Will the Judiciary Rise up to Meet Challenges to Indian Constitution?

Only time will tell if the judiciary can regain its independence voice.

By far the biggest outcome of the 2024 general elections for India is that the ruling coalition will no longer be able to amend the Constitution and convert the country from a secular state to a Hindu rashtra.

During the election campaign, the Prime Minister of India memorably said, “Ram is my idea of India.” The people of India have denied him the opportunity to see his dream come true through an amendment to the Constitution.

Lallu Singh, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) candidate from Faizabad (Ayodhya), who made a remark that his party wanted 400 seats to amend the Constitution or introduce a new one, has lost the election.

The present coalition government of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), will also not be able to amend the Constitution by deleting Article 16, which gives reservations in public employment to socially and economically backward classes.

The core of the Constitution will remain protected. The people of India have not just exercised their franchise, what we saw was the closest thing to a referendum on the basic features of the Constitution.

The question looming large in people’s minds was whether we will remain a secular nation or become a nation governed by sanatana dharm.

India has chosen to retain the core of the Constitution, which is secular, democratic and republican. Those who wanted to replace the system of governance with their version of “Ram Rajya” have been defeated.

Those who wanted to set up the norm of ‘cultural nationalism’, whatever that means, above the Constitution in the name of decolonisation of the country, have lost the unjust ideological war.

The Constitution is the end product of the aspirations of India’s independence movement and to deny the legitimacy of the Constitution in the name of decolonisation was an attempt to deny the sacrifices of the freedom fighters and those who led India to Independence.

Fortunately, voices that were calling into question India’s Constitution have been met with a resounding answer by India’s electorate.

The Constitution is not a colonial document, far from it; it makes a break with obscurantism and entranced hierarchies and inequalities constructed by Brahmanism.

What does the future hold for the judiciary?

Tradition and convention demands that law officers of the government of India resign even if they are to be continued by the incoming government. So far, we have not seen the Attorney General for India or the Solicitor General of India or the Additional Solicitors resign. This was required to be done by them.

In the recent past, we have seen the critical role of law officers in courts eroded by their inability to take an independent stand from the government they represent.

They seem to have forgotten that they do not take instructions from the government but advise the government. In my wish list, I would like to see this happen.

We are entitled to ask who will be the Attorney General for India, who will be the Solicitor General of India and who will be the other law officers of the incoming government. At the very least, they must not be people who deny the legitimacy of the Constitution of India and its basic features.

It has been famously said that when there is a strong government, the judiciary is weak. In recent years, we have witnessed an ebb in the confidence people vest in the judiciary. Petitioners in jail have chosen to withdraw their petitions for bail rather than have them heard by certain judges known for their proclivity to deny bail.

Another recent trend, and an unfortunate one that cannot be trivialised, is the surge in criticism against the judiciary, bookmarked by the rising number of memes calling out the judiciary for its inability to uphold the fundamental rights of the people and toeing the government line in all major challenges to governmental action or legislation.

Only time will tell if the judiciary can regain its independence voice. For all our sakes, let us hope it does sooner than later.

At present, there are two vacancies in the Supreme Court. The third vacancy will arise on September 1 this year, when Justice Hima Kohli demits office. Thus, there are a total of three vacancies in the Supreme Court to be filled up before the current Chief Justice of India (CJI) D.Y. Chandrachud retires on November 10 this year.

We need to keep a watch on who will be appointed to these vacancies sooner or later. Can we hope to see those committed to the ideology of the Preamble to the Constitution be appointed, or will there be more Victoria Gowris alluding to two of India’s minorities as “White Terror” and “Green Terror”.

Who really decides who becomes a judge of the Supreme Court of India? In theory it is the collegium, we know, but why are candidates recommended by the collegium not being appointed. What complex political calculus results in the delay of appointments to create a desired seniority among judges? Even the judges sought to be transferred by the collegium are not being transferred by the government.

We now have a system in which the future CJI is handpicked for appointment well in advance. While making an appointment to the Supreme Court, seniority does not appear to be the criteria anymore.

In a situation such as this, the government may be tempted to appoint those who it thinks will favoUr them. It is here that we expect the judiciary to demonstrate its independence.

Finally, let us look at the critical cases pending in the Supreme Court for decision:

  • The validity of the Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act, 1991 is pending before the Supreme Court. This case is of foremost importance since it is linked to the secularism of our country. The fate of litigation arising from the Gyanvapi mosque and the Krishna Janmabhoomi–Shahi Idgah case depends upon what the court will rule on the validity of Places of Worship Act.
  • The challenge to the validity of the Citizenship (Amendment) Act (CAA), 2019 is yet another crucial case. This case will decide whether the parliament can grant citizenship to immigrants based on their religion alone and the outcome of the case will also impact our understanding of secularism in this country.
  • The Supreme Court is yet to hear a challenge to the Chief Election Commissioner and Other Election Commissioners (Appointment, Conditions of Service, and Term of Office) Act, 2023, which excludes the CJI from the committee to appoint the chief election commissioner and election commissioners.
  • The validity of the Prevention Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA) and also the correctness of the judgment in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary versus Union of India, in which a three-judge Bench upheld contentious provisions of the PMLA, likely to be heard by the Supreme Court in the coming days. We have seen how the PMLA has been misused by the ruling government for political gains by breaking the opposition parties and threatening legislators from the opposition.
  • A larger Bench of the Supreme Court is yet to hear the validity of the passage of the Finance Act, 2017 as a money bill, which introduced problematic changes in the PMLA.
  • The judgment on the validity of Section 6A of the Citizenship Act, 1955, which granted legislative sanction to the Assam Accord extending citizenship to those who entered the state of Assam up to and including on March 24, 1971, is awaited. The law has been challenged on the ground that no illegal immigrants who entered Indian territory after 1947 should be granted citizenship.
  • The judgment of a seven-judge Bench on the question whether the Aligarh Muslim University is a minority institution is also awaited. This case is directly linked to the interpretation of Article 30 of the Constitution, which confers the right on minorities to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice.
  • The judgment on the power of state governments to sub-classify based on relative backwardness within the Scheduled Castes (SC) and Scheduled Tribes (ST) is also awaited. It is likely to impact whether backward among the SCs/STs including de-notified tribes and Vimukta Jatis can be granted separate quotas within the SCs/STs quotas.

All these laws entail violations of the right to life and liberty as guaranteed in the Constitution. In addition, the challenge to the CAA goes to the very root of granting citizenship based on religion alone.

We have seen very often that governments try to achieve through courts what they cannot achieve politically or on the floor of the legislature. At this point, it is not possible to see which way the court will lean or how it will read the message of the elections.

What kind of litigation is likely to reach the court after elections? We are likely to see petitions being filed by losing candidates challenging elections including on the ground that the winning candidate had campaigned on the basis of religion.

Finally, on a happy note, the pre-general elections period saw another election, the election of the president of the Supreme Court Bar Association (SCBA).

Senior counsel Kapil Sibal won by a majority of 1,070 votes. This appears to indicate that he has bridged the divide between the right and liberal constituencies at the Bar. This, by itself, is a healthy trend as it stopped the sharp polarisations we have seen at the Bar in the recent past.

Since 2014, the ruling party has adopted a strategy to get things done through surrogates by filing petitions in courts to achieve a political aim. Hopefully, this trend will become a thing of the past.

One also hopes to see the SCBA at the forefront for undoing the damage that has been inflicted on civil liberties in this country in the last decade.

We have seen very often that governments try to achieve through courts what they cannot achieve politically or on the floor of the legislature.

The journey must begin with a demand that the three new criminal laws are not implemented until there is a judicial audit of the implications of these laws for the citizens of India and access to justice.

With inputs from Paras Nath Singh.

This article was originally published on The Leaflet. 

Defending the Constitution Is Our Daily job, We Must and Will Always Speak Up

Senior advocate Indira Jaisingh writes that the recent letter stated to be written by 600 members of the bar comes as no surprise. “It is in fact a reaction to the resistance and a defence of the status quo.”

Lawyers are on last frontier between the judiciary and the executive, and can either safeguard the judiciary’s independence or facilitate the collapse of the separation of powers between the two. Judges, after all, are drawn from the community of lawyers and the organic link between them is never broken. An independent bar is therefore a precondition for the independence of the judiciary. But do we have one today? As the Supreme Court Bar Association moves towards the election of its leaders, its members must think carefully who they wish to elect to safeguard the independence of the judiciary

Defending the Constitution is our daily job.

We are trained to identify any deviation from rules and norms which become immediately visible to us and we are trained to raise an alarm when we see arbitrary actions, whether on the administrative side of the judiciary or the executive. It is in this context that the powers of the ‘master of the roster’ have come in for comments from the legal profession.

