Bhutan’s Echoes, Lost Youth and a Vote on Ghosts by Royal Dictum

Scattered across Bhutan’s literary, media and arts landscape is a deep, almost desperate, drive to strike a balance between its time-told faith in the spiritual aspects of life and the necessity to make itself relevant for its young population.

This is the first in a three-part series on Bhutan’s young, its old, and the efforts to bridge the gap between the two, seen through the the country’s annual Bhutan Echoes literature and arts festival.

Thimphu: Bhutan’s had it. It cannot, anymore. If last year’s Bhutan Echoes – the country’s marquee literature and arts festival – was a cautious reminder of the soft power of stories in the event’s first post-pandemic staging, this year’s was precise and emphatic in its message. It is all too well that the world sees Bhutan through the buzz-prisms of ‘happiness’, Buddhism and whatever passes for ‘Himalayan mysticism’, but Bhutan itself is very, very tired of being just that. 

A pathway at the Royal Bhutan University campus, the main venue of the Bhutan Echoes festival, designed to look like the skies. Photo: Soumashree Sarkar

The festival, from August 2 to 5, took place in a Thimphu that was exquisite but largely rain-washed. And yet not even the loudest thunder could drown out the voice of its key concern – that the country has to reconcile with the future to stop its youth from leaving it. And that it has to convince itself that to be happy, even on the Gross National Happiness scale, is to also allow its young to have hope. 

Scattered across Bhutan’s literary, media and arts landscape is a deep, almost desperate, drive to strike a balance between its time-told faith in the spiritual aspects of life and the necessity to make itself relevant for its young population – and here’s the catch – according to the parameters set by the rest of the world. The festival, its cannily planned sessions, and the idle chatter that the cruelly beautiful Royal Bhutan University campus afforded seemed to make it clear that the time for change is now. Suddenly, in grand old 2024, the same Gross National Happiness concept that Bhutan had so earnestly vowed to uphold just does not seem enough to be able to contain opportunities for all its people.

Since 1999, when Bhutan allowed its first TV to switch on, it has been steadfast in adhering to a principle of wellbeing that transcends mere economic indicators. The world, thus, has seen it as unbesmirched. This has been convenient for the world and has given Bhutan identity. But this projection of tranquility has come amidst crippling poverty. Its young have migrated to foreign countries, especially Australia, in stupendous numbers. Just in the 11 months between June 2022 and May 2023, 1.5% of Bhutan’s population had moved to Australia. Its youth unemployment rate is in double digits. It is difficult to be ‘happy’ when your home does not contain your future. 

“We as Bhutanese don’t feel like we belong to the same world as others,” says Sonam Pelden, one of Bhutan’s few women in tech, the co-founder of Curiouser AI, and a sharp philosopher. 

The tension in her words highlight the tension in the country. 

Students at the Bhutan Echoes festival in Thimphu. Photo: Bhutan Echoes.

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Bhutan Echoes is a curious festival and straddles several roles at once. A festival of the liberal arts, it is also organised directly by the country’s department of tourism and the India Bhutan Foundation. Festival speakers, key attendees and journalists are given dinners, a taste of Thimphu’s performance scene and a tour of its sights. Overall, it is a pitch for Bhutan itself and since it is the biggest event so far for which the country opens its doors, it is an indicator of what the country wishes for itself.

Also read: Ensuring That the Sacred Is Still Alive in Bhutan

The festival has as its patron a hands-on queen mother, Ashi Dorji Wangmo Wangchuck. Her half-son is the king of Bhutan. The queen mother is a writer herself, but more viscerally, a very humorous orator. If the festival is a marker of Bhutan’s ambitions, then the queen mother is a marker of the festival’s spirit. Through sessions, she sat listening with rapt attention – with her eldest grandson, daughter and other members of the family alongside, or simply alone. “I want to hear Bhutan Echoes echo around the world,” she said in her inaugural speech. 

Bhutan Echoes royal patron, the queen mother Ashi Dorji Wangmo Wangchuck (in yellow) at the inaugural ceremony of the festival. Also seen are her daughter, the princess Sonam Dechan Wangchuck, and elder grandson, the prince Jigje Singye Wangchuck. Photo: Bhutan Echoes.

Given how geographically and politically cloistered Bhutan’s existence has been, her words are like a physical door opening. So is the fact that a few days before the festival was to take place, the organisers changed its theme from ‘mindfulness’ – a key Buddhist concept – to ‘enlighten, evolve, and evoke.’ It is difficult to not ascribe such a change into the obvious shift into a motive of wanting to move forward. 

It is not that Bhutan wishes to discard its spiritual core, but at Bhutan Echoes, it did work towards making it more accessible – in poetry that writes itself, the main event’s stage was designed like a traditional Bhutanese living room. Another case in point is this – the queen mother’s youngest grandson, Vairochana Rinpoche Ngawang Jigme Jigten Wangchuk, is a monk. He is 11 years old and the son of a Harvard-educated princess. Last year, at her Bhutan Echoes session, former judge and diplomat Benji Dorji asked the queen mother about this young monk. She said that he had always been wiser than his years and that monkhood had been a natural choice for him. “But let’s not talk about this,” she had quickly added. This was understandable – what’s a royal family without a veneer of privacy? 

The queen mother, Ashi Dorji Wangmo Wangchuck with (right) Meru Gokhale. Photo: Bhutan Echoes.

So much more the surprise this time, then, when not only did the queen mother regale an entire audience with the detailed story of her grandson’s spiritual journey but also rattled off funny anecdotes from the young monk’s life in her session with publishing wiz Meru Gokhale. “We were not used to looking after monks!” she said in mock desperation, to a laughing audience. At three, she said, the Rinpoche was speaking in Sanskrit. At Nalanda, where his family took him on a trip, he was more tour guide than visitor. “A senior guide tried to test him. Sternly, he said that the place where we were standing was a granary,” she laughed. 

This opening up was organic yet cautious – a reminder at the very beginning of the festival that old can marry new, that it is possible to be devout and hopeful, to be young and a monk.

At one point, after speaking at length on ghosts, Gokhale said that she and the queen mother sounded like “two cuckoos are in conversation.” It set the tone of the festival – the fact that a royal whose presence in a room necessitates everyone stand up, and who thus had the power to dial up the seriousness of any chat, chose not to. 

Also read: Bhutan’s Funny Women and Brave Dreams

Later in the same session, in all her prescience, the queen mother asked the audience, “How many of you have seen a ghost?” 

A queen asking a hall full of people such a question is as Bhutan as things get. But almost the entire hall raising its hand in response is possibly testament to the fact that the past is not that easy to run from. 

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“We all have dreams but at this stage we are all kind of lost here,” says Tashi Yangden.

Tashi Yangden.

Yangden is studying for a BSc degree in forestry from the College of Natural Resources in Punakha, in east Bhutan. Yangden is from Mongar, 361 kilometres away. In Thimphu for a week to volunteer for the Bhutan Echoes festival, Yangden says she is already making plans to leave for Australia once her BSc ends. Her sister is already studying psychology there and her parents have been excited to send her too. 

“It’s the ‘Australia virus’,” she laughs. “People stop you on the streets and ask, ‘Hey, when are you leaving?’”

Yangden wants to get an advanced degree – something she mentions she cannot get – and return to Bhutan to work in its forests. 

So why do Bhutan’s young leave? “Two reasons are responsible. There is corruption – kids of rich people get jobs. And there are poor wages. In Australia, you are paid hourly. Here, you are paid a smaller wage at the end of the month,” she says.

As difficult as it is to reconcile corruption with a country known for its purity, Yangden’s words are a reminder that nothing is lost on the young.

It is this cynicism – that eternal prerogative of the youth – that Bhutan’s experts and policy makers are now working to remedy. More on that in part two. 

In First Major Conviction Under UP Conversion Law, Prominent Islamic Scholar and 11 Others Sentenced to Life

Mufti Osama Nadwi, lawyer for prominent cleric Maulana Kaleem Siddiqui and three others, told The Wire that they will challenge the verdict in the Allahabad high court.

New Delhi: A court in Lucknow on Wednesday (September 11) sentenced to life 12 persons, including a prominent Islamic scholar from West Uttar Pradesh, and awarded a 10-year jail term to four others after finding them guilty of running an inter-state syndicate for unlawfully converting Hindus to Islam.

This is the first major instance of conviction in a mass conversion case in the state after it introduced a controversial law against unlawful conversion in 2020-21.

The 16 persons are convicted under Sections 3, 5 and 8 of the Uttar Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion Act, 2021 as well as other sections of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) linked to promoting hatred on religious grounds, outraging religious sentiments and cheating.

Out of the 16, 12 persons received life sentences after being convicted under Section 121A of the IPC linked to waging war against India. 

The images of persons convicted under the Uttar Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion Act, 2021. Photo: Special Arrangement

Among those sentenced to life are prominent Islamic cleric Maulana Kaleem Siddiqui and Maulana Umar Gautam, a Muslim preacher who ran the Islamic Da’wah Centre (IDC) India in Delhi. Gautam was born into a Hindu family in Fatehpur and embraced Islam later in life.

The UP Anti-terrorist Squad (ATS), which had arrested them in the case in 2021, had accused Siddiqui of being the “mastermind” and Gautam of being the “kingpin” of the alleged conversion racket. The two had vehemently denied the charges of forced or unlawful conversions. While pleading for bail in a lower court in 2022, Gautam had said that those persons who had changed their religion  to Islam after the legal due process used to come to his institution to read the Kalma. 

