India’s Refusal to Back UN Arms Embargo on Israel May Be Linked to Adani Drone Exports

JV run by businessman close to PM Modi received official clearance for sales 10 times in past five years, claims drones are for ‘non-combat’ but Indian licensing system classifies items as munitions.

New Delhi: On April 5, India was one of 13 countries to abstain from voting in a resolution adopted by the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) that called for an immediate ceasefire in Gaza and an arms embargo on Israel.

Having voted in favour of a UN General Assembly resolution for an immediate ceasefire in Gaza on December 12, 2023, one might wonder why the Narendra Modi government chose to abstain four months later, contradicting its December 2023 position.

The U-turn was likely triggered by the resolution’s call for an arms embargo on Israel. The Indian government, which has been selling weapons to Israel (as will be shown below), clearly wishes to continue sending munitions there notwithstanding the growing international criticism of the Israeli Defence Forces’ conduct in Gaza and the taint of genocide – which has already seen Germany, a key seller of weapons to Tel Aviv, dragged before the International Court of Justice.

In the first week of February 2024, various media outlets, both at home and abroad, reported that the Hyderabad-based Adani-Elbit Advanced Systems India Ltd., a joint venture company between Adani Defence and Aerospace and Israel’s Elbit Systems, had exported over 20 India-made Hermes 900 (rechristened Drishti 10) UAVs/drones to Israel.

However, neither India nor Israel has acknowledged the reported exports so far. The company, too, has not refuted these reports. Indeed, an Adani corporate source confirmed off the record that the exports had taken place.

Licensing system for drone exports

UAVs and drones, being items of dual-use with potential civil and military applications, are subject to specific regulations which apply to all SCOMET (Special Chemicals, Organisms, Materials, Equipment and Technologies) exports – as overseen by the Directorate General of Foreign Trade (DGFT) under the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. Drones and UAVs, in general, are covered under Category 5B of the SCOMET List. There are also some specific variants that fall under other categories, such as Category 6A010, of the SCOMET List.

According to Adani Defence and Aerospace promotional material, the “Hermes 900 is a state of the art, combat proven multi-role unmanned platform with an endurance of 36 hours, payload capacity of 420 kg, altitude of over 32,000 feet (10km+) with applications across civil, defence and homeland security (emphasis added)”. As per DGFT regulations, the above specifications of the India-made Hermes 900 (Drishti 10) UAVs/drones imply that they can be exported only with a licence under the provisions of SCOMET for every export, and with the attendant conditions.

Therefore, whether the reported exports have actually taken place can be confirmed if it can be known if, and when, a SCOMET licence was issued to the company. According the DGFT data available in the public domain, no application for export of any SCOMET item had been made to the DGFT by the Adani-Elbit JV company till April 10, 2024.

Such applications to the DGFT for export of SCOMET items are considered by an Inter-ministerial Working Group (IMWG), which decides on its approval or denial. The minutes of the meetings of this IMWG between January 2015 and March 2024 are available in the public domain.

Scanning the minutes of the period between January 2018, the year Adani-Elbit JV company was formed, and March 2024, did not reveal any mention of Adani-Elbit’s application, or approval/denial thereof, in these minutes as well.

So is the story about Drishti 10 drones being used in Israel’s ongoing genocidal war on the Palestinian population in Gaza wrong?

There is evidence from the company’s own words that Adani has been exporting Drishti 10 UAVs/drones. The company’s press release on February 6, 2020, from Lucknow, said: “Adani Elbit Advanced Systems India Limited, a joint venture between Adani Defence & Aerospace and Elbit Systems, Israel, had set up the first private UAV manufacturing complex at Adani Aerospace Park in Hyderabad to indigenize unmanned aerial platforms. The only Hermes 900 production facility outside Israel, which [was] inaugurated in December 2018, has started exporting Hermes 900 Unmanned Aerial Platform[s] to international customers (emphasis added).”

