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When India became independent in 1947 there was hope that Goa’s turn would come soon. However, Goa was liberated from the over 450 years of Portuguese rule only on December 19, 1961. The blame for this delay of 14 years is sought to be placed at the door of Jawaharlal Nehru. History has put on him the responsibility for this delay. But it is important to analyse roles played by different leaders and people, especially Nehru, amidst the present controversy that he alone was responsible for Goans not being able to unfurl the Indian tricolour on Goan soil.
Nehru believed since 1946 that “Goa was a small pimple on the beautiful face of India and it would not take much time to pinch once India gained independence”. Being fully involved in the fight against British Imperialism, Nehru became engaged in the Goan question after 1947, addressing conferences, rallies and seminars, meeting delegations from Goa and above all making important policy statements on the floor of the house.
Today, much to the chagrin of lovers of history, historiography seems to be influenced by the colour of political ideology. Leaders are either humanised or demonised depending on which side of the political spectrum they belong. Historians however cannot view the happenings of the past based on the colour of the spectacles they wear. It is therefore the need of the hour to place on record historical facts and the geo-political compulsions in global politics at that point of time.
Also read: No Country for My Nationalism
On August 15, 1947, Nehru in a message to the press expressed his anguish over the fact that many could not share in the freedom that had come, although they were a part of India and added that they would remain to be so whatever may happen. Goa has always had a distinct linguistic and geographical identity, alongside a cultural and emotional bond as a result of its unique past. This fact was recognised by the national leaders as early as in December 1948, when the INC passed a resolution that if a changeover took place; Goan culture and institutions would be maintained within the larger frame work of free India. It is pertinent to understand that respect for the unique Goan identity could never be doubted once Goa was liberated from the colonial yoke.
Nehru had made it clear that his government’s policy was to settle this issue by peaceful means. A Portuguese consul was stationed in Bombay and the Indian counterpart in Panaji. On February 27, 1950, Nehru’s government initiated negotiations for a peaceful transfer of power; however on August 14, Nehru announced that this was rejected. On December 6, 1950, he lamented that all these years we have reasoned, argued and used peaceful methods, without any results. Portugal had full knowledge that it had no legal or moral right to claim the right of passage through Indian territory, but it still dragged India to the world court in The Hague, from which it received a great rebuff.
Negotiations had been initiated with France in 1947 to integrate the far-flung French pockets of Chandranagore, Mahe, Yanam, Karaikal and Pondicherry with India. The French response was positive. By 1955 all the pockets were integrated with the Indian Union. Attempts at similar negotiations with Portugal failed. Portugal argued that Goa was an overseas province of Portugal and belonged to her on grounds of historicity and that culturally Goa was Portuguese. On April 12, 1954 in a speech delivered through the national broadcast, Portuguese dictator António de Oliveira Salazar makes it clear that “Goa was non-negotiable to just let go, as though it was an object to be given away or sold.” Nehru however till then had believed that Goa would be a part of India through a peaceful settlement like Pondicherry.
In 1954, India and China enunciated the Panchsheel, the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. Nehru based India’s foreign policy on these five principles: coexistence and respect for the territorial and integral sovereignty of other countries as well as non-aggression and non-interference with their internal affairs. Committing military aggression meant that Nehru would be criticised for not practicing what he preached. V. Gadgil believed that Nehru hesitated to take action not because it was difficult, but he feared that he would lose his role as a peacemaker in the world political arena. Dadra and Nagar Haveli were liberated in July and August 1954 respectively, with the Azad Gomantak Dal as the vanguard.
The years 1954-55 were the years of the Satyagraha movements led by the Goa Vimochan Sahayak Samiti. Nehru’s government, fearing a backlash on innocent and unarmed satygrahis, put a ban on Indians entering Goa. The resulting deportations to Portugal and massacres did not provoke Nehru and he believed non-violence would solve this issue. The Portuguese then sealed the borders and cut off the rail links. In response the Nehru government imposed an economic blockade.
