after the violence on Dalits. The mainstream media did not initially cover the grand celebration that began on new year’s eve to mark the 200th year of the end of Brahmin Peshwa rule in which the Mahars (Dalits) fought together with the British. It was only when Dalits organised protests on the evening of January 1 to express their anger against the violence unleashed by the caste supremacists’ on Dalits and Bahujans who had peacefully gathered at the Bhima-Koregaon, that it caught the eye of the media.

That same evening, Prakash Ambedkar gave a call for a Maharashtra bandh, in which all Ambedkarite organisations participated. Raosaheb Kasbe, an eminent scholar from Maharashtra, remarked, that the scale of mobilisation was unprecedented and the last time such a large mobilisation had taken place was during the Namantar (renaming) movement centred around renaming Marathwada University. Several commentators also mentioned how socialist trade union leader George Fernandes and Shiv Sena chief Bal Thackeray could earlier enforce such bandhs. The success of the bandh clearly established Prakash Ambedkar’s position as the pre-eminent Dalit leader in the state. The protests also gave a clear message to the ruling establishment not to take its citizens for granted. Since the Ambedkarite student protests in the wake of the death of Rohith Vemula and mobilisation of Dalits at Una in Gujarat, this is the third time that Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-ruled state governments have gone into a defensive mode. Following the success of the Maharashtra bandh, the state hit back at the Dalits by organising a combing operation and arresting scores of youth, charging them with serious cases that would will eventually ruin the future of some of the brightest minds.

This tendency of going after Dalits by implicating them in police cases, many of which turn out to be false, is not a new phenomenon. The state had responded in the same way to Dalit mobilisation during the early 1970s in Worli and Naigaum in Mumbai, the Namantar movement during the late 1970s, and the Khairlanji protests about a decade ago. In comparison to the previous incidents, however, the arrival of social media and a vibrant Dalit public sphere have paved the way for the Bhima-Koregaon incident to come centre stage for debate and discussion.

Also read: Post Bhima Koregaon Violence, Police Target Dalits Across Maharashtra; Minor Boys Worst Hit

Anti-Dalit violence

Violence against Dalits is an everyday phenomenon. However, not all crimes against Dalits are reported because of the hostility displayed by the ruling political and state establishment. Whenever Dalits face violent attacks from upper caste members, the state is either complicit with the latter or it displays its unwillingness to take legal action. Instead, the state tries to silence the protesting Dalits by implicating them in false cases. Commentators on the Bhima-Koregaon have referred to the 1997 brutal killing of innocent Dalits living in Ramabai Ambedkar Nagar. Like today, back then too, the reins of the state were in the hands of the Shiv Sena-BJP combine. The protests in 1997 began over the desecration of Ambedkar’s statue. The situation became extremely volatile and Dalits were angry at the ruling parties as well as leaders from their own community. Ramdas Athawale narrowly escaped death as an angry mob threw stones at him. The Congress and the Nationalist Congress Party (NCP), who were then in opposition, promised the protesting Dalits that they would punish the police officer, Manohar Kadam, who had ordered the firing. In 1999, the Congress-NCP combine did come to power and ruled Maharashtra until 2014. However, Kadam never faced any legal action. In fact, promoted subsequently, he now receives all post-retirement benefits.

While discussing Dalit protests in Maharashtra, one is reminded of the 1974 anti-Dalit riots in Mumbai, where the state, together with upper-caste perpetrators of violence, attempted to silence the Dalit Panthers. Dalit Panthers – an organisation that emerged in the early 1970s – were the only militant force in Mumbai posing not only an ideological challenge to the state, but also demonstrating its willingness to confront its political opponents with physical violence. The Dalit Panthers’ critical stance on the state’s inability to control atrocities against Dalits in the villages, and their critique of the Hindu religion brought them into direct conflict with the Congress-led state as well as the Shiv Sena.

