Book Review: The Spirited Lives of Everyday People and Their Vanishing Livelihoods

Aparna Karthikeyan’s ‘Nine Rupees an Hour: Disappearing Livelihoods of Tamil Nadu’ lays bare the cruel socio-economic arrangement that devalues the skills of some, while disproportionately rewarding the skills of others.

“Luddite” is a word used with a disparaging connotation to brand people as anti-technology. In his book Talking to My Daughter About the Economy, the economist Yanis Varoufakis writes that the Luddites, workers who protested against the loss of their jobs to the new steam-powered looms by destroying the machines in 19th century England, are among history’s more misunderstood protagonists. He posits that ‘their quarrel was not with the machines themselves…they were opposed to the fact that so few owned the machines. It was the social arrangement, not the technology they objected to.’

Take the skilled handloom weavers of the storied Kanjeevaram silk sarees. India’s quest to become a modern market economy is forcing them to quit a financially unviable occupation in search of jobs that do not require the application of their craft, but help them lead slightly better lives nonetheless. They did not destroy the power looms that outcompete them by cranking out cheap fabric at scale; they respect the “rational” decisions of the consumers who won’t be able to differentiate between a hand-woven cloth and a machine-made one. They are only disillusioned by a social order that is making it increasingly impossible to entertain any hopes of passing on knowledge accumulated over centuries to the next generation.

Aparna Karthikeyan
Nine Rupees an Hour: Disappearing Livelihoods of Tamil Nadu
Context (October 2019)

The cruel socio-economic arrangement that devalues the skills of some, while disproportionately rewarding the skills of others is unsparingly scrutinised and laid bare in Aparna Karthikeyan’s diligently researched and faithfully written book Nine Rupees an Hour: Disappearing Livelihoods of Tamil Nadu. The book is not a polemical tract though. It contains illuminating and moving narratives about a wide array of extraordinary everyday people who lead spirited lives, even as they linger on to their vanishing livelihoods. The author has brought to bear her excellent story-telling ability to ask a searching question: what kind of society allows its most creative craftspeople to wither away in the name of “creative destruction”?

There are ten different stories in the book about ten diverse but closely linked livelihoods, and each one is a gem. At one level, these micro-narratives coalesce into a carefully painted macro picture of rural Tamil Nadu. But at its core, the book is a reliable register of the ‘dreams and defeats, triumphs and tears’ (p. xi) of people who shoulder the burden of doing physically demanding and economically unrewarding skilled work. More often than not, such work is yoked to caste, and therefore it carries social stigma. This is best illustrated in the story about the palm-tree climbers. The prevailing misconception that palm-tree climbers continue to engage in tapping toddy, which is banned in the state of Tamil Nadu, makes them face humiliation in institutional settings such as banks, schools and hospitals.

The author tells the story of the farm economy, which has suffered both societal and policy neglect for decades, through the lives of three women farmers: Podhumani, Chandra and Poovayi. By doing so, she upends the conventional understanding that a farmer is almost always a male: “Women in India own around 13 per cent of farmland and do over 70 per cent of the agricultural work…They work twelve to thirteen hours more per week than men in the developing countries of Africa, Asia and the Pacific; yet, their contributions are often ‘invisible’ and unpaid’” (p. 19). Implicit in this gender bias in our understanding is an economic reasoning that is ridiculously circular: we measure what we value and we value what we measure. Both farm and family run on the energies of women who labour all day.

The story of Soundaram Ramasamy, the only woman bull-keeper in the Kangayam region near Coimbatore, is not only narrated engagingly, but also offers the readers a peek into the workings of the larger cattle economy. In fact, each story is rooted in the specific local context, and is situated within the wider national context in such a way that one gets the taste of a layered political economy critique of our idea of “development”. With the arrival of the Green Revolution, the role of cows and bulls in the farm economy diminished, and the White Revolution accelerated the replacement of indigenous breeds of cattle with exotic breeds, thanks to the rapidly increasing market demand for milk and milk products. The negative fallout of the twin blows to the cattle economy has now been aggravated by the extremely ill-advised and insidious bans on cow slaughter. As a result of these conscious policy decisions, we are staring at a triple crisis – of farm, of biodiversity and of environmental sustainability.

