How Do Entrenched Perceptions, Media, Think Tanks Affect India-China Relations?

The following is a chapter written by Shastri Ramachandran for the book Let There Be Light: Prisms of India-China Cultural Relations. The book has been edited by Asma Masood and published by KW Publishers, New Delhi. 

Abstract

This paper proposes to deal with three issues in the context of Sino-India relations.

One, the way China and Chinese see India. Needless to say, this would also touch upon the flip side of how India and Indians see China.

Two, media management in so far as it has a bearing on Sino-India relations, and how it represents Chinese perceptions and influences Indian perceptions of China.

Three, the role and impact of think tanks in China’s international, especially Sino-Indian, relations by way of setting the agenda, prescriptive media interventions and shaping perceptions in the direction of China’s objectives.

India does not figure prominently on the Chinese radar. It is our own sense of self-importance that makes us think we are giving sleepless nights to the Chinese. Chinese media is not peppered with reports, articles and comments on India. India bashing is not China’s favourite pastime. Chinese think tanks, institutions and experts working in the area of strategic affairs, military matters and international relations have more than India alone on their minds.

On the other hand, India – if Indian media is a mirror of it – is obsessed with China. Indian media is often in propaganda, offensive or battle mode when it comes to reporting on China and things Chinese. Practical-minded sections, such as businessmen and politicians, are the exception.

Media, in both China and India, seem to be motivated by the urge to create a mindset and not to inform or educate; or, create conditions for dialogue that can lead to understanding. China’s media is, doubtless, managed by the State, the Communist Party of China and the Government of the PRC. President Xi Jinping recently made it clear that the media must be unswervingly loyal to the Party. There is no ambiguity when it comes to the purpose of the content in China’s media. Given the responsibility Chinese media has been tasked with, it is doing an excellent job of attracting Indian attention, sending out messages on behalf of the Party and Government and signalling what is expected of those dealing with China. A credible Indian response is lacking.

Think tanks in China, staffed by able and competent experts, are effective in setting the tone for public discourse including in international affairs and Sino-Indian relations. They not only “inform” and “educate” the foreigner but also their own media, which depends on them to set the tone and the agenda in international relations.

The author’s impressions (including from the experiences drawn in China) and situations in the not-too-distant past and in more recent times would be recalled to illustrate and underscore the above.

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Introduction

Three issues in the context of Sino-India relations demand focus in the context of this paper.

• The way China and the Chinese see India. Needless to say, this would also touch upon the flip side of how India and Indians see China.

• Media management in so far as it has a bearing on Sino-Indian relations; and, how it represents Chinese perceptions and influences Indian perceptions of China.

• The role and impact of think tanks in China’s international, especially Sino-Indian, relations by way of setting the agenda, prescriptive media interventions and shaping perceptions in the direction of China’s objectives.

These shall be explored based on this author’s experience and impressions (including from time spent in China – where the author has worked with leading newspapers – and, by recalling situations in the not-too-distant past as well as in more recent times to illustrate and reinforce my observations.)

I. Perceptions – How China and India see each other

Before setting out to understand how China sees India, it may be useful to take a look at how India and Indians view China.

There is no single definitive Chinese view of India, just as there is not one definitive Indian view of China. India and China, in my view, have much in common, including a range of interests that may be pursued to their mutual advantage in a globalised world. Yet the two Asian giants are separated by their perceptions of each other.

These perceptions, in so far as they are evident and articulated, are confined to sections of academics, diplomats, officials, the armed forces, “defence sources”, strategic experts and policy advisers and self-appointed “opinion leaders”, which term includes journalists and media figures.

As you may have noticed, missing from the list of perception “managers” or “drivers” mentioned above are business and industry leaders (and politicians). Being eminently practical men and women who have to get on with the business of running their respective businesses, they view China as a business proposition. As long as their industries and enterprises are doing good business in China and with China, the captains of commerce are all for avoiding any kind of friction.

In fact, the one question many corporate leaders ask in private is: Why is there so much mistrust between India and China? In their opinion, both countries can benefit and achieve so much more if the negative perceptions are put behind. To them, these negatives are meaningless because there cannot be a war between the two countries as both countries would suffer enormously. Military conflict would wreck the growth and development of both India and China.