The Dalit Panthers also criticised the leadership of the Republican Party of India for allying with the Congress as well as Communists and Socialists who did not address the caste question. During the 1974 anti-Dalit violence, Dalit Panthers confronted the upper caste perpetrators with counter violence. That the Panthers’ response was effective can be determined from a telling cartoon then drawn by the Shiv Sena chief Bal Thackeray in his magazine Marmik. The cartoon depicted an angry Panther who was being requested to follow Ambedkar’s path of Buddhism and jettison violence.

Dalit groups protesting at Thane railway station during the Maharashtra bandh following clashes between two groups in Bhima Koregaon near Pune, in Mumbai. Credit: PTI

While the Panthers were successful in responding to the upper caste attacks, the state machinery, most notably the police, colluded with upper caste elements. During the 1974 riots, not only did the upper caste perpetrators receive state patronage, but several children of policemen wore their parents’ uniforms and unleashed a wave of terror in the Bombay Development Division (BDD) chawls of Worli and Naigaum, an area inhabited by Dalits. The Marathi magazine Saptahik Manohar carried detailed reports about these incidents. Later, under political pressure, the state appointed the Bhasme Commission, but none of the accused were ever punished.

The Namantar controversy in the Maharashtra state assembly in 1978 revolved around renaming the Marathwada University as Babasaheb Ambedkar University. The Marathas opposed the move and even the socialist-leaning newspaper Marathwada Dainik invoking the asmita (pride) of Marathwada, was against renaming the university. Prominent socialists such as Govind Bhai Shroff and Anantaro Bhalerao were in the forefront of the opposition. It thus provided a moral justification for the opponents of renaming. These divergent views, as Gail Omvedt succinctly documents in her book, Reinventing Revolution, resulted in massive violence against Dalits in which the state gave a free hand to the upper castes to carry out violence. Soon after, thousands of educated Dalit youths were implicated in false cases which destroyed an entire generation’s livelihood and chances of social mobility. The cases filed against 900 upper caste perpetrators during the Namantar movement in Marathwada were later dropped by the Sena-BJP in mid 1990s.

Closer to our own times is the case of the Khairlanji Massacre that took place in 2006. Here, too, none of the accused of the brutal murder and rape of women in a Dalit family went to the jail. In fact, in 2010, the then Congress-NCP-led state awarded Khairlanji village a prize for being a “tanta mukta gao” (dispute-free village). In addition to being soft on the perpetrators of casteist violence, the state became increasingly hostile towards Dalit protestors. The state implicated Dalit activists in false cases by branding them “Naxals” and therefore anti-national. By branding Dalit protestors as Naxals, the state took an easier route as it could then give up the responsibility of listening to their protesting voices. Despite large-scale mobilisations organised by various Dalit groups, none of the cases reached its logical end – that is, putting the perpetrators of casteist violence behind the bars.

Also read: Bhima Koregaon and the Dalits’ Never-Ending Search for a Nation

While dealing with Dalit protests, which at times take violent forms, the mainstream media treats it on par with the violence unleashed by the Brahmanical Hindutva groups. However, there are several differences. First, the state is either soft on Hindutva groups or actively supports them in carrying out violence against Dalits and other socially marginalised groups. However, when protesting Dalits take to violence to make their voices heard, they face legal action. Second, and this is very crucial, violence by Dalits is directed towards state property, whereas upper caste violence is towards people from socially marginalised groups. Third, Dalits’ use of violence is supplemented with a rational critique of the state’s failure to protect their rights as citizens. Upper castes use violence to maintain their caste privileges and ‘teach’ a lesson to the protesting Dalits.