Assignment of work is made by the master of the roster, the chief justice of the court. This roster is announced in advance and is dependent of subject matters such as civil law, service law  criminal etc. Assignment of work is not and must never be dependent of who is the petitioner before the court.

Some of us noticed with alarm that matters relating to politicians concerning life and liberty go to certain benches alone. It was then our duty to raise an alarm. If our fears were misplaced, we had a right to be informed about the reasons for these decisions and assured that no arbitrary assignments were being made. Despite public debate on the issues, no explanation has been forthcoming from the registry of the court. In this situation, it becomes the duty of lawyers to raise the issue collectively and individually in different fora, inside and outside court.

A recurring problem

The problem is not new. As recently as in 2018, four senior judges of the Supreme Court raised the issue in the public domain when Deepak Mishra was the CJI. Despite this no solution has been found to the problem until it has surfaced again in recent times.

The issue was raised in court by the late Shanti Bhushan when he filed a petition challenging the power of the ‘master of the roster’ as being unguided and arbitrary. On one occasion when Prashant Bhushan was entering the court to appear in the matter, he was physically stopped from entering by a vociferous section of the bar who blocked his entry and tried to prevent him from reaching the front row.

This episode set the trend for the open display of polarisation at the bar through extra-constitutional means. What must be noted is that every effort was made to raise the issue of the powers of the master of the roster through legal channels. The issue remains outstanding and since it concerns the functioning of the judiciary, which is itself charged with the duty to protect the rights of the citizen versus the state, it will continue to be debated in the public domain.

Also read: ‘Classic Playbook of the Autocratic’: Lawyers Decry Modi-Backed Letter on Judiciary

Questions of life and liberty

This time it has surfaced over the issue of life and liberty. Lawyers have noticed that matters relating to the denial of life and liberty, especially of politicians of the opposition kind (others have no need to worry about life and liberty) and indeed members of civil society whose incarceration is considered necessary by the powers that be, such as Umar Khalid, get assigned to specially constituted benches. Things have reached a stage when litigants may be losing faith in the independence of judiciary. When those who are in custody seeking bail withdraw their cases from the Supreme Court rather than have it heard, the judges should be sitting up an asking themselves the question, why is this happening?

Whither ‘dispensation of justice’?

There is a collapse of the system of dispensation of justice for reasons which are too numerous to document here but history has shown that there will be from the legal profession, a resistance to any attempt to interfere with the independence of the judiciary. The recent letter stated to be written by 600 members of the bar, led by Harish Salve, comes as no surprise. It is in fact a reaction to the resistance and a defence of the status quo.

To begin with, as many have pointed out, the letter comes soon after the decision in the electoral bonds case and the not-so-subtle reference is to those who appeared in the case. It is no secret that Salve, now based in London, appeared on behalf of the State Bank of India (SBI) and was told in no uncertain terms that there was no ambiguity in the order as claimed the SBI and the judgment of the court should be respected forthwith. In this letter, he now finds his place with the president of the Supreme Court of India Bar Association and the president of the Bar Council of India, both of whom cannot open a sentence without “thanking the PM” for whatever it may be they are talking about. It is hardly a matter of surprise that the letter now gets the approval of the prime minister of India via a tweet blaming the Congress. This is yet another reference to lawyers who appeared in the case, some of whom were members of the Indian National Congress at some point.

The letter suggests that some of us who have spoken up on these questions are trying of “browbeat” the judiciary and that we selectively praise the judiciary when it suits us and criticise it when we lose cases in court on behalf of clients. The judiciary is an institution charged with the duty of standing between the citizen and an overbearing state. There will always be lawyers who will raise difficult questions about the functioning of the judiciary in defence of a rule of law. In order to stay robust, the judiciary must receive issue-based support from society and the legal profession but not unconditional support from the bar.

When we raise demands for free and fair justice on matters of life and liberty in the public domain, we defend the Constitution itself, not just the clients we represent. This is not cherry-picking for individuals or for corruption as suggested but support for right action when it is deserved and criticism of any deviation from the rule of law. Lawyers do not expect every case to be decided in favour of their clients but they do expect a fair and impartial hearing in court .

Given the importance of the judiciary and the legal profession, ruling parties have always tried to organise lawyers on their side and this letter is one such attempt. There are no institutional structures of communication between the judiciary and the government. Its institutional communications are confined to the appointment of judges and no more. Perhaps on budget and infrastructure issues the minister of law and justice does have official channels of communication with the judiciary, but nothing beyond that. Hence lawyers become very important channels of communication between the two institutions and the surrogate voice of the ruling party can be heard through them.

A duty to speak up

Lawyers have a duty to speak up when they see a failing judiciary and by that, I mean a judiciary in danger of losing its independence. On these issues lawyers have a duty to speak inside courts and outside court. This is not about supporting individual judges or opposing others. It is also not about winning of losing a case, it is about losing the judiciary as a whole. When we see that special rosters are set up to deal with special case, we need to speak up. When essential institutions of democracy are not protected such as the independence of the Election Commission, we need to speak up. This is not about cherry-picking individual cases, but about our approach to those cases which by their very nature support of undermine constitutional values.

It is no accident that this polarisation of the bar has taken place over the last ten years, a time when the country itself has been polarised quite consciously by the right-wing, which has strong politically aligned organisations in the legal profession.

The solution, if any, lies in transparency and accountability. It is time for the secretary general of the Supreme Court registry to issue a white paper on the powers and functions of the ‘master of the roster’ for the country as a whole to debate.

Indira Jaising is a noted human rights lawyer and a senior advocate at the Supreme Court of India. 

At a Time When the Battles of India’s Future Will Be Fought in its Courts, We Will Miss Fali Nariman

He was a liberal in the constitutional sense of the word, defending the fundamental rights of citizens against an overbearing state.

Fali Nariman is no more and the legal profession will never be the same again.

While there is no need to fear change, a part of our living history is lost. This is a very important part, which began before the constitution came into force and which continues today.

Fali Nariman was a man who saw the making and unmaking of the constitution. Acutely conscious of an attack on secular values he spoke up defending his liberal values and continued doing so, almost till his last days.

He was a liberal in the constitutional sense of the word, defending the fundamental rights of citizens against an overbearing state.

Belonging as he did to a minority community, he was also aware of the constitutional commitment to minorities in this country, a country which gave him the opportunity to rise to the top of his profession and to serve it in turn. He was shaped by the city of Bombay, now Mumbai, which enabled him to represent big businesses and master commercial law.

His commitment to democracy was obvious when he resigned as Solicitor General of India in 1975 upon the declaration of the Emergency.

The legal profession owes him a lot, but primarily the fact that he fought for and sought the collegium system of appointing judges.

He, during his lifetime, challenged every law which attempted to give governments the dominant voice or the last word in appointing judges to the Supreme Court and high courts.

He stood by a commitment to the separation of powers between the executive and the judiciary.

The big question is, will generations that follow – particularly the young lawyers of today – be able to ensure this separation of the domain of justice from the domain of partisan politics?

If he leaves a legacy, it is this: without independence of the judiciary from the executive of the day, the constitution will be reduced to nothing more than a piece of paper. 

Loud and aggressive in his advocacy of a case or a cause, Fali Nariman saw this country change from a colony to an independent state. He also saw it through the Emergency of 1975 and watched it arrive at this post-2014 state, which calls into question the basic features of the constitution and where India is described as a ‘temple’.

Fali Nariman did what one individual could do in a lifetime and more, leaving behind a challenge for the lawyers of today to carry the defence of the constitution forward. At a time when the battles of the future will be in the courts, we will miss him.

Indira Jaising is a noted human rights lawyer and a senior advocate at the Supreme Court of India. 

From the Certainty of the Constitution Towards Amorphous Culture and Customs

‘Custom’ and ‘culture’ impacted the judiciary as one saw an increasing trend to use those to justify imposing restrictions on fundamental rights or writing them out of existence.

You can read part one of Indira Jaising’s assessment of the courts in 2023 here.

How has the appeal to custom and culture impacted the judiciary?

It appears to have had a direct impact as the judiciary too has started appealing to culture and customs to justify imposing restrictions on fundamental rights or writing them out of existence.

Nothing illustrates this better than the judgment of Justice P.S. Narasimha in the marriage equality case, that involved a challenge to the Special Marriage Act, 1954.

He begins by saying:

“Marriage is a social institution and the status of the right to marry: There cannot be any quarrel, in my opinion, that marriage is a social institution.”

Two questions arise from this bald statement. In what sense of the word is marriage a social institution?

One might answer this question by saying that its breakdown has consequences for the parties to the marriage and the children of the marriage. These are issues that can be addressed by secular law, not religious codes, as has been done for the Hindu law of marriage.

The learned judge then proceeds to say:

“In our country, it [marriage] is conditioned by culture, religion, customs and usages. It is a sacrament in some communities and a contract in some other.”

