Watch | ‘Misuse of CBI, ED to Persecute Oppposition Violates Constitution’s Basic Structure’

Congress MP Abhishek Singhvi tells Karan Thapar that opposition parties should collectively file a case in the Supreme Court arguing that the misuse of central agencies to “harass opposition politicians” violates Article 14 of the constitution.

In an interview where he expands upon and explains in greater detail an idea he first proposed at the recent Congress Plenary Session in Raipur, Congress MP and lawyer Abhishek Manu Singhvi says that the misuse of the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) and Enforcement Directorate (ED) to persecute and harass opposition politicians violates Article 14 and its consequence is a breach of the basic structure of the Indian constitution. He says that the best response would be for opposition parties to collectively file a case in the Supreme Court. Singhvi also believes that the Supreme Court will accept the case – even though some people might argue it verges on the political and could be deemed to be a transgression by the Supreme Court into the realm of the executive – because as an Article 14 case, it concerns a fundamental right and also because the issue raised is the adverse impact on the level-playing field which is essential for democracy which is, of course, a part of the basic structure of the constitution.

In a 27-minute with Karan Thapar for The Wire, Singhvi clearly and carefully explained his argument. He argues that Article 14 is “the most dynamic of all articles in our constitution”. He says through case law over the last 75 years, its ambit has been expanded to include a non-arbitrariness facet and also a due-process facet. Now, as a result, Article 14 can be applied when you ask the question, “How fair is the law?” So, his first point is the manner in which the ambit of Article 14 has been expanded in the last 75 years.

 

His second point is to do with the impact and consequence of the actions taken by the CBI and ED against opposition politicians. He says their skewed and discriminatory application of laws has created a non-level playing field for democracy. The facts, he says, prove this – 95% of all cases filed against politicians are filed against opposition politicians. Now, since free and fair elections and, more importantly, democracy is undoubtedly part of the basic structure of our constitution, if action by the CBI and ED against opposition politicians creates a non-level playing field for democracy then, clearly, this action is adversely affecting the basic structure of the constitution.

So the action taken by the CBI and ED against opposition politicians can be questioned in terms of non-arbitrariness and due process (how fairly is the law being applied) and, therefore, Article 14 applies. Secondly, because the action by the CBI and ED creates a non-level playing field it damages democracy and, therefore, adversely affects the basic structure of our constitution.

The Congress MP also explains why it would be important for opposition parties to collectively raise this matter in the Supreme Court rather than individually. He explains why he thinks the opposition must today commit itself to a decision that whenever it forms a government at the Centre it will set up an inquiry panel to investigate misuse of government agencies like CBI and ED and ensure action is taken against officers who have allowed their powers to be misused.

Finally, Singhvi talks about the need for “a legal coalition” of opposition parties to defend their free speech in parliament. Here, he is not talking about a defence against the behaviour or decisions of the Lok Sabha speaker and Rajya Sabha chairman but the possibility of taking this matter to the Supreme Court. He believes arbitrary and unfair exercise of powers by the speaker or the chairman is judicially reviewable.

Last of all, Singhvi answers two questions: Does his party support and endorse his proposals? Has he got any indication from the opposition – parties or individuals – whether they will go along with his proposals?

Alleged Offenders Should Be Given Anticipatory Bail For Limited Time Due To COVID: HC

It said that there is apprehension to the life of the accused as well as police and jail personnel.

Allahabad: The Allahabad high court has held that alleged offenders should be given anticipatory bail to avoid the spread of COVID-19 due to overcrowding in jails.

It said that there is apprehension to the life of accused as well as police and jail personnel.

Justice Siddharth passed the order while allowing, for a limited period, the anticipatory bail plea of Prateek Jain from Ghaziabad, who is an accused in a cheating case.

The court directed that in case Jain is arrested then he shall be enlarged on anticipatory bail for a limited period till January 3, 2022.

The court said that the Supreme Court recently passed several directions to decongest prisons across India.

“The observations and directions of the apex court show concern about overcrowding of jails, and in case this court, ignoring the same, passes an order which will result in overcrowding of jails again it would be quite paradoxical,” it said.