Adani acknowledges drone sales, claims ‘non-combat’ use

In an attempt to get a complete picture of the issue, The Wire sent three questions to the spokesperson of Adani Defence and Aerospace by email:

  • How many times has the company exported Hermes 900 UAVs since it was established in 2018?
  • Which country/countries have these drones, or variants of these, been exported to?
  • What were the dates of issue of SCOMET licence for each export?

The first response received by The Wire seemed to hedge against giving a proper reply. It said:

“Adani Defence exported aero-structures and subsystems of 20+ Drishti 10 UAVs for surveillance and reconnaissance missions (non-combat) between 2019 and 2023. It is reiterated that these drones are purpose-built for surveillance and reconnaissance missions and can’t be used for attack roles (emphasis added).

As per the Ministry of Defence guidelines, defence production and exports are governed by Indian license requirements, and due permissions have been taken by Adani from DDP [Department of Defence Production] for the deliveries.”

There was, thus, no straight answer to any of the three queries. Though the reply stated that aero-structures and subsystems (emphasis added) of 20+ Drishti 10 (Hermes 900) UAVs were exported between 2019 and 2023, it did not give the number of times these had been exported and to which countries. Also, by saying that “due permissions have been taken by Adani from [the]DDP for the deliveries (emphasis added)”, the company indirectly admitted that no licence was obtained from the DGFT for these exports.

This acknowledgement ties up with the fact that, as noted earlier, no SCOMET licence applications, or approvals thereof, could be traced either in the DGFT’s public record of the status of applications made till April 10, 2024, or in the minutes of the meetings of the IMWG of the DGFT held till March 2024. Significantly, however, Adani’s reply puts the whole issue in an entirely different light.

A licence from the DDP is required only for munitions which, by definition, are for military use. Category 6 of the SCOMET List is populated by munition items and is called the Munitions List. The DGFT directive for the need for a DDP authorization for munitions came into effect in April 2017; vide its Public Notice No. 4/2015-20. The DGFT notification also stated that the grant of authorization for export of munitions (Category 6 of the SCOMET List) would be governed by the Amended Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) issued for the purpose by the DDP.

There is a sub-class of UAVs/drones that are classified as munitions (sub-category 6A010 of the SCOMET List), which require an authorisation by the DDP rather than the DGFT. And the characteristics of the UAVs that fall under this sub-category are given as follows:

6A010: “Aircraft”, “lighter-than-air vehicles”, “Unmanned Aerial Vehicles” (“UAVs”), aero-engines and “aircraft” equipment, related equipment, and components…specially designed or modified for military use (emphasis added):

  1. Unmanned “aircraft” and “lighter-than-air vehicles”, and related equipment, as follows, and specially designed components therefor:

  2. “UAVs”, Remotely Piloted Air Vehicles (RPVs), autonomous programmable vehicles and unmanned “lighter-than-air vehicles”;

  3. Launchers, recovery equipment and ground support equipment;

  4. Equipment designed for command or control

Further, DGFT’s January 2024 document Handbook on India’s Strategic Trade Control System specifies which uses of UAVs/drones are civilian and which are military (Table on p. 10):

Civil/Industrial Use: Aerial Photography and Videography, Search and Rescue, Infrastructure Inspection

Military/WMD Use: Surveillance and Reconnaissance, Target Acquisition, Strike Operations, Electronic Warfare, Mine Detection and Clearance (emphasis added)

It should be noted that ‘Surveillance and Reconnaissance’ is categorised as “military use”, and not civil. Clearly, the end-use of the exported Drishti 10 (Hermes 900) UAVs/drones, as stated by the spokesperson of Adani Defence and Aerospace in his email to The Wire, is “surveillance and reconnaissance”. Which is why the export of these required an authorisation from the Department of Defence Production (DDP), and not the DGFT.

Thus, by saying that the UAVs exported are for “non-combat use”, the spokesperson is being disingenuous. Because, while the Drishti 10 (Hermes 900) may not be used for dropping bombs and shells, their surveillance and reconnaissance operations can potentially assist the armed forces and thus be used in combat. Indeed, that is precisely why surveillance and reconnaissance has been categorised as “military” by the DGFT. Also, as quoted earlier from the February 2020 press release, the company itself has stated that these UAVs/drones are combat-proven.

