The study also examines the role that socio-demographic status – a combination of per capita income, population age, fertility rates, and average years of schooling – plays in determining health loss.
Life expectancy in India has increase over the years with men living longer by 6.9 years and women by 10.3 years. The latest data on life expectancy between 1990-2013, however, also shows healthy life expectancy didn’t increase as much: men gained 6.4 years and women gained 8.9 years. Life expectancy for women in India still outpaces that of men, 68.5 years compared to 64.2 years.
Healthy life expectancy takes into account not just mortality but the impact of non-fatal conditions and summarises years lived with disability and years lost due to premature mortality. The increase in healthy life expectancy has not been as dramatic as the growth of life expectancy, implying that people are living more years with illness and disability.
In India, the leading causes of health loss, as measured by disability-adjusted life-years (DALYs), in 2013 were ischemic heart disease (IHD), chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, lower respiratory infections, tuberculosis, neonatal preterm birth complications, neonatal encephalopathy, diarrhoeal diseases, cerebrovascular disease, road injury, and low back and neck pain.
Overall, neonatal encephalopathy and tuberculosis were not among the leading causes of health loss globally.
The study, ‘Global, regional and national disability-adjusted life years (DALYs) for 306 diseases and injuries and healthy life expectancy for 188 countries, 1990-2013: quantifying the epidemiological transition’, published in The Lancet on August 27, examines fatal and nonfatal health loss across countries. The study was conducted by an international consortium of researchers working on the Global Burden of Disease study, including from the Public Health Foundation of India (PHFI), and led by the Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME) at the University of Washington.
Top causes of DALYs
Causes of health loss differed by gender in India. For Indian men, the top-five causes of DALYs in 2013 were:
IHD
Tuberculosis
Obstructive pulmonary disease
Neonatal encephalopathy
Neonatal preterm birth complications.
For women, the top five causes of DALYs in 2013 were:
IHD
Lower respiratory infections
Diarrhoeal diseases
Obstructive pulmonary disease
Neonatal preterm birth complications
For Indian men, the fastest-growing leading causes of health loss between 1990 and 2013 were:
Self-harm, which increased at rates of 149.9%
IHD, at 79.9%
Cerebrovascular disease, at 59.8%
Only IHD was in the top-10 causes of male DALYs in 1990.
For women, the largest increases among the leading causes of DALYs in 1990-103 occurred for:
IHD (69%)
Depressive disorders (66.1%)
Cerebrovascular disease (36.8%)
Only IHD was among the 10 leading causes of health loss for women in 1990.
“Healthy life expectancy in India is 12 years lower for women and 8 years lower for men than in neighbouring Sri Lanka,” said study co-author Dr. Lalit Dandona, a professor at PHFI and IHME and led the work of this study in India. “This difference indicates that substantial health improvements in India are possible and that public policy should make this a top priority in order to enable India reach its optimal development potential.”
TB’s haunt
The study also examines the role that socio-demographic status – a combination of per capita income, population age, fertility rates, and average years of schooling – plays in determining health loss. Researchers’ findings underscore that this accounts for more than half of the differences seen across countries and over time for certain leading causes of DALYs, including maternal and neonatal disorders. But the study notes that socio-demographic status is much less responsible for the variation seen for ailments including cardiovascular disease and diabetes.
“It is unacceptable that tuberculosis continues to be among the top five leading causes of disease burden in India in 2013, as it was a quarter century ago,” said Dr. Soumya Swaminathan, Director General of the Indian Council of Medical Research. “Systematic evidence-based approaches for tuberculosis control and ultimate elimination have to be rapidly implemented in India to improve the situation.”
Attributing longevity to marked declines in death and illness caused by HIV/AIDS and malaria in the past decade and advances made in addressing communicable, maternal, neonatal, and nutritional disorders, the study says health has improved significantly around the world. Global life expectancy at birth for both sexes rose by 6.2 years (from 65.3 in 1990 to 71.5 in 2013), while healthy life expectancy at birth rose by 5.4 years (from 56.9 in 1990 to 62.3 in 2013).
The eurozone was badly designed for everyone, not just for Greece.