Gautam and his son Abdullah Umar are also convicted under Section 35 of the Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act, 2010 for allegedly securing large sums of funds from foreign persons and institutions illegally in their non-FCRA accounts. The money was allegedly used for unlawful conversion and for providing financial help to the converts.

Gautam’s organisation IDC India was accused of being used to carry out the mass conversion and receiving foreign funds for the purpose.

Special Judge NIA ATS court Vivekanand Sharan Tripathi, while pronouncing the quantum of punishment, ordered that the victims of unlawful conversion, Aditya Gupta and Mohit Chaudhary, be paid Rs 2 lakh each as compensation under the 2021 Act.

The detailed conviction order is still awaited. According to the allegations levelled by the police against the accused persons they were mass converting Hindus into Muslims through allurements and religious misrepresentation.

The case dates back to June 2021 when the UP ATS arrested Gautam and Mufti Qazi Jahangir Alam Qasmi from New Delhi on charges of allegedly mass converting people to Islam through the allurements and inducements of jobs, money, marriage and mental pressure.

They along with their organisation IDC India are booked for unlawful conversion, cheating, criminal conspiracy, hurting religious sentiments and promoting enmity between religions. The police arrested more people during the course of the investigation and at the end 17 persons were chargesheeted. Legal proceedings against one person, Idris Qureshi, are stayed by the Allahabad high court.

The 17 persons belonged to different states, with seven from Uttar Pradesh (including Siddiqui, Gautam, and Gautam’s son Abdullah Umar), four from Maharashtra, three from Delhi, and one each from Gujarat, Haryana, and Bihar.

The police said that some of the accused persons in the mass conversion case were found to be influenced by the literature of the American extremist Islamic preacher Anwar Al-Awlaki, who was linked to the Islamist militant group Al-Qaeda. On the basis of this, Sections 121A and 123 of the IPC, related to punishment for waging or attempting to wage war or abetting waging of war against the government, and concealing a design to wage war against the government are invoked.

The police had accused Gautam of allegedly converting 1,000 persons to Islam and getting many of them married to Muslims. The ATS on Wednesday said it had recovered documents of religious conversion of 450 persons as well as marriage certificates of such converted people.

Qasmi, an associate of Gautam, was accused of illegally issuing conversion certificates and marriage certificates for the converted persons. Siddiqui, a well-known Islamic cleric who also runs a trust, was accused of using YouTube to spread religious preachings against other faiths and highlighting the virtues of Islam in a bid to inspire people to convert their religion.

The accused persons targetted non-Muslims, especially women, minors, deaf and mute students and those from the weaker sections such as Dalits and tribals, alleged the ATS.

The images of the persons convicted under the Uttar Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion Act, 2021. Photo: Special Arrangement

The case created a lot of hype with the overlap of mass conversion, foreign funding and extremism-related allegations. Uttar Pradesh police said the mass conversions were taking place to carry out a “demographic change”.

The ATS said that the IDC India was allegedly used as a centre of mass conversion.

IDC was also the examination centre for the International Open University, a private distance education university run by the controversial Islamic preacher of Jamaican origin Bilal Philips, said the ATS.

“The main aim of this syndicate was to carry out a change in the demographics through illegal conversion and  implement Sharia law in the country by de-stabilising the elected government,” said the ATS.

The ATS further accused Gautam and others of operating with the principle of “multi-level marketing” to convert a large number of people at a fast pace.

The accused persons would propagate the ills of other religions, especially Hindu, and speak about the virtues of Islam. Through religious misrepresentation, allurements of jobs, marriage and wealth, and the “fear of burning in the fire of hell,” they were converting people to Islam, said the ATS.

The accused persons, now convicted, are also charged with identifying deaf and mute students of the Noida Deaf Society and converting them through allurements and intimidation.

Siddiqui published a monthly magazine Armughan and other literature to propagate his ideas, said the police. The ATS also found as incriminatory a book written by Siddiqui, ‘Aapki Amanat Aapki Seva Mein’ published in 2006 in Muzaffarnagar.

The police also alleged that the accused persons were receiving crores of rupees as funds from abroad and other states in the country through hawala and other sources. Apart from this, they were running several trusts illegally on rotation to receive funds, said the ATS.

Out of the 16 accused, four persons Mohammad Salim, Rahul Bhola, Mannu Yadav alias Abdul Mannan and Kunal Ashok Chaudhary — are sentenced to 10 years in prison after being convicted under Sections 3, 5 and 8 of the UP Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion Act, 2021 along with sections 120B, 153A , 153B, 295A, 417 and 298 of the IPC.

While Sections 3 and 5 of the unlawful conversion law deal with criminalising religious conversion deemed to have been done through force, misrepresentation, undue influence, coercion, allurement, any fraudulent means or by marriage. Section 8 is related to the charges of not following the prescribed procedure for religious conversion, under which a person desiring to convert has to submit a declaration to the district magistrate sixty days in advance.

The 16 persons convicted in the case received jail terms of 10 years and three years, respectively for offences under Sections 5 and 8 of the anti-conversion law.

The ATS produced 24 witnesses in the court.

Mufti Osama Nadwi, lawyer for Siddiqui and three others, told The Wire that they will challenge the verdict in the Allahabad high court.

Expressing disappointment over the verdict, Nadwi said the FIR and the chargesheet in the case were merely based on far-fetched “presumptions”.

Also read: 30 Former Judges of Supreme Court, High Courts Attend Meet Organised by Vishwa Hindu Parishad

“They arrested someone on the charge of murder for sowing a seed and then presuming that one day the seed will grow into a tree and the wood from that tree would be used to make an axe that would be later used for murder,” said Nadwi, explaining his point though an illustration.

Nadwi said the court’s order was “full of loopholes” including points such as that the FIR under the unlawful conversion law was not lodged by an aggreived party or a relative, as mandated by the Act.

He also dismissed the charges against Siddiqui that he was propagating Islam and promoting conversion through a YouTube channel. “Maulana Kaleem’s (Maulana Kaleem Siddiqui’s) YouTube channel is still running. Why haven’t they banned it yet,” asked Nadwi.

Lawyer Zia Jilani, who represented some of the other accused, described the court judgment as “perverse”, “illegal” and “unsustainable in the eyes of the law”.

He told The Wire that the entire proceedings were based on an FIR that was lodged by an incompetent person.

“The investigating officer of the ATS lodged the FIR even though the law states that only an aggreived person or a relative can lodge a complaint under the unlawful conversion law,” said Jilani, adding that the court neglected this aspect.

“How come the case is tenable under law,” asked the lawyer, who plans to challenge the verdict in the high court.

Jilani also pointed out that none of the 24 witnesses produced by the Uttar Pradesh ATS testified to being forcibly converted. In fact, many of them had converted long before the law was enacted, he added.

Jilani, who represented Rahul Bhola and Mannu Yadav, both mute and deaf, said that the investigating officer produced only a single witness against them, and that too on the premise that they made conversion certificates for the person.

Najmus Saquib Khan, another lawyer representing the accused, argued that despite the police allegations of an attempt to alter the demography through funding, the ATS could only produce eight independent witnesses, out of a total of 24 witnesses presented in the court.

Moreover, out of the eight, only six were directly related to conversion allegations. Khan said that many of these conversions were carried out much before the 2021 law came into force. He also found it odd that while the ATS produced only eight independent witnesses, the number of people accused in the case was 17, raising questions about the agency’s initial claims that around 1,000 persons — later toned down to a figure of 450 — had been illegally converted.

“Where are these 450 persons and why were their statements not recorded?” Khan asked.

The arrest of Gautam and Siddiqui had invited plenty of criticism against the Uttar Pradesh police which was accused of carrying out a witch-hunt against Muslim preachers under the garb of the new law.

With the NIA/ATS court in Lucknow convicting 16 persons, the state police said it felt vindicated after many people had expressed doubts about their allegations.

“What’s notable is that following the arrest of the kingpin and mastermind in the case, some religious fundamentalists had on social media and other mediums had dubbed it as politically motivated and criticised it,” said the ATS in a statement.

Uttar Pradesh director general of police Prashant Kumar went a step further and described the verdict as a “landmark” case proving that the police action was based on facts and evidence.

“This decision will send a good message in the society that those involved in the activities of unlawful religious conversion…that their goal was exposed.  This will also bring awareness among people that they should not get involved in such wrong things,” said Kumar.

Scotland, Gaza and Afghanistan — Where have the Gods Gone?

I see the mangled faces and limbs of toddlers in Gaza in my dreams and all my education falls away from me like old paint from a crumbling edifice, writes the author.

Scotland

After the Scottish Macbeth murders the legitimate king, he looks for probable enemies, real or imagined.

Among them, MacDuff  tops his list.

Aware of the danger to his life, MacDuff goes to England, leaving his family behind.

The anarchist-fascist Macbeth nonetheless has his wife and all his children assassinated.

When this news reaches him, this is what he wonders:

“Did the heavens look on and not take their part?”

No voice returns an answer from heaven.

Gaza

How trenchantly MacDuff’s uncomprehending wonderment about the indifference of the gods has sprung to mind  during the course of the unimpeded turkey-shoot slaughter of women and children in Gaza.

In the Islamic context this bafflement is particularly piquant because (as a young teacher in my audience at a lecture delivered in Kashmir University some years ago underscored to me) good Muslims believe that not a leaf stirs without god’s will.