When it comes to the stories of the makers of nadaswaram and sickles, women weavers of the Pathamadai mats (who earn just nine rupees an hour) and performers of folk art forms, what is striking is the meticulous detail with which the author describes the complexity and arduous labour that inform their craft. These women and men take immense pride in their vocation, but their aspirational children who have seen their parents suffer a great deal to make ends meet seek gouravam (pride) in landing white-collar jobs in cities. They are too aware of the ugliness of the rural caste order to romanticise the caste labour their parents were forced into at a very young age. Migrating to urban centres has been a “great escape” for many from the clutches of feudalism in Tamil Nadu, which happens to be the most urbanised state in India.

The inferior treatment meted out to the craftspeople and folk artistes stems from a dogmatic notion of culture that is coloured by caste and class prejudice. Hanne M. de Bruin, a Dutch national who did her PhD on kattaikkuttu, and is married to P. Rajagopal, a chief exponent of the art form, asks the author: “Why are we not invited to theatre festivals in the city? To Chennai’s December music season? Why are we paid a pittance, compared to a classical musician, who might earn ten times more than what we do?” (p. 220). Even in the case of classical art forms, whether one makes it big depends largely on ‘which family you’re born in, whether you have a support system’ (p. 130), says Nrithya Pillai, Chennai-based Bharatanatyam dancer and teacher. Sakthivel, the nadaswaram maker from Narasingampettai, rues that while the players of the instrument have received awards and enjoy superior lifestyles, there has not been any significant improvement in the lives of its makers. The relationship between the makers and players of musical instruments is a highly unequal one, with the players always enjoying the upper hand. Carnatic music vocalist and author T.M. Krishna has chronicled the dynamics of such relationships in his recent book Sebastian & Sons: A Brief History of Mrdangam Makers.

Aparna Karthikeyan. Photo: Facebook

Some of the livelihoods that feature in the book would have found a place in the framework of constructive village work that was propounded by Gandhian economic thinkers like J.C. Kumarappa. They wanted to build a non-violent and just social order predicated on decentralised village republics. What was remarkable about Gandhian economic thinking was its unwavering attention to the moral, material and ecological consequences of economic actions. It eschewed both possessive individualism and coerced collectivism.

To borrow a phrase from Rajni Bakshi, the “civilizational Gandhi” who lived and died for satya and ahimsa, knew violence was inherent in a system that subordinated human beings to machinery, killing creativity and individual autonomy. For a very long time, scholars have attempted to draw attention to the manifestations of Gandhi’s idea of ahimsa in his economic vision. Ethics and economics are inseparable in that vision.

Farmers, artisans and petty producers who have been dispossessed in both stock and flow terms in a “post-reform” India are being relegated to the sidelines as the country chugs along to become a “modern” capitalist economy. The author appeals to the collective conscience of her readers by asking them a trenchant question: “Forced to sell their agricultural land, compelled to migrate to overcrowded cities, having little choice but to join the lower rungs of the labour market, heavily disadvantaged by a lack of formal education, isn’t this too, a violence?” (p. xvii). We would do well to remember that capitalist transitions across the world have been characterised by many forms of coercion and violence. The human cost of such a transition when it happens on a subcontinental scale is simply unimaginable.

The institutions that underpin any society are products of social engineering; they are not natural or inevitable. We can create spaces where traditional livelihoods thrive without the stigma of caste attached to them. We can ensure that farmers and weavers receive marketing support and remunerative prices for their output. We can build an environment where folk art forms compete with classical art forms on an equal footing. Things can be different, because they have been.

Raghunath Nageswaran has an M.A. in Economics from the University of Madras, India. His principal area of research interest is the political economy and economic history of post-independence India. He is a freelance writer and can be contacted at raghind@gmail.com.