Dalit protests and state

But things have changed. Dalits protests, as I have shown, have historically met with extremely hostility from the state and society. In the aftermath of the Bhima-Koregaon incident, the views that have been expressed by the mainstream media, the state and the Hindutva groups are not new at all. Like in all such previous incidents, the state in this case too gave a free hand to the upper caste perpetrators of violence and implicated scores of Dalit youth in false cases. However, what is new is the current context is that Dalits are effectively using social media to communicate with the wider society. In fact, while the mainstream media remained initially silent and later biased in covering the Bhima-Koregaon incident, it is the social media which played a crucial role in the success of bandh call by Ambedkarite groups. The second factor that is different from the previous incidents is the presence of a vibrant Dalit public sphere, both in the vernacular languages as well as in English. Fourth, Dalits are also using the revised Atrocity Act for filing cases against upper caste perpetrators of violence. Fifth, there is a loosely connected group of Dalit lawyers who are volunteering to help the arrested Dalit youths. Sixth, the international presence of Ambedkarites has meant that every major incident results in solidarity and protests, such as the ones in London, San Jose (California, USA), and Hannover (Germany). Lastly, unlike in previous times, all major political parties, from the Left to the Right, are desperately trying to woo the Dalit constituency.

These factors pose a major challenge to the establishment and especially Maharashtra chief minister Devendra Fadnavis, who, while in the opposition, had criticised the then Congress-Nationalist Congress Party-led state for the increase in the number of atrocities against Dalits. He had even claimed that the accused in casteist violence were related to the members of the ruling parties. One had, therefore, expected him to govern differently. However, current events suggest that irrespective of the shade of the political party that comes to power, there remains a strong element of continuity in the state’s approach towards Dalits and their protests. While the state’s approach in dealing with Dalit protests may not change – at least in the near future – the changed context in which Dalits are successful in bringing their issues centre stage has the potential to bring out newer possibilities.

Sumeet Mhaskar is an Associate Professor at the O.P. Jindal Global University and Junior Research Partner with the Max Planck Institute for the Study of Religious and Ethnic Diversity.

Post Bhima Koregaon Violence, Police Target Dalits Across Maharashtra; Minor Boys Worst Hit

‘Instead of arresting those involved in terrorising our community, the police has been busy arresting our children,’ said the uncle of a 14-year-old boy who was picked up.

‘Instead of arresting those involved in terrorising our community, the police have been busy arresting our children,’ said the uncle of a 14-year-old boy who was picked up.

Dalit protesters block a road during Maharashtra bandh called over Koregaon violence in Thane, Mumbai. Credit: PTI

Mumbai: Sarita Kamble stood in front of the tall, wooden door of the Dongri Observation Home for almost 10 minutes before entering. “He can’t see me crying. It will make him weak. Let us go in once I feel composed,” she hastily tells her husband, Sanket, as she struggles to hold back her tears.

It’s January 6, three days since her 15-year-old son was picked up by Chembur police for “unlawfully assembling on the street”, “rioting” and the most serious of all – “voluntarily causing grievous hurt to any person being a public servant in the discharge of his duty”. Sarita’s son studies in class nine at a municipal corporation run school near Deonar. He is one of 16 boys, all below 16, to be booked and later lodged at Dongri Children’s Home for their alleged roles in the riot and vandalism at Chembur on January 3. Sarita, like other parents, has come to see her son.

One law student from her neighbourhood in Govandi had told her that her son Rahul might be kept in “jail” for 10 years. “That boy told me the sections are grave. He opened some page on his mobile phone and read it aloud,” Sarita says. “Ataa daha varshaa saathi gela samjha tumcha mulga (your son has gone in for 10 years now),” Sarita recalls his exact words.

But once she steps inside the observation home and speaks to the social workers from the Resource Cell for Juvenile Justice (RCJJ) – a field action project started by the Centre for Criminology and Justice Department of the Tata Institute of Social Sciences (TISS) – Sarita gets some clarity. “They (social workers) said under-18 children cannot be kept here for more than three years. But my son is still a child. He is innocent. I cannot let him be here for even a day more,” she tells The Wire while waiting outside the probation officer’s office, hoping to see her son.