I remember suggesting to him that his argument would mean that all of Kashmir’s problems too had god’s assent;  I did not receive an answer, only a hushed surprise and chuckle down the perceptive audience.

So, who is to blame for the heart-wrenchingly unprecedented butchery in Gaza?

If not they, then where are the gods?

Afghanistan

We often think of death as the ultimate catastrophe.

But, think again.

Life-in-death may after all be the ultimate atrocity; reason why so many prefer to take their own lives rather than carry on living life-in-death?

Also read: ‘Zionism Is Not Judaism’: Lessons From Rabbi David Weiss

I am alluding to the women of Afghanistan who have now been forbidden to have their voices heard in public as per report.

All that in pursuit of “virtue” by god’s own men deputed to  combat “vice”.

And no vice may ever be combated except by viciousness in the extreme.

Afghan women are of course required to produce  babies, preferably all male, so god’s men can proliferate and keep the women back in life-in-death quarantine.

What makes this fate  hurtful terminally is the fact that all the Afghan women one has met have far exceeded their men in intelligence and prowess.

Looking at these puzzling circumstances among people who most fear and propitiate god, those other words from the Bard spring to the uninitiated, rude mind:

“as flies to wanton boys

are we to the gods;

they kill us  for their sport.”

And the gods we know are often men in unchallenged authority bolstered by the inordinate lust of dominance, cannily fuelled by corporate lucre and religious proprietorship.

I see the mangled faces and limbs of toddlers in Gaza in my dreams and all my education falls away from me like old paint from a crumbling edifice.

On this “teacher’s day” I feel more ignorant than  I did  affecting the act of teaching over more than four decades.

Badri Raina taught at Delhi University.

In Photos: At a Dhaka Temple, Talk of Politics

Those at the Dhakeswari National Temple say that current anti-Hindu sentiments are a disgrace became Bangladesh’s culture is very cohesive.

The Dhakeswari National Temple in old Dhaka is a beloved spot for Hindus living in Bangladesh. The temple sees Hindu festivals including the prime attraction – the Durga Puja.

In 2021, anti-minority violence during the Durga Puja led to a protest from India and a promise from then prime minister Sheikh Hasina to act against miscreants who vandalised various pandals.

Bangladesh’s population comprises nearly 8% Hindus. Differences in religion were always a political tool, rather than reflective of a fundamental difference, many across Bangladesh tell me.

Yar Hussain, a common citizen of Dhaka, for one, says that anti-Hindu sentiments are a disgrace became Bangladesh’s culture is very cohesive.

The temple committee has hung a placard in solidarity with those killed in the quota reform protests. Photo: Shome Basu/The Wire

Basudev Dhar is a septuagenarian and heads the apex body of all the Durga Pujas in the country. He too says the alleged attacks on Hindus are politically motivated. Hindus, he feels, are kept out of land deals and struggle to buy or sell property at just prices. Dhar adds that land grabbing is an old allegation against the Awami League and affects other minorities and some Muslims too.

While reports came in of Hindu households being attacked in the aftermath of Hasina fleeing to India, Dhar says that the Dhakeswari temple and nearby Hindu families were protected by some Jammat-e-Islami cadre.

Another Hindu community member who requested anonymity, said that the seeds of anti-Hindu sentiment were sown by the 1992 demolition of the Babri Masjid.

Jagganath Chanda. Photo: Shome Basu/ The Wire

The making of the Durga idol is in full swing at Dhakeswari. Last year’s idol is showcased and will be immersed on the day of ‘Mahalaya’, seven days before the main Durga Puja starts. This is practice unique to this temple as elsewhere, the idol is immersed on Dashami or Dussehra.

The premises are filled with the fragrance of incense. As night falls, the gate is locked by the priests and guards take over. Local police too keep a close watch.

Bangladesh historian Syed Aulad Hossain has cited the mention of the Dhakeswari temple in the Ain-e-Akbari.

Dhar in his book Dhakeswari Ateet O Bartaman (Dhakeswari, The Past and The Present) mentions that the temple had visits from Arakan and Mughal people during the reign of Sultan Hussain Shah, and later, Raja Maan Singh, Akbar’s general, also visited it.

Basudev Dhar. Photo: Shome Basu/The Wire

In 2015, one year after coming to power, Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited the temple. This is also the temple that Muhammad Yunus visited after taking charge of the interim government. Today, a team of Hindu visitors will meet Union home minister Amit Shah at New Delhi to speak of anti-minority grievances.

Alok and Ranu. Photo: Shome Basu/The Wire

Alok and Ranu came on a night bus from Sylhet to the temple. Alok says that most Hindus including his own family have been Awami supporters. Today he feels betrayed by Hasina feeling the country, leaving a large number of Awami supporters in danger.

 

All Eyes on Badal’s ‘Punishment’ as He Is Declared Guilty of Religious Misconduct by Akal Takht

While Badal has apologised, his detractors have sharpened their attack on him by seeking his resignation.

Chandigarh: Sukhbir Singh Badal’s stature as president of Punjab’s Sikh panthic party, the Shiromani Akali Dal (SAD), faced a massive setback after the Akal Takht, the supreme Sikh seat of authority, declared Badal “tankhaiya” – guilty of violating the Sikh religious code.

The declaration, announced on Friday (August 30), was on account of decisions he took as deputy chief minister and SAD chief from 2007 to 2017 that according to the Akal Takht “deeply harmed the image of the panth and caused damage to Sikh interests apart from the SAD’s own downfall”.

While the Akal Takht did not give the details of Badal’s controversial decisions, a letter by SAD rebels in July blamed Badal for trying to have the Sirsa-based Dera Sacha Sauda chief Gurmeet Ram Rahim pardoned by the Akal Takht in an old case involving his alleged blasphemous bid to imitate the tenth Sikh Guru.

In that letter, Badal was also blamed for his lack of proper action in handling incidents related to the sacrilege of holy the Sikh text, the Guru Granth Sahib, in 2015 despite holding the home department portfolio. Two Sikh protesters were then killed in police firing, leading to major resentment within the community.

Several SAD and Congress Sikh leaders in the past were declared tankhaiya and later atoned by offering karah prashad, reciting Gurbani or hymns, and performing services like washing utensils and cleaning shoes as part of their “punishment”.

But the situation in Badal’s case is different, as his detractors point out. Given that the charges against him are grave, all eyes are on the quantum of ‘punishment’ against him.

Explaining the issue, Sikh author and senior journalist Jagtar Singh told The Wire that declaring someone tankhaiya is a centuries-old Sikh practice of religious indictment. The next step is that their tankha, or punishment, must be quantified.

In Badal’s case, he said that the credibility of the Akal Takht is at stake. If Sikhs reject the decision taken by the Akal Takht jathedar just like in the Gurmeet Ram Rahim pardon row in 2015, then the supreme Sikh institution may face another setback.

In 2015, the decision by the Akal Takht in pardoning the Dera chief for his alleged blasphemous act sparked a major row. The decision was later revoked.

Jagtar emphasised that the bottom line here is that the Akal Takht’s decision in Badal’s case must have acceptability among Sikhs at large. Otherwise, the issue will remain alive.

Rumbling in SAD, rebels aggressive

Badal has kept a low profile ever since the Akal Takht’s decision.

Much of the party’s work is being handled by Balwinder Singh Bhunder, a close Badal aide who was elevated to post of the SAD’s working president a day before the Akal Takht pronounced its decision on Badal.

Badal, sources said, is in wait-and-watch mode, hoping for an amicable solution to the biggest challenge of his political life so far.

He has already appeared in person before the Akal Takht and submitted a written apology. He is said to be the first serving president of the grand old party of Sikhs to be declared tankhaiya.

On the contrary, anti-Badal sentiments have been sharpened by SAD rebels, who have been up in arms against him ever since the party’s dismal performance in the recently concluded Lok Sabha polls.

One of the rebel leaders, Gurpartap Singh Wadala, told the media that Badal should resign from the post of SAD president immediately if he really respected the Akal Takht.

He said that as tankhaiya, Badal cannot hold any position, participate in social functions, offer ardas in a gurdwara or pay obeisance till he is accepted after undergoing punishment.

“The SAD constitution also bars any tankhaiya from holding the president’s post. He has ruined the Akali Dal due to his lust for power,” he added.

How the Indian State Constructs ‘Muslimness’ through Law and Violence

In Tanweer Fazal’s book, ‘Practices of the State: Muslims, Law and Violence in India’, he explains how this state-sponsored identity flattens the Muslims into a homogenous community.

Tanweer Fazal’s book, Practices of the State: Muslims, Law and Violence in India, is an investigation of how a singular discourse of ‘Muslimness’ has been produced in India in defiance of the fact that the Muslims are a heterogenous and internally variegated community with divergent religious practices and beliefs. This book asks what binds a Bengali Muslim in Assam, with a Qureshi meat-seller in Uttar Pradesh and a Muslim villager in Bhagalpur Bihar, to a Muslim worshipper in Ayodhya or an Arzal Muslim seeking to be recognised as a scheduled caste person, notwithstanding their varied lived contexts? According to Fazal, it is their experience of ‘state’, not only in times of crisis but at an everyday level. This experience, Fazal argues, is not internally generated but produced externally, as a result of state practices, law-making and law-enforcement.