There is no logical connection between these two statements. Even if marriage was not governed by sacrament or contract, it would still have social consequences, for example, the homelessness of women or the abandonment of children.

It would still be a social institution in which the society has a stake and the State has a legitimate interest in intervening to prevent the adverse consequences of a breakdown.

The question of whether marriage is a sacrament or a contract has consequences only for the form in which the marriage is solemnised. Some people choose to solemnise marriage in a secular form, some in a religious form and some in both.

Now let us look at the issue of marriage as a contract. What is being referred to here is the nikah at the time of a Muslim marriage where the man and the woman agree to wed each other. That is the contract.

This should not be something special to Muslim marriages.

Is it being suggested that a Hindu marriage does not require the two parties to consent to the marriage simply because it is a “sacrament”?

That would be a preposterous proposition to make and hence one must presume that a Hindu marriage involving a saptapadi also required the consent of the two parties to the marriage. This argument applies equally to a Parsi marriage or a Christian marriage or a secular marriage under the Special Marriage Act.

The judge then goes on to say, “State regulation in the form of codification has often reflected the customary and religious moorings of the institution of marriage.

An exercise to identify the purpose of marriage or to find its ‘true’ character is a pursuit that is as diverse and mystic as the purpose of human existence; and therefore, is not suited for judicial navigation.”

This is a complete cop-out. To say that the law in any circumstances cannot decide the content of marriage is to avoid a decision on the subject. I have said elsewhere that it is an agreement, hence a contract requiring informed consent between two people to share their lives, their hopes and aspirations with each other, their joys and their tragedies, to have sexual intercourse with each other, the exclusion of the rest of the world.

Also read: There May Be a Silver Lining in the Supreme Court’s Marriage Equality Judgment

In the choice of partner, the State has no legitimate interest. What the State does have a legitimate interest in is the distribution of assets and custody of children upon the breakdown of a marriage.

The judge then goes on to say, “But that does not render the institution meaningless or abstract for those who in their own way understand and practice it.” Indeed people do have their own understanding of what marriage is and it is far from being meaningless or abstract.

But for the judge in question it does render the institution abstract since “to identify the purpose of marriage or to find its true character that is as diverse and mystic as the purpose of human existence”.

It is the judge here who has abandoned his judicial robe and put on that of a mystic. One wonders why it is so important to give marriage such an exalted social status if one is not able to define it. Surely, it cannot be a social institution and a mystic one at the same time!

We are then told “the rules governing marriage and family, were largely customary, often rooted in religious practice. This exercise of codification, not always accurate and many a time exclusionary, was the product of the colonial desire to mould and reimagine our social institutions.”

It is here that we can identify in the judgment the underlying major premise (unspoken). Marriages are largely governed by religion, (and should continue to be) save for the “colonial desire to remould and reimagine our social institutions”.

There is amnesia about the fact that social reformers of Indian origin campaigned for the abolition of sati, for widow remarriage, for the right of woman to education, and for gender equality in the matter of inheritance.

To call it “colonial desire” is ahistorical. It also echoes the narrative of the ruling party that they are decolonising laws passed by the British – the language here is similar.

The subsequent mention of much-needed social reform does not make a difference to the underlying issue that marriage is a religious not a social institution governed by ancient custom which predates the Constitution of India. One must not forget the fact that custom, in order to be law, must be shown to exist since “time immemorial”.

We are then told, “Even when our own constitutional State attempted codification and reform, it left room for customary practices to co-exist, sometimes providing legislative heft to such customary practices.”

Different marriage laws are then cited to substantiate this. A glance at each of these indicates that they all relate to the form in which marriages may be solemnised, including diverse religious forms, but there is a failure to recognise that none of these laws address the substance of what is a marriage.

A bouquet of statutes offers a choice to parties to a marriage in what manner they wish to solemnise a marriage but what they have in common is the fact of a marriage by consent of the parties, not a “mystic” pursuit.

The form in which a marriage is solemnised cannot take away from the essential substance of a marriage, be it heterosexual or queer. There is an utter confusion between understanding the substance of the marriage and the form in which it is solemnised.

It is true that most marriage laws do have two substantive qualifications, one of age and the second the exclusion of prohibited degrees.

This is so that the State can have a legitimate interest in ensuring that those who consent to a marriage are in a position to give informed consent and so far as the prohibited degrees are concerned, this is for reasons of maintaining the health of the community and prevent inbreeding.

They can be said to be reasonable restrictions on the right to marry, constitutional or statutory. What is more, the restriction on prohibited degrees can be waived by custom. Hence, custom, far from restricting the choice of partner, enhances it.

And now for the final punch, the underlying premise, “In my considered opinion, the institutional space of marriage is conditioned and occupied synchronously by legislative interventions, customary practices and religious beliefs.

“The extant legislative accommodation of customary and religious practices is not gratuitous and is to some extent conditioned by the right to religion and the right to culture, constitutionally sanctified in Articles 25 and Article 29 of the Constitution of India.

“This synchronously occupied institutional space of marriage is a product of our social and constitutional realities, and therefore, in my opinion, comparative judicial perspectives offer little assistance.

“Given this nature of marriage as an institution, the right to choose a spouse and the right of a consenting couple to be recognised within the institution of marriage, cannot but be said to be restricted.”

So, there we have it, the right to marry is not a fundamental right but wait a minute, even if it was, it can be restricted by culture and religion.

In the hierarchy of norms, this represents a complete surrender of our constitutional freedoms and rights to “culture”, howsoever defined, with which the courts cannot interfere.

The logical fallacies and contradictions in this judgment are immense. Understating statutes is weak, with an inability to distinguish between formal validity and substantive validity of a marriage, an understanding of what are called “personal laws” is absent (notice that the words are not mentioned here).

If indeed there is no fundamental right to marry, what is there to prevent the State from telling us who to marry and who not to marry, or from saying Bharatiya culture will determine that question as well?

The judge points out, “Even today, much of the Mohammedan law of marriage is governed by religious texts and customs and there is hardly any State intervention.”

We are not talking about the role of the State here but that of the judiciary in sitting in judgments over statutory law.

The judge forgot to mention that in Shayara Bano versus Union of India and others, the Supreme Court struck done the customary practice of triple talaq at the invitation of a Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led government.

Also read: Triple Talaq: Why Just Muslims, Let’s Criminalise the Abandonment of All Wives

Further, the judge states, “The claim of the right to marry, de hors the existing statutory framework, is nothing but a claim to create a legally and socially enforceable status.”

May we have a legal definition of “status”? Being unmarried is also a status, not created by law, so what is the relevance of the fact that marriage is a status?

Then there is the question of marriage laws not being standalone laws. “They interact in multifarious ways with succession, inheritance and adoption laws, to name a few.”

But all these already have existing statutory frameworks. So far as inheritance is concerned, almost all personal laws permit the making of a will and the disposing of property to a greater or lesser extent.

Moreover, the Special Marriage Act was specifically amended to ensure that if two Hindus marry under the Special Marriage Act, they do not have to be governed by the Indian Succession Act, 1925 but will continue to be governed by their personal laws. Incidentally, this exception was made for Hindus alone and no other community.

Having concluded there is no right to marry, the judge concludes there is no right to a “union or an abiding cohabitational relationship”. Perhaps he overlooked the definition of a “domestic relationship” in the Protection of Woman from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 which recognises relationships “in the nature of marriage”.

The Chief Justice of India opines that “it is insufficient if persons have the ability and freedom to form relationships unregulated by the State”. He goes on to state that there is no right to “recognition” of the relationship by the State.

But he forgets that in the Shayara Bano case, the argument made was the act of recognition of triple talaq was an act of the State and it should be derecognised by the court.

The judge says, “In my considered opinion, it is in positively mandating the State to grant recognition or legal status to ‘unions’ from which benefits will flow, that the doctrine of separation of powers is violated.”

Was the doctrine of separation of powers violated when the court declared triple talaq unconstitutional?

Justice P.S. Narasimha continues, referring to his disagreement with the judgment of the Chief Justice of India, “Moreover, the right to a union cannot be located in Article 25 of the Constitution of India.

“Emphasis is placed on the term ‘freedom of conscience’ because that would situate in this freedom of conscience, the right not only to judge the moral quality of one’s own action but also to act upon it.

“If that were permissible under Article 25, then the textual enumeration of freedoms in Article 19 becomes redundant since these freedoms can be claimed to be actions on the basis of one’s own moral judgment. I find it difficult to agree with such a reading of Article 25.”

There are two fallacies here. Article 25 explicitly allows us to judge the moral quality of our actions and to act on them so long as we do not harm public order, morality, health and the fundamental rights of others.

Nowhere does the judge state that non-heterosexual relationships are immoral. Moreover, way back in Maneka Gandhi vs Union Of India, the court pointed out that rights overlap with each other and create a “golden triangle”. Hence, the fact that there is an overlap in the content of the right is of no consequence.