“Counsel for the state has not given any assurance of protection of the accused persons, who are in jail and may be sent to jail, regarding their protection from contacting the infection of novel coronavirus,” it observed.

The court said that extraordinary times require extraordinary remedies and desperate times require remedial remedies.

“Law should be interpreted likewise… the apprehension of an accused being infected with novel coronavirus before and after his arrest and the possibility of his spreading the same while coming into contact with the police, court and jail personnels or vice-versa can be considered to be a valid ground for grant of anticipatory bail to an accused.

“The informant/complainant may take objection to the relief being granted to the applicant and may be dissatisfied from the observations made in this judgment in favour of the accused. However, they should not lose sight of the fact that only when the accused would be alive he would be subjected to the normal procedure of law — of arrest, bail and trial,” it said.

The court, considering limited functioning of courts in the state, observed that experts are of the view that the third wave is likely to hit in September and it is uncertain when the normal functioning of court will be restored.

“In such uncertain times it would be against the requirement of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, which provides equality before law and equal protection of law, to leave an accused unprotected from arrest and suffer the consequences of being infected with novel corona virus,” it said.

The court, while granting anticipatory bail to the petitioner, directed him not to obstruct or hamper police investigation, not to leave the country and also not to seek any adjournment in the trial pending against him.

(PTI)

Why the Proposed Citizenship Amendment Runs Foul of Constitutional Provisions

The joint parliamentary committee fell prey to flawed reasoning in concluding that the Bill would be able to withstand legal challenge.

Speaking in Kolkata, Union home minister Amit Shah promised to bring the National Register of Citizens to the state, but only after the government had passed the Citizenship Act (Amendment) Bill, 2016 in the Rajya Sabha to ensure that no Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh, Jain and Christian refugee was denied citizenship for being an illegal immigrant.

The CAB was introduced in the Lok Sabha on July 19, 2016, a couple of months after the conclusion of the state assembly elections in Assam. In these elections, held two years after the BJP-led NDA came to power at the Centre, BJP leaders, including party president Amit Shah, spoke in rallies promising a ‘Bangladeshi-free Assam’.

Echoing the campaign speeches of Prime Minister Narendra Modi in the 2014 Lok Sabha election, Shah sought to convince people in Assam that the BJP would get rid of Bangladeshi ‘infiltrators’.

Simultaneously, the party also promised to protect Hindus who had fled to India to escape religious persecution in Bangladesh, enact a law for the rehabilitation of Hindu refugees from Pakistan and Bangladesh, set up a task force to expedite pending citizenship requests from refugees, and issue long term visas of 10-15 years, wherever citizenship requests were taking long to process.

Also read: A Common Thread in the Centre’s Plans on the Brewing Citizenship Question

Immediately after its introduction in the Lok Sabha, CAB 2016 was entrusted to a Joint Parliamentary Committee (JPC), which submitted its report on January 7, 2019, recommending the Bill for discussion in parliament.

Nine members of the 30-member committee submitted notes of dissent, indicating that there was no consensus on the final recommendation. The Bill was placed for discussion in the Lok Sabha on January 8, during the last session of the 16th Lok Sabha. It faced opposition there, but was passed with the force of the NDA’s numerical majority.

The matter was placed for discussion in the Rajya Sabha on January 9 – a day when house proceedings were dominated by the EWS quota bill, which ended in the adjournment of the house. With the dissolution of the Lok Sabha by the president in preparation for the next general election, the CAB lapsed. 

The BJP then made CAB part of the party’s campaign for the 2019 Lok Sabha election. In rallies in Assam and West Bengal in particular, but also in other states, the BJP leaders made it clear that when the party returned to power, it would ensure the passage of the CAB into an Act. The manifesto of the Congress party released on April 2 announced its opposition to the CAB.

Home minister Amit Shah being garlanded at a rally in Kolkata on October 1, 2019. Photo: PTI/Ashok Bhaumik

Headed by Rajendra Agrawal, a BJP MP, the joint parliamentary committee was expected to submit its report by the last week of the winter session of 2016. In its 425-page report, finally submitted on January 7, 2019, the committee has noted its mandate, modus operandi, minutes of meeting, and dissent notes of nine members, apart from its recommendations on the final Bill.

