The Majoritarian Assumptions That Birthed a Populist Verdict

The Supreme Court judgment unjustly placed the onus on Muslims to prove that the Babri Masjid was built without destroying a prior Hindu structure.

The judgment delivered by India’s Supreme Court on the long-pending Ayodhya dispute is nothing less than shocking.  Prime Minister Narendra Modi hailed the judgement as one that brought a “new dawn”. However, one wonders how!

Briefly, the judgment validates the Hindu claim that the Babri mosque, built in the sixteenth century by “Muslim invaders” and in place until 1992, was constructed on the ruins of a Hindu temple – believed to be the birthplace of Lord Ram. As is well known, mobilised kar sevaks, in cahoots with the state agencies, demolished the mosque on December 6, 1992.

The SC has ordered the central government to establish a trust and build the Ram temple. However, recognising that “Muslims have been wrongly deprived of a mosque” built “well over 450 years ago,” it ordered allotting a separate plot of land to the Muslim Waqf board elsewhere. Notably, while the order makes it obligatory for the government to build a temple, a similar obligation regarding the mosque is missing. The order states that the Waqf board “would be at liberty” to build a mosque.

It is my argument that the SC judgment is profoundly populist.

It is populist because it is based on a prior unverifiable Hindu majoritarian assumption that Lord Rama was born exactly on the same spot where the Babri Masjid stood. Unjustly placing the onus on Muslims to prove that Babri Masjid was built without destroying a prior Hindu structure, the 1045-page judgement appears as an exercise –at times, fairly a rushed one – to validate the Hindu majoritarian assumption. A similar example of judicial populism is the recent remark by Justice S.R. Sen of the Meghalaya high court that India should have been declared a “Hindu country.”

Majoritarian assumptions in the judgment

There are two core elements of judicial populism. Firstly, judicial populism, writes Upendra Baxi, “identifies the will of the people with justice and morality” to disregard the process of evidence formation, fidelity to fairness and the non-negotiable idea of justice. Second, as I have argued elsewhere, one important feature of Indian populism is the very notion of “authentic” people as coterminous with Hindus, with Muslims being outsiders and alien to the nation.

Also read: Supreme Court’s Ayodhya Verdict Rests on a Glaring Contradiction

The assumption that belief of the Hindu majority equals justice is manifest in the judgement as follows:

“It is thus concluded on the conclusion that faith and belief of Hindus since prior to construction of Mosque and subsequent thereto has always been that Janmaasthan [birthplace] of Lord Ram is the place where Babri Mosque has been constructed.”

Leaving aside the tautology in the sentence – it is thus concluded on the conclusion – curiously, the judgement places belief of Hindus beyond time: “always.”

Yet, it unsuccessfully attempts to provide evidence to Hindus’ belief. Referring to Hindu scriptures, the judgment states that the belief of Hindus about the birthplace of Lord Ram cannot be “groundless”. Do these scriptures specify the exact location of Lord Ram’s birthplace as the same spot as Babri masjid’s? Certainly not! Unaddressed also remains the debate, as noted by anthropologist of Hinduism, Peter van der Veer, about whether Ayodhya of the epic Ramayana is the same as the contemporary Ayodhya.

Devotees walk past the pillars that Hindu nationalist group Vishva Hindu Parishad say will be used to build a Ram temple at the disputed religious site in Ayodhya, October 22, 2019. Photo: Reuters/Danish Siddiqui

The urge to prove the exact birthplace is such that the judgement approvingly cites the statement of one witness, Rajinder Singh (a Hindu, as an analyst speculates). Singh claims that his study of books on “Sikh Cult” makes it “evident” that the “disputed land is a birthplace of Shri Ramchanderji and Guru Nanak Dev [Sikhism’s founder] had sought the darshan of Shri Ram Janam Bhoomi Temple.” Anmol Singh shows the inauthenticity of the entire claim, including the absent citation. Mark that Sikhism is pejoratively called a cult, not a faith.