According to S. Mane, senior police inspector from Govandi, Sanket, Rahul, along with 39 others, had indulged in vandalism and caused harmed to public property. These teenage boys, according to the police, were out on the street protesting against the violence unleashed on Dalits at Bhima Koregaon near Pune on January 1. But Sarita says her son was on his way to tuition class. “He was wrongly booked,” she repeats to everyone she speaks to in the next six hours inside the juvenile home.

Also read: Bhima Koregaon and the Dalits’ Never-Ending Search for a Nation

The Kamble couple had to wait for over an hour before they meet Rahul. He’s no longer in his school uniform – dark blue pants and white shirt – that he was wearing when he had left his home. It has been replaced with a yellow t-shirt with stripes and brown shorts.

“Who gave you these clothes?” she enquires. Rahul stands there with his head bowed. “Jail cha uniform aahe ka ha? (is this a jail uniform?),” she asks him. Rahul nods. By then four other boys join him. All of similar age, build and in similar striped t-shirts and brown shorts. They were all brought to Dongri home on January 3. Of the 16 children, one was released on the same day.

“He was bleeding profusely. Mirror shards had pierced him deeply and ruptured his skin badly on the right side of his body. He was in a terrible state. The magistrate had ordered his release on the same day,” confirms a social worker at the observation home.

The juvenile home in Mumbai. Credit: Free Press Journal

The trauma of having spent three days in confinement and the uncertainty of how many more days they would have to spend there has made most of these children extremely restless. “We have been asking sir (pointing at probation officer Dilip Naragnkar’s room) about when we can return home. He says he can’t tell. I have my board (10th) exams coming up in another one month’s time,” says 15- year old Avi. He tells this reporter that he was picked up from his house. “I had not stepped out that entire day. My elder brother had participated in the protest in the morning, but he too got back home in an hour. But the police came home and took us both to the Govandi chowki and then brought us here. My brother is 19. He was taken to another jail.”

Rahul’s co-inmate Aniket, another 15-year-old boy, is limping. These teenagers had not known each other until January 3. But for three days, Rahul has been taking care of Aniket. When this reporter asked Aniket about his injury, he said that a police constable had hit him with a baton. “I was out protesting with my sister and mother at Deonar. We were a huge group. They let my sister and mother go and brought me here. Many boys from my area were picked up.”

The families allege that the police did not spare anyone. “Police have launched a manhunt against our children. They arbitrarily arrested them,” says Sukhdeo Khairnar, whose 14-year-old nephew was also arrested. “Arrested for what? Is protesting illegal?” asks an elderly woman. Her 16-year-old grandson was also rounded up.

Also read: Beyond Bhima Koregaon: A Tale of Dalit-Maratha Relations in Modern Maharashtra

By 3 pm on January 6, the magistrate, Jyoti Purkar, calls all 15 children, one by one, to her chamber. Their parents are asked to furnish two independent sureties each. This means they had to find individuals with a regular job, stable income and the readiness to vouch for these children. Belonging to the lowest strata of the society, this is a lot to ask for. Families desperately begin making calls and scrounging for help. Within a few hours, some relatives and neighbours pour into the observation home. But the documents they’ve managed to assemble do not suffice. The last entry made in one of the bank passbooks was in 2014. Another person had come with his papers of his “zero balance bank account”. “Most women among us work as domestic help. Men in the family do odd-jobs. We do not have any family members with high income,” said one of the mothers.

Finally by 4 pm, 13 families convince the Juvenile Justice Board. They children are then released against two “personal bonds” each. For two other kids – 14 and 16 year old – their families could not provide “convincing” sureties and their release is deferred for later.

Most arrests in Mumbai were from the slums of Chembur, Deonar, Vikroli and Powai in the northeast region. People from Dalit Bahujan communities living here were also the ones who had travelled in huge number to Bhima Koregaon on January 1. Several private vehicles were booked to travel from different parts of Mumbai to Bhima Koregoan memorial. Most of them had to return mid-way after the violence on participants and visitors heading to the memorial. Since this was also the 200th anniversary of the Bhima Koregaon battle, an occasion of great importance to Dalits, the crowd this year had gone up from a few thousands to over two lakhs.