The JPC spoke to ‘experts’ from different ministries including law and home, apart from ‘stakeholders’ from different states. It is clear that the JPC was conscious that the CAB, when enacted into a law, could face the charge of discrimination and judicial scrutiny may render the Act unconstitutional on the ground that it violated Articles 14 and 25 of the constitution. The JPC considered the charge of potential violation of Article 25 surmountable, since the CAB in its opinion was not violating the right to freedom of religion.

It devoted its efforts, therefore, towards preparing a defence against the charge of violation of Article 14, i.e., equality before the law and equal protection of the law guaranteed by the constitution to all ‘persons’ – citizens and aliens. 

Also read: Amit Shah’s NRC Plan Decoded – Communal Division, and a Big Lie Too

In this context, the JPC considered the suggestion that the category ‘persecuted minorities’ could be used in the Bill instead of identifying communities based on religion. It must be pointed out here that the CAB does not use the category religious minorities anywhere in the Bill. The Bill only gives reference to the notifications dated September 7, 2015 and July 18, 2016 to the Passports Act and the Foreigners Act, which mention the term ‘religious persecution’.

Yet, the JPC rejected this proposal in deference to the wishes of the ‘legislative department’, which advised it against the incorporation of a wider category of persecuted minorities, which would ‘negate the objectives of the Bill’, and ‘lose sight of’ religious persecution as the primary objective of the amendment.

The Department of Legal Affairs convinced the JPC that the CAB was sufficiently fortified against judicial scrutiny for violation of constitutional norms because it did not discriminate against persons on the ground of religion. It was making a distinction among persons on the ground of religion, for the purpose of meeting the primary objective of the Bill, which was extending the protection of citizenship to minority communities facing religious persecution in specified countries.

The consideration of religious persecution for making distinction among persons for extending the protection of citizenship could not, in its opinion, be construed as discriminatory, and in violation of Article 14 of the constitution because the distinction was being made on the grounds of both ‘intelligible’ differentiation and ‘reasonable’ classification.

The JPC took recourse to these two standards of evaluation – of intelligibility and reasonableness – drawing from the Supreme Court judgment in 1952 in the case State of West Bengal vs. Anwar Ali Sarkar This basically meant that the JPC was convinced that the CAB would withstand challenge on the ground of discrimination and violation of Article 14 since it ‘distinguished’ a group from another group of persons on intelligible grounds and this distinction had a rational relation to the objectives of the CAB.

In addition, the JPC believed that the objective of equality in Article 14 did not postulate equal treatment of all persons without distinction but equality of treatment in equal circumstances. In other words, the JPC was convinced that mentioning the names of the six religious minority communities would stand the scrutiny of the judiciary and its commensurability with the constitution.

Also read: Even Before NRC, Mumbai’s Bengali-Speaking Muslims Spent Years Trying to Prove Citizenship

Interestingly, the Supreme Court judgment referred to by the JPC, i.e., West Bengal vs. Anwar Ali Sarkar (1952) had resulted in the dismissal of the appeal by the West Bengal government against a Calcutta high court judgment in a case involving the trial of Anwar Ali Sarkar under the West Bengal Special Courts Act (X of 1950).

The objective of the Act, as declared in its preamble, was ‘to provide for speedier trial’ for certain ‘cases’ or ‘offences’ or ‘classes of cases’ or ‘classes of offences’, and to empower the state government to constitute special courts, with procedures for trial, which were different from those laid down in the Criminal Procedure Code. 

The JPC drew support from the Supreme Court judgment to argue that the classification of persons on the ground of religion would not constitute discrimination under Article 14 since they constituted a distinct group or class of cases requiring the protection of citizenship to escape religious persecution. Their inability to get speedy admission into citizenship made their condition precarious, especially since they were likely to be slotted as illegal migrants. The CAB attempted to correct that anomaly, by inserting exemptions in the citizenship law.