When Yanis Varoufakis was elected to parliament and then named as Greek finance minister in January, he embarked on an extraordinary seven months of negotiations with the country’s creditors and its European partners.
On July 6, Greek voters backed his hardline stance in a referendum, with a resounding 62% voting No to the European Union’s ultimatum. On that night, he resigned, after prime minister Alexis Tsipras, fearful of an ugly exit from the eurozone, decided to go against the popular verdict. Since then, the governing party, Syriza, has splintered and a snap election has been called. Varoufakis remains a member of parliament and a prominent voice in Greek and European politics.
When asked about Tsipras’s decision to trigger a snap election, inviting the Greek public to issue their judgement on his time in office, Varoufakis said:
If only that were so! Voters are being asked to endorse Alexis Tsipras’ decision, on the night of their majestic referendum verdict, to overturn it; to turn their courageous No into a capitulation, on the grounds that honouring that verdict would trigger a Grexit. This is not the same as calling on the people to pass judgement on a record of steadfast opposition to a failed economic programme doing untold damage to Greece’s social economy. It is rather a plea to voters to endorse him, and his choice to surrender, as a lesser evil.
We asked nine leading academics what their questions were for a man who describes himself as an “accidental economist”. His answers reveal regrets about his own approach during a dramatic 2015, a withering assessment of France’s power in Europe, fears for the future of Syriza, a view that Syriza is now finished, and doubts over how effective Jeremy Corbyn could be as leader of Britain’s Labour party.
Anton Muscattelli, University of Glasgow – Why was Greek prime minister Alexis Tsipras persuaded to accept the EU’s pre-conditions around the third bailout discussions despite a decisive referendum victory for the No campaign; and is this the end of the road for the anti-austerity wing of Syriza in Greece?
Varoufakis: Tsipras’ answer is that he was taken aback by official Europe’s determination to punish Greek voters by putting into action German finance minister Wolfgang Schäuble’s plan to push Greece out of the eurozone, redenominate Greek bank deposits in a currency that was not even ready, and even ban the use of euros in Greece. These threats, independently of whether they were credible or not, did untold damage to the European Union’s image as a community of nations and drove a wedge through the axiom of the eurozone’s indivisibility.
Me and my shadow. Tsipras and his finance minister. Credit: Alkis Konstantinidis/Reuters
As you probably have heard, on the night of the referendum, I disagreed with Tsipras on his assessment of the credibility of these threats and resigned as finance minister. But even if I was wrong on the issue of the credibility of the troika’s threats, my great fear was, and remains, that our party, Syriza, would be torn apart by the decision to implement another self-defeating austerity program of the type that we were elected to challenge. It is now clear that my fears were justified.
Roy Bailey, University of Essex – Was the surprise referendum of July 5 conceived as a threat point for the ongoing bargaining between Greece and its creditors and has the last year caused you to adjust how you think about Game Theory?
Varoufakis: I shall have to disappoint you Roy {Editor’s note: Roy Bailey taught Varoufakis at Essex and advised on his PhD}. As I wrote in a New York Times op-ed, Game Theory was never relevant. It applies to interactions where motives are exogenous and the point is to work out the optimal bluffing strategies and credible threats, given available information. Our task was different: it was to persuade the “other” side to change their motivation vis-à-vis Greece.
I represented a small, suffering nation in its sixth straight year of deep recession. Bluffing with our people’s fate would be irresponsible. So I did not. Instead, we outlined that which we thought was a reasonable position, consistent with our creditors’ own interests. And then we stood our ground. When the troika pushed us into a corner, presenting me with an ultimatum on June 25 just before closing Greece’s banking system down, we looked at it carefully and concluded that we had neither a mandate to accept it (given that it was economically non-viable) nor to decline it (and clash with official Europe). Instead we decided to do something terribly radical: to put it to the Greek people to decide.
Lastly, on a theoretical point, the “threat point” in your question refers to John Nash’s bargaining solution which is based on the axiom of non-conflict between the parties. Tragically, we did not have the luxury to make that assumption.