Policemen stand guard at a traffic junction in Mumbai, India, January 3, 2018. Credit: Reuters/Danish Siddiqui

Policemen stand guard at a traffic junction in Mumbai, January 3, 2018. Credit: Reuters/Danish Siddiqui

“We suffered violence first hand at Bhima Koregaon. The call for bandh on the following day was only a response to it. Instead of arresting those involved in terrorising our community, the police has been busy arresting our children,” Khairnar says. The Pune police are yet to arrest the prime suspects in the Bhima Koregaon attacks – Manohar alias Sambhaji Bhide and Milind Ebute, both Brahmins and prominent Hindutva leaders.

In Mumbai alone, close to 300 persons, all belonging to Bahujan communities have been arrested. The Directorate General of the Police’s control room confirmed a total of 502 FIRs have been registered across Maharashtra in the aftermath of the Bhima Koregaon violence.

“We have not collated any data so far on the number of arrests made. But most arrests have been in Mumbai, Aurangabad, Nanded and some parts of Nagpur,” says the officer attending to calls on Monday morning. News reports from various district confirms the number of persons arrested could be anywhere between 4,000 and 5,000. At least 5,000 more have been booked, but yet to be arrested. Besides being a part of unlawful assembly, most of them have been booked under serious, non-bailable charges such as vandalism and attempt to murder.

Advocate Darshan Ingole, one of the young lawyers who have been handling many of these cases, feels many of these charges might not even stand the scrutiny of the court. “Most of them are trumped-up charges. But the purpose is not to convict these young kids, but to instill terror in their minds. Can you even imagine what a family dependent on daily wages goes through if they have to visit the court and police station every day?” he asks.

Activist and journalist Vaibhav Chaya feels Dalit Bahujans commonly get criminalised during such violent incidents. “This way, most youth will be kept busy in dealing with these criminal cases against them. Their energy and resources all diverted from (their) education and career. These cases end up criminalising the community en masse.”

Chayya and several other young activists and lawyers have been working continuously since the day violence broke out at Bhima Koregaon. Besides coordinating with a network or lawyers and activists in most affected areas of Mumbai and other regions of the state, they have been busy putting out appeals to the Bahujan youths on the social media to protect their interests. “This is a tiring process. But it is only the community that can come together and salvage the situation during such times.”

(Names of children and their families have been changed in order to protect their identities.)

Beyond Bhima Koregaon: A Tale of Dalit-Maratha Relations in Modern Maharashtra

Over the last few decades, Hindutva groups have been increasingly radicalising Marathas to counter Dalit assertion.

Protests against the violence in Bhima Koregaon area. Credit: PTI

The recent violence at Bhima Koregaon has once again brought the relationship between the Dalits and Marathas of Maharashtra into the limelight. The violence follows a long and complicated history of their camaraderie as well as the antagonism between them, which often revealed the social and political turbulence of the time. The terms of the relationship between the two communities are not directed solely on the basis of caste; they are also defined by the roles these communities play on the ground. Numerically, Marathas are dominant in the state. They are a landed community and enjoy significant monopoly over key political offices. Compared to them, Dalits are less in number, but have a significant population dispersed across Maharashtra. After the arrival of the Ambedkarite alternative, Dalits, particularly Mahars, have consistently posed a challenge to Maratha hegemony by explicitly rejecting stigmatised traditional village-based duties. Since then, tension between the Mahars – who have converted to Buddhism – and the Marathas has actively grown, leading to volatility in the state.