Tanweer Fazal,
Practices of the State: Muslims, Law and Violence in India,
Three Essays Collective (2024)

This idea of one’s identity being externally determined is reminiscent of Frantz Fanon’s Black Skin White Masks. He articulates his experience of walking down the street where a little French kid sees Fanon and says, “Look a negro” with a tremor. Fanon explored how the white gaze constructed a black man as dangerous and savage and splattered his body with blackness. Fazal similarly demonstrates how, in India, the statist gaze produces and reproduces a discourse of the Muslim as an internal other who is violent and treacherous. According to him, this state-sponsored identity flattens the Muslims into a homogenous community and thereby generates a particular kind of lived experience.

Conceptual framing of the book 

Fazal’s book examines the inter-relationship of a triad – the State, the National Public, and the Margins. Fazal begins with setting aside the idea of the state as a concrete immovable system and instead finds the notion of ‘state-idea’ more productive to work with. The term ‘state idea’ implies that the state is most visible not in its policy declarations – the point that most political analysts focus on – but in the way its policies come to be framed, the way they are implemented; and in the way the state is experienced by social groups.

Fazal defines the Dominant or National Public as social groups that are “in constant interaction with the State” to the extent that each “structure the moral constitution of the other”. The Margins, according to Fazal, are the sites imagined (or ‘epistemologically produced’) by the State as “wild and uncontrolled” and “insufficiently socialised into law” and consequently bear the brunt of state power and violence. In this statist imagination, the Muslims find themselves located at the margins along with Dalits, tribals or the working poor with epithets such as criminal, fanatic, seditious and terrorist stuck on them. This semantic location of the ‘Muslim’ at the margin gives the state functionaries a free hand to use violence to tame, civilise and keep them in check. The experience of the Muslims nevertheless is a graded one as not all Muslims are evenly placed at the Margins and neither does this location elide the possibility of intra and inter community strife. For instance, the educated, upper caste Muslims occasionally escape the violence and have the possibility of being seen as the good or sarkari Muslims – what Fanon would call wearing a white mask.

A systemic structure of impunity

Fazal uses this conceptual framework to analyse five case studies that take the reader through the structure and practice of the modern Indian state in constituting Muslimness. These include essays on: the way the discourse of Bangladeshi (the greedy and feckless foreigner) is deployed to exclude local Muslims from the National Register of Citizens (NRC); the history of the cow slaughter ban legislation and the implication of Muslims as beefeaters; the manner in which two commission reports on Bhagalpur Riots in 1989 ended up impugning of Muslims as criminal and fanatic; the combined legal histories of dispute over religious structures – the Shahidganj Mosque (1940) and the Babri Masjid (1885-2020). Unlike the Shahidganj Mosque case, where the colonial courts erred in favour of non-interference and status quo, in the Babri masjid case the courts capitulated to majoritarian opinion despite evidence to the contrary, overlooking the procedure and precedence; and lastly, the promulgation of Scheduled Caste Order 1950 (and the later court cases involving this order) that left vast swathes of Muslims and Christians out of receiving benefits of reservation policy to prevent lower caste communities from converting (and receiving the SC status as a compensation for remaining Hindu). 

What all the case studies reveal is a ‘systemic structure of impunity’, where the post-colonial state and its functionaries time and again indulge in legally sanctified exclusions (especially of Dalit Muslims), abet persecutory violence at an everyday level and generate a discourse that flattens the Muslims into a homogenous community. The case studies depict how Muslims become the bearers of the epistemic and physical violence that accompanies nation building. This leaves the most vulnerable in the community – children, women and Muslim Dalits even more susceptible to violence and social exclusion.

Muslims in state’s gaze

Fazal shows how the use of the word Bangladeshi as an umbrella term for all Muslims in Assam and Bengal becomes a way to erase the social existence of local Muslims. According to the government, the increase in Muslim population in the region owes itself to the continuous influx of ‘Bangladeshis’, however, Fazal provides demographic statistics that show that the increase is because of higher fertility rates, specifically in the poorest districts; and this spike is there not only amongst Muslims but also amongst the Adivasi communities. The discourse around the Muslim community calls to mind Sankaran Krishna’s idea on ‘cartographic anxiety’ – the way the state and its functionaries produce the inside and the outside by raising the spectre of foreign infiltration to discipline and produce the “domestic(ated) self”. The “citizen” identity is expected to revoke and nullify all other identities, especially religious ones which are seen as primitive and a carry-over of an outmoded past.

Likewise, the history of the cow slaughter ban shows how Muslims have come to be vilified as perverted ‘beef-eaters’. At the heart of this accusation is the deep-seated fear of ‘miscegenation’, which is the fear of racial or caste purity being ruined because of intermixing through a sexual relationship. This fear, coddled and anchored in India’s caste system, imagined as rigorously endogamous with strict rules regarding who you can procreate with, in turn, carries over into the Hindu-Muslim divide. The maintenance of Hindu purity mandates a vilification of Muslims and use of violence to maintain the order of things. This violence is not simply episodic (a riot, a killing, a chance encounter) or physical or an aberration that needs to be accounted for, but an structural and epistemological phenomenon that is a constant state-of-being for the majority of Muslims in India. 

Taking a leaf from Jean Paul Sartre’s Nothingness of Being, where he reflects on the Jewish identity being fixed by the anti-semite gaze, in India the state’s gaze fixes the Muslim as Muslim with no freedom to be anything but Muslim. There is an ‘overdetermination’ of a Muslim’s identity from the outside with the person having little or no power to constitute it for oneself. As if their essence lies in the Muslimness and not in being a human. And once denuded of their essence as a human being, a Muslim becomes an easy target for violence. The irony is that although a recipient of persecutory violence, the Muslim is constructed as a violent and treacherous being. 

Challenging foundational myths

Fazal’s book is part of a growing stream of literature that is challenging two foundational myths of the Indian republic.

First, the belief that all Indians were Hindu to begin with. This idea is present not only in V.D. Savarkar’s Hindutva but also in Jawaharlal Nehru’s Discovery of India and is used to uphold the claim of unity of Indian culture and nationhood. This myth fundamentally posits the Muslims as outsiders or late entrants. Although Nehru’s was an inclusive reading, the notion of Muslims as passive recipients of Hindu tolerance and largesse (because they are guests, poor cousins, saturated by their cultural and religious identity, and so on) nevertheless remains. The precondition of a Hindu’s tolerance is that a Muslim must remain silent and grateful; and a Muslim asserting their Indianness – by upholding a copy of the constitution at anti-CAA/NRC protests and the like – is welcome, but not their ‘Muslimness’.

Second is the notion that India is a tolerant country. Fazal’s case studies clearly show that it is a highly violent country with instances of exclusion written into the Constitution and the legal fabric of the country. If anything, India is a country highly tolerant of violence. In a country where exclusion – the feeling like one is not being allowed to belong fully, not feeling protected by law or the state, being unable to participate fully in the public life, living with a sense alienation – is something that haunts the Muslims, one wonders if the Indian state ever had the capacity to be neutral?

Aparna Vaidik is a professor of history at Ashoka University.

Akal Takht Declares SAD Chief Sukhbir Singh Badal ‘Tankhaiya’. What Happens to His Party?

The Akal Takht’s decision is over Sukhbir Badal’s time as deputy chief minister of Punjab from 2007 to 2017 during which he took some controversial decisions.

Jalandhar: The Akal Takht on August 30 declared Shiromani Akali Dal (SAD) president Sukhbir Singh Badal a ‘tankhaiya’.

In term, given by the supreme body of the Sikh religion, implies that a person is guilty of religious misconduct.

The decision to declare Sukhbir Badal ‘tankhiaya’ was taken by the five Sikh high priests of Akal Takht, over his tenure as Deputy Chief Minister of Punjab from 2007 to 2017 during which the decisions that he took were seen to have harmed the image of the panth  – the path established by Sikh Gurus. The Akal Takht held that it caused huge damage to Sikh interests and led to the decimation of the SAD.

Sri Akal Takht Jathedar, Giani Raghbir Singh, while addressing the gathering on the premises of Golden Temple in Amritsar asked Sukhbir Singh Badal to appear before the Akal Takht within 15 days. He also asked all Sikh cabinet ministers in the previous SAD-Bharatiya Janata Party government to appear before the Akal Takht and offer explanations.

Akal Takht was founded by sixth Sikh Guru Hargobind Singh on June 15, 1606, on the principle of miri and piri. Miri signifies temporal authority and piri means spiritual authority. The Akal Takht issues all hukamnamas or edicts related to the Sikh community. Any person found violating the moral code of conduct is declared tankhaiya by Akal Takth and must complete penance as decided by the Sikh clergy.

Notably, the SAD rebel group led by former SGPC president Bibi Jagir Kaur, former MP Prem Singh Chandumajra, former SAD leaders Gurpartap Singh Wadala and Surjit Singh Rakhra on July 1 appeared before the Akal Takht Jathedar and apologised for “mistakes” committed when the SAD-BJP government was in power from 2007 to 2017. The leaders called their group Shiromani Akali Sudhar Lehar.

The rebel group leaders had been demanding the resignation of Sukhbir Badal as SAD president and holding rallies across Punjab on this issue.

Sukhbir Badal, too, in response to the rebel group’s demands had admitted to his mistakes without making a direct mention to them, and sought atonement from Akal Takht in a letter shared on social media.