Cristina Flesher Fominaya, University of Aberdeen – The dealings between Greece and the EU seemed more like a contest between democracy and the banks, than a negotiation between the EU and a member state. Given the outcome, are there any lessons that you would take from this for other European parties resisting the imperatives of austerity politics?
Varoufakis: Allow me to phrase this differently. It was a contest between the right of creditors to govern a debtor nation and the democratic right of the said nation’s citizens to be self-governed. You are quite right that there was never a negotiation between the EU and Greece as a member state of the EU. We were negotiating with the troika of lenders, the International Monetary Fund, the European Central Bank and a wholly weakened European Commission in the context of an informal grouping, the Eurogroup, lacking specific rules, without minutes of the proceedings, and completely under the thumb of one finance minister and the troika of lenders.
Protest and survive. On the streets of Athens. Credit: Yannis Behrakis/Reuters
Moreover, the troika was terribly fragmented, with many contradictory agendas in play, the result being that the “terms of surrender” they imposed upon us were, to say the least, curious: a deal imposed by creditors determined to attach conditions which guarantee that we, the debtor, cannot repay them. So, the main lesson to be learned from the last few months is that European politics is not even about austerity. Or that, as Nicholas Kaldor wrote in The New Statesman in 1971, any attempt to construct a monetary union before a political union ends up with a terrible monetary system that makes political union much, much harder. Austerity and a hideous democratic deficit are mere symptoms.
Panicos Demetriades, University of Leicester – Did you ever think that your message was being diluted or becoming noisy, or even incoherent, by giving so many interviews?
Varoufakis: Yes. I have regretted several interviews, especially when the journalists involved took liberties that I had not anticipated. But let me also add that the “noise” would have prevailed even if I granted far fewer interviews. Indeed the media game was fixed against our government, and me personally, in the most unexpected and repulsive way. Wholly moderate and technically sophisticated proposals were ignored while the media concentrated on trivia and distortions. Giving interviews where I would, to some extent, control the content was my only outlet. Faced with an intentionally “noisy” media agenda that bordered on character assassination, I erred on the side of over-exposure.
Simon Wren-Lewis, University of Oxford – Might it have been possible for a forceful France to have provided an effective counterweight to Germany in the Eurogroup, or did Germany always have a majority on its side?
Varoufakis: The French government feels that it has a weak hand. Its deficit is persistently within the territory of the so-called excessive deficit procedure of the European Commission, which puts Pierre Moscovici, the European commissioner for economic and financial affairs, and France’s previous finance minister, in the difficult position of having to act tough on Paris under the watchful eye of Wolfgang Schäuble, the German finance minister.
It is also true, as you say, that the Eurogroup is completely “stitched up” by Schäuble. Nevertheless, France had an opportunity to use the Greek crisis in order to change the rules of a game that France will never win. The French government has, thus, missed a major opportunity to render itself sustainable within the single currency. The result, I fear, is that Paris will soon be facing a harsher regime, possibly a situation where the president of the Eurogroup is vested with draconian veto powers over the French government’s national budget. How long, once this happens, can the European Union survive the resurgence of nasty nationalism in places like France?
Kamal Munir, University of Cambridge – You often implied that what went on in your meetings with the troika (the IMF, ECB and European Commission) was economics only on the surface. Deep down, it was a political game being played. Don’t you think we are doing a disservice to our students by teaching them a brand of economics that is so clearly detached from this reality?
Varoufakis: If only some economics were to surface in our meetings with the troika, I would be happy! None did.
Even when economic variables were discussed, there was never any economic analysis. The discussions were exhausted at the level of rules and agreed targets. I found myself talking at cross-purposes with my interlocutors. They would say things like: “The rules on the primary surplus specify that yours should be at least 3.5% of GDP in the medium term.” I would try to have an economic discussion suggesting that this rule ought to be amended because, for example, the 3.5% primary target for 2018 would depress growth today, boost the debt-to-GDP ratio immediately and make it impossible to achieve the said target by 2018.
Players in the game. Merkel, Lagarde, Juncker, Draghi, Hollande and Tsipras line up. Credit: Yves Herman/Reuters
Such basic economic arguments were treated like insults. Once I was accused of “lecturing” them on macroeconomics. On your pedagogical question: while it is true that we teach students a brand of economics that is designed to be blind to really-existing capitalism, the fact remains that no type of sophisticated economic thinking, not even neoclassical economics, can reach the parts of the Eurogroup which make momentous decisions behind closed doors.