Such viewpoints from thinking corporate leaders rarely make it to the media. Not only because the media does not seek out such views but because those in businesses more solid than shaping the intelligentsia’s opinion are loathe to be identified in public as being pro or anti-China, and thereby reinforcing prevalent preconceptions and prejudices.

Like business, the political class, too, is more interested in cultivating, rather than alienating, China and the Chinese political leadership. Unlike the media, which is over-preoccupied, if not obsessed, with China, politicians are prone to China-bashing when they are not in government. When in office, the BJP-led NDA was no less vigorous than the Congress-led UPA in its efforts to strengthen India-China relations and keep them on a firm and friendly footing. As Prime Minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee spared no effort to befriend the Chinese and establish enhanced levels of cooperation. He was hardly deterred by an earlier foray in the late 1970s – when he was External Affairs Minister in Morarji Desai’s cabinet –  which turned out to be ill-advised if not a case of misplaced enthusiasm. Similarly, Narendra Modi and Nitin Gadkari (when BJP President) were no less gung-ho about China, although at present there is a marked lack of both warmth and trust in the relationship between India and China under the present political leadership in New Delhi and Beijing.

Also read: India-China Ties: The Future Holds ‘Antagonistic Cooperation’, Not War

When in the Opposition, the BJP criticised the UPA on China; just as the BJP opposed the India-US civilian nuclear deal during the time of the UPA led by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, though the BJP under Vajpayee was all for it when in government.

Media reports in India invariably tend to give the impression that China is up to some trick every day; that someone, somewhere in China is forever busy doing something to needle, belittle, encircle, overawe, dismember, intimidate, or deceive India; that aggressive designs are at work to step up military pressures.

Influential sections in India see China variously as “a threat”, “enemy”, “rival”, “competitor” and a rising power “itching for war”. And, these sections are convinced that China’s view of India is no different.

Nothing could be farther from the truth.

Indians would be disappointed, if not devastated, to know that India does not figure prominently on the Chinese radar. It is our own exaggerated sense of self-importance that make Indians think they are giving sleepless nights to the Chinese; that the Chinese media is suffused with reports and comments on India; and, that India-bashing is the favourite pastime of Chinese institutions and experts working in the area of strategic affairs, military matters and international relations.

II. Media Management – Context and Cases

During my time in Beijing (in 2009 and 2010), the days on which India appeared in China’s English dailies or TV were few and far between. Even bilateral exchanges, ministerial visits and official cultural events didn’t make the kind of splash it does in India. India figured prominently in the Chinese media when the state, party or government wanted to send messages without the official stamp. In contrast, there’s much more of China in the Indian media.

India and Indians need to face up to the fact that we are not in China’s sights as much as we think. During the months (in 2009) I was with China Daily, which is the government’s official daily, India figured prominently only a few times. The first occasion was when the Lok Sabha election results were declared, and the Manmohan Singh-led UPA won a second term.

The report was followed, the next day, with a namby-pamby editorial comment which was just so many words that did not make a single focused point and was put together by so many ham-handed hacks, including a few Indians; and, the objective was to have an editorial which appears to say something but does not actually say anything, especially anything flattering to India, which might be taken as an indication of opinion in China.

The second time was an interview with Dr S. Jaishankar, the present Foreign Secretary, who was then Indian ambassador to China, having succeeded Mrs Nirupama Rao on her elevation as Foreign Secretary. The interview was a very official and officious one. The ambassador was to be interviewed as part of an ongoing series on country heads in Beijing and in “keeping with this policy”, Ambassador Jaishankar was duly interviewed by a journalist of adequate rank who was briefed on what was to be done. Of course, the questions were sent in advance and the content of the interview was written to the satisfaction of Jaishankar as well as the bosses of China Daily.