In the JPCs view, this constituted both an intelligible differentia and reasonable classification. Essentially, for the JPC, the test of reasonableness was primarily procedural, merely requiring correspondence between classification and the objectives of the law which made different rather than equal treatment imperative.

In its judgement in Anwar Ali Sarkar case, however, the Supreme Court had gone beyond procedural requirements to lay down substantive conditions for fulfilling the criterion of reasonableness. It did this by locating reasonableness in the stringent requirement of conformity to the equality provisions in Article 14 of the constitution. This is evident in the explanation given by the Supreme Court for dismissing the appeal by the West Bengal government, stating emphatically that the West Bengal Special Courts Act violated Article 14  on two grounds: (i) for failing the test of ‘equality before law’ by discriminating among persons while conducting a trial, and; (b) for removing the guarantee of ‘equal protection of law’ against the arbitrary power of the state.

Also read: In the Idea of an ‘All India NRC’, Echoes of Reich Citizenship Law

The dissenting judge, Patanjali Shastri, as well as CJI Arthur Trevor Harries who wrote the lead judgement, agreed that the state had the power to distinguish and classify persons ‘to be subjected to particular laws’. They also agreed that while the state government had discretionary powers which were plenary in nature, these powers could not be arbitrary. 

Thus, the criteria of intelligibility of the differentia and the reasonableness of classification, foregrounded by the JPC as protection against judicial scrutiny, can be still be prised open for constitutional validation, to ask whether they satisfy both grounds of protection guaranteed by Article 14, i.e., protection against discrimination (equality before the law) and protection against the arbitrary exercise of state power (equal protection of the law).

In 2009, the Delhi high court’s judgment in Naz Foundation vs. Government of NCT of Delhi referred to the ‘scope, content and meaning of Article 14’ as elaborated in what it called ‘a catena of decisions’.  These decisions, the judgment stated, lay down that while Article 14 ‘forbids class legislation’, it allows ‘reasonable’ classification for the purpose of legislation.

Apart from the test of reasonableness and therefore ‘permissible’ classification, the Naz Foundation judgment recommended a further test of reasonableness, requiring that the objective for such classification in the law must also be subjected to judicial scrutiny: “If the objective be illogical, unfair and unjust, necessarily the classification will have to be held as unreasonable”.

Citing the judgment in Maneka Gandhi case, the Naz Foundation judgment augmented protection against state arbitrariness by stressing that the law should ‘eschew arbitrariness in any form’ since arbitrariness was antithetical to equality, both according to political logic and constitutional law.

Also read: If India Wants to Remain Secular, the New Citizenship Bill Isn’t the Way to Go

Thus, while providing a test for reasonableness, the Naz Foundation judgment went beyond the procedural test of correspondence between an intelligible differentia and the objectives of law, by subjecting the objectives themselves to scrutiny. The judgment provided substantive test of protection against exercise of arbitrary power of the state, to say that any violation of Article 14 is in fact a violation of equality provisions in the constitution. The restraint on state arbitrariness, according to the judgment was to come from constitutional morality, which as B. R. Ambedkar declared in the constituent assembly, was the responsibility of the state to protect.

Upendra Baxi has read the Naz foundation judgment as a ‘dignity plus’ for enhancing the idea of constitutional morality through its ‘scrupulous extension’ by taking Parts IV and IV-A of the Constitution as constituting ‘a nearly complete code of constitutional morality’.  Both these parts constitute for Baxi the ‘thresholds of critical morality by which some actually existing standards of positive morality ought to be judged and where necessary further constitutionally displaced’. In this understanding ‘constitutional morality must outweigh the argument of public morality, even if it be the majoritarian view’.

It may be argued then, that the Anwar Ali Sarkar judgment, the Naz Foundation judgment, and a series of judgments cited in the latter have built, incrementally and cumulatively, a set of substantive conditions that need to be satisfied to meet the test of reasonableness. 

While protection against the arbitrary power of the state is drawn directly from Article 14, the tests of equality and dignity are traced to the code of constitutional morality, which is to be found running through the constitution generally, but more specifically in the preamble and chapters III, IV and IV-A of the constitution relating to fundamental rights, the directive principles of state policy and fundamental duties.