Mariana Mazzucato, University of Sussex – How has the crisis in Greece (its cause and its effects) revealed failings of neoclassical economic theory at both the micro and the macro level?
Varoufakis: The uninitiated may be startled to hear that the macroeconomic models taught at the best universities feature no accumulated debt, no involuntary unemployment and, indeed, no money (with relative prices reflecting a form of barter). Save perhaps for a few random shocks that demand and supply are assumed to quickly iron out, the snazziest models taught to the brightest of students assume that savings automatically turn into productive investment, leaving no room for crises.
Moving to the micro level, the observation that, in the case of Greece, real wages fell by 40% but employment dropped precipitously, while exports remained flat, illustrates in Technicolor how useless a microeconomics approach bereft of macro foundations truly is.
Tim Bale, Queen Mary University of London – Do you see any similarities between yourself and Jeremy Corbyn, who looks like he might win the (UK) Labour leadership, and do you think a left-wing populist party is capable of winning an election under a first-past-the-post system?
Varoufakis: The similarity that I feel at liberty to mention is that Corbyn and I, probably, coincided at many demonstrations against the Tory government while I lived in Britain in the 1970s and 1980s, and share many views regarding the calamity that befell working Britons as power shifted from manufacturing to finance. However, all other comparisons must be kept in check.
Syriza was a radical party of the Left that scored a little more than 4% of the vote in 2009. Our incredible rise was due to the collapse of the political “centre” caused by popular discontent at a Great Depression due to a single currency that was never designed to sustain a global crisis, and by the denial of the powers-that-be that this was so.
The much greater flexibility that the Bank of England afforded to Gordon Brown’s and David Cameron’s British governments prevented the type of socio-economic implosion that led Syriza to power and, in this sense, a similarly buoyant radical left party is most unlikely in Britain. Indeed, the Labour Party’s own history, and internal dynamic, will, I am sure, constrain a victorious Jeremy Corbyn in a manner alien to Syriza.
Turning to the first-past-the-post system, had it applied here in Greece, it would have given our party a crushing majority in parliament. It is, therefore, untrue that Labour’s electoral failures are due to this system.
Lastly, allow me to urge caution with the word “populist”. Syriza did not put to Greek voters a populist agenda. “Populists” try to be all things to all people. Our promised benefits extended only to those earning less than £500 per month. If it wants to be popular, Labour cannot afford to be populist either.
Mark Taylor, University of Warwick – Would you agree that Greece does not fulfil the criteria for successful membership of a currency union with the rest of Europe? Wouldn’t it be better if they left now rather than simply papering over the cracks and waiting for another Greek economic crisis to occur in a few years’ time?
Varoufakis: The eurozone’s design was such that even France and Italy could not thrive within it. Under the current institutional design only currency union east of the Rhine and north of the Alps would be sustainable. Alas, it would constitute a union useless to Germany, as it would fail to protect it from constant revaluation in response to its trade surpluses.
Now, if by “criteria” you meant the Maastricht limits, it is of course clear that Greece did not fulfil them. But then again nor did Italy or Belgium. Conversely, Spain and Ireland did meet the criteria and, indeed, by 2007 the Madrid and Dublin governments were registering deficit, debt and inflation numbers that, according to the official criteria, were better than Germany’s. And yet when the crisis hit, Spain and Ireland sunk into the mire. In short, the eurozone was badly designed for everyone. Not just for Greece.
So should we cut our losses and get out? To answer properly we need to grasp the difference between saying that Greece, and other countries, should not have entered the eurozone, and saying now that we should now exit. Put technically, we have a case of hysteresis: once a nation has taken the path into the eurozone, that path disappeared after the euro’s creation and any attempt to reverse along that, now non-existent, path could lead to a great fall off a tall cliff.