Review: Why Criminals Enter Politics in India

In ‘When Crime Pays’, Milan Vaishnav explores the factors that influence voter demand for candidates with criminal reputations, showing that voters prefer them not despite their dubious record but because of it.

In When Crime Pays: Money and Muscle in Indian Politics, Milan Vaishnav explores the factors that influence voter demand for candidates with criminal reputations, showing that voters prefer them not despite their dubious record but because of it.

BJP_Congress_symbols_Reuters

Criminal candidates with ill-gotten wealth make themselves available to political parties as “self-financing” candidates. Credit: Reuters

“There are two ways of making politics one’s vocation: either one lives ‘for’ politics or one lives ‘off’ politics,” said German sociologist Max Weber in his essay ‘Politics as a Vocation‘. Surely, many politicians have come to live off politics but what are the ‘incentives’ that encourage individuals soaked in criminality to take the plunge into it in the first place? At a time when we are witnessing increasing criminalisation of politics in our democracy, this question needs to be confronted head on and that’s precisely what Milan Vaishnav sets out to do in his book When Crime Pays: Money and Muscle in Indian Politics.

The author has adopted a political economy approach to the study of the “symbiotic relationship” between crime and politics in India. The book is divided into three parts: Part I lays down the subject of enquiry and gives a broad overview of the larger changes that have happened in our society and economy since independence; part II explores the demand side and the supply side factors influencing the marketplace for criminals in politics and part III examines the nature of that marketplace and discusses concrete steps that need to be taken to minimise its importance.

While we know that the share of MPs and MLAs with criminal backgrounds has been growing steadily, the puzzle that stares us in our face is why such candidates get rewarded and not rejected by the voters. The author says that “the market metaphor serves as a useful frame to understand why the appeal of politicians linked to criminality endures”. Political parties act as a platform, purveying criminal candidates to the voters. This marketplace is best seen as a ‘platform market’, where strong ‘network effects’ are at play and the two sides – demand and supply – mutually reinforce each other.

One notices that the presence of criminal elements in politics is not altogether new. As the historian Srinath Raghavan has pointed out, muscle-power as embodied in entrenched caste-relations in rural India was instrumental in mobilising votes for the Congress party in the first two decades after independence. But the phenomenon we are looking at is the transformation of criminal individuals from being the hired guns of party politicians to becoming full-time politicians themselves. Why did they have to take the giant leap?

“Three trends – political fragmentation, deepening competition and continued Congress decline – converged in the late 1980s to break open the political system in an unprecedented manner”. How did this incentivise criminals to make their foray into electoral politics? The explanation offered is an interesting one: “Thanks to the uncertainty stemming from greater electoral competition, they were no longer able to rest easy knowing that the party that employed them would remain in power”. The author intelligently deploys the concept of ‘vertical integration’ to elucidate this development.

Milan Vaishnav When Crime Pays - Money and Muscle in Indian Politics Harper Collins, 2017

Milan Vaishnav
When Crime Pays – Money and Muscle in Indian Politics
Harper Collins, 2017

What do political parties gain by recruiting criminally connected individuals, especially when it can be self-defeating as the party’s image can take a beating for fielding criminals in elections? This is where the role of ‘competition’ comes into play. With the proliferation of political parties and expanding size of the electorate, electoral democracy has become a costly affair, which needs a steady flow of money to keep its wheels moving. Criminal candidates with ill-gotten wealth make themselves available to political parties as “self-financing” candidates and promise financial rents to the party coffers, thereby liberating parties of the binding constraint.

The supply side incentives are clear, but doesn’t the demand side (voters), which demands democratic accountability, express its dissatisfaction at this trend by rejecting such crooks? The author argues that “where the rule of law is weakly enforced and social divisions are rampant, a candidate’s criminal reputation could be perceived as an asset”. He identifies four channels through which such candidates establish their credibility – redistribution, coercion, social insurance and dispute resolution. All four, including coercion, are the sole prerogatives of the state and by guaranteeing these through their criminal reputation, they signal ‘credibility’.