Coyness in openly identifying customer

As pointed out earlier, the spokesperson had carefully avoided providing information about the countries these exports between 2019 and 2023 had been made to. On being pressed further by a follow-up mail, the spokesperson gave the dates of issue of DDP authorisations in the different years as well as the set of items for whose export authorizations had been given (which was the same for all the exports) but refrained from giving the destination for each export.

According to the information provided by the spokesperson, the company had obtained DDP authorisations once in 2019, thrice in 2020, five times in 2021 and once in 2022. And all these authorizations were for the same set of items: “Fuselage, Fuselage bonded assembly, V-tail assembly and Log Covers Kit”.

So, strictly speaking, there is no verifiable information that the India-made Hermes 900 (Drishti 10) drones (or parts thereof) have been exported to Israel, because, unlike the SCOMET licensing by the DGFT, the details of DDP authorizations, the export destination countries in particular, are not made public.

Also, the information disclosed by the spokesperson throws up a technical issue. The set of items claimed to have been given DDP authorisations for export does not conspicuously include any wing-related item. On being contacted again to clarify this, the spokesperson categorically said, “We cannot share anything more on our drone/UAV exports”, and also refused to put this down as an e-mail.

Adani annual reports identify Israel as destination for drone exports

According to a drone expert that The Wire contacted, who wishes to remain anonymous, the wing forms a very important part of the drone, which needs to be carefully designed and integrated with the fuselage. So, it is very unlikely that ‘the fuselage bonded assembly’ would have included the wing part as well. Also, the expert pointed out that the authorised items do not include the crucial avionics part.

However, from the very brief statements made in the Annual Reports of Adani Enterprises Ltd. (AEL) for FY 1019, FY 2020, and FY 2021, one can infer that Adani-Elbit, till at least March 2019, was perhaps yet to achieve the capability of fabricating all the subsystems required for assembly and integration of full-fledged Hermes 900/Drishti 10 UAVs/drones, and that during the 2020-21 period the company had definitely exported the fuselage aero-structure alone to Israel, and perhaps not the other subsystems.

AR FY19 said, “The factory has started operations with the manufacturing of complete carbon composite aero-structures for Hermes 900…catering to the global markets and will be further ramped up for the assembly and integration of complete UAVs.”

Both AR FY 20 and AR FY21 said, “The Company’s joint venture with Israel-based Elbit Systems exported the first ship set of the Hermes 900 fuselage to Israel…” Here is the only confirmation available in the public domain that Adani-Elbit did export at least the fuselage part of Hermes 900 UAVs/drones to Israel.

So, unless the company is hiding information about the export of wings part and the avionics, it is not clear if the company exported all the sub-assemblies required for assembling a functional Hermes 900 drone/UAV. So it is unlikely that, except for the technology’s parent company Elbit Systems in Israel, any other third party would be able to assemble a full-fledged operational Hermes 900 drone with the claimed items of export alone.

If we strictly go by the information provided by the spokesperson alone, it would seem that Adani-Elbit JV has so far exported only some India-made Hermes 900 subsystems to the Elbit head quarters in Israel for these to be assembled back there into complete operational drones, and not all the aero-structures and subsystems required to do so. Even so, these subsystems too constitute ‘munitions’, or weapons, under SCOMET and the fact that the company had to obtain DDP authorizations for the export of these makes that explicit.

If the complete drones, or even only their subsystems, were exported to Israel, it is inconceivable that, given the unprecedented scale of the ongoing military offensive by the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) against the population of Gaza, these would not be/have been used towards supporting the military’s combat operations in reconnaissance and surveillance.

No evidence that India is monitoring end use

Clauses 8 (iii & iv) of the Amended SOP for the grant of export authorization, to both private and public sector units, of November 1, 2018, state:

8 (iii): End Use Certificate (EUC) declarations can be verified by the Government as deemed necessary, both before and after export (emphasis added);

8 (iv) The item(s) exported should not be used for purposes other than those declared in the EUC.