He concludes “for the reasons stated above the Petitions are dismissed”.

The judgment shows that, mirroring the Executive, our courts have set up a norm above the norm of the Constitution, i.e., culture, and will not enforce the text of the Constitution when it conflicts with the culture, howsoever defined. It is indeed the repudiation of the judicial function.

The legal community needs to be vigilant to prevent this failing court since the future of the rights of citizens seems to be in jeopardy.

The marriage equality judgment is the only judgment of the Supreme Court besides the one that held that Hinduism is a way of life and not religion alone which legitimises culture as the measure of whether a restriction on a right was reasonable or not.

We note that Article 13, which declares all laws that violate fundamental rights void, defines law to include “custom” but it does not include ‘culture’ as law. Yet today we have a judgment that clearly permits culture to trump fundamental rights.

If the cultural test of “reasonableness” can be used to uphold governmental action, why can it not be used to interpret the Constitution itself or the validity of a constitutional amendment for that matter?

Keshavananda Bharati versus State of Kerala, which was decided in 1973, held that the basic features of the Constitution, such as fundamental rights, secularism, democracy and federalism, could not be amended even by a Constitutional amendment.

Yet, today we see the same result as we would by an amendment by the creation of a norm higher than and inconsistent with the values of the Constitution.

A new set of practices has replaced constitutionalism and legality and has been elevated to the level above the Constitution with reference to which the Constitution and its basic features are to be interpreted. Rights, as we know them, are replaced by duties, negating the entire chapter on fundamental rights.

Our fundamental duties now take precedence over our fundamental rights. We must all do our ‘kartavya’ without any expectation of freedom. A new language of politics and consequentially law has been invented in place of constitutionalism.

We are told that there is an “intrinsic dharma” of the people of India which is ancient and predates the Constitution. Once a norm above the Constitution is created, it is easy to see why there is no need to amend the Constitution.

That is why I say that 2023 has been the year of the surajmukhi court.

Indira Jaising is a noted human rights lawyer and a senior advocate at the Supreme Court of India. She is a co-founder of The Leaflet, where this article first appeared. It has been republished with permission.

There Is No Lack of Judicial Power in India. Just a Refusal to Act on It.

A long look at 2023 and how the courts let India down.

At the end of the year 2023, a court must be judged by its core function, the judgments that it delivers in defense of the rights of citizens and the defense of the rule of law, holding power to account.

Constitutions have existed under monarchies and kings who claim a divine right to rule. There is no concept of kings being accountable to the people, they are accountable only to the Divine.

However, modern constitutions are based on the theory that sovereignty resides with the people to be exercised in our interest by our elected representatives. They bear distinctive features that encode liberal norms and most importantly mandate their enforcement by a judiciary.

Our Constitution is a binding legal document not a statement of political intent to be enforced at the discretion of the government of the day.

Marbury versus Madison, decided in 1803 in the US, established judicial review, which laid the foundation for modern-day constitutional and administrative law. The judgment came at a time when the Supreme Court of the US was being attacked by Thomas Jefferson and his followers.

The judgment of Justice Marshall established for the Supreme Court of the United States the apex position of final interpreter of the Constitution. There is little disagreement among scholars around the world on the principle that “a law repugnant to the Constitution is void, and that courts, as well as other departments, are bound by that instrument”.

This is what constitutionalism is about. That was the end of the doctrine of supremacy of the Parliament or the Congress, by giving the court a final voice on the legal and constitutional propriety of acts of any member of the Executive or an Act of Congress.

Ours is a Constitution that explicitly states, in Article 13, that all laws, customs, and usages inconsistent with or repugnant to our fundamental rights shall to the extent of the repugnancy be void.

The very existence of Articles 32 and 226, which allow direct access to the Supreme Court and the High Courts respectively, establishes the enforceability of our rights.

There is a hierarchy of norms for the governance of our society and the Constitution is at the top of it.

Yet our Constitutional rights as citizens now appear to be unenforceable. Our elected representatives now treat the Constitution not as a normative and enforceable document but as a political document alone, a statement of intent to be enforced selectively at its discretion.

It is this approach to the Constitution that the court has been unable to correct and on which it has failed to demand accountability.

In 2023, the Supreme Court failed to protect electoral democracy, the health of our economy, our own health, federalism, and the fundamental rights of citizens.

Whether it was demonetisation and its impact on the country, the right of our elected representatives to remain in office without being subjected to Operation Lotus, or the disappearance of a state and its conversion to a Union territory, the court deferred to the wisdom of the government of the day, sometimes explicitly stating that it was not the function of the court to interfere with government policy or under the doctrine of not wanting to enter the “political thicket” laying claim to work on the theory of separation of powers.

Gradual repudiation by the court of its core function of judicial review

It appears almost as if our rights are not enforceable anymore and there is an attempt to return to the idea that governments are benevolent decision-makers and know best what to do. The Constitution has been robbed not only of its spirit but also of its binding normative nature.

The government of India has not lost a single judgment in the Supreme Court in 2023

The four most significant challenges to major decisions of the government, demonetisation (save for one dissent), the swearing in of a Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led government in Maharashtra by the governor, the abolition of Article 370, and the challenge to the Special Marriage Act, 1954 which excludes queer marriage, all were decided in favour of the government.

A prominent feature of judgments of the Supreme Court in 2023 has been that even when the declaration of law was in favour of the petitioner, the operative Order was not.

The court in Subhash Desai versus Principal Secretary, Governor of Maharashtra and Ors held that the action of the governor in swearing in a new government was bad in law and yet the government was allowed to remain in place, and it was left to the speaker to decide on the applications for disqualification of members of legislative assembly (MLAs).

At the time of writing, more than one year after the chief minister was unlawfully sworn in, the BJP remains the ruling party and the speaker has taken no decision.

When it came to In Re Article 370 of the Constitution of India, even though the Supreme Court held that the amendment to Article 370 proviso via the Article 367 rout was ultra vires, it ruled that the abolition of Article 370 by the Presidential Order was valid since the President could, in any event, abolish Article 370 by resorting to Article 307(3) independent of the proviso “unilaterally”.

The entire discussion of the powers of the President during an Emergency was unnecessary, the abolition could occur with or without an Emergency. On the question of the validity of the reorganisation of the state into a Union territory, the court accepted the statement of the Solicitor General of India – which is not binding on the Parliament – that elections in J&K will be called before September 2024, rather than giving a mandamus to conduct the elections.

When it came to same-sex marriage, the court sent the petitioners back to the government to work out a new law laying down guidelines for a violence-free relationship.

The ruling party believes that our jurisprudence can be written and rewritten, and that it is time to return to our culture which goes back to Vedic times – to a time before repeated invasions by ‘foreigners’.

They believe that our laws are to be found in the Manusmriti and the Arthashastra and we must return to our roots. Could these ideas perhaps be permeating into the judiciary through a process of osmosis?

If the Constitution of India has any value, it is that it contains Article 226 and Article 32 which enable the courts to give binding directions to the government, which are the heart and soul of the Constitution. It is these Articles that are endangered today.

The body of the judiciary has self-inflicted wounds.

The question

How has all this been achieved?

Some authors such as Tarunabh Khaitan have expressed the view that this has been achieved by killing the Constitution with a thousand cuts. True that is for the legislature. But what about the judiciary?

Others have said that when governments are authoritarian and majoritarian, the courts are weak. But then why have an independent judiciary at all?

Still others call it an ‘Executive court’, an inaccurate description since Executive courts do not normally have the power of judicial review at all, as in the former USSR.

Some have even suggested that the courts are being blackmailed. For this, there can be no evidence.

The answer can be a combination of these factors but there is something deeper than these factors to be investigated.

To understand this, let us look at our not-too-distant constitutional past, the declaration of the Emergency and the resistance to it.

The struggle against the Emergency demonstrated both the strength and the malleability of constitutionalism. It demonstrated how the political process, parties and individuals approach a written document, namely the Constitution, to shape their approach and attitude to the rule of law.

The struggle against the Emergency was to restore the status quo ante politically and later to amend the Constitution to ensure that the right to life is guaranteed and can never be suspended.

Both, Indira Gandhi, who was instrumental in imposing the Emergency, and Jayprakash Narayan, who led the struggle to revoke the Emergency, accused each other of being “dictators” and “fascists”— meaning thereby they saw the other deviating from the path of liberal democratic principles on which the Constitution and Indian polity was envisioned to be founded.

Both of them claimed allegiance to the Constitution. Speaking of the events which led to the imposition of the Emergency, namely the protests led by Jayprakash Narayan and the students’ movements, Bipan Chandra points out in his book In the Name of Democracy: “The defence of Indian democracy seems to have been the main justification for both the J.P. movement and the Emergency regime.”