Faces of alterity

Logically, the burden of proof to demonstrate their respective claims could have been placed on either of the parties to the dispute or both. But by placing this burden singularly on Muslims, the judgment favours Hindus even though archaeological evidence offers no categorical proof that Babri Masjid was built by demolishing a prior structure.

However, it also asserts that the mosque was not built on a “virgin” land. To this end, it refers to artefacts “pertaining to Hindu religious places” found during excavation. Leaving aside the certitude of this “evidence” and the conclusion drawn therefrom, the crucial question that excavation became possible only after the mosque’s destruction is left as unworthy of any discussion.

Watch | ‘Parts of Ayodhya Judgment Laughable, Different Standards of Proof Unfair’

Anthropologists studying archaeology maintain that excavation is not an impartial study of “reality” or “fact” but instead their creation, which in turn re-arrange both reality and fact, often as neat layers or sequences. Such concerns about precise chronologies and periodisation are often implicated in nationalism, which in India is at once against and beholden to colonialism.

One key colonial strategic invention was the depiction of Muslims as conquers-invaders-outsiders and of Hindus as indigenous-subjugated whom the British liberated from Muslims’ tyranny. As Prime Minister, Modi staged this notion of Muslims as outsiders in one of his first speeches in the Parliament when he used the phrase “twelve hundred years of servitude.”

The British depicted Muslims as foreigners to polarise Hindus and Muslims against each other and present their own foreign conquest as enlightened. Historian Barbara Metcalf observes that The History of India, as Told by Its Own Historians (1849) by Henry Elliot was one such strategic manual.

The judgment displays this assumption right on the introductory page: “The lands of our country have witnessed invasions and dissensions.” On the next page, it mentions the rule of Mughal emperor as “conquest” that demolished the ancient Ram temple. Elsewhere, it approvingly cites, “with emphasis supplied,” a colonial gazetteer, which portrays Babur as a “conqueror.”

Importantly, the judgement doubts the interpretation of inscriptions on the mosque, including its precise year of construction, by Alois Führer, a German orientalist. A similar doubt is absent about Führer’s other opinion cited in the judgment: “The old temple of Ramachandra at Janamasthanam must have been a very fine one, for…its columns have been used by the Musalmans in the construction of Babar’s masjid.”

This absence shows subscription to colonial history erected on lies and fantasies. When the British captured Kabul in 1842, they destroyed the central mosque of Ghazna and spuriously claimed its main gate as the gate of Somnath temple. According to historian Mannan Ahmed Asif, to brand Muslim rule as tyranny and consolidate the British East India Company’s domination, Lord Ellenborough (d. 1871) presented the alleged gate of the Somnath temple to Hindu leaders as “memorial of your humiliation”, which was also a “record of your national glory.” The so-called Somnath gate was then taken in a procession and Hindus exhorted to pay respect to.

A statue of Ram in Ayodhya. Photo: Reuters/Danish Siddiqui

My argument is not that Muslim rulers did not destroy temples. Certainly, they did. But they also offered patronage and grants to temples. Likewise, Hindu rulers too destroyed places of worships of other faiths. Anthropologist Peter van der Veer details competition and violent conflict among the Rāmānandī order of monks in Ayodhya.

What I stress is the British creation of history as a polarising paradigm, its subsequent institutionalisation as hegemonic knowledge and its widespread currency in our very present. Lala Lajpat Rai (d. 1928), a famous Hindu freedom fighter, noted the wicked effect of colonial knowledge:

At that time, a book on Indian history called Waqiat-i-Hind used to be taught at Government schools. That book created in me the feeling that Mussalmans had subjected the Hindus to great tyranny. Gradually the respect for Islam that I had acquired from early training began to change into hatred because of study of Waqiat-i-Hind.

A powerful example of the polarising paradigm of colonial history between us-Hindus versus them-Muslims is the misleading distinction between Indic and foreign religions. While Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism and Sikhism are deemed Indian or indigenous, Islam and Christianity are branded as foreign. Though the judgment denies this distinction in the specific context of non-human as juristic personality, this premise informs the judgment throughout. At times, denial as a disclaimer is needed precisely because of the presence of that which is denied.