The pertinent question then in the present context is whether the government/DDP has taken any steps to verify if they are being put to use only for non-combat end use, as claimed by the Adani spokesperson?

One, in fact, can raise the larger question of what indeed is the instituted operational procedure under the DGFT and the DDP for EUC verification of exported SCOMET items.

Further, Clause 9 (vii) of the Amended SOP says:

9 (vii) The Authorization issued will, however, be subject to review by [the] Government of India, if any, in future and extant national security and foreign policy considerations of [the] Government of India. (Emphasis added)

India’s official position at the UN General Assembly changed in December 2023 (after its abstention in October 2023) in favour of an immediate ceasefire in the Palestine-Israel conflict. This then makes ‘foreign policy’ considerations mentioned in Clause 9 (vii) above for reviewing the export authorisation by the DDP relevant. However, given its recent abstention on April 5, 2024, from the UNHRC resolution, which called for an embargo on the sale of arms to Israel, the Modi government is clearly in no mood to review the licence given to Adani-Elbit JV company for export of munitions to Israel.

Not carrying out end-use verification, especially in the current context, and not reviewing the export authorisations that have been to Adani-Elbit, amount to the Modi government extending direct military support to Israel in its war in Gaza.

It is one thing to not directly condemn Israel’s military actions against the Palestinians. But overtly providing military support to Israel is quite another. And not voting in favour of an arms embargo on Israel has only made Modi government’s stand on the ongoing slaughter of Palestinians in Gaza explicitly clear, and open. It wants to continue exporting munitions to Israel.

R. Ramachandran is a science writer.

Decoding the Defence Ministry’s Cryptic Claims About Arms Exports

The ministry claimed that India’s defence exports had rocketed to Rs 13,000 crore in FY 2021-22, constituting a 55% increase over the preceding year. But a closer look raises several questions.

There is an element of ‘whodunnit’ to recent Ministry of Defence (MoD) claims that India’s defence exports had rocketed to Rs 13,000 crore in financial year (FY) 2021-22, constituting a 55% increase over the preceding year.

Announcing this feat, a defence ministry official also revealed that 70% of these exports were from the private sector, but did not give any details of the items sold overseas. The cryptic information provided by him was too sketchy for any definitive conclusions to be drawn regarding the actual growth in India’s defence exports and the prospects in the coming years. 

In fact, a closer analysis of the available data further deepens the plot.

In late March 2022, junior defence minister Ajay Bhatt informed parliament that the overall value of Indian defence exports till March 21, 2022 was Rs 11,607 crore. It is astonishing, to say the least, that exports jumped in the remaining 10 days of March by Rs 1,397 crore. This amount exceeded the monthly average value of defence exports during FY 2021-22 and, for that matter, any of the previous seven years, FY 2014-15 onwards.

This, however, was not the first time that the MoD had made such seemingly exaggerated claims, which remained unsubstantiated.  

A similar phenomenon was witnessed between FY 2016-17 and FY 2018-19 when the value of exports abruptly jumped from Rs 1,521.91 crore to Rs 4,682.73 crore, and then further to Rs 10,745.77 crore. At the time, no explanations were forthcoming, except for an anodyne one-line statement in the MoD’s Annual Report that over a dozen reforms had been executed during FY 2018-19 which, in turn, had provided a fillip to exports. 

Also read: Instead of Celebrating Trivialities, India Needs Sober Pragmatism to Plan its Defence Exports

The tabulation of this export data, too, remains enigmatic. Reports indicate that the overall value of exported materiel projected by the MoD is the aggregate of the value of ‘authorisations’ issued, and the contracts signed. Evidently, the calculations are not based on the invoice value of the products or items exported during the year. In the normal course, the actual value of defence exports can only be determined by money either received or owed by overseas importers. 

Jumbling together the value of export authorisations, which may or may not result in an eventual sale, contracts against which payments are spread over extended periods, and money actually received by the exporters in a year, maybe deft accounting – but it only obfuscates the real picture. 