In the hierarchy of norms for the governance of our society, both accepted that the Constitution is at the top.

In contrast, today’s ruling party looks at liberalism as an import, they yearn for a return to Ram Rajya, the codes of Manusmriti and the governance of the Arthashastra.

Sitting judges now refer to these texts to justify their decisions at a rate that can only be described as alarming. Theology, whatever name is used to refer to it— custom, culture or religion— has for many become the source of law.

This change is symbolised in our public life by the installation of the Sengol in the new Parliament building, a symbol of kingship rather than of Republicanism.

With the upcoming consecration of the Ram Temple— built by a trust set up by a Supreme Court judgment— by constitutional functionaries in the name of exercising the right to religion, the separation between religion and the State is imploding. What tsunamis this admixture will produce only time will tell.

The question also is how this appeal to customs and culture impacted the judiciary.

It appears to have had a direct impact on the judiciary as they too have started appealing to culture and customs to justify imposing restrictions on fundamental rights or writing them out of existence.

Nothing illustrates this better than the judgment of Justice Narasimha in the marriage equality case.

The judgment shows that, mirroring the Executive, our courts have set up a norm above the norm of the Constitution, i.e., culture, and will not enforce the text of the Constitution when it conflicts with the culture, howsoever defined. It is indeed the repudiation of the judicial function.

The legal community needs to be vigilant to prevent this failing court since the future of the rights of citizens seems to be in jeopardy.

The year 2023 has been the year of the surajmukhi court.

In addition to the judgment of the court which held that Hinduism is a way of life and not religion alone, the marriage equality judgment is the only judgment of the Supreme Court legitimising culture as the measure of whether a restriction on a right was reasonable or not.

We note that Article 13, which declares all laws that violate fundamental rights void, defines law to include “custom” but it does not include ‘culture’ as law. Yet today we have a judgment that clearly permits culture to trump fundamental rights.

If the cultural test of “reasonableness” can be used to uphold governmental action, why can it not be used to interpret the Constitution itself or the validity of a constitutional amendment for that matter?

Keshavananda Bharati versus State of Kerala, which was decided in 1973, held that the basic features of the Constitution, such as fundamental rights, secularism, democracy and federalism, could not be amended even by a Constitutional amendment.

Yet, today we see the same result as we would by an amendment by the creation of a norm higher than and inconsistent with the values of the Constitution.

A new set of practices has replaced constitutionalism and legality and has been elevated to the level above the Constitution with reference to which the Constitution and its basic features are to be interpreted. Rights, as we know them, are replaced by duties, negating the entire chapter on fundamental rights.

Our fundamental duties now take precedence over our fundamental rights. We must all do our ‘kartavya’ without any expectation of freedom. A new language of politics and consequentially law has been invented in place of constitutionalism.

We are told that there is an “intrinsic dharma” of the people of India which is ancient and predates the Constitution. Once a norm above the Constitution is created, it is easy to see why there is no need to amend the Constitution.

There has been a transformation of an unparalleled kind in the last 10 years. It is not just a thousand cuts or an undeclared Emergency, the very norms by which we govern ourselves have been changed. The tragic part is that all this has been achieved through the judiciary.

The government needs the judiciary to legitimise its political agenda and achieve the transformation of the State from a secular to a theocratic one. What we are seeing is that the text of the Constitution remains in place while its core values of justice, liberty, equality, fraternity and dignity have been repudiated.

To those who say we are decolonising our law, it must be said that the Constitution including its preamble is sui generis. The Constitution of India represents a revolutionary break from everything that went before it and hence the ideology of the past— political or religious cannot be used to interpret it.

The three criminal laws did not need a repeal, if reform was needed, they could have been amended. It is false to suggest that they are part of an effort of decolonisation to achieve citizen-centric justice.

Changing names does not make laws anti-colonial just like changing names of cities does not transform them into clean, green and liveable.

Deceitful devices

Apart from setting up cultural norms to govern the country, many deceitful devices have been used, leaving it to the judiciary to sort out the mess. Money Bills have been used to create crimes, to circumvent the Rajya Sabha.

Notifications have been issued where legislation was required, as in the case of demonetisation.

It was left to the dissenting judge to point out that the law had been circumvented.

How are judges appointed: Who ‘mans’ our courts?

Our courts are literally maned. During the tenure of Chief Justice of India (CJI) Dr D.Y. Chandrachud-led collegium, which has been relatively long, 14 judges have been appointed to the Supreme Court. Not one among them is a woman or from the Scheduled Tribe or Scheduled Caste communities.

Indeed, an impressive statue of Dr B.R. Ambedkar in band and gown was installed under the leadership of the CJI. We seem to honour Dr Ambedkar more in brick and stone than in having regard to Articles 15 and 17 of the Constitution of India.

And what are the politics of the judges appointed?

Given that our high courts and Supreme Court judges are self-appointed by the collegium, it is the judiciary alone that bears the burden of making appointees of fair-minded and independent judges of their choice, and of ensuring caste, religious, and gender diversity in our courts. In this, it has failed.

Let us look at a highly controversial appointment to the High Court of Madras, that of Lakshmana Chandra Victoria Gowri. She was part of a women’s organisation of the BJP. Her speeches in that regard are in the public domain and they can rightly be characterised as being ‘hate speech’, proscribed by the Constitution.

For example, she likened Islam to “green terror” and Christianity to “white terror”. Yet she came to be appointed as a judge of a high court. When the news broke, the lawyers in Chennai were so outraged that they filed a petition in the Supreme Court, challenging her appointment on the ground that she was not eligible to be a judge, in that her public utterances were against constitutional morality and showed bias towards minorities.

After a great deal of confusion relating to whether or not the collegium was aware of her utterance, the matter was listed before a Bench comprising Justices Sanjiv Khanna and B.R. Gavai.

The petition was hastily dismissed on the ground that once appointed, no challenge to the appointment could be made as the ground of challenge is limited to the question of whether or not the person was qualified as required by the Constitution, namely the person concerned should have been a practising advocate for at least 10 years.

That was begging the question raised, namely, whether a person who had exhibited her hatred of religious minorities was eligible to be a judge of a Constitutional court.

The appointment was made with the full consciousness of the fact that she had made those speeches. She was administered the oath of appointment while her appointment was still under challenge. Welcome to the ideological court.

Magical transformations do not occur when judges sit on Benches. The real name of the game is Koun Banega CJI? Seniority, which was the primary criterion for the appointment of judges to the Supreme Court from high courts, was given a go by picking up judges from high courts who could go on to become the CJI, given the young age at which they are picked up.

Appointments and transfers suggested are not made. The Constitution has offered no method by which the recommendations of judges can be implemented by issuing a mandamus to the President of India.

Judges who have been recommended for transfer to other courts, more particularly four judges from Gujarat, have remained in the comfortable climate of the state despite the recommendation having come months ago.

At the time of writing, news has come in that two days after one of the collegium judges retired, chief justices have been appointed to five high courts, giving the clear impression that the voice of the retiring judge was avoided.

What we are looking at is a collapse of the judiciary from within. We must take it that every judge who is appointed has been appointed with the concurrence of the collegium.

The two avatars of a judge

We have seen judges before and after they become chief justices of the court. Something definitely changes when they become chief justices, maybe it is the power that comes with being the ‘first among equals’ but their sense of power certainly increases.

One source of power is that of the Master of the Roster. The assignment of cases to particular judges is the function of the master. The practice and procedure of the Supreme Court has been that a case will be heard by a Bench that issued notice on the case.

In case one of the judges is not available or is on a different Bench, the case is assigned to the senior of the two judges and if the senior for some reason is not available then to the junior of the two.

See, for example, Paragraph 6 of the Handbook of Practice and Procedure. Para 6 specifically says: “If the first coram is not available on a particular day on account of retirement, the case shall be listed before the judge constituting the second coram. If the second coram is also not available, the case shall not be listed on that day.”

This practice was wantonly abandoned, making it possible to assign any case to any Bench. We have a herd of lawyers Bench-hunting, now are we witnessing the registry Bench-hunting? Efforts by senior lawyers to meet the Master of the Roster to address the issue have failed.

The most visible of our judges in the public domain, the CJI, is the most inaccessible to the Bar, which is meant to be an equal partner in the protection of the independence of the judiciary.

Occasional visits to the canteen or the singing of children’s jingles for Christmas is no substitutive for interaction between the Bench and Bar on matters of judicial administration. Open letters never to be replied to are all we are left with.

It is time for judges to wake up and understand that it is lawyers alone who stand as a barrier between the Bench and the Executive. It is no doubt a tragedy that the Bar today is as polarised as civil society, and the Bar has failed in its duty of fiercely defending the independence of the judiciary from the Executive.