Also read: ‘Free India Is Born’: What the Headlines Said on August 15, 1947
Nehru in a debate in the Lok Sabha criticised Salazar’s argument that Goa was an overseas province of Portugal and argued that even the pro-American bloc of Allies or NATO powers (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) could not be forced to deal with the problem. The hidden fear of this treaty was that if any of its members were attacked the others were to come to its aid. Salazar of course wanted to retain its colonies under one pretext or the other. Two mass rallies were addressed by Nehru in Bombay on October 2, 1955 and June 4, 1956 only on the Goa issue. The Goan Tribune newspaper printed the entire speech verbatim. He reiterated that no coercion would be used to join India.
Nehru addressed another Goa rally in Bombay on June 13, 1958. “Nehruismo” is a full-page write up on the leader’s political philosophy written in the Goan Tribune, by its editor Lambert Mascarenhas. This article expresses the angst of Goans at Nehru’s uncooperative behaviour. “He is said to have played in the hands of Salazar,” and is mocked upon as “Nehru– the patient, Nehru the peaceful.” The author felt Salazar’s ‘heroismo’ should be dubbed ‘Nehruismo’. Nehru’s assurance that “The Goa issue will be solved sooner than most people expect” was questioned. “How soon is sooner?” was the question raised. The editor was in fact voicing the aspirations of all Goans.
In March 1961, Nehru met a delegation of the Goan Political Convention in Delhi. This delegation had representatives of different sections of the Goan community in Goa and in India like Advocate Louis Mendes (my father) as the representative of the Goan Clubs Federation. Some other members were Lambert Mascarenhas, Bertha Menezes Bragança, George Vaz, Vishwanath Lawande and Fr H. Mascarenhas. This impressed upon the prime minister the need for an early settlement.
In October 1961, the seminar of the Portuguese Colonial Possessions in New Delhi resulted in the African leaders requesting Nehru “to show the way”, so that their own freedom would follow. At the Chowpatty rally in Bombay in the same month, Nehru spoke for the first time of the need of using “other methods” to solve the problem.
Thereafter in November, Nehru visited the US, Yugoslavia and Egypt. The defence minister, Krishna Menon, was responsible for the final decision of Operation Vijay but it could not be done without Nehru’s approval. Ultimately the ease with which Goa, Daman and Diu were liberated and the way in which it was tackled by the Soviet Union and India in the UN Security Council only show that the conditions would not have been different in 1947. On the contrary, Portugal would have been helpless to face Goa’s liberation issue in the Security Council or UN General Assembly of which it was not a member then.
Advocate Antonio Bruto da Costa dedicated his life to a cause forgotten by both Indian and Portuguese historiographies. Although his view had no popular support (except for a group known as Circulo de Margao), he spoke of a Terceira corrente which brings to light a third current/force, which refused both Portuguese colonialism and Indian nationalism by fighting for autonomy and possibly also independence. After 1961 he accused Nehru of having broken his promise to abstain from violence and thus usurped Goans’ natural right to plebiscite and sovereignty. Goans have always been known to be strongly opinionated and even the writings in the newspapers of that period like the Gomantak and the Goan Tribune show that there was no unity among the “freedom fighters”.
The ultra-nationalists often insinuate from public platforms that historians need to investigate the reasons for this “long wait of 14 years”, and seem to be allergic to the very name “Nehru”, understandably because of their own political compulsions. The accusation that Nehru was deliberately responsible for delaying Goa’s liberation is unwarranted and has no place in historiography. Nehru believed in peaceful negotiations and avoiding bloodshed at all costs. He continued to believe that the Goa issue would be ultimately resolved by the method of negotiation similar to that followed by the French in Pondicherry. However the fascist dictator António de Oliveira Salazar never believed in negotiations and it is a lesser known fact that he never even visited Goa. The jingoists of this nation must stop passing judgments on a matter of such great geo-political significance based on their own homegrown political biases.
Professor Sushila Sawant Mendes is an author and historian in Goa.