He wrote on X: “Waheguru ji ka Khalsa, Waheguru ji ki Fateh. ‘Dass’ bows his head and accepts the order issued by Sri Akal Takth Sahib, the highest shrine of Miri Piri. As per order, I will soon appear before in front of Sri Akal Takth Sahib and seek forgiveness.”

On August 31, Sukhbir Badal appeared before the Akal Takht. Badal’s former Cabinet ministers Daljit Singh Cheema, Gulzar Singh Ranike, Sharanjit Singh Dhillon and Mahesh Inder Grewal  – the latter was advisor to the CM – also gave their explanations.

Many leading Sikh leaders like Master Tara Singh, Sant Fateh Singh, former Punjab CM Surjit Singh Barnala, former President Giani Zail Singh and former Union Minister Buta Singh had also earlier been declared tankhaiya by the Akal Takht.

Allegations against Sukhbir Badal:

As deputy CM of Punjab from 2007 to 2017, Sukhbir Badal’s role had been under the scanner. Some of his controversial moves were granting pardon to Dera Sacha Sauda chief Gurmeet Ram Rahim Singh, allegedly getting the Akal Takht to appoint Sumedh Singh Saini as Punjab Director General of Police in 2012, the sacrilege cases of 2015, the killing of Sikh youths in Bargari and the alleged failure to provide justice to the victims.

Though Saini was removed from the post of DGP Punjab, the allegations damaged SAD’s image among core Sikh voters. Since 2017, SAD’s image as a ‘pro-farmer’ party also took a major hit despite it breaking away from the BJP over the now repealed farm laws in 2020.

SAD rebel group leader speaks

Former SGPC president and member of SAD’s rebel group leader Bibi Jagir Kaur welcomed the Akal Takth’s decision.

Bibi said, “Since Sukhbir Badal committed mistakes, he has been declared tankhiaya by the Akal Takht. If anybody violates the sanctity of the path, he will have to face punishment. Sukhbir Badal has already said that whatever punishment he will be given by the Akal Takht, he will accept it.”

Will Akal Takth’s decision revive SAD’s fortune?

Talking to The Wire, the former head of the sociology department at Panjab University, Manjit Singh said that this is not the first time that a sitting party president has been declared tankhaiya by the Akal Takht.

“In the past, the Akal Takht had declared Surjit Singh Barnala, Jagdev Singh Talwandi and dozen other Sikh religious leaders as tankhaiya. At the same time, those who had committed serious violations were expelled from the panth as well. However, after two years or so they were mostly taken back in the panth by the Akal Takht”, he said.

In the past two decades, two premier institutions of Sikhs – the SAD and the Shiromani Gurdwara Parbhandak Committee (SGPC), the ‘mini parliament’ of Sikhs, has been weakened because of their connections with the BJP, the professor said. He said that it is an open secret that both SAD and the SGPC share an umbilical cord as well.

Manjit Singh said that this, however, is the first time that SAD and its rebel factions have wholly accepted the Akal Takht’s decision – a move that he feels could signal its revival.

“Though it is an in-house issue of the SAD, the way the Akal Takht jathedars conducted the meeting and declared Sukhbir Singh Badal tankhiaya…it was an assertion of spiritual power. This will give a push to panthic politics,” he said.

The rebels could also lose ground, as a result, he added.

“In connivance with the BJP, the rebels perceived that Sukhbir Badal would succumb to pressure. However, approaching the Akal Takht became their biggest misadventure. The rebels were under the impression that Sukhbir Badal would not back out but instead he appointed SAD leader Balwinder Singh Bhundar as the party’s acting president. Since Sukhbir Badal stated that as SAD president, he takes all the blame on himself, it left no room for rebels to attack him further,” the professor added.

Professor Manjit claimed that as there was no glue to keep the rebels together now.

‘Mounting pressure’

Another prominent Sikh affairs expert Malvinder Singh Mali, who worked with former CMs Parkash Singh Badal and Captain Amarinder Singh, and also served as liaison officer of former SGPC chief Gurcharan Singh Tohra, said that though it is not exactly clear that on which grounds the Akal Takht acted against Sukhbir Badal, it is clear that he will have to resign from the position of SAD president.

He asserted that this would pave the way for the unity of breakaway Akali factions, who were disenchanted by SAD’s politics but said, “There was no chance of a revival of SAD under Badal’s control.”

Mali emphasised that it was not leadership but a shakeup of Akali politics which was the need of the hour.

“The SAD will have to stick to its core principles of Anandpur Sahib resolution, Amritsar declaration, 1994 and the idea of federal and confederal politics. Instead of wavering between panthic and moderate Sikh politics and blindly following the Central government, the Akalis will have to fight for the rights of Punjab by staying within the parameters of the Indian constitution,” he added.

Another Sikh historian Dr Gurdarshan Singh Dhillon termed this a major development in Sikh and Akali political history.

“Sikh history is replete with examples of how even some close to the Sikh Gurus were declared tankhaiya by the Akal Takht. From Sri Guru Hargobind whose grandson was expelled from the panth to Sri Guru Har Rai whose son was excommunicated from the panth to Maharaja Ranjit Singh, whosoever violated the religious order were declared tankhaiya. Sukhbir Badal will also have to accept Akal Takth’s punishment as a humble Sikh,” he said.

SAD’s future

Facing one electoral defeat after the other, SAD has been reduced to a party led by the Badal family alone. Recently, a close aide of Sukhbir Singh Badal, Hardeep Singh Dimpy Dhillon quit SAD and joined AAP to contest the upcoming by-election from Gidderbaha assembly constituency in Muktsar district.

Dhillon had been with the party for 38 years but quit after rumours swirled that Sukhbir might field his estranged cousin Manpreet Badal, who is now with the BJP from Gidderbaha seat.

Similarly, a fortnight ago, sitting SAD MLA Dr Sukhwinder Kumar Sukhi from Banga reserve assembly constituency in Nawanshahr district also quit Akali Dal and joined AAP.

After Dr Sukhi’s exit, SAD’s strength was reduced to two MLAs only in the 117-seat Punjab assembly – Ganieve Kaur, the wife of Bikram Singh Majithia, who is the brother-in-law of Sukhbir Badal and Manpreet Aiyali. Even in the parliament, SAD’s lone MP is Sukhbir’s wife and four-time Bathinda MP Harsimrat Kaur Badal.

The Many Crises of Indian Muslims

“The project is that this is a Hindu land that belongs to Hindu people and Muslims are outsiders. And India has to bring an end to these thousand years of slavery,” author of the book ‘Shikwah-e-Hind: The Political Future of Indian Muslims’ Mujibur Rehman told The Wire in an interview.

Harsh Mander discusses with Mujibur Rehman his new book Shikwah-e-Hind: The Political Future of Indian Muslims (Simon and Schuster, 2024).

Harsh Mander (Henceforth HM): I think a central question for me is — what explains the confusion, the ambiguity, the silences of India’s secular majority? Firstly, do you agree that indeed secular formations constitute a majority?  And what explains their muted response to the attacks of the Right, and the worrying, even terrifying, persecution of India’s Muslims?

Mujibur Rehman (Henceforth, MR): Well, there are several reasons for this. The secular elite is not homogeneous. Its various strands respond in their own ways, which reflects the ambivalence I speak of. Some find this completely nonsensical, what is going on, and feel there is no point of responding to this nonsense, this is just bizarre and beyond comprehension for them.

Shikwah-e-Hind: The Political Future of Indian Muslims, Mujibur Rehman, Simon and Schuster, 2024.

Second, there are also secular political elites who feel that given the electoral popularity of [the] BJP since 2014 and its ability to form governments after governments, given its growing electoral power, secular goals are now defeated as India has become significantly Hinduised. They just don’t want to fight those forces any longer because they feel that this is a lost cause. They say — let us try to navigate this new reality some way or other. In their navigation they often use Hindutva symbolism, through soft Hindutva politics.

But my sense is that those people are definitely out of touch with reality because the results of the 2024 general elections clearly showed that Indian voters were not comprehensively Hinduised, they were not throwing their weight blindly behind the Hindutva project. So there is a gross misreading on the part of some secular elites who were intimidated or  scared by the growing electoral dominance of the BJP. As I argue in my earlier book, Rise of Saffron Power (Routledge 2018),the failure of the non- Congress opposition parties that came to power in 1977 and then again in 1989 to emerge as an enduring political formation is the main reason for the political void which was filled up by the BJP. Had there been a non- Congress, non- BJP opposition coalition in India’s electoral space, the BJP might have remained a regional party.

So to answer your question if there is a secular majority, my answer is yes- there is. A broad secular coalition — as a united force against the Hindutva — is a feasible political project out of which a secular politics could be rebuilt, even if it may not  be a perfect one.

HM: As you look back at Hindu Muslim relations, one of you interesting observations is that conflicts between Hindus and Muslims are not simply a product of the colonial encounter. You argue that while there has been peaceful co-existence, there have been conflicts even before the British came.

MR: Well, there is greater evidence of peaceful existence than of conflict in Indian history.  And the conflict that has taken place has been to establish supremacy. There is a long and complicated story of conflicts that were not religious but of state power, the State control by Hindu rulers, the State control by Muslim rulers. This has been wrongly interpreted as Hindu-Muslim conflicts. There was nothing called the Muslim rule, nor as the Hindu Right history is claiming that Hindus have suffered a lot of humiliation in long years of Muslim rule. What we had is this handful of Muslim families/dynasties who have ruled over many centuries. These dynasties have also fought each other. They fought their own family members and killed each other. They were not out here to preach Islam or establish Islamic superiority, they were driven by the lust for power, how to expand and consolidate power. In that process, they harmed Muslims, they harmed Hindus, they harmed Christians. But this false classification of “Muslim rule” has contributed to negative images and negative memories concerning Muslims, which is one fount of legitimacy for the Hindu Right.