The Chinese would never give undue, or for that matter, at times, even due, importance to India or Indian representatives (Former National Security Advisor, Former Secretary and Ambassador to China Shivshankar Menon is an exception to some extent). In fact, if there is an occasion and opportunity to belittle India and they feel they can get away with showing it as an inadvertent occurrence, some official organs would do it. One example was found in the foyer of the China Daily’s building. There were photographs of a China Daily event (perhaps, its celebration of 25 years in 2008?), which were blown up and displayed prominently on panels specially acquired for the exhibits. One photograph, conspicuous for what it showed, (deliberately) did not carry a caption saying that it was of Ambassador Nirupama Rao seated with the Chinese VIP on stage. The caption identified the Chinese official and the Belgian diplomat (perhaps, not the ambassador) in the picture, but not Nirupama Rao though she was the most prominent face in the picture and occupying a position of greater importance.

To amuse myself I asked a number of Chinese staffers why this was so. One assistant to the editor-in-chief said that nobody pays much attention to “such things”. Another said that the display and all the captions were personally approved by China Daily’s Editor-in-chief, who is said to enjoy the rank of a Vice-Premier. One senior editor, close to the powers that be and who had travelled with President Hu Jintao to cover his US visit around that time, told me that the photo and caption conveyed what they were intended to convey; and, that Rao’s name could not have been omitted (or put in for that matter) by “some nobody”.

Many weeks later, she told me that often editors and employees tried to anticipate what the authorities may expect of them; but more often than not, such things were neither noticed by the authorities nor did it matter to the government.

Also read: ‘The Indian Media is More Nationalist Than the Chinese Media’

So, if how, how often and in what light India appears in China’s media is an indication of India’s ‘presence’ and ‘visibility’, then the answer may be that the Chinese do not attach great or overriding importance to India and Indians; if and when they do, they do not want it to be known; and, to all appearances, in China’s scheme of things, India is just another neighbour or foreign country that China has to deal with in the normal course. In short, India is no big deal.

If that is the case, it may well be asked, why is China’s Global Times, to take another example, so much in the news in India for its anti-Indian comments and articles?

I cannot speak for the Global Times, yet my feeling is that the Chinese are having fun at our expense. Either to feed the frenzy or to amuse themselves, this is fun and games for some savvy Chinese journalists, politicos or officials, or a clutch of all three. Why? Because Indian media gets itself all worked up over whatever India-related stuff appears in China’s media; and, this, doubtless, is terrific publicity and mileage for the publications and media vehicles.

The Global Times (English) was launched in April 2009, and in a very short time thereafter, it has gained widespread recognition and unprecedented “quote value” not only in Indian media but also in other influential sections including academics, strategic affairs and defence analysts, policy wonks, and centres of China studies. It is from the stable of People’s Daily – which is the Party daily. The Chinese edition of the Global Times has been coming out for decades – and is not only, perhaps, the largest circulated newspaper but also the most profitable – the fact that many came to know of it only after the English version began hitting the headlines underscores the marketing success of the English edition of the Global Times.

There are Indian journalists queuing up to write for the Global Times, and Indian officials and diplomats who would like to see their views and viewpoints in the columns of this paper. There are many who boast of being “China-watchers” merely by reading, quoting and ‘contextualising’ what appears in the Global Times.

What this shows is not China’s preoccupation with India, but that the Global Times is a marketing success on the simple market principle that all publicity is good. All that the Global Times needs to catch the attention of millions of viewers and readers in India is a bit of rant against in India. And, the audience thus gained in India, is much, much more than what the Global Times has in China. In just a few years, Global Times won an audience that China Daily has failed to gain after more than 30 years in the business.

During my stint with the English edition of Global Times (2009-10), I recall that only one India-related editorial was carried. Any other references to India were either in my contributions, or when there were Indian official and political visitors. It is only sometime in 2011-12, that Global Times began snagging eyeballs for its reports and articles on India. That it is the best-known media product from China attests to the success of the strategy of taking a stridently nationalist position – be it on India, Japan, Vietnam, the Philippines or the US. And, every strident or discordant means more readers, notching up more successes for the daily.

China’s English dailies, much like Pakistan’s English dailies, enjoy a large measure of freedom because they cater primarily to small sections of the English-reading population such as the large number of expatriates and the diplomatic community. Few Chinese read China Daily or the Global Times regularly. They are more in the nature of “export products” for a foreign audience, manufactured by the Chinese with much effort invested in the content for achieving the desired impact or outcome. These papers also act as trial balloons, provide red herrings and say what cannot be officially said but requires to be said on behalf of officialdom.