The agitation of the prosperous Patels for OBC status opens the door to more such movements by the well off
Credit: Shuchi Kapoor
Hardik Patel was unknown till last month. He shot to prominence in July this year when he parted company with the — rather colourless — Sardar Patel Group, to launch his own Patidar Anamat Andolan Samiti (PAAS). By all counts Hardik might well have remained colourless too. He has an average education, an average family background, average wealth, all in all, a typical underage boy next door.
Yet, at 22 years of age he is undoubtedly the youngest mass rabble-rouser our country has seen; a Justin Bieber of India’s political pop. As the reigning heartthrob of Gujarat’s Patel community, he is often called Patidar Hriday Samrat. This in-your-face take on Prime Minister Modi’s sobriquet, “Gujarat Hriday Samrat”, is meant to both challenge and slight the current government of the state.
Hardik Patel’s career is still at the first stage rocket phase, yet look how high he has flown. In the past 60 days or so, he has addressed dozens of rallies all over Gujarat, enchanted tens of thousands and won tremendous acclaim. Yet, doubts persist about whether he is as self-propelled as it is often made out to be.
Hardik sightings are now quite the pastime for many. Amongst others, he has been spotted in the company of Praveen Togadia and Gordhan Zadaphia, neither of whom are on Anandiben Patel’s official guest list. They are still part of the BJP flock, but as votaries of hard core Hindutva, they have been put out to pasture with other designated black sheep.
There is, however, a little history behind this. The traditional rivalry between Leuvas and Kadva Patels showed up when Keshubhai, a Leuva, opposed Modi’s ascension in 2012. At this point, the Kadvas stayed on with the ruling wing of the BJP and won. Even though Keshubhai had his pockets of strength in places like Rajkot, Mehsana, and Saurashtra, his faction was routed.
All of this was seemingly forgotten when Modi triumphed as Prime Minister. Yet the wounds must have still been there. Is it just a coincidence that Hardik Patel, Keshubhai Patel, Gordhan Zadaphia and Praveen Togadia, are all Leuva Patels? Probably this association has already been made which is why Hardik Patel announced that he was a leader of all Patels, “Kadva nahin, Leuva nahin” (not Kadva or Leuva).
Yet he missed out naming another branch of Patels, viz., the Anjanas. This community’s official entry among the OBCs has been a sore point with the Leuvas and Kadvas who are still trying to force the door open. Hardik’s main demand is that all Patels should be considered “backward” and that it is unfair to favour just the Anjanas. A prosperous distant relation hardly releases the kind of envy that a well-placed neighbour does.
Political opportunism
He has a point here because so many other castes have muscled their way into this category on the basis of pure political heft. If Jats and Marathas can demand OBC status, Gujjars ST status, why should the Patidars be left out? This absurdity was waiting to happen once the Mandal reservation scheme was accepted. As political opportunism, not social uplift, was the rationale behind OBC reservations, calculations needed to be considered “backward” were carefully doctored.
This aspect is best expressed in the way social backwardness is detailed. This fact is exaggerated manifold because it carries more weight than what is given to either educational or economic backwardness. Social backwardness has four sub-criteria, each more ridiculous than the other, but together they account for a whopping 12 points.
To begin with, a community gets three points if it performs manual labour, which any prosperous Jat, or Maratha or Patidar would proudly lay claim to. Another three points if the women in the family contribute to household income; even milking your buffalo or weeding the garden patch qualify. Three more points if other castes think poorly of you. Which caste has universal acclaim? Finally, another round of three points if a significant proportion of marriages in the caste takes place before the permitted legal age. In other words, people are now being rewarded for actually breaking the law.
Add them all up and we already have 12 points, while it needs only 11 to be considered as an OBC. There is little reason, therefore, to even think of economic and educational backwardness and consequently, these criteria are rarely brought up. As social backwardness is hard to disprove, most “backward” aspirants harp on this aspect most of all.
Politically, the Patels are undoubtedly on top on every front. They dominate the private sector and control, among other things, the diamond polishing business and the groundnut oil trade in the state. At least one third of ministers in Gujarat’s cabinet today are Patels, even though this caste comprises but 15% of the state’s population. According to estimates, about 70% of Micro Small and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs) are owned by Patels.