Also read: Looking Back at the Colonial Origins of Communal and Caste Conflict in India

Faith and belief in justice

My argument and critique of the judgment as an Indian citizen are calls for decolonial jurisprudence liberated simultaneously from colonialism and its close kin, nationalism. Even for the postcolonial Indian period, the judgement continues to use the colonial term Mohammedan rather than Muslim.

My call for a decolonial jurisprudence is difficult to secure. However, it is not impossible. Integral to this jurisprudence is the premise that there are also faiths and beliefs other than the ones the judgment appears to be preoccupied with.

It is the faith and belief of citizens – agnostic, atheist, religious, secular and the like – in democracy and justice beyond the logic of fear and lure. At least, it was this faithful hope that awakened me in the chilling cold during the wee hours of the night on November 8 in Germany to read the SC judgment.

Honorable judges, can democracy and judiciary become faithful to such a hope in justice? A hope, which is not only mine! It is also the hope of a people interpretatively interrupted and yet to be recognised!

Irfan Ahmad is a political anthropologist and senior research fellow at Max Planck Institute for the Study of Religious and Ethnic Diversity, Göttingen, Germany. With Pralay Kanungo, he is the co-editor of The Algebra of Warfare-Welfare: A Long View of India’s 2014 Election (Oxford University Press, 2019). He tweets @IrfanHindustan.

How a Third Dimension was Introduced to the Ayodhya Judgment

The case, which has so far been projected as a Hindu-Muslim dispute, has now harnessed the Sikh faith.

The Babri Masjid case is not just a title dispute. It’s a dispute between the idea of the nation-state and the idea of India that ordinary people carry in their hearts and minds.

On one hand you have the demand for a Hindu nation as envisaged by the RSS and its political wing, the BJP and and on the other the fluidity of the India that refuses to be boxed by narrow/conservative definition of religion, caste/jati, region or language, something that the preamble of the Constitution of India in some measure reflects with its emphasis on justice, liberty, equality and fraternity as foundational stones of democracy.

This is amply illustrated by the reaction of the Sikhs to the recent verdict of the Supreme Court on the Babri Masjid case. The case which has so far been projected as a Hindu-Muslim dispute has now acquired a third dimension.

The five-member bench Court in its wisdom sought consultation with a Sikh expert (Rajinder Singh) on the question of whether Guru Nanak Dev (1469–1539) the founder of the Sikh religion, visited Ayodhya as part of its perusal of travelogues before the construction of the mosque in 1528. Guru Nanak Dev is believed to have travelled to Ayodhya between 1510–11, which is before Babur’s invasion of the Indian subcontinent.

Also read: Why Sikhs Are Angry With the Ayodhya Judgment

The judgment refers to the expert on pages 992–994, where it states that Rajinder Singh, was a witness for the Uttar Pradesh Sunni Central Board of Waqfs (defendant №2 in Suit № 4). On this page, Sikhism is described as a “cult” and Rajinder Singh as “a person having an interest in the study of religious, cultural and historical books of a Sikh cult”. In his deposition, Rajinder Singh states:

“Guru Nanak Devji, after getting the appearance of God on an auspicious day, Bhadrapad Poornima, 1507 CE prepared him for going on pilgrimage. Then he went to Ayodhya via Delhi, Haridwar, Sultanpur, etc. Almost 3-4 years have passed in this journey. Similarly, Guru Nanak Dev went on pilgrimage to see Shri Ram Janam Bhoomi Mandir in 1520–11 CE. It is mentioned here that invader Babur has not invaded India by that time.”