For the last decade or two, the terms of caste antagonism between the two communities have fundamentally changed. Hindutva groups are using the pretext of hostility to increasingly radicalise the Marathas to counter Dalits. The Marathas have been witnessing a significant decline in their social and political stature since the late 1990s. The cause of this is primarily the loss of political monopoly in recent years. Before the 1990s, anti-Dalit violence perpetrated by the Marathas was a crude assertion of caste superiority. On the other hand, anti-Dalit violence in contemporary times is packaged with Hindutva ideology, which seeks to push the society back into primitive darkness. The invocation of past Maratha glory is strategically used to fuel social tensions between the two communities. Maratha youth, who are facing unemployment and a lack of educational opportunities, are easily pulled into this conflict.

Also read: Bhima Koregaon and the Dalits’ Never-Ending Search for a Nation

Non-Brahmin politics and the invocation of Shivaji

The history of the Dalit-Maratha relationship is, however, not confined to hostility and antagonism as is often showcased. Like the Marathas, Dalit castes like Mahars, Matangs and Chambhars were important constituents of the village community. Like the Marathas, Dalits too traditionally celebrate Chhatrapati Shivaji, the founder of the Maratha empire, though focusing primarily on his progressive and inclusive role as a state administrator. He is also remembered by Dalits as one who nurtured an unprejudiced attitude towards the lower sections of society. In the last 100 years, the history of Shivaji has been communalised by popular writers and leaders in Maharashtra. But Dalits here identify him as their inspiration and a ruler who ruptured the caste hierarchy. Moreover, the iconic stature of Shivaji has been one of the significant factors that helped collectively mobilise Dalits, lower castes and Marathas on several occasions. Mass movements like the non-Brahmin movement, which sought to bring together different caste groups such as Marathas, Dalits and other lower castes, have frequently used Shivaji’s iconic personality to sustain the unity.

Jyotiba Phule. Credit: Wikimedia Commons

In modern times, it was Jyotiba Phule who was the first to make Shivaji’s socially and politically relevant. Phule saw him as one of the most prominent Shudra-friendly rulers of India. He wrote a powada (ballad) on Shivaji, depicting him as a ruler who actively promoted social integration. Phule also portrayed Shivaji as an egalitarian ruler who never discriminated on the basis of caste and religion; he was described as the pride of peasants and the toiling masses, with Phule fondly calling him Kulvadibhushan. In his writings, Phule asked the Marathas to follow Shivaji’s profound sense of equality and justice. Phule’s Shivaji was one of the first significant efforts to situate dominant Marathas into the nascent non-Brahmin discourse. It was also an attempt to creatively construct a history by using prominent symbolism available to society. After Phule’s death, non-Brahmin and Dalit leaders like Narayan Meghaji Lokhande, Vitthal Ramji Shinde, Chatrapati Shahu, B.R. Ambedkar and Nanasingh Patil employed Shivaji’s symbolism to mobilise the masses. In fact, in the 1920s, Ambedkar’s letterhead depicted Shivaji’s sword (Bhavani talwar), which also reflects the all-encompassing image of Shivaji.

On the other hand, there has been a concerted attempt by the right-wing to paint Shivaji and Maratha history with communal colours, including an evident upper-caste slant. Right-wing historical narratives are often situated within anti-Muslim and upper caste-centric discourses, thus complicating the social and political fabric of Maharashtra. With active government support since the inception of the state, these histories have dominated historical discourse in Maharashtra. As a result, it has become easy to appropriate Shivaji and Maratha history into the Hindutva fold. This appropriation started a long time ago; it predates the rise of the political right-wing in the state.