To further complicate matters, the MoD also included the value of equipment and platforms gifted to ‘friendly countries’ under grants-in-aid, in the overall value of exports.

Media reports have indicated that the Rs 13,000 crore earnings from defence exports included the Rs 2,770 crore sale to the Philippines of two BrahMos cruise missile batteries, or six mobile autonomous launchers, which many defence analysts believe may be in jeopardy, following the accidental firing in March of a BrahMos missile by the Indian Air Force from one of its bases in northwest India that infiltrated deep inside Pakistani territory, before harmlessly impacting a wall in a small township in Punjab province.

A court of inquiry was ordered into the incident, the outcome of which remains unknown, as does the progress of the missile sale.

Also read: Did Rajnath Singh Subtly Suggest ‘Human Error’ Led to Accidental Missile Firing?

There is also considerable vagueness about military goods exported by the Indian companies. Bhatt told Parliament in August 2021 that the exported items included simulators, tear gas launchers, torpedoes, loading mechanisms for aircraft and night vision binoculars. Also included in the list were fire control systems for armoured vehicles, weapon locating radars, high-frequency radios and coastal radar systems.

And though this list sounded formidable, Bhatt tellingly added a damper; he admitted that the ‘majority’ of these exports included merely ‘parts and components’.

There are multiple factors, other than numerous putative reforms, that influence military equipment exports. In FY 2019-20, for example, exports declined from the previous year’s tally of Rs 10,746 crore to Rs 9,116 crore, falling further to Rs 8,435 crore in FY 2020-21 due, in all probability, to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Conversely, the jump in exports during FY 2020-21 was possibly due to the MoD ‘prevailing upon’ private vendors to make up the shortfall in achieving their annual offset targets for previously imported equipment and ordnance. Offsets of 30% are levied on all materiel purchases over Rs 2,000 crore, requiring the vendor to invest in India’s defence and security sector. That the foreign vendors are struggling to meet the offset targets is quite well known.

Considering that many of the companies under pressure to make up for the shortfall in discharging their offset obligation are US-based, it is not surprising that the main exports during the FY 2021-22 were to the US, followed by the Philippines, with which India signed the BrahMos deal in January this year.

The other importers of Indian defence products include unnamed countries in South-East Asia, West Asia and Africa.

There is a further complication in the offing that could see offsets not only decline in value, but fade out altogether. This is because all ab initio single vendor procurements, including those from the US via its Foreign Military Sales programme and other countries under inter-governmental agreements, are exempt from offsets since 2020. Seen in this perspective, defence exports could plummet, or plateau, once offset obligations under process were completed.

India aims to export aerospace and military equipment worth Rs 35,000 crores by 2025, for which exports will need to grow two-and-a-half times in the current fiscal and over the two subsequent years.

An honest assessment of where India stands – in 2017-21 it accounted for 0.2% of the global arms export – and a well-coordinated strategy to make deep inroads into big defence markets are essential. This target cannot be achieved by exporting components and sub-systems, banking on offset contracts to boost export, the occasional big-ticket sale, or by deluding ourselves through clever accounting.

Amit Cowshish is a former financial advisor (acquisitions), Ministry of Defence.

Switching Strategy: Lessons from China for India’s Defence Industry

If Modi’s aim of becoming an arms exporter is to be realised, India should look to how China has restructured its state-owned defence enterprises.

If Modi’s aim of becoming an arms exporter is to be realised, India should look to how China has restructured its state-owned defence enterprises.

India can take a page out of China's defence playbook. Credit: Reuters

India can take a page out of China’s defence playbook. Credit: Reuters

A look at the defence industries in both China and India shows that China has already cemented its position as a leading exporter of defence products. China has established itself as a world leader in arms manufacture by doubling its arms exports in the past five years as reported earlier this year by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. China’s arms imports reduced by almost 25% during 2011-15 and its arms exports jumped by almost 88% in the same period. India’s defence spending in 1988 was $11.35 billion or 3.6% of GDP which grew to $51.25 billion or 2.4% of GDP by 2015. China’s defence spending on the other hand was $11.4 billion or 2.5% of GDP in 1989 and grew to $214.78 billion or 2% of GDP by 2015.