The judgment notes that along with this statement, Rajinder Singh annexed various “janam sakhis”. His deposition in this context is:

“I had studied a number of ancient books in the form of edited and published books about Sikh cult and history which include

  • Adhi Sakhies (1701 CE), “Puratan Janam Sakhi Guru Nanak Devji Ki” (1734 CE) creation of Bhai Mani Singh (1644–1734 CE);
  • Pothi Janamsakhi: Gyan Ratnawali”, “Bhai Bale Wali Janamsakhi” (1883 CE) creation of Sodhi Manohar Das Meharban (1580–1640);
  • Sachkhand Pothi: Janamsakhi Shri Guru Nanak Devji”, creation of Baba Sukhbasi Ram Vedu (8th descendant of Sri Laxmi Chand younger son of Guru Nanak Devji);
  • Guru Babak Vansh Prakash (1829 CE);
  • creation of Shri Tara Hari Narotam (1822–1891 CE);
  • Shri Guru Tirath Sangrahi” and famous creation of Gyani Gyan Singh “Tawarikh Guru Khalsa: Part I (1891 CE) etc.

It is fully evident from the information gained from these books that disputed land is a birthplace of Shri Ramchanderji and Guru Nanak Dev had sought the darshan of Shri Ram Janam Bhoomi Temple at Ayodhya, it is also proved from these books that with the passage of time Shri Guru Teg Bahadur and his son, Shri Guru Gobind Singh have also sought the darshan of Shri Ram Janam Bhoomi Mandir at Ayodhya”.

The judgement then goes on to record that “It is true that from the extracts of the Janma Sakhies, which have been brought on record, there is no material to identify the exact place of Ram Janma Bhoomi but the visit of Guru Nanak Devji to Ayodhya for darshan of Janma Bhumi of Ram is an event, which depicted that pilgrims were visiting Ayodhya and were having darshan of Janma Bhumi even before 1528 AD. The visit of Guru Nanak Dev ji in 1510–1511 and to have darshan of Janma Bhumi of Lord Ram do support the faith and beliefs of Hindus.”

The Sikh community has reacted vociferously to this deposition and inference made by the five-member bench led by the Chief Justice of India, Ranjan Gogoi. Their essential objection is that Sikhism has been misrepresented and misunderstood.

Also read: Ayodhya and After: Why Muslims Should Not Reject the Five Acre Compromise

But what exactly are “janam sakhis”?

The literal translation would be “life stories” or in other words, tazkiras or written hagiographies and malfusat (compilations of conversations of a saint) that became popular during the rise of the Sufi movement in North India in about 12–13th century. As its contemporaries, it was natural for Bhakti saints (Sants) to borrow this form of remembrance/ recording from the Sufis.

This accounts for records of Kabir Bani and Baba Farid Ganj-i-Shakkar’s philosophical discourses and many others (that have been reproduced in the Guru Granth Sahib, the holy book of the Sikhs).

As was the norm of the day, many of the saints, addressed their faithful in various literary forms. The most common of which were oral literary forms such as dohas (couplets), pads (short lyrics set to music/ raga) and sakhis (is a form of doha with roots in Sanskritic tradition of Aparbrhamsa).

The first compilation of Sant poetry which bears a definite date, according to historians, is the Adi Granth i.e., the holy book of the Sikhs, compiled by Guru Arjan in 1603–1604.

The Sants from this time are divided into two main groups. The northern group includes poets from the North-West region of Punjab, Rajasthan and the Gangetic valley, whose figurehead is Kabir and the southern group that includes Maharashtra, and whose figurehead is Namdev. The difference between the two groups is that the north group is defined by strong anti-Brahminical overtones, while the southern group was strongly wedded to the Vedantic tradition or the authority of the Vedas and the Vaishnava tradition.

The North group to which Guru Nanak Dev belonged, as his affinity for Kabir, demonstrates, makes fun of Vedic teaching, rituals, and knowledge. Kabir though Muslim, rejects the authority of the Quran. Guru Nanak Dev asserts that he’s neither Hindu nor Muslim. Here not only “sruti” and “smriti” of scriptures are disregarded but the authority of scriptures as such, which is viewed as the privilege of the Brahmins.