Shivaji in battle. Credit: Youtube

Ambedkar and Dalit-Maratha relations

The late 19th century witnessed an enormous churning in Maharashtra (a significant portion of this region was part of the erstwhile Bombay presidency). Under Phule’s leadership, efforts to bring the oppressed caste groups together was largely contingent on the participation of Dalits and Marathas. The reason for the phenomenal success of the Satyashodhak Samaj, founded by Phule, was that it was followed and supported by large number of Marathas, Malis and Dalits. Phule was partially successful in establishing ‘non-Brahmin’ as an important category to reckon with. While defining this, he had famously argued that non-Brahmin society was defined by its distinct culture and history. However, the argument regarding socio-cultural unity could not sustain non-Brahmin prospects in politics for long, as it was filled with inherent contradictions. One of the factors that led to the decline of the non-Brahmin voice was the inability of dominant castes to overcome internal social and political differences. Since the 1920s, Dalits began to assert themselves separately as a powerful and organised group. From the beginning of his public life, Ambedkar was not very keen to associate himself with non-Brahmin politics. He believed that the non-Brahmin identity, despite being an important instrument of social change, was not capable of tackling the question of caste discrimination. Additionally, the involvement of Marathas and other dominant non-Brahmin castes in the perpetration of violence against Dalits resulted in the intensification of hostility. Reports of violence against Dalits increased phenomenally when Dalits began to actively organise and assert themselves against the dominant Maratha supremacy in the villages.

After Phule’s death, the Satyashodhak-led anti-Brahminical assertion transformed into a credible political movement under Chhatrapati Shahu’s leadership. During this period many Maratha leaders emerged, and they actively allied with Dalits to advance the fight against untouchability. They were instrumental in establishing strong institutions that helped foregrounding the assertive and organised Dalit movement. Vitthal Ramji Shinde, a Maratha social reformer, was one such example. He was one of the most important Dalit leaders before the arrival of Ambedkar, and aggressively spoke on behalf of Dalits. Despite his serious differences with Ambedkar, the schools and hostels started by him became prominent hubs of the Ambedkarite Dalit movement. Many prominent Dalit leaders emerged from his institutions.

Chhatrapati Shahu. Credit: Wikimedia Commons

On the other hand, Shahu, the ruler of the princely state of Kolhapur and one of the most charismatic Maratha leaders, shaped the course of Dalit politics in the early 20th century. He was able to bring together a range of leaders from disparate caste groups and provided a strong push to the cause of assertive non-Brahmin politics. He also enthusiastically supported Ambedkar and was instrumental in helping fund his education abroad. The first major public meeting that Ambedkar ever addressed was attended by Shahu. His untimely death created an enormous vacuum within the Maratha and non-Brahmin leadership, which eventually led to the decline of non-Brahmin politics in Maharashtra. He was replaced by two prominent leaders from western India, Keshavrao Jedhe and Dinkarrao Jawalkar. They actively supported Ambedkar in the 1920s and 1930s, but eventually chose to join the Congress. They were instrumental in decimating the upper-caste leadership within the Congress, paving the way for Maratha-oriented leadership at a provincial level. From then onwards, Marathas began to politically dominate the Marathi-speaking landscape of western India.

Dalits enthusiastically sought the help of progressive Marathas and actively appropriated them in the anti-caste movement. Simultaneously, Ambedkar was able to attract activists and leaders from different caste groups in his organisations. The peasant organisation led by Ambedkar in the Konkan region, particularly in the decade of the 1930s, was led by his prominent non-Dalit colleagues; one of them was Narayanrao Patil, a Maratha. Patil played a crucial role in shaping the thumping electoral victory in the 1937 elections for the Independent Labour Party, Ambedkar’s first political party, particularly in the Konkan region. On the other hand, the Vidarbha region also produced significant Maratha leaders who actively aligned with Dalits. One of them was Punjabrao Deshmukh, the first agriculture minister of India, who started his public life as a radical social activist and an active organiser of the anti-caste movement. Before switching allegiance to the Congress, he served as a member of the provincial legislature of Central Provinces and Berar, representing the Independent Labour Party. He remained Ambedkar’s trusted colleague for a long time.

Despite active efforts to bridge differences between the Marathas and Dalits, the top non-Brahmin leadership was unable to prevent large-scale anti-Dalit violence in the rural hinterlands of Maharashtra. Reports between the 1920s and 1947 clearly suggest that anti-Dalit violence erupted when Dalits actively resisted the dominant hegemony. Dalit resistance during this period was reinforced by the presence of a strong assertive Dalit movement under Ambedkar’s leadership. In fact, anti-Dalit violence played a crucial role in shaping organised Dalit politics. As a result, Maratha-Dalit relations at the village level remained fundamentally unchanged for several decades.