The crucial question that begs our attention is whether they cater to a cross section of the electorate. The answer is no and it is so because, such individuals exploit social divisions to thrive and promise to protect sectional interests by engaging in “defensive criminality”, where they use strong-arm tactics to uphold the dignity of their caste brethren. The tension between caste-kinship and citizenship will be the driving force of a social churning that would put Indian democracy’s stressed institutions to further test in the political sphere. These criminal politicians are partial answers to the governance vacuum and know it is in their interest not to think up sustainable solutions that would render them irrelevant: “If the rule of law vacuum were solved by investing in state capacity to provide basic public goods, criminal candidates would lose their lustre”. In other words, even a minimal state envisaged by Adam Smith can fix our problems if it gets its institutional structure right.

By explaining how these factors influence voter demand for candidates with criminal reputation, the author debunks the “ignorant voter” hypothesis and shows that voters prefer such candidates not despite their dubious record but because of it. This thesis neatly fits into the classic economic paradigm of rational individuals making decisions in their self-interest by efficiently processing all the available information. But the author alerts us to the caveat that this thesis is context-specific and cannot be universally applied.

It would be pertinent to look at the trends in the dynastic consolidation of political power and perpetuation of criminality in politics. Recall that during the political Emergency, the complete takeover of state power by the Nehru-Gandhi family resulted in the criminalisation of the entire state apparatus and it was only a matter of time before the regional and smaller players emulated the first family’s model of centralising power. From the Akalis in Punjab to the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam in Tamil Nadu, most parties are run as family firms.

Milan Vaishnav. Credit: Youtube screenshot

Milan Vaishnav. Credit: Youtube screenshot

Nonetheless, it is important not to forget that leaders of such parties enjoy popular support in spite of their corrupt and criminal backgrounds. The paradigmatic example is Jagan Reddy of YSR Congress, who was seen by the masses as achha chor (Robin Hood types), as the veteran journalist P. Sainath put it, in the run up to the 2014 general elections. Lack of internal party democracy has increased the discretionary powers of the party patriarch/matriarch. The author has dealt with this aspect in detail to show how it encourages the continued supply of criminal candidates.

In using the marketplace analogy, the author states that a truly “free” market works through arm’s length transactions and informational symmetry. He argues that “politics often departs significantly from these core tenets” and “politics is about the structure of power”. These arguments are equally applicable to the so-called free market as well. In fact, information asymmetry is a major source of economic power and the invisible hand of the market doesn’t hesitate to use its invisible fist. As for the free market conception, it would be illuminating to read Ha Joon Chang’s 23 Things They Don’t Tell You About Capitalism to know that the myth of the free market is predicated on weak grounds.

The author uses the growth of multiparty competition as one of the explanatory factors to show what forced criminals to enter politics. If one assesses this argument within the analytical frame the author has used, then contrary to the standard economic proposition that competition will lead to social well-being and optimal outcomes for all, competition in the electoral marketplace has resulted in sub-optimal outcomes. An important observation made in the book is that criminals are recruited by political parties across the board to contest elections and their ideological vacuum allows them the suppleness to recruit such candidates. If the recently concluded assembly elections in Uttar Pradesh and its aftermath is any indicator, then one can argue that it is perfectly compatible to have both programmatic content and criminal legislators who can push the boundaries of that content.

That said, this is an intellectually stimulating work of scholarship. The interesting anecdotes and apocryphal stories about the criminal candidates add rich flavour to the narrative. The author has crunched truckloads of data by mining the Election Commission’s database of candidate affidavits and findings from independent election surveys. The numerous graphs in the book effectively supplement the well-constructed narrative. For those who despair about the state of politics, the book is a sobering reminder that ‘politics is a strong and slow boring of hard boards’ and ‘it takes both passion and perspective’.

Raghunath Nageswaran holds an M.A. in Economics from Madras Christian College.