The code of constitutional morality constitutes critical morality by putting in place evaluative frameworks for substituting those standards which may be acceptable to the ‘majoritarian’ public, but are against the norms of constitutional democracy.

Anupama Roy is Professor, Centre for Political Studies, JNU, New Delhi and author of Citizenship in India (Oxford University Press, 2017).

SC Notifies EC on Plea Seeking Cross-Verification of Votes in 30% of All Polling Booths

The petition said the current verification process on just one polling booth per assembly constituency was “manifestly arbitrary, irrational and unreasonable”.

New Delhi: A Supreme Court bench, headed by Chief Justice Ranjan Gogoi, has issued a notice to the Election Commission seeking its response to a plea that demanded counting and cross-verification of Voter Verifiable Paper Audit Trails (VVPAT) in at least 30% of all polling stations within an assembly constituency.

The petition was filed by former civil servant M.G. Devasahayam, former IFS officer Kalarickal Pranchu Fabian and retired bank officer Thomas Franco Rajendra Dev. It sought directions to the EC to make it mandatory for the returning officer to order hand-counting of all the VVPAT slips in a constituency if the margin of victory was found to be less than 3%. It also demanded mandatory hand-counting of slips even if, irrespective of the margin of victory, the discrepancy between the EVM and VVPAT tally was over 1%.

EC stand based on analysis by two statisticians

The petitioners also noted that their representatives met the Chief Election Commissioner on August 24, 2018 and then again on October 4 to raise the demand. However, the commission justified its decision to only randomly cross-verify one polling booth per constituency based on a research paper by noted statisticians Dr Ajay G. Bhat and Dr Rajeeva Karandikar.

The petitioners submitted before the apex court how several “false assumptions and pitfalls” were relied on by Bhat and Karandikar in their analysis. “The same have been summarised in a note prepared by Dr S.K. Nath, former Director-General, Central Statistical Organisation, Government of India,” they submitted.

Petition cites ex-CSO chief to seek higher VVPAT verification

Referring to Nath, the petitioners said he came to the conclusion that “the sampling size of one booth per constituency only gives a 60% confidence value of a mischief-less and/or a flawless, unbiased election and that to achieve a 95% to 99% confidence level – as is necessary for the functional integrity of the electoral process – at least 10-30% of all the EVMs/polling stations must be selected randomly for cross-verification and tallying EVM counts.”

Also read: Telangana Polls: Mass Deletion of Voter Names Reported, EC Admits Mistake

Raising a question of law, the petition contended that such cross-verification and counting of VVPAT slips was essential in the interest of upholding democratic principles. They said such principles demand that there should be transparency in elections so that “the general public can be satisfied that their vote is correctly recorded and counted.” Also, they said, “all essential steps in the elections ought to be subject to public scrutiny.”

Elections should be perceived as free and fair

The petitioners said ordinary citizens should be “able to check the essential steps in the election process without special expert knowledge”. Finally, they said, there “ought to be verifiability in the counting of votes and ascertainment of the results reliably – without any special technical knowledge.”

The petitioners said “elections must not only be free and fair, but also be seen to be free and fair.”

‘Low cross verification violative of Article 14’

The petitioners said the EC’s decision “to confine such a cross verification exercise to a statistically insignificant number of approximately only one polling station in each constituency, regardless of the number of polling stations in such a constituency,” was “manifestly arbitrary, irrational and unreasonable.”

As such, they said, this decision of EC was also “inter alia, in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.”

The petition said: “India is the largest electoral democracy in the world with more than 900 million registered voters.”

It said the constitutional mandate of superintendence, direction and control of elections to parliament and state legislative assemblies is vested with the EC.

SC directions on VVPATs came in 2013 

The petitioners recalled that in 2013, in Subramanian Swamy v Election Commission of India, the apex court held that in the interests of transparency and voter satisfaction, it is imperative that the EC implement a mechanism of VVPATs. This was necessitated so that a voter could satisfy himself that his vote has been accurately recorded and that should there be any question as to the accuracy of the electronic count, the paper count would be available to corroborate the same.