There may be official sanction for what appears in China Daily or the Global Times, but not everything published in these dailies reflects the position of the Party or the government as many sections in India, especially in the media, seem to believe.

India may be China’s biggest neighbour, but unflatteringly enough, we do not loom large in their view regardless of India-baiting by China’s media.

III. Role of Think Tanks in Perception and Media Management

The role of think tanks is inseparable from the media in China. In fact, some media, such as Xinhua the Chinese news agency is much more than merely media or think tank. Xinhua, as a state agency is almost a state within the Chinese state, and wields enormous influence over the rest of the media – which is very vast – and the government. Hence, I refer to Xinhua here, for it cannot be considered in the same class as China Daily or the Global Times, or any other media outlet, including CCTV, which is huge but does not have the heft of Xinhua.

Often, seasoned Chinese observers, including in China, are able to get a sense (but not put a finger on) the behind-the-scenes goings-on in the subtle differences of nuance and emphasis to be found in the media organs of the party, the government and the People’s Liberation Army. China’s news agency, Xinhua, which prides itself on putting out viewpoints and commentaries from diverse Chinese media organs, is more than a mere purveyor of news and views. Besides disseminating information and opinion, Xinhua plays a role in defining perceptions by setting out what is to be done and how. A sub-state, or power unto itself, Xinhua serves the Communist Party, the PLA and the government even while it influences policy and decision-making in several ministries but especially the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and State Council Information Office.

In matters of media and perception management, the ministries of information and foreign affairs are often guided by Xinhua, especially when it comes to summit meetings and state visits to China and of Chinese leaders to other countries. All reports relating to high-level interactions with other countries are required to be cleared for publication by the foreign ministry. This is to ensure that there are no divergent perceptions or discordant notes in the media, regardless of whether they are owned by the party, the government or the PLA. The editors make no secret of this. At other times, these media organs have the leeway to advocate their “sectoral” interests in so far as it does not militate against the larger “national interest”.

It is not always possible or practical to separate think tanks, media and perception management as three separate tracks because all three are created, controlled and driven by the Chinese state in the interests of the Chinese state, the Communist Party and the government. The convergence of think tanks, media and perception managers is controlled at their core, designed for coordinated functioning and calibrated for maximum collective impact. Inevitably, China wins against the perceived adversary thanks to these well-tuned state organs operating in perfect synchronisation whenever it is required.

These would be borne out by five situations, which I shall touch upon by way of examples before concluding.

1. The 1962 war is a war the Indian armed forces can never forget. While Indian media misses no opportunity to recall the conflict, few in present-day China hark back to it. In October 2012, at a function for releasing a series of five titles on China edited by the distinguished diplomat K. Raghunath, who had served as Ambassador to China and Foreign Secretary, National Security Advisor Shivshankar Menon had a dig at the Indian media. He referred to how the media in China had treated the 50^th anniversary of the 1962 India-China war and compared it with the “outpouring” in the Indian media; an outpouring, which, far from providing any clarity of the issues involved, only blurred the boundaries between facts, history and fiction, between conjecture and scholarship, and between reporting and opinion, making one wonder what motives drive the Indian media in its “coverage” of China and India-China relations.

In contrast, if recall serves, there was only one mention of it in the Chinese media. All the institutions and agencies – think tanks, media et al – which would otherwise have got into the act were conspicuously silent.  Not saying anything can be a very eloquent statement at times and is also media management.

2. The events of April-May 2013 – centred around the Ladakh (Depsang) incursion followed by External Affairs Minister Salman Khurshid’s visit to Beijing, ahead of Premier Li Keqiang’s visit to India (his first foreign trip after taking office in the decadal power shift) – are still fresh in public memory.

The Indian media’s coverage of Khurshid’s Beijing visit as much as his post-visit press conference, organised by the External Publicity Division of the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), was extraordinary for the media reporting what was not said and what did not happen: That Khurshid did not ask the Chinese why they had violated the Line of Actual Control; that the Chinese did not regret (not even “express regret”) or apologise; and, so on. Sections of the Indian media – which repeatedly described the standoff as the “worst such confrontation since 1962” – were screaming for a confrontation; before his visit, there were strident demands in the media that Khurshid call off his visit and that Premier Li should be compelled to cancel his trip.