HM: One important point that you make is that violence of various oppressed communities is part of India’s history from the earliest times. And the persecution and violence against Muslims that we see today is only one chapter in a much longer history of the suppression, persecution and violence against the Dalits, Adivasis and women.  So, taking a longer view of history, how serious is this present moment of heightened and extreme persecution of India’s Muslims?

MR: My framework of analysis is a little different from what other scholars have used with respect to the Hindu-Muslim conflict. The Hindu-Muslim conflict in contemporary times has been presented as a case of violation of minority rights. The invocation of the Constitution in this context is also based on this understanding that Muslims are religious minority, and they have certain rights and those rights are getting violated and this is not fair and good for Indian democracy. What I argue is that what is unfolding is more serious than simply the violation of rights. What is unfolding is a de-Islamisation process. The Hindu Right is making concerted efforts to take on Muslim symbols and Muslim institutions, the Muslim ways of life taboo and redundant.  All aspects of Muslim lives are under negative scrutiny- their food, their way of dress say like hijab, their food like beef, legality of Masjids/darghas, ways of prayer, azaan etc. This attack is very comprehensive, and must be seen to include also the recent Bill being now attempted concerning Wakf Board, which has less to do with the land than with the de-Islamisation project. The drive is for “no more Muslim, no more Islam”.

HM: Many scholars, observers, and commentators see a kind of continuum between the politics of Mr. Modi and the RSS and leaders like Donald Trump or Jair Bolsonaro, or Geert Wilders, or Recep Tayyip Erdogan, etc. – the whole range of the far right-wing leaders. They see a lot of commonalities, because they all target particular minorities and they foster hate. They are impatient with democratic process and institutions. Yet you say that what is happening in India, in relation to India’s Muslim minorities is distinct from each of these instances. Would you like to explain this a little more?

MR: Commenting on the rise of Mr. Modi and the Hindu Right politics, many scholars say this is happening elsewhere in the world as well. So this is not something very unique. But I challenge that perspective.  That is why I underline that what India is going through is an ideological warfare. To understand this, you have to go back at least 100 years, looking at the political landscape of India of 1920s. The indigenous ideological movement of India that grew up in the 20s, led by the Hindu Mahasabha and all the Hindu Right organisations, gradually acquired strength. They operated from different platforms. Some organisation came and disappeared, like the Bhartiya Jana Sangh (BJS) — and  then the Bhartiya Janata Party [the BJP] came into existence in 1980. The project is that this is a Hindu land that belongs to Hindu people and Muslims are outsiders. And India has to bring an end to these thousand years of slavery.  This is what Mr. Modi said in  his speech in the U.S. Congress where he spoke of 1000 years of slavery. So obviously the Hindu Right’s conception of the nation does not consider Muslims as a part of this society and that is a tragic irony! At a point of time, when you have a person of Hindu heritage Rishi Sunak, until recently served as the Prime Minister of Britain, you have a person of Hindu heritage, Kamala Harris,  running for America presidency.  On the other hand,  whereas Muslims who have been living in this country for centuries, they are not even fielded by the BJP to contest elections. There is  no member in the parliament [by the BJP in 2024 general elections] let alone serving in the cabinet. The Prime Minister makes a statement from the ramparts of the Red Fort on 15 August, 2024  that we need a secular civil code. Whereas the government itself is not secular, the ruling party is not secular, his cabinet is not secular. We do not have a secular government but we want a secular civil code. That itself is a contradiction. So, I think the first thing that the Prime Minister should do is he should set up a secular government, and set up a secular political party before he talks about the secular civil code, that is my position.

Also read: Local Admin and Police Okaying Bulldozer Action Against Muslims Should Remember Nuremberg

So the distinction that I would like to  make so far as the other question is concerned is that the rise of the Hindu Right movement is not a result of global pattern nor does it have global sources.  It is primarily an indigenous movement that was growing since the 1920s. Obviously there were global developments that provided legitimacy to this argument. For instance, 9/11 [terrorist attacks in the USA] provided a tremendous amount of environment for Islamophobic arguments. And so, the Hindu Right was able to take advantage of this favourable environment. My own understanding is that the Hindu Right movement would have grown in India on its own regardless whether there was a Trump in America or not,  or other populist leaders elsewhere. What is equally crucial to note that  in India’s attempt to build a secular polity did not take adequate measures  to contain the anti- secular or anti- minority politics of the Hindu Right. Various secular regimes often under-estimated the Hindu Right forces and remained indifferent to their activities in the formal and informal arena of politics. In a way, the Hindu Right had a smooth ride in its ideological and political journey since the days of India’s independence. So this an indigenous movement but they derived some legitimacy from the global populism. Put bluntly, Narendra Modi is a populist leader but also a very ideological leader. Indeed, Mr. Modi and Mr Nehru are the two most ideological leaders of India. While Nehru wanted India to move towards the left and the Mr. Modi has been successfully bent the nation towards his right wing ideology.

HM: You have talked about political representation. The Muslim people never have had membership in parliament and legislatures that is proportionate to their share in the population. But this representation has declined even more sharply in the last 10 years. And as you observe there is not a single number of parliament and almost no member of the legislative assemblies of the ruling BJP. Which means that 200 million people are hugely under-represented. The really thin defence that is given by the BJP, which you quote, is that they are just looking at winnability, they are not against Muslims. But the results of 2024 prove them wrong. All parties together put up historically the lowest number of Muslim candidates, but the number of successful candidates remained the same. It is also important to underline that it is not necessary for Muslims to represent Muslims. How grave is this crisis of representation? And what are the possible remedies? 

MR: Well, this is a serious problem. Let me begin by  saying that proportionate presentation is very important for different ethnic groups for a variety of reasons There is a famous saying about the “American Revolution”. No taxation without representation.  Taxation without representation essentially is colonialism. It is one thing that people are not adequately represented, it is another thing to make it a policy  not  to allow some ethnic group or minorities  NOT to represent themselves, which  is  far more dangerous.

Then what is happening to  Muslim community here ? What we have  noticed  is that  there is a deliberate attempt  by the BJP not to field Muslim candidates. In the last election [2024 Lok Sabha] as we noticed in Kerala, they [the BJP] only fielded one candidate which they knew was not going to win.  Obviously, this is no representation. It is apparent that the  BJP  does  not have any interest in representing or accommodating Muslims in their party structure. Also we notice,  in  the same political party- the BJP-has got  several spokespersons who are Muslims. But they do not stand for minority rights. I would like to call them the agents of Hindutva. Even there, the BJP has no consideration to include a Muslim in the cabinet.

The big question is: what kind of people we need in an ideal secular polity? You know, anyone can represent anybody. That is an ideal secular polity. It does not matter whether you are Muslim or Hindu.  But otherwise, I think the community should be allowed also to represent themselves for the same reason that women should be allowed to represent themselves. It is possible that some men may have an understanding of women’s problems, but in the end,  by  enabling women to represent themselves could bring different sets of issues to the table and different sorts of legitimacy and  inclusion. The same is true with regard to  Muslims or  Dalit community as well.

What happens here is that  there is a deliberate attempt to exclude  Muslims  justified by the argument that Muslims were  in power for a thousand years and they had done all kinds of injustice. And now it is the pay-back time! So, they cannot be in power or be treated as equals.  They should be treated as subjects. So the Hindu Right argues that they  have been very nice to Muslims and they  will take care of any issues  Muslims have. It will be left to the whims and fancies of the Hindu Right leaders  on how to deal with this community. So, how your Wakf Board is going to be run will be decided by Hindu representatives in the Wakf Board. But how the temples are going to be run is not going to be decided by Muslims and Christians. So only Muslims will be under surveillance.

But another important thing that I want to say on this is: While talking about, of course, the best form of government is the proportionate representation, where Muslims could get a fair share in terms of their share population. What kind of Muslims are representing the community? That is also equally important. Take, for instance, you had Muhammad  Shahabuddin,  a mafia DON of Bihar,  in the Lok Sabha.  What sort of community interest or democratic and social interest is going to  be served by a mafia don becoming a Member of Parliament? Similarly,  Atiq Ahmad from Uttar Pradesh who was recently gunned down, who was considered to be a gangster. So the  secular political parties when they field Muslim candidates, they should also know that what kind of candidate they are fielding. Even  I will include Yusuf Pathan [elected MP from Bengal] for instance. I personally do not understand what sort of political rights and issues Mr. Yusuf Pathan, who is otherwise a fine cricketer, could represent from the point of view of Muslim or secular interests. In these parameters,  we do have some sort of distortions. There is massive underrepresentation even in secular parties or under secular regimes and then  there is complete exclusion by the Hindu Right.

HM: Any minority has typically three sets of anxieties and concerns. One set of concerns relate  to identity. A second set of concerns  relate  to equity. The third is security. And here you have a very painful extensive chapter outlining the experience of violence against Muslims in what are called communal riot.