Therefore, the petitioners submitted that the larger principles of structural due process, transparency, voter confidence and satisfaction require the EC to conduct random cross-verification of EVM counts with VVPAT counts in order to not only detect any technological mischief or mal-programming of EVMs, but also deter such mischief.

VVPATs verified for only 0.3% EVMs in Gujarat, 0.9% in HP polls

They said the EC recognises this and has been implementing such a random cross-verification process in the recent state elections. The petition pointed out that while VVPAT verification was carried out during the Gujarat and Himachal Pradesh assembly elections in December 2017, only 0.4% and 0.9% of the EVMs in the two states were covered.

As such, they submitted that “in order to detect and deter any such mischief or bias in the EVM process, at least 30% of all polling stations in a constituency must be chosen randomly for EVM counts to be cross-verified with VVPAT counts.”

Also read: How Did the EC Link 300 Million Voter IDs to Aadhaar In Just a Few Months?

Stratified sampling of votes urged

The petitioners also stated that “it is also desirable that a stratified sampling be performed with a random sample of one or more polling stations drawn from each of the following ‘strata.”

They suggested that the polling stations could be divided on the basis of classification such as “urban (middle/ upper class); urban (poor/slums); semi urban or rural”. Likewise, they said they could be classified on the basis of “Dalits/minorities; remote hilly/desert/forest areas.”

Finally, they also suggested that the classification could also be on the basis of turnout: “Those with very heavy voter turnout (>80%); with moderate voter turnout (50%-80%); with low voter turnout (<50%); those for which a large number of complaints have been received, etc.”

In Violation of the Constitution, Hinduism Treated as First Among Equals in Gujarat

A PIL filed before the Gujarat high court highlights how the BJP-led Gujarat government has focused on promoting and developing only Hindu religious sites and holidays and argues that the Pavitra Yatradham Vikas Board is illegal, arbitrary and violative of the constitution.

In a country constitutionally wedded to the ideals of secularism, can a state government promote one religion while ignoring the others? In Gujarat, over the last two decades under the rule of the BJP, there are numerous instances that can be cited that point in this direction.

The latest example comes in the form of disclosures in a public interest litigation filed before the Gujarat high court by Mujahid Nafees, a member of a social organisation called Minority Co-ordination Committee.

The PIL alleges that the Pavitra Yatradham Vikas Board (PYVB), constituted by the Gujarat government in 1995 for developing religious sites – such as providing better amenities to the visiting devotees – has focused on promoting and developing only Hindu religious sites over all these years.

Also read: Migrant Labour Exodus Shines a Light on the Dark Side of Modi’s ‘Gujarat Model’

The petitioner has stated that initially, religious shrines such as Ambaji, Dakor, Girnar, Palitana, Somnath and Dwarka were declared as ‘Pavitra Yatradhams’.

“However, the list has grown exponentially since then and now the temples covered under the Pavitra Yatradham Board are around 358. It is respectfully submitted that the aforesaid list does not contain even a single religious shrine belonging to Muslim, Sikh, Jain, Christian, Baudh, Zoroastrian or other religions,” the petitioner has stated. The details about the sites were obtained by Nafees through an application filed under the Right to Information Act.

Article 27 forbids the State from compelling a person to pay taxes for the promotion or maintenance of any particular religion or religious denomination.

The Board is meant to provide facilities like drinking water on the approach road and around the shrine, toilet and bathroom facilities, install sheds, tents, proper sanitation and disposal of waste, a parking facility, repair of approach roads and basic medical facilities.

The petitioner has claimed that the Board is illegal, arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the constitution and therefore deserves to be quashed and set aside. Article 14 asks the State cannot deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India.

He has also alleged that the action of the state government in selecting only a particular religion for promoting its religious spots is “arbitrary, discriminatory and unconstitutional”. He has further alleged that assuming for the sake of argument that the state government can promote or maintain religious spots of a particular religion, then also, the expenditure incurred by the state government is not as per the rules and regulations of the Board.