Patel domination
Over and above all of this, they have another unique feature that sets them apart from all other castes in India. No other caste dominates both the urban and rural economy the way the Patels do. They have one foot in the village, another in the city, and more than a toe hold in Africa, the UK and the US. It is this trait that probably took the BJP ideology easily from city to village in Gujarat.
That is all very well, but each state is unhappy in its own way. Out of roughly 261,000 MSMEs in Gujarat, as many as a third of them are officially “sick”. According to Hardik Patel’s organization, the slogan of Vibrant Gujarat has yet to become a reality with the small businessman. This obviously implies shrinkage of urban jobs in the private sector, leaving the state to pick up the slack in terms of employment.
A possible boost to Hardik’s Patidar Anamat Andolan Samiti could well have been the failure of many Patels to secure jobs in the recruitments held recently in the public sector. If only they had a 5% share in the OBC pie, so many Patels might have made the grade. A cynic might well say, when there are over 140 communities listed as OBC, what difference does one more make?
Yet this agitation led by Hardik has a bellwether quality about it. If this movement succeeds, will others come out in the open and trample all over the well laid garden Narendra Modi left behind? If Hardik Patel becomes the cat’s paw of Togadia and Zadaphia will the right turn in Gujarat get sharper?
Understandably, for this reason, the Centre and the state are concerned and, as we all know, once the issue of cultural pride gets recognition it’s hard to beat it down. Hardik Patel’s organisation realises this too, which is why they are pushing their luck right up to the margins. Political brinkmanship will be on full display on both sides and, no matter which side wins, from now on OBC movements will always be led by prosperous castes.
The sad news is that politicians are tempted not to look at economic issues in the eye but to cast them aside as a caste related matter. Apart from those who seek to gain immediate advantage by squeezing themselves into the OBC category, the limitations of such niche politics are so clearly limiting. Yet, attempts to redress economic issues will remain caste coded because we have politically ceded territory to Mandal ideologues.
Apart from the instant damage such policies bring about, they also firm up the Orientalist view that India is caste ridden by definition. Mandal’s recommendations helped further this point of view, including among academics who should have known better. After OBC reservations became a live reality, no politician was willing to bell it for fear it would wake a sleeping dog up.
Caste calculations don’t always work
All of this added up to make caste politics a self-fulfilling prophecy. This, in spite of the fact, that there are so many instances when election outcomes made caste calculations look stupid. When Indira Gandhi won in 1971, or the Janata in 1977, or Rajiv in 1984, or Mayawati in 2007, or indeed Modi in 2014, where was caste? In fact, contrived caste calculations will fail again in the forthcoming Bihar elections.
Yet, in the interregnum when little people strut out, the call of the OBC bellows, as if stereophonically, from all sides. This process has not yet been formally conceptualized but, for the time being, we could call it “Mandal’s curse”.
Dipankar Gupta is Director, Centre for Public Affairs and Critical Theory, Shiv Nadar University.
While Modi appeals for peace and business goes on as usual in Gujarat, an underlying current of tension prevails as people wonder when and how the Patidars are going to roll the dice next.
A photo feature
Credit: Shuchi Kapoor
Ahmedabad: The streets of Ahmedabad succumbed to the might of the Patidars—or Patels—of Gujarat on August 25 as hundreds of thousands of men, with some women and children, arrived in trucks, buses, tempos and cars from all major districts of the state to demand Backward Class status and thereby ensure for themselves reserved quotas in education and government jobs.
Credit: Shuchi Kapoor
Given the relative affluence and prosperity of the Patels—members of the caste are landowners, farmers and village leaders, and even own a quarter of all motels in the United States—their need for reservation seems incongruous to many.
Credit: Shuchi Kapoor
The Patels have entrusted leadership of their protest to 22-year-old Hardik Patel, who either wants reservations for the Patidars or the complete abolition of reservation for all.
Credit: Shuchi Kapoor
When the otherwise peaceful Kranti Rally called for August 25 failed to meet its purpose and Chief Minister Anandiben Patel refused to give in to their demands, Hardik raised the stakes, going on an indefinite hunger strike and refusing to end the protest. He was arrested but within an hour of his detention, violence erupted in different parts of Ahmedabad and simultaneously in several districts of Gujarat.