Over the course of more than two decades, the defence spending of both nations increased. However, China’s increase was both exponential and sustained whereas India’s defence spending fluctuated and saw only marginal year-on-year increments.

Apart from the exponential increase in defence spending, what is it that helped China transition from being an arms importer to being a leading global arms exporter? Tracing the evolution of reforms and their subsequent implementation in China’s domestic defence industry provides the answers to this and could serve as lessons for India’s current focus on indigenising defence production under the aegis of ‘Make in India’.

The Chinese approach

China’s success in revitalising its defence industry is owed to two main factors – one, providing ample funding for weapons acquisition and two, fundamental reforms based on the ‘Four Mechanisms’ of ‘competition, evaluation, supervision and encouragement’. The reforms of 1998 were followed up with a foundation principle put forward during the Sixteenth Party Congress in 2003 – yujun yumin (locating military potential in civilian capabilities). This was done to encourage the building of a civilian sector capable of meeting military needs and to ensure the coordinated development of civilian and defence economies.

Starting from 1977, Chinese military delegations travelled abroad in order to inspect equipment and weapons –  concentrating on selective components, technologies and on concluding co- production agreements. Part of the strategy of building domestic capability in defence products was to build production volume by reverse engineering weapons systems from components and systems acquired from foreign entities. However, in the long run both military and civilian leadership recognised that this approach would not stand them in good stead owing to the lack of indigenous military technology, research and innovation.

Growth has to be bolstered by constant innovation in order to build efficiency and adaptability into all economic activity. Chinese policy makers and industrialists recognised this and worked in tandem to provide greater funding for scientific and technological research. China spends 2.09% of its GDP, or $372 billion on R&D compared to India spending only 0.85% of its GDP or $61 billion on R&D. On a global scale, China’s spend on R&D accounts for 20% of the global spending on research, which is far higher than India which contributes a mere 3.6%. These numbers are not industry specific and thus cannot clearly indicate how far research expenditure has helped in developing the potential of the defence industry. However, in conjunction with the defence budget numbers, it is clear that China is spending almost four times as much as India on defence, five times as much on R&D and exports twice the amount of arms it was five years ago.

Structural reform was integral to the efficient implementation of policy and regulations. In order to make defence industry more efficient, the overarching state-owned enterprises (SOEs) were broken down by sector. Based on operations and products SOEs were categorised under – missiles, shipbuilding, information technology and aviation. This was complemented by a simultaneous reorganisation of ministries to oversee the segregated sectors with ministry of aeronautics and ministry of astronautics for aviation, ministry of electronics industry for information technology and finally, ministry of ordnance industry and ministry for nuclear industry for missiles. Individual units were made more efficient by necessitating relocation closer to cities and ports, shutting down of non-performing units and transferring production and control of certain equipment to civilian authorities.

The Indian take-away

The current focus in India is on indigenisation of defence production. The 2016 iteration of the defence procurement policy and recently notified changes to the FDI policy are instruments in this process. Several critics have pointed out that allowing FDI (especially 100% FDI in defence) and allowing wholly owned subsidiaries to come under the definition of Indian companies will not help in developing domestic defence manufacturing capability. The policy changes are welcome in so far as they will help spur competition as well as pave the way for foreign technology in armament and weapon systems to be more accessible in the domestic market. However, these are only short-term measures and only in a best case scenario will bring our lagging defence economy up to speed.

It has taken quite a long time to finalise the acquisition of Rafale jets from Dassault Aviation, even after government to government negotiations. A critical area in which India can take a leaf out of China’s book is in negotiation tactics during weapons acquisitions. China is known to drive a hard bargain, but their attractive co-production agreements and the availability of both cheap labour as well as R&D funding prove to be strong selling points for foreign OEMs.