The high court has issued notices to the state government and the Board. The next hearing in the matter has been scheduled for December 12.

“Our whole contention is that constitutionally, the government cannot promote any religion. Secondly, it has no right to utilise the taxpayers’ money in doing so,” Nafees told The Wire.

The 2017 SC order

The PIL is also being viewed in the context of the issue pertaining to the Gujarat government’s stand on repairing religious sites destroyed in the 2002 riots, mostly those of the minority community. The state government had reportedly come up with a scheme to pay up to a maximum Rs 50,000 as ex-gratia assistance to authorised religious places damaged, destroyed or desecrated during the 2002 communal riots in the state.

A camel cart passes by a burned mosque on the outskirts of Ahmedabad on May 16,
2002. Credit: Reuters/Kamal Kishore

The state had secured a victory in the Supreme Court in August 2017 where an order of the Gujarat high court delivered in February 2012 to compensate the owners of religious structures destroyed in the riots was set aside. The Supreme Court had said that it would be a violation of Article 27 of the constitution if a “substantial part” of the taxpayers’ money was spent on distribution of compensation to destroyed religious structures.

Article 27 forbids the State from compelling a person to pay taxes for the promotion or maintenance of any particular religion or religious denomination.

Reservations were expressed against the Supreme Court order on the grounds that it had failed to uphold a vital principle that read the government must be held accountable if shrines are destroyed or damaged during communal riots.

An observer pointed out in a lighter vein, “It’s a typical case where the government resorts to taking protection under ‘Nehruvian secularism’ when it comes to promoting religion practiced by the majority and used ‘traditional secularism’ when it comes to addressing the minorities.”

Navratra politics

The decision of the state government to declare a ‘Navratri vacation’ from October 10 to 17 in government run educational institutions is also being viewed as part of the same agenda of promoting a single religion. The ‘Navratri vacation’ has made a comeback after two decades and even though as many as 400 schools have protested and said that it would end in an “academic shortfall”, the state government is not budging.  Although the vacations are optional for private institutions, the general perception is: who can dare to “live in Rome and fight with the pope”?

“The arrogance with which the government comes out with such orders makes one doubt its motive and policies. The implementation of the academic calendar should not suffer,” Congress spokesperson Manish Doshi said.

A deep-rooted phenomenon

The whole phenomenon of promoting a majority religion – and to some extent Jainism, which the Hindutva lobby views as a denomination of Hinduism in the state – has been visible in various forms for quite sometime.

While slaughter houses, mainly operated by the Muslims, have been remaining closed for the entire period of Paryushan, Hindutva elements have been raising demands for declaring entire towns as vegetarian. While non-vegetarian food is prohibited in places like Ambaji and some area around Palitana, Somnath may be the next to fall.

Also read: The Irrelevance of Muslims in Gujarat Elections

“The demand to declare entire Palitana and Somnath as vegetarian is an obvious ploy against the Muslims and Other Backward Castes (OBCs) who are in a majority in these places and a substantial number of them earn their livelihood running small eating joints serving eggs, chicken and fish. This is nothing but plain muscle flexing,” said an observer. Nafees pointed out that fishermen have even been threatened on many occasions to stop fishing.

Social activist Prasad Chacko, who works on human rights issues pertaining to Dalits, minorities and other marginalised communities, says, “This is criminal violation of fundamental rights. The government and the other organisations have been criminally circumventing the constitution in every way so that there is no need to amend it. Earlier there was a fear that the constitution would be changed if the BJP is in power but now there is no need for it. Every pronouncement and statement is hate filled towards this direction. Even the mob behaviour and lynching is nothing but outsourcing of violence.”

Even the central government’s reported move of serving a ‘Navratri thali’ on trains is being questioned on similar grounds. Many among the minorities, and even a section of majority that eats non-vegetarian food during the festive season, have publicly questioned whether the railways would make special arrangements for Durga Puja, Eid, Christmas and other holidays.

Rajeev Khanna has been a reporter for the last 23 years with special interest in Punjab, Haryana and Gujarat politics, and has worked in print, radio, TV and online media.