As the following Sakhi of Kabir demonstrates:

“Brahmin is the guru of the world
but he is not the guru of the devotees
He got entangled in his four Vedas
and there he died”

Guru Nanak Dev like Kabir rejected idol worship and the ritual barriers between castes based on the notion of pollution. He held pilgrimage to holy spots and holy baths as totally irrelevant to man seeking salvation. In fact, studies show, that Guru Nanak Dev’s position is in many places identical to that of Buddhists and Jains of old. The belief in nirguna — one formless whole — Ek Onkar re-asserts this position. How could such a man have gone for darshan or a pilgrimage, as suggested in the deposition?

The question that arises here then is what “janam sakhis” were presented before the Court? Going by the dates of the sakhis mentioned in the deposition it is clear that all the sakhis date from the 18th century and later when the Brahminical revivalism becomes evident. So, only a detailed study of these sakhis, on whether they represent the Vedantic scholarship or the nirgun view of the world held by Guru Nanak Dev as recorded by Guru Arjan can decide the matter.

Punjab, Rajasthan and the Gangetic valley are the repository of an alternate idea of India. And this idea of India cannot be overturned by a bench of judges. As a legal expert commented, “The law and state cannot and should not tell us what is essential or non-essential in a religion. The judiciary is not supposed to take over the role of the clergy.”

The article was originally published on Medium. You can read it here

Other Muslim Parties in Ayodhya Case Dissociate From Waqf Board’s Mediation Proposal

“…we must make it absolutely clear that we the appellants before Supreme Court do not accept the proposal made which has been leaked out to the Press, nor the procedure by which the mediation has taken place nor the manner in which a withdrawal of the claim has been suggested as a compromise,” their statement to the Supreme Court says.

New Delhi: All Muslim parties in the Ayodhya title dispute case except one – the Sunni Waqf Board – have said in a statement to the Supreme Court that they do not support the Board’s proposed settlement offer. They have also said that the mediation committee’s attempts were “not representative”.

“It is difficult to accept that any mediation could have been done under the circumstances especially when the main Hindu parties had openly stated that they were not open to any settlement and all the other Muslim Appellants made it clear, but, they would not do so (sic),” the statement says.

The statement was filed in the court by the advocates-on-record for the other Muslim litigants – Ejaz Maqbool, Shakil Ahmed Syed, M.R. Shamshad, Irshad Ahmad and Fuzail Ahmad Ayyubi. Shahid Rizvi, advocate-on-record for the Sunni Waqf Board, was not a party to the statement.

The parties have also questioned the media reports on the settlement offer, saying that “the leak to the press may have been inspired by either Mediation Committee directly or those who participated in the said mediation proceedings or participants. (It needs emphasis that such a leak was in total violation of the orders of the Supreme court that had directed that such proceedings should remain confidential.)”

Also read | Ayodhya Dispute: How Zameer Uddin Shah Fell Into the Hindutva Trap

On Wednesday (October 16), the last day of back-to-back hearings in the Supreme Court, The Wire reported that the primary Muslim litigant in the title dispute case informed the bench that it is willing to drop its appeals in the matter provided the Centre is willing to guarantee that all other places of worship in India will be protected from similar encroachment.

The other Muslims litigants have now said that this proposal is unacceptable to them. “…we must make it absolutely clear that we the appellants before Supreme Court do not accept the proposal made which has been leaked out to the Press, nor the procedure by which the mediation has taken place nor the manner in which a withdrawal of the claim has been suggested as a compromise,” their statement to the Supreme Court says.

The Waqf Board’s proposal was presented to the court via the three-member mediation panel. Some but not all Hindu parties have signed the settlement, sources told The Wire. The Vishwa Hindu Parishad-backed Ramjanmabhoomi Nyas has not accepted the terms of the settlement.

Besides firm safeguards for all other mosques in India, the settlement envisages the renovation of 22 existing mosques in Ayodhya, permission to build another mosque in lieu of the Babri masjid at some other location, and the possibility of worship in a number of historic mosques which are currently under the care of the Archaeological Survey of India.