The MEA’s attempts to disabuse the impression of India-China ties being fraught with tension and on the verge of hostilities, as purveyed by sections of the media, failed to have the desired effect. To the contrary, the MEA’s efforts to set the record straight were frustrated by further negative reporting.

Again, in contrast, Chinese media and think tanks were cool-headed in their responses and analysis. State-driven media management was more balanced, deliberately non-provocative and aimed at easing the tension and ironing out the differences. Despite being controlled by the government and Party, they gave a better account of themselves than India’s private media which, during this period was more aggressively statist. In fact, the Indian media came out as being the more confrontationist champions of perceived Indian interest vis-à-vis China than the Government of India and the ruling coalition.

If the Chinese media’s low-key performance and output were orchestrated by the government and its perception managers, they did an excellent job; and, in the process also served to expose the Indian media which, in comparison, emerged in a very bad light.

3. The third situation was in September 2014. Days before President Xi Jinping’s arrival in India, PLA troops were locked eyeball-to-eyeball with Indian security forces around the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in eastern Ladakh’s Chumar sector. Both sides sought to play down the issue. The inference in India was that Xi himself was taken by surprise at this development; and, that it was more likely the outcome of pulls and pressures that are presumed to be at play within the Party; and, within the government, particularly between the PLA and other arms of the state.

China’s Communist Party, the PLA and the government again did a good job of “media management”. Intentionally or otherwise, no word ‘leaked’ out about: what led to the incident; the chain of command involved in its occurrence; the responses of those in the party, PLA and government; and, what India was to be told about it.

The Indian media was in the dark. With the matter having gone up to the Prime Minister’s office and everyone on guard against queering the pitch before Xi’s visit, the MEA and the Ministry of Defence were most discreet. The media had to make do with general assumptions such as this incident being the outcome of another factional tussle within the Party between the PLA and a section of the political leadership. The general reading was that there are columns within the PLA for upholding the Party’s primacy just as there are factions within the Party that want the PLA to call the shots on foreign policy, especially in the relationship with India. Just as there is a tussle between India’s MEA, Ministry of Defence and the armed forces to press their respective viewpoints and interests (particularly when it comes to China and Pakistan), in China, too, there is a struggle for supremacy between the military, the Party and the government.

Also read: With Mud-Slinging, Chest-Thumping, Media From India, China Mirror Border Impasse

It was only after Xi’s successful visit, during which the incident was not allowed to cast a shadow on his meetings with Prime Minister Narendra Modi, did the Chinese media trot out various explanations, including that it was a “mistake”. What followed was as much a case of tight media management as that which preceded Xi’s visit – where Chinese media was informed and educated about what had to be put out. And, what was put out may have been not only at variance with the facts and the truth but also from sources which had little or nothing to do with the development; and, perhaps, even no direct knowledge of it.

In such situations, Chinese think tanks and experts come in very handy for building scenarios, plausible theories and stories, and rationalisations. And, the evidence of their diverse creative and intellectual output is invariably manifest in the media which puts out the required message for the intended audiences abroad.

The Indian media, for its part, is left to its own conjecture and devices to construct or fabricate what it may with the aid of whosoever can sketch out anything credible – because the official sources tend to keep a tight lid on information outgo in times and on developments such as these, which can have a negative bearing when high-level exchanges are at involved. In the event, Indian media also depends on Chinese media outlets for telling or selling their own versions – and, it is no secret that the Chinese reports, explanations and articles would have had in mind not only the Indian media but also the Indian audience for such narratives.