Credit: Shuchi Kapoor
While Hardik was released and the riot contained the same night, eight people were killed in the police action and there is now a fresh demand for murder charges to be pressed against the policemen who allegedly fired at the protestors.
Credit: Shuchi Kapoor
In an attempt to ensure the Patel revolution will not be televised (at least not via social media), 3G data and SMS services in the state were suspended and life came to a standstill for two days. Besides the Gujarat police, 11 columns of the Army have been called in as a protective combat measure. Many trains have been cancelled or diverted.
Hardik blames the government and the Gujarat police for starting the violence. Some Patidars at the OBC rally were blunt and vocal: “If we can bring down the Congress, we are equally capable of bringing down the BJP and Modi too if our needs aren’t met. If the government is by the people, it also has to be for its people. Our children score 90% and don’t get jobs while an OBC person even with 45% is able to do so. Who is being unfair here?”
Credit: Shuchi Kapoor
As the authorities try to restore normalcy, the protest has raised several questions:
What kind of ‘vibrant’ development model does Gujarat really have — and how could Narendra Modi offer this as a model for the rest of India—if its most socially and economically influential community seeks reservation?
Is the Modi effect wearing off, considering he is far removed from the issue and has lost connect on the home turf?
Why is Gujarat so susceptible to violence in spite of its dark history with riots? Instigators will always be there, but why doesn’t the public and media denounce the occurrence of such incidents time and again? Why is it so easy for politically influential agitators to take control of the streets?
While Modi appeals for peace and business goes on as usual in Gujarat, an underlying current of tension prevails as people wonder when and how the Patidars are going to roll the dice next.
The smart city’s pursuit of a top-down approach to city planning and management defies the core ideas of participation and citizenship that must drive the urban project.
The smart city’s pursuit of a top-down approach to city planning and management defies the core ideas of participation and citizenship that must drive the urban project
What say will they get in a smart city? Credit: Chris JL/Flickr/CC BY 2.0
On Thursday, the Government of India unveiled a list of 98 cities that will be made part of the Prime Minister’s Smart City project.
Policymakers and urban experts alike have interpreted the smart city as an opportunity to address the pain points of India’s urban populations. Even as it is couched in the language of citizen participation, however, the smart cities mission launched by the government scuttled the very democratic processes that Indian citizens are constitutionally entitled to. This contradiction is painfully apparent in the comparison of the citizen-centric smart city that features in the Prime Minister’s public rhetoric to the top-heavy smart city model that is conjured by his government’s guidelines.
The ideal model
Despite definitional ambiguities, the smart city has been admired and critiqued as a technological fix for Indian cities. However, in presenting the smart city as “one that remains two steps ahead in anticipating the needs of its citizens and provides it”, Modi has attempted to take the idea out of the technical realm and directly to the people. This customer-centric smart city intends to change the narrative around Indian urbanisation; cities are no longer to play eternal catch up, instead they are to be ahead of the game. All the right buzzwords—technology, environment-friendly development, energy saving, walk to work and citizen participation—are in place.
To support the idea of citizen participation, the PM has placed an inordinate emphasis on decentralised decision-making. Project approvals for new urban sector schemes, including the Atal Mission for Rejuvenation and Urban Transformation of 500 cities (AMRUT) and Housing for All or Pradhan Mantri Awas Yojna that were launched at the same time as the smart cities mission, are now with the states and not the Centre. The fulcrum of power and decision making for the smart cities scheme, however, is imagined to be at city-level, while the state and Central government play “support” roles. This is reflected in the competitive nature of the selection of the 100 smart cities that will receive the funding (a total outlay of Rs 50,000 crore); each selected city would get central assistance of Rs. 100 crore per year for five years. In describing the ‘Challenge” route, the PM linked competition with excellence and made clear that he expected decisions to be with local governments, seemingly fostering a “bottom-up approach”.