Today, we not only have a Chairman of the Bar Council of India but also a President of the Supreme Court Bar Association who credits the Prime Minister in their public statements for all that goes in the name of justice.

Unfinished agenda 

Having achieved its agenda of building a Ram Mandir and the abolition of Article 370, what is the unfinished agenda of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh? Is it that of the Uniform Civil Code (UCC) or might that be for the incoming government?

Recent reports suggest that states such as UP, Himachal, Gujarat and Assam will introduce their own UCC but there is no indication what these codes will contain.

While states have the power to make changes to family law, in a federal structure these will bring in extraordinary problems pertaining to the recognition of these laws by other states which will likely have their own separate laws on the subject matter.

Interstate marriages and migration will bring with them their own problems of private law regarding the applicability of laws of two different states on subjects ranging from the validity of marriage to jurisdiction over property, but those problems can wait for another day.

Are you surprised I call 2023 the year of the surajmukhi court?

Postscript

Its ironic that at the time of writing, the Supreme Court of Israel, sitting in a full panel of 15, by a majority and for the first time in its history, rejected the law passed by Parliament in July that barred judges from using a particular legal standard to overrule decisions made by government ministers.

While the full text of the judgment is not available, it is reported the judgment centered on the concept of ‘reasonableness’, a legal standard used by many judicial systems, including in Australia, Britain and Canada.

One may India to this list.

There is no lack of judicial power in India, just the refusal to act on it.

Indira Jaising is a noted human rights lawyer and a senior advocate at the Supreme Court of India. She is a co-founder of The Leaflet, where this article first appeared. It has been republished with permission.

An Open Letter From Indira Jaising to the Chief Justice of India on Women’s Day

The judiciary must consciously eliminate derogatory tendencies towards women in our (spoken and judicial) language.

To the Chief Justice of India

March 8, 2019

Dear Sir,

The profession of advocacy relies heavily on the power of language, its interpretation, and its socio- political baggage. Language is our weapon and shield, we agitate with our words, and we seek protection in our guaranteed rights.

As Deborah Cameron puts it,

“Sexist language teaches us what those who use it and disseminate it think women’s place ought to be:  second-class citizens, neither seen nor heard, eternal sex-objects and personifications of evil.”

In this way, sexist language is violent.

It needs to be reminded to everyone in our profession that such power wielded by our words inside the courtrooms and outside should be eliminated so as to not manifest as violence.

Language is more than a mere communication tool. It is an intuitive social, cultural and political indicator, which reflects prevailing attitudes and ethos of any society. So, when we talk about “gender bias” in a language, we refer to the superior-inferior paradigm that has evolved due to distinction in gender .

Gender is a social construct, heavily burdened with stereotypes, labels and moral character attributes. The Constitution of this country protects us all against discrimination based on “sex”,  and this Hon’ble Court has held that perpetuating gender stereotypes is a form of such discrimination.

In my years at the Bar, there have been multiple incidents where sexist remarks being made by lawyers, go unnoticed by the Bench. Such tacit acceptance of sexist language in the courtroom and brushing it aside as “didn’t mean any harm”, gives it a level of legitimacy, and a judge fails in their duty in protecting the fundamental right enshrined under Article 15 if they don’t disapprove of and call out sexist language, remarks or comments made in their courtroom.

Also read: The Indian Women Who Fought Their Way Into the Legal Profession

Recently, I was referred as  a “wife”  rather than by my name or as counsel, by a senior male lawyer in the courtroom, although immediate corrective action was taken by him upon my protest.  It was left to counsel to point out “ this is a sexist remark.” The judge did not protest. In another event, a lawyer remarked to  a fellow panellist on a national television debate that “if you are afraid, go wear petticoats and bangles.”

On another occasion in the Supreme Court while I was arguing, a senior male lawyer referred to me as “that woman” while he was referring to all his male colleagues as “my learned friend”, and this, when I was the Additional Solicitor General and was representing the CBI. I expected the judge to immediately reprimand him, but he did not. Instead the  judge was enjoying the spectacle and smiling  I asked for protection from the use of such derogatory language and he said “Madam, you don’t need any protection, you are overprotected”.

So if you stand up for your rights, you demand equality you are victimised and you better grin and bear it.

On other occasions, I have been called “shrill” while my male colleagues are valorized for being totally aggressive in the court. These things hurt immensely. I have already gone on record to say I have been sexually harassed in the corridors of the Supreme Court of India, notwithstanding my grey hair and notwithstanding that the corridors are under CCTV surveillance.

More than anything else, women crave for their dignity to be respected at the workplace. In over fifty years of practice I have not found any improvement in the culture of the courts which is predominantly male. Women, though present, in larger numbers are invisible from public discourse, unless they are someone’s wife, sitter, daughter, or politically connected to the powers that be.

In the pursuit of a “gender just” and “equal” society, misogynistic phraseology in political, social or legal parlance cannot be allowed, entertained or nurtured.

Judgments of courts across the country enjoy the status of being the law of the land, but unfortunately judicial language continues to use words and phrases which perpetuate patriarchy, endorse stereotypes of women’s perceived roles and behaviour and entrench biases that are detrimental to the status of women in our society.

Judges of the Apex Court in a judgment have referred to a woman in a live-in relationship as a “keep”.  I had occasion to point out in my writings that only slaves and property can be “kept”. Words and phrases in judgments that connote a subordinate role to woman in a relationship, objectify them as property, and merely for the man’s sexual pleasure, should not only be condemned and expunged, but barred from being used. This is the only way of creating a gender sensitive bar and bench.

Legal language or the language of law, of which the judiciary is the custodian and guardian, should be the  norm-setting language of equality for acceptable legal discourse of a nation. In a democracy, legal language must be judged by how clearly and effectively it communicates the rights and obligations conferred by the Constitution, including the right to gender justice.

On the occasion of International Women’s Day, I urge and implore you to take active measures for ensuring that advocates and judges across the country are mindful and checked for the gender sensitivity of their language inside the courtrooms and outside. It has been over 70 years that Article 15 of the Constitution entitled persons of all sexes equal status in this country.

Also read: How Cultural Nationalism and Women’s Rights Locked Horns in the 19th Century

It should be unpardonable to perpetuate any sexist stereotypes that demean or denigrate the person of any sex, especially in the courtrooms, which are places of seeking justice.

Justice D.Y. Chandrachud in the judgment of this Hon’ble Court in Navtej Johar v. Union of India (2018) 10 SCC 1, wrote in his concurring opinion that perpetuating stereotypes about a class under Article 15(1) is a violation of that fundamental right. The relevant extract is as follows:

“A discriminatory act will be tested against constitutional values. A discrimination will not survive constitutional scrutiny when it is grounded in and perpetuates stereotypes about a class constituted by the grounds prohibited in Article 15(1). If any ground of discrimination, whether direct or indirect is founded on a stereotypical understanding of the role of the sex, it would not be distinguishable from the discrimination which is prohibited by Article 15 on the grounds only of sex. If certain characteristics grounded in stereotypes, are to be associated with entire classes of people constituted as groups by any of the grounds prohibited in Article 15(1), that cannot establish a permissible reason to discriminate.”

Justice Chandrachud had further upheld this in the Sabarimala Temple entry case, reported as Indian Young Lawyers Association v. Union of India (2018 SCC Online 1690) as follows:

“To suggest that women cannot keep the Vratham is to stigmatise them and stereotype them as being weak and lesser human beings. A constitutional court such as this one, must refuse to recognise such claims.”

I have taken the liberty to make a few suggestions and I hope you will consider them.

  • The judiciary  under the guidance of the Chief Justice of India takes the lead and sets up a Commission of Enquiry to do a gender audit of court room culture, discriminatory behaviour, availability of  infrastructure such as crèche and toilets to ensure the right to work with dignity  and safety and security of women at the Bar.
  • Organise a Fact-Finding Committee to document judgments and judicial documents that contain sexist remarks, to understand the gravity of violence meted out through these judgments, and ensure that these words and phrases are barred from being used in judicial language by judges and lawyers
  • Make active efforts to learn, if an advocate being appointed to a senior leadership position, or a judge being promoted, has condoned sexist behaviour or indulged in it inside the courtrooms or in public life. Such person should not be given the position of a role model or a leader.
  • Issue a circular or practice directions to judges across the country to check the usage of sexist language by lawyers, litigants, and others in their courtrooms.

Sir, the judiciary is responsible for not only rejecting such phraseology, but for ensuring its elimination in the reading, interpretation and explanation of the law.

Just as language echoes the times and culture of the period, it also has the power to influence the thoughts of a nation and mould the culture of a society. The judiciary must consciously eliminate derogatory tendencies towards women in our (spoken and judicial) language.

The symbol of justice may be a blindfolded woman, but none of us will settle for tokenism or symbols.

Wishing you a very Happy International Women’s Day!