Also read | Ayodhya as Cultural Smart City: A Mediation Proposal for the Mosque-Temple Dispute

In virtually day-to-day hearings over the past few weeks, the bench, headed by Chief Justice Ranjan Gogoi, had heard arguments from the two Hindu litigants in the case – the Ramjanmabhoomi Nyas, controlled by the Vishwa Hindu Parishad, a front of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, and the Nirmohi Akhara – as well as the Sunni Waqf Board.

Gogoi retires in the middle of November and the bench is expected to deliver its judgment in the landmark case by then.

Headed by a former judge of the Supreme Court, Justice (retd) F.M.I. Khalifullah and comprising the respected advocate Sriram Panchu and the Art of Living founder Venkatratnam Ravishankar Ramanayakanpet (also known as Sri Sri Ravi Shankar), the mediation panel had earlier informed the court that an out-of-court-settlement could not be reached between the three parties to the dispute.

The Allahabad high court, in its judgment to the title suit dispute in 2010, had found some merit in the claims of each of the three parties and divided the 2.77 acres of land where the mosque stood equally between the three of them. The Supreme Court was hearing appeals to this verdict.

On December 6, 1992, senior BJP leaders Lal Krishna Advani, Murli Manohar Joshi, Uma Bharti and others were present in Ayodhya when a large mob of political activists who had been mobilised for the purpose climbed atop the mosque and began demolishing it. Within hours, it was reduced to rubble.

The criminal case filed by the Central Bureau of Investigation against Advani and others has been languishing for years. Despite the apex court saying in 2018 that the trial be expedited, no verdict is yet in sight.

Watch | When Will The Culprits Of Babri Mosque Demolition Be Punished?

As the Supreme Court postpones its hearing in the Ayodhya issue to January and the Sangh presses for an ordinance to build the Ram temple in Ayodhya, Arfa Khanum Sherwani asks why the culprits haven’t been punished even 25 years after the Babri mosque’s demolition.

Solicitor General Tushar Mehta Cannot Appear in the Babri Masjid Case

The neutrality of the Union of India as statutory receiver of the disputed lands must not be compromised, nor must the officially neutral stand of the State of Uttar Pradesh.

Neither the Union of India not the State of Uttar Pradesh can now appear in the Babri Masjid matter. Nor can the solicitor general, Tushar Mehta, on their behalf. I not only told him this in open court but actually put this in a written submission to that effect in court indicating why he should not do so.

He appeared as additional solicitor general on 13 occasions from August 11, 2017 to September 27, 2018 and again for the 14th time as solicitor general on October 29, 2018. At the hearings in July 2018, he was told in open court that there was a conflict of interest in two ways; he could not appear for the Union of India which was not a party; and, he could not appear for the state of UP. He was doubly conflicted.

Also read: In the Babri Case, the ‘Heavens Have Already Fallen’ and the Title Suit Can Wait

Why was this? First, the Union of India was appointed as the statutory receiver in M. Ismail Faruqui (1994), decided on October 24, 1994. We need not go into the merits of that decision which twisted the entire meaning of the Acquisition of Certain Area at Ayodhya Act, 1993; or into the unfortunate statement depriving Muslim mosques of constitutional protection which was qualified in M. Siddiqui in September 2018 in a 2:1 decision. The implications of that will invite attention when the matter is heard fully. However, in M. Ismail Faruqui (1994) the court specifically said:

…the disputed area is vested in the Central government as a statutory receiver with a duty to manage and administer it in the manner provided in the Act maintaining status quo… (to) exercise its power of vesting that property further in another authority or body or trust… (and) to take all necessary steps to implement the decision in the suits and other legal proceedings and to hand over the disputed area to the party found entitled to the same on final adjudication made in the suits.

It was a 3:2 decision but binding. Obviously as additional solicitor general or solicitor general, Mehta cannot appear to conflict with the neutrality of the Union as statutory receiver.