The larger goal of indigenising defence manufacturing is to eventually become an exporter of defence equipment. If the larger goal is to be met, there are some important things that India can learn from the Chinese experience. The process and the means need not be replicated, but rather adapted to the Indian context. The nation cannot perhaps afford to increase its defence budget in either capital or revenue terms, not only because of the economic concerns but also because of different sociopolitical priorities. However, structural reforms and providing a fillip to R&D are crucial steps required for providing a solid base to domestic defence industry and innovation.

Structural reform in public sector enterprises, as in the case of state-owned enterprises in China, is required in order to enhance the competitiveness of our DPSUs. These reforms can come in  the form of relinquishing or transferring certain products or their manufacture over to the private sector (i.e. the civilian economy). DPSUs are dependent on SMEs for component systems and spares. It would be worth a try to allow SMEs to take over production of component systems for larger weapons platforms, providing DPSUs the opportunity to divert capital towards R&D as well as improving their scale of operations. This would be a win-win for both DPSUs and SMEs as both would be able to devote time and resources to improving scale and productivity, which would lead to an improvement in the overall quality of products.

When it comes to R&D in defence, the DRDO has held the fort for a long time now. However, the products and innovation that have come out of the organisation have been found wanting in terms of quality and adaptability to scaling up for production. Bringing in SMEs and private sector players as junior partners in defence R&D would help DRDO enhance both their ‘know- how’ and ‘know-why’ in terms of product innovation and quality. Given the relatively low budget allocation for R&D, diversifying labs and having each lab specialise in specific areas such as electronics or missile technology, would help make effective use of the limited funds by directing them towards priority sectors.

Among the major challenges facing China with regard to its defence industry (specifically the SOEs) are security implications of using foreign investment and technology. The recent stockmarket turmoil served as a means for the political elite to reinforce their conviction that central control of SOEs is essential in order to avert financial crisis. This is something that the Indian administration is also concerned about. However, the possible solution to this would be to reduce state and administrative intervention as far as possible in order to enhance efficiency of resource allocation and encourage participation of smaller private entities.

India has focused on policy mechanisms for spurring growth of domestic defence industry thus far. It is now imperative that structural reform and R&D are given greater attention as the means to the end of achieving indigenisation of defence manufacturing. If India aims to become an exporter of defence products, a change in strategy now will be crucial in determining success in the future.

Dnyanada Palkar is Senior Research Associate, Pahle India Foundation, New Delhi

Get Wired 18/8: MoEF Bypassing SC, Special Parl. Session, IndiGo’s Order, and More

Get up to speed with the day’s top news.

Environment Ministry wants to bypass SC on wildlife projects

Environment Ministry said that it would decide on diversion of forestland for projects around protected areas without waiting for approval of the Supreme Court or the Standing Committee of the National Board for Wildlife (NBWL). The statement came in a new set of rules that the ministry set up examining projects involving wildlife. The ministry has decided to sanction the cutting of trees for development projects in eco-sensitive zones around 650 wildlife areas. The government added that it would seek the permission of the courts only for projects inside the wildlife areas. Projects of that kind account for less than 10% of the proposals considered by the Forest Advisory Committee (FAC).

President told to reject mercy pleas of two convicts

The Ministry of Home Affairs has suggested rejecting the mercy pleas of two convicts sentenced to death for rapes and murder to the President. The Maharashtra Governor had also rejected their pleas after the Supreme Court upheld the sentence. The ministry’s decision received the endorsement of the Union Home Minister Rajnath Singh. Mohan Anna Chavan and Jitendra Gehlot, both lodged in Maharashtra jails, sought clemency from President Pranab Mukherjee as a last resort. The President, is however, bound by the advice of the council of ministers on matters of this kind. He has so far rejected 22 mercy petitions, most recently that of Yakub Memon.