Regards,

Indira Jaising

This letter was first published on The Leaflet. Read the original here.

CBI’s Attempted Arrest of Kolkata Police Commissioner Was an Attack on Federalism

India has no “federal crimes“, only a federal investigating agency. Its powers are subject to the state giving its consent to investigate a crime within its territory.

What began with an attack on the powers of the Delhi government to govern in accordance with the Constitution, has ended with an attack on the West Bengal government to govern in accordance with the Constitution. The NDA government at the Centre appears to think that the CBI has the right to destroy the federal character of the Constitution.

When convenient, we are told that law and order is a state problem, but when it is politically expedient to interfere with the functioning of a State, the CBI is ever-present in every state. While Justice Lodha once described the CBI as a “caged parrot,” he could not have imagined that the consequence of un-caging it would be to destroy the very federal structure of the Constitution.

Federal investigative agencies cannot investigate in a state’s territory without its authorisation

In the case of an interstate crime, the police of a particular state that wants custody of a person, has to requests the police of the other state to provide police assistance, and obtain a production warrant from the court where the crime is being investigated.

It is true that the Supreme Court can, when satisfied that there is good reason to do so, direct the CBI to investigate a crime in any state. However, in the Sharada case , although there was an order directing the CBI to investigate the case, the Court was not monitoring the case and had directed that all further applications should be made to the high court.

Also read: Explainer: What the Standoff Between Mamata Banerjee and the Modi Govt Means

The Supreme Court while doing so had directed the states to “cooperate” with the investigation, an expression which must be understood in its ordinary meaning, that is that the state should facilitate the investigation.

The West Bengal state police wrote to the CBI offering cooperation.  However, the CBI issued summons under Section 60 CrPC. The state moved the Calcutta high court against the summons against its officers. The Calcutta high court kept the summons in abeyance.

The CBI scooped down to the commissioner’s office without a warrant

By no stretch of imagination did it mean that the CBI has the power to make the raid at the office of  the Kolkata police commissioner in relation to the investigation, when the high court is seized of the matter and has passed an order keeping in abeyance the CBI summons to the Kolkata the police in relation to the investigation.

In the face of the order, the attempted arrest of the CP was not only illegal but grossly mala fide.

Those who are tasked with the duty of governing in accordance with the Constitution, have failed us. A government which believes it represents “the Will of the People” due to its majority in Parliament, has failed to understand that it governs under a federal Constitution, where each state is autonomous. Such an attack would never be made in a state governed by the BJP.

When police systems are operated for political gain, we live in a police state.

It is no wonder that Anand Teltumbde gets arrested in the face of an order protecting him for four weeks. It in no wonder that the CBI is being used to curb dissent.

The very existence of the CBI hangs by a thread of a resolution, undermining the power given to the states to investigate crime. A challenge to its legality is pending, indefinitely, in the Supreme Court of India.

The Supreme Court of India itself is being repeatedly being tested, as in the Rafale case, the Alok Verma case and now in the West Bengal case. Will it emerge as the guardian of the Constitution? Let’s wait and watch.

As elections come closer, we can expect to see more and more attacks on the courts and the Constitution.

Also read: West Bengal vs Centre: Mamata Banerjee Holds Cabinet Meeting at Protest Site

Update

At 10:35 am today, the Solicitor General Tushar Mehta mentioned the case before the Bench presided over by the Chief Justice of India for urgent orders. The round of urgency the Solicitor General said that the Kolkata police commissioner was attempting to destroy evidence, to which the Chief Justice responded by saying that there was no such evidence in the applications filed. Hence, urgent listing for the day was declined.

CRPF illegally deployed by CBI

The CRPF is meant under law, to assist the civil authorities of the state. But the Centre has made it a habit to directly deploy the CRPF, as they did earlier in Karnataka when the Income Tax authorities raided Shiva Kumar while the Congress MLAs were kept away, and again in Tamil Nadu when the office of the Chief Secretary was searched.

Direct use of armed forces in any state is not permissible under the Constitution of India. The Supreme Court has repeatedly made it clear that the Armed Forces in India of which the CRPF is one, can only be deployed to aid civil authority of a state at the request of the State.

At the time of writing, the applications filed in court have not yet been served to the Standing Counsel for the State of West Bengal.

The article was originally published at The LeafletYou can read the original here

Case Number 1,33,000: When Rape Survivors are Reduced to Mere Numbers

Rape survivors who turn to the judiciary for help are often left stranded in legalities for years. This poem tries to put feelings into these nameless, faceless case files.

Pandeyji is in pain,

He met with an accident while returning from office.

Everyone is praying for the family and cursing the culprit

I ask ma, why don’t they come, meet me and curse my culprit

I’m also in pain; I was returning from college and I was raped.

.

I’m not lying,

They were four/five/six/seven/eight/ twenty

I was wearing a burqa/saree/ jeans/frock.

I was screaming, but they ate me like one-year-old Bittu chews his toys.

Ma, it was difficult to walk.

.

Pain; I write of it, because I have been told not to speak much

My lawyer told me,

That, I’m one lakh and thirty three thousand cases away from justice and that I will have to face questions like,

‘who opened the button first’

‘What colour was your bra’

After which, many me’s got scared,

But a few decided to fight.

One, I have stopped crying,

Two, I have started hiding,

Three, I have stopped studying.

Last, I have stopped dreaming.

But you can see me still breathing.

.

They would often tell me that I’m lucky to have survived,

There are so many who were already dead when found, I was still breathing fine.

However, I strangely envy them,

After all,

One, they never met those monsters again and saw them smiling,

Two, they never went through that nightmare of doctors and fingers,

Three, they weren’t expelled from their school,

Four, they weren’t called names.

.

Now that I have lost respect I think I have lost it all,

Pandey ji is a victim of rash driving

But I’m a woman of questionable character.

.

But still,

I’m fine.

I’m breathing.

One lakh and thirty three thousand women,

rotting in our courts, all screaming for help, right now.

.

Sameeksha Mishra is a 20- year old theatre artist and student at Delhi University, originally from Varanasi. Find her on Instagram @inklaab._
Featured image credit: Andrew Smith/ Flickr CC BY-SA 2.0

Besides Gender Justice, Triple Talaq Case Was Also About Separating Religion and State in Family Law

Marriage must now conclusively be held to be a secular institution, governed by civil law that confers equal rights on men and women within a marriage.

Marriage must now conclusively be held to be a secular institution, governed by civil law that confers equal rights on men and women within a marriage.

Triple talaq

Muslim women hold placards in support of the All India Muslim Personal Law Board during a signature campaign in Ahmedabad. Credit: Reuters

“Marriage in Islam is a contract, and like other contracts, may under certain circumstances, be terminated. There is something astonishingly modern about this – no public declaration is a condition precedent to the validity of a Muslim marriage nor is any religious ceremony deemed absolutely essential, though they are usually carried out.”

These are the words of Justice Rohinton Nariman and Justice Uday Lalit in the triple talaq case. It is an example of what Oliver Wendell Holmes called the “inarticulate major premise” of the judgment. Every judgment endorses and strengthens certain values, and undermines and delegitimises others. Even though the judges may not spell it out, one reads between the lines of every judgment. In this case, the judges have founded their judgment on the search for modernity in marriage laws.

Modernity requires individuation and respect for the autonomy of individuals, the recognition of agency in all human beings, the ability to take decisions for themselves.

A failure to separate the realm of the secular from that of the religious has led to disastrous consequences in all spheres of life in this country. The expression “religious laws” is an oxymoron, for what is law cannot be religion and what is religion cannot be law. Religion, as we all acknowledge, is a matter of faith, not a matter of  law. What the constitution protects is the freedom of conscience and the right freely to practice and propagate religion.

Article 25 of the constitution, freedom of conscience and free profession, practice and propagation of religion, states:

(1) Subject to public order, morality and health and to the other provisions of this Part, all persons are equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practise and propagate religion

(2) Nothing in this article shall affect the operation of any existing law or prevent the State from making any law

(a) regulating or restricting any economic, financial, political or other secular activity which may be associated with religious practice;

(b) providing for social welfare and reform or the throwing open of Hindu religious institutions of a public character to all classes and sections of Hindus

For too long it has been of assumed that family law is “ religious law” and is hence protected by Article 25. The irony is that the modernity of the Muslim law of marriage lies in its secular dimensions – namely that marriage is a contract freely entered into between two consenting adults. It is ironic that the All India Muslim Personal Law Board now suggests that marriage laws are protected by Article 25.

All marriages are a contract between two consenting adults, taking them out of the realm of the religious and making marriage a secular social institution with rights and liabilities assigned by law. It can hardly be suggested that a Hindu marriage is a forced one ­– solemnised without the consent of one of the parties to the marriage. All rights and liabilities that are recognised by a secular state and enforced as such are assigned by law and not by religion. A secular state does not enforce religion; it only protects religious beliefs and practices. In contrast, an Islamic state or a Hindu rashtra would enforce religion. It is for this reason that we do not have Sharia courts or Hindu courts in India.