The state of UP had also decided to take a neutral stand as is clear from the high court’s voluminous Lucknow bench judgment.

  • At pg.46/Vol.1 of the Impugned judgment “Defendants No 5 to 8 (State and its authorities) did not propose to contest the suit and they requested that they might be exempted from the cost”
  • At page 152/Vol.1 of the impugned Judgment- “Application dated 21.4.1962/28.5.1962 of Defendants No.5 to 8 (State of Uttar Pradesh, Collector, Faizabad City Magostrate, Faizabad and Superintendent of Police, Faizabad) (Suit 4)
  1. On behalf of defendants No. 5 to 8, an application dated 21.4.1962/28.5.1962 has been filed stating that they are all State officials and State Government is not interested in the property in dispute and as such, they do not propose to contest the Suit. The State officials had taken a bona fide action in respect of the property in dispute and in due discharge of their official duty. Therefore, they be exempted from the cost of the suit.”
  • At page 3612/Vol.3 of the Impugned Judgment the application preferred on behalf of Defendant Nos5 to 8 to Suit 4 of 1989 is produced, at paragraph 1 it is specifically stated that “That the Govt is not interested in the properties in dispute and as such the Petitioners don’t propose to contest the suit”. Further, in conclusion it has been prayed that the Petitioner Defendants (i.e. State and its authorities) be exempted from costs of the suit.”

The state was thus not contesting the suit and remaining neutral quite apart from exemption from costs. Today, the state is openly violating its neutrality in respect of the property.

What Mehta did in a written submission on behalf of the state of UP was to argue that the Muslims were not bonafide in their application for reference (thus taking sides) and that the Muslims were wrong. On this a suitable reply was given.

Also read: Why the Supreme Court’s Judgment on Mosques is Fatally Flawed

But even on being warned on the ethical issue of conflict of interest, Mehta insists on appearing. Why so? The simple explanation is that he believes he must take cudgels in any matter in which the Union is involved. But our national flag cannot be given a communal interpretation. It is neither saffron nor green nor white for communal reasons. The chakra on white reminds us of purity. Mehta is vitiating the neutrality of the state and Union and the exalted position of solicitor general which is lowered by such actions. For the sake of respect for the Union, if not his own, he must not conflict his stance to compromise two governments: the Union and the state of UP.

The chief minister of the state of UP, the RSS and others are clamouring for the temple to be built at all costs. The first appeal is to be heard under a confounding atmosphere. This is now a case of critical importance and has to be decided fairly. In the P.C. Sen judgment of the Supreme Court (1969), Chief Minister P.C. Sen was found guilty of contempt for commenting on a Milk Order challenge pending in the Calcutta high court.

To return to Tushar Mehta. He may have been hired by the state of UP. We would like to know what his instructions from the state of UP were and by whom. The next date is January 19, 2019. No one is scared of Mehta’s ill prepared arguments in this case. It is a question of propriety; and, no less justice

Rajeev Dhavan is a senior advocate in the Supreme Court of India. He is senior counsel for the Muslim appellants in the Ayodhya civil dispute case.

In the Babri Case, the ‘Heavens Have Already Fallen’ and the Title Suit Can Wait

The Supreme Court is not and cannot be anxious about fast-tracking a case merely because it has been pending for so many years without resolution, or that its outcome is likely to influence the results of a general election.

On Monday, the bench of Chief Justice of India Ranjan Gogoi, Justice Sanjay Kishan Kaul and Justice K.M. Joseph disclosed that the appeals against the 2010 Allahabad high court judgment in the Babri Masjid title dispute will be listed before the “appropriate bench” in January next year and that bench will decide the schedule of hearing of the case.

The announcement has led to intense speculation about whether the case would be heard and decided before the next Lok Sabha elections, scheduled in May 2019, with some blaming the Supreme Court for the inordinate delay in hearing the matter.