75 arrested in Tamil Nadu for caste based violence

A mob of over 500 torched a dozen Dalit houses in Seshasamudram village in Tamil Nadu’s Villupuram district on Saturday night. The mob belonged to the politically powerful Vanniyar community in the state. The attack was related to a pending dispute concerning the right of Dalits to remove a car procession on a main road in a village dominated by caste Hindu families. District Superintendent of Police K.S. Narendran Nayar, who was among the injured policemen, after the attack, said that the police have arrested 75 people, besides seven juvenile boys and 11 women for taking part in the attack. The managing director of a Madurai-based human rights organisation ‘Evidence’, Kathir said that several Dalit women were abused during the attack and asked to leave their children at home. He also pointed out that the attacks began at 8:30 pm and went on till the morning when the police finally arrived. The Dalits connected the violence to the building of the Mariamann temple after they were denied access in to at least 5 temples. A similar such incident had taken place in 2012, when 148 Dalit houses were burned in Dharmapuri after a Vaniyar man committed suicide because his daughter eloped with a Dalit boy.

Govt approves 18 Chinese companies’ entry into India

The Narendra Modi-led government has approved applications received from 18 Chinese firms since June 2014 to either set up project offices, branch offices or liaison offices in the country. Several of these applications were from companies in the power sector, construction companies and a few from petroleum companies. The list also included an airlines company and a big tire manufacturer.

Power distribution companies inflate dues by Rs.8,000 crore

Three private companies inflated their dues by Rs.8,000 crore to be recovered from consumers. The Comptroller Auditor General said in its report that there is scope to cut down tariffs in the city.  The report says that three companies manipulated consumer figures and scrap sale details, and took a series of actions detrimental to consumer interests. These include buying costly power, inflating costs, suppressing revenue, dealing with other private companies without tenders and giving undue favours to group companies. The companies mentioned in the report are Yamuna Power Ltd, Rajdhani Power Ltd (both owned by Anil Ambani’s Reliance) and Tata Power. The CAG report suggests that the companies did not undertake any cost benefit analysis, nor did they take steps to reduce their power purchase cost through optimum scheduling.

Special parliamentary session in September, says Modi

The NDA government is in talks with all political parties to bring them onboard a special session of Parliament in the second week of September for GST Bill passage. The government, which is in minority in Rajya Sabha, failed to pass the Goods and Services Tax Bill in the Monsoon Session due to strikes from the Opposition over Lalitgate and Vyapam scams. The Rajya Sabha with a total strength of 244, would mean163 members will constitute a 2/3 majority if all are present and voting. The Congress that currently has 68 members in the Rajya Sabha will be the biggest opposition.

Arms exports to get a boost

In a move, which identified 16 categories of products that can be exported after clearance, the government intends to increase military trade. Listed items include warships, tanks, armoured vehicles, ammunition, rifles and small arms, military training equipment, electronic warfare devices, software, bombs and torpedoes. The defence ministry has also amended earlier export control laws that require multiple end-user certificates by Indian companies wishing to export components and parts of larger systems, making the law more relaxed. These two moves are likely to see cause a hike in exports.

Mexico to increase Indian car imports

As per reports, car exports to Mexico will go up by over 50% to 1.32 lakh units in 2015-16, as against 82,000 vehicles for the same period last year. Volkswagen is expected to ship more than 55,000 cars from India to Mexico while General Motors will export over 45,000 units of the small car Beat.

Main suspect in attack on Bangladeshi bloggers is British

Security forces in Bangladesh claim that the main planer behind the attacks on the bloggers in Bangladesh was a British citizen of Bangladeshi origin. The Rapid Action Battalion had arrested 58-year-old Touhidur Rahman, and two other “active members” of Ansarullah Bangla Team, which was banned in May over a series of killings of bloggers. The head of the team that made the arrest Mufti Mahmood said “ Rahman told us that he is a British citizen”.

Indigo confirms record 250 aircraft order

India’s biggest airline, confirmed an order to buy as many as 250 Airbus Group SE A320 neo single-aisle jets worth $26.6 billion at list prices. This gave the plane maker its biggest order by volume. The agreement between the two was signed on Saturday and confirms an earlier provisional order by IndiGo in October last year. Earlier in 2011, IndiGo had ordered 180 planes worth $15 billion from Airbus. The new order broke the record the previous order had of being the largest purchase ever made.