MR: Let us look at our own history and see what kind of violence that society had gone through at different points of time. So that is why I quote Paul Brass that Gandhi and others resorted to  non- violence  as a method of struggle because they knew that Indian society has enormous potential for violence. Not that everything was non-violent. There was violence happening here and there. Look at some of the social practices like Sati. A lot of violence  that occurs  in our own society which has nothing to do with what is going on elsewhere in the world. that is why it is important to see it as a continuum.  So, basically, I’m trying to argue that our people have also got the capacity to unleash violence of all kinds against our own people, and what we are seeing against Muslims or against  Dalit  is  only part of it.

As far as the law is concerned. Take, for example, we have enough laws against violence against women, and we had this horrific violence that has taken place in Kolkata against a doctor in the hospital . To deal with such violence requires societal reform, education  etc.  So, how to reform those attitudes? I don’t think political parties are taking any interest in doing that. We don’t see this in our governance structure.  Look at containing religious violence. We are all children of one God, so different religions and people can cohabit together. Gandhi used to do all of that through his religious prayer meetings. But these have been abandoned  by secular political parties. And so the question is can people belonging to different religions live together? This is no longer a social reality. You cannot enforce all these things merely through State policy. This requires a reform movement. So one of the arguments I have, let me conclude it by saying that secularism is not just to protect minorities. It is also to rescue Hinduism, since Hinduism is threatened with new politics of Hindutva. So I think one of the tasks of secularism is also to rescue  Hinduism from Hindutva!

Also read: Suspected VHP Activists Accused of Terrorising Doda’s Muslims

HM: You conclude with the lines. “Without the healthy political future of the world’s largest religious minority, India’s Muslims,  Indian democracy will remain incurably wounded”. You speak about your dream, echoing  Martin  Luther King, of building a country which values people for the content of the character and not their religious, caste or racial identity. I see that you are finding it hard to see light at the end of the tunnel. But  it is that really the case? As a scholar, but also a person of Muslim identity who has  grown up in this country and  loves this country, are you seeing a situation of persecution that is going to continue without any let-up even in the middle run? Or do you see hope?

MR: Well, I’m quite hopeful since I mentioned about Martin Luther King, Jr. As Dr. King used to say that the arc of humanity  would eventually gravitate towards  justice. So, I do believe  that GOOD will eventually trump over Evil. And well-meaning people will eventually  be victorious. How would  we get there ?  It requires a  political struggle. This book is also an appeal for such a political struggle, both in the electoral  as well as  non-electoral arena. This book is further  an appeal to the Muslim community, to take active interest in political activism, and to remain alert to what is unfolding in the world of power. This book is also about appealing to the Muslims to be  remain politically active, and organised. At this point, the Muslim community is not sufficiently  organized and  its elites are  deeply de-politicised. I’m quite convinced that in this area of nationalism only those who love a hundred percent of his population are the  hundred percent  nationalists. Those who don’t love  hundred  percent population, they are not nationalist at all. You know, people,  who talk about 80 vs 20 population don’t love this country.

Unfortunately, as I said before that there are some secular political parties and their leaders who believe that those voters [who vote for the BJP] are believers in the idea of a Hindu Rashtra, and have become more radical and political Hindus. Therefore, these secular parties  also  deploy Hindu  idioms and language  in their campaign or what is also called soft Hindutva. We saw that in the Madhya Pradesh assembly elections.

My own sense is this there is no adequate secular push back. If there is an adequate secular push back, the politics would change in favour of minorities and Muslims.  Only by firm positioning  with respect to Muslims and their rights, there would be  rewards not just for Muslims but also from majority community, and in the end, it will be  useful in  defeating the Hindu Right-wing forces.

 Yes, democracy in India can be re-built. I recognise that there  were strategic blunders that were committed. But at the same time, I don’t see neither India nor most parts of the world are moving in any direction other than multiculturalism and equal rights.  In a nutshell, the political  struggle for secularism  has to continue – through writing, activism, and it is possible a secular democracy can be brought back, which will be good for Muslims, for Hindus and all people of India.

Harsh Mander is a social worker and writer.

Janmashtami in Gaza, the World’s Largest Open Air Prison

As Hindus the world over observe Janmashtami, and meditate on the significance of the life of Shri Krishna, we must ask ourselves how we feel about the genocide that Israel has been waging against the people of Gaza for ten months, with no end in sight.

I have arrived in Palestine on Janmashtami, Lord Krishna’s birthday. I’ve come with a group of Jewish, Christian, Muslim, Hindu and Buddhist siblings.

Krishna was born in a prison in Mathura, and while his evil uncle Kamsa planned to kill him, the guards fell asleep and the prison doors mysteriously opened. Krishna’s father Vasudeva carried him across the Yamuna River to safety in Gokul. 

Gaza has been described in the past as the “world’s largest open air prison” by the United Nations and Human Rights Watch. Israel has enforced a siege of Gaza for almost two decades. Not only can Gazans not freely enter and leave, they are denied adequate food and water, and Israel periodically bombs them in a practice they call “mowing the lawn.”

The siege of Gaza is illegal according to international law.

Palestine is an occupied territory, and international law allows her the right to resist Israeli occupation under the Geneva Conventions.

Krishna had an idyllic childhood in Gokul, and Indians enjoy retelling stories of his many childish pranks including stealing butter from neighbours because he loved butter.

Since the Hamas attack on Israel on October 7th, when 1200 Israelis were killed, and 251 Israelis were taken hostage, Israel has responded with a brutal bombing campaign, which the International Court of Justice has ruled is “plausibly” genocidal.

The court’s ruling stated that “there is a real and imminent risk that irreparable prejudice” to the rights of Gazans under the Genocide Convention.

At this point Gaza isn’t an open air prison; it’s a bombed out cemetery.

40,000 Gazans have been killed, a third of them children. We have seen photos, videos and testimonies everyday since October 7th, of parents carrying their dead babies’ corpses in plastic bags, children with limbs blown off, children with their brains blown out, children who were decapitated.

Schools, hospitals and refugee centers have been deliberately targeted by Israel. In the bombing of al-Tabin School a few weeks ago, over 100 were killed, and not one of the bodies was in a condition that allowed their families to identify them.

In Gaza today, children are malnourished, facing famine, and there have even been cases of polio among children stemming from malnutrition and non-existent sewage treatment. UNRWA, the main conduit for aid and education in Gaza, is no longer funded by the US. In recent weeks, we have reports of children among Gazan prisoners being tortured by Israeli soldiers. 

Krishna played a key role in the epic war of the Mahabharata. He was the chief negotiator between the two sides, and tried to prevent the war without taking up arms himself. 

The Mahabharata is eloquent with regards to war etiquette. It enjoins war between equals, the giving of notice before the commencement of hostilities, and the limitation of the battle to professional soldiers. Civilians were not to be brought into the war, and women and children always protected.

There are injunctions against killing women, children, non-combatants, and even “those who are in fear.” Enemy soldiers, when wounded, were to be offered medical assistance and granted freedom after they were healed.

Israel does not observe such rules of war. There are rarely announcements before civilian sites are bombed. Civilians are asked to evacuate to safe zones, and then the safe zones are bombed. Israel claims to be in ceasefire negotiations with Hamas, but it assassinated Hamas’ chief ceasefire negotiator Ismael Haniyeh.  Israel uses weapons that are illegal, like white phosphorus.

The Bhagavad Gita contains the divine teachings of Krishna in the role of guru and charioteer to Arjuna. Krishna asks him to:

– strive for “lokasangraha,” the wellbeing of all. 

– be “para dukha dukhi,” seeing the joys and sorrows of others as one’s own.

– undertake his own dharma – righteous course of action – since it is better to do one’s own dharma imperfectly than someone else’s dharma perfectly. 

– not feel attached to the outcomes of his actions

As Hindus the world over observe Janmashtami, and meditate on the significance of the life of Shri Krishna, we must ask ourselves how we feel about the genocide that Israel has been waging against the people of Gaza for ten months, with no end in sight.

Indian drones and bombs are among the arsenal that Israel is deploying in this genocide. We are complicit. Even if it makes no difference at all, we must speak up.

The Bhagavad Gita is a call to action. Arjuna is confused, depressed, paralysed, and Krishna tells him to get up and act. 

He says, “Those who see action in inaction and inaction in action are truly wise amongst humans.” 

Krishna is telling us that inaction does not mean neutrality, and action isn’t necessarily right action. 

Remaining silent in the face of injustice makes one complicit. We don’t have the option of sitting this one out. And even if we take a stand and do our part, there is no guarantee that we will make the right choices.

I have traveled to Palestine on Janmashtami to bear witness, listen and learn. With humility, I will pray for and call for an end to this catastrophe.

What will you do?

Sunita Viswanath is Executive Director, Hindus for Human Rights

Unravelling the Hindutva Playbook of Social Engineering 

An authoritative account of a post-truth India, this book fills a yawning gap in intellectual resistance, by unravelling the nuts and bolts of the strategies followed in setting the stage for the Hinduisation of the public sphere.

Meera Nanda’s A Field Guide to Post-Truth India is a timely contribution to understanding the complex transformative political and cultural processes that have taken place in the country since 2014 which finally saw the emergence of a majoritarian state. The Narendra Modi-led Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and its ideological mentors have been able to influence and control various government branches and institutions of the state including the media and the judiciary in establishing a Hinduist ethno-religious suzerainty over a constitutionally secular Republic.