Although the previous bench comprising the then CJI, Dipak Misra, Justice Ashok Bhushan and Justice S. Abdul Nazeer began to hear the case, it could not complete its work before CJI Misra’s term ended on October 2. This was because the court first had to resolve the preliminary issue of whether it should refer to a larger bench the question of prayer at a mosque being integral to Islam. A five-judge constitution bench had in 1994 declared that it is not an essential practice of Islam, a ruling which had influenced the high court verdict significantly. The Dipak Misra bench had held in a 2:1 judgment that the issue need not be referred to a larger bench for re-examination and that the 1994 bench had held what it did in a different context, that is, acquisition of lands, whereas the present appeals are not concerned with it. Justice Nazeer dissented from the majority, and supported reference to a larger bench.

The Supreme Court has held in many cases that a judgment is relevant for the facts of that case, and if the factual matrix changes in a subsequent case, the principles laid down in a previous judgment are not exactly applicable in that case. The majority judges, therefore, did not find merit in Justice Nazeer’s conclusion that the matter required to be reconsidered by a larger bench. If the majority judges’ view holds, then the consequence would be that a three-judge bench has to determine which sections of the 2010 Allahabad high court judgment were impacted by the 1994 judgment holding that prayer at a mosque is not an essential practice of Islam, and declare those portions of the judgment as null and void. This holds interesting possibilities.

Also read: Why the Supreme Court’s Judgment on Mosques is Fatally Flawed

On the other hand, a review petition seeking reconsideration of the 2:1 judgment of the Supreme Court on the issue – to be filed by Muslim groups – may persuade the new three-judge bench to be constituted to agree that there were errors apparent on the face of the record of that judgment. In that event, the reference issue may be reopened, and heard all over again in open court. If the review succeeds, the larger bench to be constituted will hear the matter afresh, and give its verdict on the question of prayer at a mosque being integral to Islam. The appeals in the title dispute will again be heard by a three-judge bench. These are all inevitable imponderables likely to arise in the case which cannot be pre-empted by scheduling an early hearing of the merits of the land dispute.

A signboard is seen outside the premises of Supreme Court in New Delhi, India, September 28, 2018. Credit: Reuters/Anushree Fadnavis

Perhaps keeping all these factors in view, the CJI-led bench on Monday found merit in not prioritising the title dispute by jumping the gun to schedule a hearing. By saying that an “appropriate bench” will hear the matter in January and schedule further hearings in the case, the CJI-led bench was not ruling itself out of the reckoning that it might hear the case. The term “appropriate bench” used by the CJI as the master of the roster, refers to any bench hearing a particular matter as per the roster, and which can include his own bench.

Although most review petitions are heard and dismissed by judges in circulation as a matter of routine, some do get to pass the threshold stage, and get listed for hearing in open court. When a review petition is heard in open court, lawyers entertain hopes that they could convince the bench about the errors apparent on the face of the record of the main judgment being reviewed. The outcome of the review petition against the September judgment – yet to be filed – will throw some light on the course of hearing of the appeals in the title dispute by the “appropriate bench” in January 2019.

Watch | Decoding the Legal Issues Around the Babri Masjid Case

The Supreme Court is not and cannot be anxious about fast-tracking a case merely because it has been pending for so many years without resolution, or that its outcome is likely to influence the results of a general election. The court’s calendar depends on the nature of cases coming before it, and the merits and the urgency of the prayers of the petitioner, as understood by the judges hearing them. After concluding a hearing, the judges are entitled to spend some more time in writing their judgments. While prioritising a case over others, the question which the judges generally ask themselves is whether the case involves the liberties of a citizen, or an impending development (such as an execution or demolition) which cannot later be reversed.

In other words, “will heavens fall?” if the case is heard and decided in its natural course, is the appropriate question to ask in the Ayodhya title dispute. The answer, if the history of the dispute is any indication – a senior counsel once observed during the hearing of the case that “the heavens have already fallen” in this case, alluding to the demolition of the Babri Masjid on December 6, 1992 – is that there is nothing more to be lost if the court’s calendar means any delay to some parties.