Dalit-Maratha relations in post-independence India

In the post-independence period, the relationship underwent significant changes. The demographic majority attained by the Marathas in the newly-created state of Maharashtra and their unchecked political monopoly over state affairs tilted the balance of power in their favour. Being a landed community, the majority of Marathas continued to work on the land and in agriculture, and they aggressively controlled the rural regions of Maharashtra. This led to a constant tussle between the Marathas and Dalits. The long-term volatile situation eventually led to the explosion of radical voices in the 1970s in the form of the Dalit Panthers.

The case of caste violence perpetrated by the Marathas at Bavda village triggered the formation of the Dalit Panthers in 1972. The primary focus of this organisation was ending caste violence against Dalits. Though short-lived, the Dalit Panthers emerged as a formidable voice of aggressive Dalit youth.

Also read: Will Prakash Ambedkar Take the Lead in the Fight for Dalit Rights in Maharashtra?

Meanwhile, Maratha monopoly over the social and political landscape of Maharashtra continued until the 1990s. The decade of the 1990s witnessed important changes which deeply affected Maratha supremacy. The implementation of the Mandal Commission recommendations, the introduction of the New Economic Reforms and the enactment of the SC/ST Prevention of Atrocities Act collectively led to the decline of Maratha supremacy. As a result, they witnessed a substantial decline in their social and political stature. This decline became palpable only in the 2000s. Simultaneously, it was in the 1990s and 2000s that Hindutva organisations began to expand their organisational network. In the last few years, they have grown primarily due to the large-scale participation of disgruntled Marathas from rural areas. These organisations have been polarising the political landscape on religious and caste lines, particularly against Ambedkarite Dalits who are largely identified as a major impediment to their political project. Consequently, a substantial section of the Marathas and other dominant middle castes, particularly from rural regions, have been getting increasingly attracted to these organisations, thereby creating the possibility of perpetual social tension.

The incident that took place at Bhima Koregaon was not an isolated one. Cases of caste violence and atrocities against Dalits have become habitual since time immemorial. They demonstrate the intimate relationship between caste and violence. When Dalits challenge dominant society, they are often castigated and targeted by the political establishment. In modern times, this phenomenon has been frequently repeated, particularly after the inception of an assertive Dalit movement under Ambedkar’s leadership. Ambedkar was regularly mocked as anti-national and sectarian by the Congress leadership during his lifetime. In post-Ambedkar Maharashtra, Dalits who challenged the dominant notions of society were conveniently marginalised by political elites. Caste violence has been a part of Maharashtra’s culture for a long time. Hindutva ideology did not develop overnight; it was actively aided and patronised by the Congress and the Nationalist Congress Party for many decades. On the other hand, history textbooks taught in the schools of Maharashtra reflect this clandestine alliance between the two; an alliance that has collectively led to the communalisation of intellectual discourse.

The Bhima Koregaon violence is significant primarily because it illustrates the new strategy used by dominant castes against Dalits. There is a significant difference between the anti-Dalit violence of the 1980s and 2018. The violence perpetrated by the dominant castes in the 1980s was a localised affair; on the other hand, violence at Bhima Koregaon was not. It was not a spontaneous reaction as has been claimed. It was carefully managed and strategised from a distance. The friction between the Marathas and Dalits, which began at Vadhu Budruk, was carefully used to instigate violence at Bhima Koregaon. The rage of crisis-ridden Marathas was deliberately directed to disturb social harmony. Maratha history is continuously invoked to attract disgruntled Marathas. If this trend continues, it will provide a template for greater social conflicts between different communities that could lead to a breakdown of dialogue. More than any other community, such conflicts will significantly impact Dalits.

Prabodhan Pol teaches history at Ramjas College, University of Delhi.