The author posted this article on Facebook after the Economic Times reportedly refused to publish it.
With the finance minister announcing five sets of reform and relief measures, it is time to assess these.
One way of doing so is to examine which proposals need direct fiscal support, which require monetary assistance via the banks and the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) and which constitute policy reforms. This has been done by several economists. The consensus is that of the total package valued at Rs.20.9 lakh crore or 10.3% of GDP, the direct fiscal cost — or cash out of the central kitty — is a tad over Rs.2 lakh crore or around 1% of GDP.
I suggest a very different political economy perspective by posing a counter-factual: What might have been the relief and reform measures if COVID-19 struck India in November 2018, six months before the 2019 general elections?
If that had happened, Prime Minister Narendra Modi would have scurried to respond very differently, knowing that he could face the wrath of the ballot box in six months. Today, instead, he reigns in the comfort of ruling for another four years before encountering the nation’s voters yet again.
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This lens is important. We now know of the myriad anguishes of the pandemic. These would have been exactly the same had COVID-19 hit us in November 2018 instead of March 2020. The real issue is whether the government’s response to these pains would have been fundamentally different if it were six months away from the general election.
You bet it would.
As an example, instead of making a mockery of five kilograms of cereals and one of channa a’piece per month for three months to the 80 million out-of-jobs and near destitute workers amounting to Rs 3,500 crore, the government would have earmarked an extra Rs 2,000 per family per month for three months. Assuming a family size of five, this would have required the exchequer to fork out an extra Rs 96,000 crore. With no threat of elections, you can give 80 million people a handout of cereals and lentils.
The 20 crore women Jan Dhan account holders would have been offered Rs 1,000 per month for three months leading up to the elections, and not Rs 500 per month promised today — upping the ante by another Rs 30,000 crore. Equally, instead of increasing the daily wages under the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act by Rs 20 — or an additional fiscal outlay of Rs 40,000 crore — Nirmala Sitharaman would have probably increased it by Rs 30 to Rs 212 per day, thus raising expenditure by Rs 60,000 crore. She would have also helped augment state finances by persuading the Reserve Bank of India to enhance the ways and means advance limit by 75% — instead of 60% — and significantly extend the overdraft duration facility.
I could continue in this vein, but shan’t. The point is that if COVID-19 hit us six months before the 2019 general elections, the greatest focus would have been on how to get cash in the hands of the poor, the out-of-job migrant workers, to give more funds to the states who are bearing the brunt of the crisis, and to offer desperately needed working capital assistance to the micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs). In fairness, there has been succour for the MSMEs. We need to see how rapidly such assistance is offered and taken up.
Packages announced six months before the election would not have wasted time on policy decisions such as privatisation of public sector enterprises, removing Coal India’s monopoly, increasing foreign direct investment limits in defence production, reforms in aviation, privatisation of power distribution companies in the Union Territories, and the like. Not that these are useless. But none will create the demand spur needed to lift the economy from the COVID-19 crisis.
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With the comfort of four more years at the helm, the government has chosen to take a distinctly parsimonious fiscal call on rehabilitation and relief. Excluding the relatively small direct fiscal support to MSMEs, total relief coming from the exchequer amounts to Rs 1,78,700 crore, or an incremental 0.8% of GDP. The government’s assumption seems to be that in the coming three to four months things will normalise, and migrant labourers will return to the cities for work. So, why spend more at this stage?
The government may be right. But it is thinking just like Neville Chamberlain who was the UK’s chancellor of exchequer between 1931 and 1937; or like Andrew Mellon and Ogden Mills who were secretaries of the treasury of the US. Instead of boosting demand, they tried to cap their budgets, which worsened matters during the Great Depression.
Some economics is invariably right, especially in a slump such as this. And it says that you need to forget about the size of the fiscal deficit; stop worrying about the rating agencies; and fret not about inflation, for there will be little or none in the next six months. You must put cash in the hands of people who need it the most and, thus, boost demand.
Learn from what the US, the UK and the Euro area are doing. Because if COVID-19 hit us in November 2018, you would have done all of that. Yet, why learn? We have four more years, don’t we?
Omkar Goswami is an economist, economic historian and a director of several listed companies. He is the executive chairman of CERG Advisory.