4. The fourth situation where I directly experienced the play of international institutes, think tanks, foreign ministry officials and experts was in April-May 2015 when I was invited, ahead of the Prime Minister’s visit to China, for writing a series of curtain-raiser reports. The entire schedule was set up with clock-work precision in Beijing and Xian, the hometown of President Xi which Modi was to visit. Experts, often with experience in and of India, who are articulate, almost always English-speaking, knowledgeable about India and Sino-Indian affairs, savvy about which issues were in focus, thorough with the history of the boundary dispute and particularly up to date on the boundary problem and details of the several rounds of talks between the Special Representatives of the two countries were fielded for media interactions. They were all praise for Modi; appreciative of the massive mandate he had won; pleased to recall that he had a record of relationship with China before becoming Prime Minister; and, that he enjoyed the largest parliamentary majority of any Prime Minister after what had been won in 1984 by Rajiv Gandhi, who broke the ice and became, in 1988, the first Indian Prime Minister to visit China in 34 years.

Almost all the experts and officials spoke of Modi as a “strong leader”, and Modi and Xi as “two strong men” who could take “strong decisions” – or, at least make a breakthrough towards resolving the boundary dispute even if not actually solve the problem. They spoke of the great expectations that China had of Prime Minister Modi, during the visit, especially on the long-standing boundary question, deliberations on which seem to have come to a dead end with the special representatives having more or less completed their part of the job.

They were hard-selling the idea of the Modi-Xi meeting as the best occasion for the “strongmen” of Asia to make a new beginning on the boundary dispute. After a few meetings in Beijing, it was clear that the Chinese leadership was interested in drawing Modi out on this; and, that much preparation had gone in to make the boundary dispute a matter of deliberation and public debate in India. To keep up the interest, they always revealed new facts and facets which would neither be refuted nor confirmed by India. At the same time, these details served to keep the debate on the issue alive and interest keyed up until Modi landed in China.

For instance, Yang Wenchang, President of the influential Chinese People’s Institute of Foreign Affairs, revealed to us that India and China were close to clinching a deal in the 1980s. But Rajiv Gandhi, in 1988, did not accept “Paramount leader” Deng Xiaoping’s proposal, which was seen by some policymakers as a “reasonable offer”. Narendra Modi can, and they hoped he would, push for a solution that Rajiv Gandhi had the chance to grasp but failed to do so.

These tactics that unravelled over a whole week – during which the places, institutes, players, backdrop, tone and emphasis kept changing but the focus and issue remained unchanged – found few takers in Modi Sarkar. Of course, the Government of India registered what was being attempted as well as expected. Thus, the expectations which were raised with planning and deliberations in the run-up to Modi’s visit to China showed the Chinese way of setting the agenda, creating a buzz over an issue, building up public interest, stirring curiosity about lesser known facets of an issue, encouraging the decision-makers for the required leap of faith and building up an atmosphere towards a pre-determined objective. It was done with aplomb and sophistication with issues and articulation finessed for maximum effect. It was a great try, although it did not succeed.

There are sections in China and India that would like to ensure that irritants and elements with the potential to become provocations are not eliminated from the relationship between the two countries. There are also powerful regional and international interests dedicated to sustaining the differences between India and China to reinforce the unfriendly perceptions prevailing in each country against the other. My experience of this in Beijing was that few Western diplomats I met expressed themselves in favour of good relations and a healthy partnership between India and China. They would invariably come up with dire theories, fraught propositions and loaded arguments that: India and China can never be friends; no cooperation is possible with China; it is a friend of Pakistan; its objective is to encircle India, incite civil strife and insurrection, and foment a break-up of the Indian Union; China cannot be trusted; China is jealous of India; China is waiting for the opportune time to go to war … and so on. They would always say that India has to stand up to China, make no compromises and be prepared for the worst etc. But, ask them why their own governments buy peace and make compromises with China, why European countries are selling their debts to China… and, they have no answers except self-deprecating smiles.

5. The last instance was the pro-democracy conference in Dharamshala in April 2016 to which Chinese dissidents in exile including Tibetans and Uyghurs were invited. The Government of India issued visas to the invitees, obviously to annoy the Chinese because of its intransigence on India’s membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), its “hold” in the UN Security Council committee against declaring Jaish-e-Mohammed chief Masood Azhar a global terrorist and New Delhi’s position on the South China Sea dispute, among other issues. The real provocation was issuing a visa to Dolkun Isa, the Chinese Uyghur exile, who is deemed a ‘terrorist’ in China, being invited and granted a visa for the conference. Beijing was furious but maintained a calm exterior and there were no taunts or rants against India in the Chinese media; there were no angry or argued articles against it by experts and such. Instead, there was only a matter-of-fact statement from Beijing that Isa was a wanted criminal against whom there was an Interpol notice. If New Delhi expected to see a display of anger or consternation, it was disappointed. It is believed that there was a stronger message – more forcefully communicated through other channels to New Delhi that Beijing would not take it lying down if Isa travelled to Dharamshala. India backed off and revoked the visa issued to Isa.