Those who resist this project are silenced using strong-arm methods and dissenters are often branded as ‘enemies of the state’. The cultural policing by vigilante groups is unleashed to force, via violence, their moral codes on others who follow different systems of religious faith or belief systems. Nanda, one of the influential contemporary social thinkers, in her latest book, addresses how this dramatic turn of events picked up momentum during the last decade and analyses how the proponents of Hindutva have been successful in social conditioning the Indian masses by relativisation of truth to restructure the original idea of a secular, inclusive and pluralistic India. 

Meera Nanda,
A Field Guide to Post-Truth India,
Three Essays Collective (2024).

By knowledge distortion, parading misinformation and outright lies, the Hindutva exponents were able to generate a narrative that glorified the past and legitimised dubious claims in the scriptures as genuine science. Thus, with myth substituting history, the entire worldview of the sponsors of the Hindu Rashtra impinges on re-creating a mythical past which is not amenable to standard testing methods.

Nanda takes an analytical approach to unravel the basics of the Hindu far-right playbook of social engineering that aims at refashioning the public mind through manipulating the truth and spreading disinformation. She observes that post-secular India is fast changing into a post-truth society, cheered and supported by a tail-wagging mainstream media. Besides conventional platforms, the explosion of internet-based media, with its wide reach, has become a very effective tool for disseminating untruths and “big lies” manufactured for mass consumption.

The British Oxford Dictionary defines “post-truth” as: “relating to or denoting circumstances in which objective facts are less influential in shaping public opinion than appeals to emotion and personal belief”. As the author says, “post-truth is the triumph of the visceral over the rational”, somewhat aligning with American professor Noam Chomsky’s characterisation of such a messaging technique as, “short-circuiting citizens’ critical and analytical senses”.

 In the Hindutva playbook, the basic norms of independent India – secularism and liberalism came to be regarded as a part of a conspiracy hatched by the Western-educated elites with the sole aim of controlling and dominating the Hindu majority. According to their interpretation of history, the Hindu victimhood goes back in time to when the Mughals and their predecessors were in power in north India. Such an interpretation of the past with communal overtones will not hold up against historical facts. The country truly became a colony during British rule and not under the Mughals – a view that aligns with what Gandhi had said about slavery. He described it as the “slavery of evil customs and superstitions” among the Hindus that prevailed in pre-British India.

The ‘field guide’ begins with a discussion on how a post-truth milieu took firm roots in India under the Modi regime, comparable in many aspects to the United States under former President Donald Trump, whom Nanda describes as a “bullshitter’ than a liar. A liar is someone conscious of hiding the truth, but a bullshitter is “indifferent to the whole business of truth” and a policy of sorts that is being developed as a successful election strategy. An Indian equivalent of Trump’s ‘Big Lie’ is the myth of the Muslim population explosion which goes against every bit of real data. This big lie is being propagated as if to transport the gullible Hindu population to a la-la land where the conspiracy theories reign – that the foreign and anti-national forces are hatching a conspiracy and are determined to bring about a demographic change so that the Hindus become a minority in their ‘own’ country. The objective of the owners of the lie factory is clear – to generate ethnic cleavages and social polarisation.  

Hindutva’s proponents have been particularly effective in peddling pseudoscience and bringing its status to be at par with evidence-based modern science. By successfully branding Hindu scriptural epistemology as ‘Indian Knowledge Systems’, they have been able to make it a part of the educational syllabus, legitimising Hindu metaphysics and mythology as science and history.  

In a chapter titled Defending Tradition, Defying Science, the author exposes the ruling regime’s zealous promotion of Ayurveda – a traditional medicinal practice bandied as a jewel in the ancient Indian Knowledge System. As if waiting for an appropriate opportunity, the Ministry of Ayush used the COVID-19 pandemic to issue an advisory recommending ayurvedic, homeopathic and Unani decoctions for preventing and treating the disease. A later advisory confirmed the evidence for the effectiveness of these formulations. Nanda provides us with a complete timeline of how the Union government moved to foster Ayurveda as a cure for COVID-19 and how brand ambassadors like Ramdev and his multi-crore company, Patanjali, entered the fray, hoodwinking the people on the questionable efficacy of his Ayurvedic antiviral pill. Nanda asks why AYUSH forgot the first principle of medicine – ‘to do no harm’, while sponsoring such remedies that are not backed by robust science. 

The fifth chapter of the book that critically analyses ‘yogic perception’, elaborated in Patanjali Yoga Sutra, should be read as an extension of the chapter on Ayurveda. The author points out that two elements of Yoga Sutras – to see empirical realities through non-sensory means and to acquire magical powers, including immortality, through herbs, have influenced both the Charaka Samhita and Sushruta Samhita, the foundational texts in Ayurveda.

These factors limit the scope of Ayurveda as a scientific discipline, and falsifiability – a deductive standard of evaluation in modern science – cannot be applied here, as no experimental or observational evidence for the claims is documented in Ayurvedic texts. Scientific studies establish that the Indian herbs or their extracts recommended by Ayurveda, such as Ashwagandha, Aloe vera, Guggul, Puncture vine, Turmeric, Gotu-kola, Bakuchi, Senna, Noni, Malabar tamarind, and Gurmar, have been associated with various types of liver toxicity and injury  – some of which were ingredients of drugs approved by AYUSH. 

Though there is a rethinking on the safety of such herbal decoctions, this writer is intrigued to read an article by chairman of the University Grants Commission M. Jagadesh Kumar, discussing the strengths of IKS and justifying its incorporation into educational programmes. He writes, “Ayurveda, the ancient Indian system of medicine, has been subject to numerous scientific studies. Ayurveda offers holistic approaches to healthcare that emphasise preventive care, lifestyle modifications, and personalised treatment strategies”. Why did he fail in his professional duty as a scientist to mention the results of the tests proving the toxicity of the Ayurvedic medicines? As the expression goes, “Who will guard the guards themselves?” 

In another chapter, Nanda examines how modern science has been used as the handmaiden of Hindu nationalism, thanks primarily to Swami Vivekananda, who declared in the Chicago address (1893) that “The latest conclusions of science echo the Vedantic philosophy… that the Hindu has been cherishing in his bosom for ages.” Nanda convincingly explains how Hindu thinkers like Vivekananda or Dayananda Saraswati who were living under colonialism had to find ways, as she puts it, to “defend their own civilisation against the condescension and scorn of their colonial overlords and Christian missionaries, while simultaneously embracing the sciences and social ideals of Western Provenance”.  This is a case where history plays a recurring role in the present, and as she says, “the contemporary Vedic science reenacting the strategies of strategic inclusivism of modern science into Vedic canon…”

Charles Darwin has been a punching bag for religious fundamentalists around the world since the publication of his magnum opus On the Origin of Species in 1859. In a chapter titled, “India’s Long Goodbye to Darwin”, Nanda explains how Dayananda Saraswati’s Vedic creationism and Advaitic evolutionism propounded by Vivekananda and Sri Aurobindo were developed as Hindu versions of Christian creationism. The decision of the National Council for Educational Research and Training (NCERT) in July 2022 to block the theory of biological evolution from the Class 10 syllabus is not a random event, but a well-thought-out attempt at the Hindui-sation of education. Nanda calls this a “silent coup”, against secular education, conducted through the recently promulgated “National Education Policy, which has pushed the secular Indian education system to embrace faith-based superstitions and pseudoscience. One can find a similar resonance in the demand of the Christian nationalists in the US to introduce intelligent design creationism in high schools.

The author also discusses the hollowness of the Hindu supremacist argument of the Indus Civilisation as a Vedic Aryan civilisation. The yearly calendars published by the Centre of Excellence for Indian Knowledge Systems at IIT-Kharagpur are used as propaganda tools carrying misinformation on India’s protohistory. These calendars use a misrepresented mixture of symbols and images to advance an account of Hindu ancestry based on a false premise that the Vedic Aryans were indigenous to the Indus Valley region, and by extending to the west, this became the progenitor of the culture worldwide. The ‘out-of-India’ theory flies in the face of all the available evidence generated by a spectrum of recent scientific and sociological studies.

Defending the truth in a post-truth world is not an easy proposition where the formal carriers of truth have either been muzzled or bought over. With the hint of a Marxian parody, Nanda ends her book with a caution: “The majoritarian state is no longer a mere specter, it is already a reality….and it is imperative for intellectuals to not merely to interpret the world they live in, but to intervene in order to change it.” What is perplexing is the fact there is very little country-wide resistance from the university and academic circles, barring some isolated valiant voices, against the post-truth assault on objective truths, science, academic freedom and democracy. Unfortunately, many of them, by being silent, are acting like willing enablers of the destruction of democracy and freedom to think, write and ask questions. 

An authoritative account of a post-truth India, this book fills a yawning gap in intellectual resistance, by unravelling the nuts and bolts of the strategies followed in setting the stage for the Hinduisation of the public sphere. The state which is constitutionally obliged to uphold the centrality of scientific temper, essential for sustaining a democratic secular Republic, is now actively participating to turn the clock back by legitimising pseudoscience and outdated metaphysics. Our nation is on the precipice of change and the backers of a supremacist ideology are working overtime on a project of remaking a country and its fundamental ethos. ‘The flame of enlightenment is waning’, a journalist once said to German novelist Günter Grass, “But”, he replied, “there is no other source of light”. As readers, we must thank Nanda for keeping the fire burning despite strong headwinds.

C.P. Rajendran is a geoscientist and a communicator on science policies, environment and education.