Also read: Beyond Triple Talaq, India Needs a Debate on How to Reform Muslim, Hindu Law


What was at stake in the triple talaq case was not just gender justice but also the separation of state from religion in the realm of family law.

Article 25 itself recognises the separation between religion on the one hand, and financial, economic political and secular practices associated with religion on the other. While family law may have been associated with religion, it is not religion.

The chief justice of India, who authored the minority judgment, failed to separate state from religion when he elevated personal laws to the status of a fundamental right. What is more, he failed to understand that personal laws have no existence independent of the subject matter they govern. In this case, since they govern matters of family law, they are family law, nothing more, nothing less. This failure leads him to conclude that personal laws are part of the right to freedom of religion, a dangerous proposition by any reckoning.

In contrast, Justice Nairman and Justice Lalit hold that triple talaq is “manifestly arbitrary” and violates the right to equality guaranteed by Article 14. The enormity of this ruling lies in the fact that they recognise that family law is not part of religion at all, hence the question of protection does not arise. It must be subject to the discipline of fundamental rights.

This brings us back to the issue of modernity. Marriage must now conclusively be held to be a secular institution, governed by civil law that confers equal rights on men and women within a marriage. Whether to marry in a church, temple, court or anywhere else is a matter of choice, but that cannot determine the content of the marriage or its legal character, which will remain governed by state-made law.

It is that state-made modern law that we seek for all women when we talk of a gender-just code, not a uniform religious code. A vision of such a law would make marriage a contract freely entered into between two persons out of love and affection, which can nevertheless be terminated in a civilised manner. Such a law would have a provision for the just division of property, which recognises the investment made by a woman of her labour, her time and her emotions in the marriage, and distributes the assets accumulated during the marriage equally between spouses on a breakdown of the relationship. Such a law would not turn out women of all faiths, as it does now, with empty hands when a marriage breaks down.

Indira Jaising is a senior advocate at Lawyers Collective.

Babri Masjid Case Must Be Decided in Court, Not Through Mediation

Mediations are only fair if both parties are equally powerful – which isn’t true for the Babri Masjid case, particularly in Adityanath’s UP.

Mediations are only fair if both parties are equally powerful – which isn’t true for the Babri Masjid case, particularly in Adityanath’s UP.

A Hindu activist walks past a temple wall, where devotees have written the name of Ram, in Ayodhya October 18, 2003. Credit: Reuters/Roy Madhur

A Hindu activist walks past a temple wall, where devotees have written the name of Ram, in Ayodhya October 18, 2003. Credit: Reuters/Roy Madhur

The recent observation by Chief Justice of India J.S. Khehar that the contentious, nearly 70-year-old Ram Janmabhoomi-Babri Masjid dispute should be settled out of court not only surprised the parties involved but also the legal community at large.

The CJI’s offer to mediate the settlement talks himself is particularly startling since anyone acquainted with the law on mediation can vouch for the fact that a mediator who seeks to mediate a dispute cannot adjudicate the same matter if the mediation fails. What is more, his comment – “this was a matter of sentiment” – gives away his mind on the merits of the case. The issue in the suit is not whether Lord Ram was born at the disputed site, but about whom the land belongs to. Sentiment and matters of faith are incapable of judicial resolution. What is more, the comment came on the mention by an outsider to the litigation and in the absence of the litigants. This makes one believe that Justice Khehar’s remark was not well thought out and that the ‘mediation’ attempt is doomed to fail.

The rules of the court in dealing with mediation may not strictly be attracted in this matter but do provide some guidance. To have any meaning, mediation requires a level playing field. Before going into the complexities of the present case, it is important to examine the law on mediation in India.

Neutrality

Justice Khehar. Credit: PTI/Files

Chief Justice of India J.S. Khehar. Credit: PTI/Files

The concept of mediation – or the settlement of disputes with the parties sitting opposite each other – is almost as old as human civilisation. The word ‘mediation’ comes from the Latin word ‘mediare’, which means ‘to be in the middle’. According to Black’s Law Dictionary, mediation is defined as “a method of non-binding dispute resolution involving a neutral third party who tries to help the disputing parties to reach a mutually agreeable solution”. In other words, it is a non-adversarial dispute resolution mechanism, facilitated by a neutral mediator, and is a well-recognised method of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) all over the world.

In this case, the question is, do we have a “neutral third party”? Given the kind of polarisation between the two sides and the communities they say they represent, where can we find a neutral third party? With Yogi Adityanath‘s appointment as chief minister of Uttar Pradesh compromising secularism itself, how can neutrality be guaranteed? I am assuming that the offer of the CJI to mediate was not intended to be taken seriously. Neutral as he may be, he could hardly be expected to mediate as well as judicially decide the matter.

The idea that mediation is one of the important mediums of ADR has gained ground in the last 40 years, especially after what is known as the Pound Conference in 1976 in the US, a national conference of jurists, lawyers and educators. At the conference, a specific resolution was passed to encourage ADR, especially mediation. Owing to the huge backlog of cases pending in the courts and the time, expenses and technicalities involved in formal litigation, renewed emphasis has been placed on ADR and how to make it effective. But mediation of a dispute that has been pending for over 70 years and has reached the Supreme Court is an inconceivable idea. Mediation normally happens before judicial adjudication, not after.


Also read: Babri ‘Mediation’ Flounders on Intra-Hindu Disputes, Demand That Muslims Drop Claim


Section 89 of the Civil Procedure Code deals with the issue of mediation in civil suits. It has been held by the Supreme Court that it is a badly-drafted section, but that apart, what is important is that the rules emphasise the neutrality of the mediator.

Some of the rules that point to this emphasis are

  • rule 8 (the mediator has the duty to disclose certain facts pertaining to her impartiality/independence),
  • rule 16 (the role of mediator is to facilitate voluntary resolution of dispute between the parties and not impose any settlement terms on the parties),
  • rule 17 (parties alone are responsible for taking decisions) and
  • rule 27 (that lays out the ethics to be followed by the mediator).

The mediator is thus the guardian of the process and the protector of its sanctity. Any indication of either conflict of interest or partiality would nullify the whole mediation proceeding.

Other relevant rules, including rule 19 (parties are to act in good faith), rule 20 (on confidentiality, disclosure and inadmissibility of information) and rule 21 (on privacy) focus on the completely confidential nature of the mediation proceedings. What the parties say or agree to in negotiations cannot be used against them in any court of law.

Balance of power

As stated in Rule 27(10), a key element of mediation is the recognition of the principle of self-determination by the parties. The mediation process relies upon the ability of parties to reach a voluntary, undisclosed agreement. Integral to this is the power balance between the parties in the mediation.

Mediation should not be recommended when there is a serious power imbalance between the position of the parties, in which a fair negotiation is not possible. When there is a significant power difference between the parties, the fairness of the proceeding is called into question, owing to apprehensions of one party dominating the process and the settlement agreement being one-sided. Thus, the issue of power relations in mediation is critical. The two central elements of mediation are the neutrality of the mediation and the voluntary consent of the parties. In case of power imbalance, parties may feel that they cannot make real and free choices and are being coerced into a settlement, thereby tainting the entire proceeding.

It is well known that there have been five prior attempts at settlement talks between the two parties, but in all cases, the talks have failed. The present appeal before the Supreme Court is an appeal against the Allahabad high court judgment delivered in September 2010, whereby the high court had divided the disputed 2.77-acre land between the Sunni Waqf Board, the Nirmohi Akhara and the Ram Lalla. Despite the sentiments of both communities, the issue at the end of the day is a title dispute, which requires judicial determination.

Free and frank negotiations, with a view to reach a fair settlement agreeable to both parties, are almost impossible in this case in the current atmosphere of majoritarianism in the state, where the head of a Hindu religious math is the chief minister. Adityanath has a declared vested interest in the dispute and has often reiterated his commitment to building the Ram mandir. Even otherwise, it is not logical to expect that negotiations between a majority and a minority community would be free and fair, without any attempt at overt or covert coercion and pressure.

The CJI, given his legitimate concern for an expeditious outcome, would do well to set up an appropriate bench of carefully-selected senior judges to decide the dispute.

Perhaps memories of the Union Carbide case should have informed his comments. A carefully crafted settlement negotiated in secret between the Union of India and Union Carbide was not only challenged by the victims, but set aside by the Supreme Court itself. Apart form the pittance paid to the victims, the criminal proceedings were also to be dropped, according to the settlement. The Supreme Court, after accepting the settlement, was compelled to set it aside.

Indira Jaising is a senior advocate at Lawyers Collective.