In this case what worked, or so it is believed, is the deadpan official statement, absence of any public debate in the media, no display of displeasure or anger but conveying the behind-the-scene cold fury resulting in a disproportionate retaliation which New Delhi did not want to risk.

There is any number of such instances. Strangely, the political and policy establishment does not seem to have the antennae and reflexes for reading and interpreting such signals and messages. One astonishing situation that comes to mind was when India was pushing and punching all the buttons to be made a member of the NSG at the Seoul plenary. Prime Minister Modi decided to go to Tashkent, venue of the SCO summit, to prevail on President Xi to relent on India’s admission to the NSG. As much as sorties of Foreign Secretary Jaishankar and others to Beijing, Tashkent and Seoul at that time, Modi going to meet Xi was totally ill-advised, and not only because this sought to personalise the issue. More importantly, the Chinese media including Global Times, the People’s Daily and other channels, kept hammering the point that nothing would be achieved by Modi meeting Xi on the sidelines of the SCO summit in Tashkent. Undeterred, Modi was advised to go. He went and, predictably enough, he drew a blank.

The message from the Chinese media, as I could read it was, that the Indian Prime Minister should desist from a mission that was certain to fail; and, not invite the rebuff it would imply. I find it hard to believe that none in the Indian establishment could read this message or grasp the import of the repeated and emphatic messages on the issue in the Chinese media.

In China, think tanks are like tanks. The thinking and whatever else they contain can be turned off, or on, to discharge whatever is required with appropriate volume and force demanded in a given situation according to the country or situation in question. These think tanks are not churning out papers, articulating positions, setting and cutting agendas on issues of perceived importance in a scheme and scheduled determined by them. Their output, though in the nature of soft power, is also battle gear.

V. Lessons – Big and Small

Whether peace or war, partnership or rivalry, competition or cooperation, perceptions have the power, in large measure, to determine the course of relations between the two Asian giants. Perceptions, no doubt, can be altered and premises revised if the reality changes. And, there is a reality beyond the border dispute. The unresolved boundary dispute has also shown that India and China can meaningfully remain engaged on multiple tracks and have a mutually rewarding relationship.

There are many lessons, big and small, that can be derived from the present state of Sino-Indian relations.

Simplistic as this may sound, to my mind, the biggest lesson is: If China and India are joined by a common purpose and united in striving for this, perhaps, they may be compelled to review their perceptions; as a result, people, institutions, media and the political class in each country may begin to view the other with less suspicion; and, thereby, gradually dissolve the distrust that has built up over decades, for it is this distrust buttressed by periodic irritants that get sensationalised to stoke conflict and raise tensions.

There are other big lessons, which have been brought to the fore by the many informed experts, seasoned observers and insightful China watchers in their respective presentations, observations and interventions yesterday and today.

Lastly, there are a number of smaller lessons, particularly for the media, the journalists and the interpreters of China and Sino-Indian relations. Many of these smaller lessons are obvious enough to be deduced from what I have said about the media and the narration of my own experiences. Apart from that, the single most important lesson is that we in the media, the journalists and the interpreters need to be: more informed; develop more capabilities and competencies including that of more people here learning the Chinese language; more intensely engaged in following events and developments; develop more expertise in gathering, studying, analysing and interpreting information, knowledge and data from more sources in and on China; educate, equip and train ourselves to read not only the lines of the text, but also between the lines, the context and the subtext. Above all, India and the communities of Indians engaged with China and Sino-Indian relations require to develop a diversity of viewpoints and not be stuck with just one or two predictable standpoints and dated ideological positions.

Shastri Ramachandaran is a senior journalist who worked with leading newspapers in India and China. He is currently an Editorial Consultant to WION TV.