False assurances of city autonomy
The PM called upon city leaders “to endeavour to leave behind their legacy, leave a mark on the city during their tenure” conjuring up a scenario in which CEOs with substantial powers are in charge of cities. Nothing could be farther from the truth. In reality, mayors in Indian cities have no powers—most are rendered ineffective by a mere two-year term in office—municipalities are financially and administratively weak and devolution of power to urban local bodies has simply not been effective. Indian cities are plagued with interference by the state government and the multiplicity of agencies—local and State-level—that often work at cross-purposes.
Instead of laying a roadmap to empower local governments and incentivising state governments to support cities with increased capacity, faster decision-making and increased autonomy, the smart cities mission has taken the easier way out. The Smart City project will be planned and implemented by special purpose vehicles (SPVs), registered under the Companies Act. The CEO of the SPV, not the city mayor is the head honcho of the smart city transformation that Modi referred to in his speech. The funds from the Centre will be channelled to cities through this SPV, making it the clear fulcrum for the ‘smart’ transition of the selected cities.
With all levels of government having representatives on its board, the SPV is presented as an instrument crafted to ensure the cooperation of the state and local government under the supervision of the Centre. Making the state government and urban local body (ULB) the co-financiers and joint moral guardians of the smart city SPV appears as an attempt to change existing state-ULB power dynamics in favour of the city, at least for the purpose of the smart city projects. However, the structure of the board does not accord more vote share or weightage to municipal officials or elected representatives. It remains unclear how these junior level bureaucrats will prevail over more powerful IAS cadre officers appointed from the state and Centre. Moreover, the guidelines are clear that the elected municipal body is expected to devolve its powers to the SPV for the purposes of the Smart City project. The real need of empowering elected city governments—and by extension empowering citizens—for long-term urban development in accordance with the intent of the 74th amendment has, once again, been bypassed.
Sustaining the smartness, an iffy proposition
It is perfectly legitimate, therefore, to be concerned about the long-term sustainability of the smart city. The guidelines are silent on the interaction of the SPV and ULB over time. How does a city function during the implementation of the smart city project, with the ULB and the SPV governing separate pieces of it? At what point does the SPV cease to exist, handing urban governance (of the now ‘smartened’ city) back to the elected municipal government?
There appears a disconnect between the PM’s stated vision of decentralised city-level decision making and the structure of the SPV as currently envisaged, in which the state and the Central government have considerable say —certainly beyond the ‘support’ role that the PM emphasises—and the ULB not enough
Without the autonomy and confidence to create and execute a vision for urban growth, without strong local governments, it is unlikely that Indian cities (all cities, not just smart ones) can be the “engines of growth” that Modi demands. The smart city program could have achieved a lot more if it had made a conscious attempt to leverage the opportunity to empower local governments and enhance their capacities instead of creating a parallel structure for implementation.
Mukta Naik is an urban planner and currently Senior Researcher at Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi
Himanta Biswa Sharma’s departure for the BJP is a loss for the Congress. But will it help the BJP?
Chief Minister of Assam Tarun Gogoi (Photo: TeachAIDS)
Assam Congress leader Himanta Biswa Sharma’s new saffron avatar has added colour to an otherwise dull and predictable political situation in the State. The inevitable finally happened—Sharma, a three-time Congress MLA and minister has quit the party and joined the BJP. This drastic shift took place because the Congress, to which he belonged, refused to vest the leadership position of the Assam Congress Legislature Party to him. The Congress leaders, both in the State as well as the AICC, ignored the view of the dissident camp led by Sharma who wanted a new Chief Minister in place of Tarun Gogoi. Pushed to the wall after the mother-son duo of Sonia and Rahul Gandhi decided to throw their weight behind Gogoi, Sharma decided to desert the Congress.
Loss for Congress?
The key question that has arisen now is this—is Sharma’s exit a loss to the Congress or a gain for the BJP in Assam in an election year? Despite a brave face being put up by Chief Minister Gogoi, Sharma’s desertion of the Congress has sent out a message that the party listens only to the views of the Nehru-Gandhi loyalists. It has put a question mark on the Congress’ inner-party democracy. That aside, it has brought to the public consciousness a perception that Gogoi, who has since made known his desire to lead the party for the fourth consecutive term, is even prepared to sacrifice the interest of the Congress to have his way and hold on to his position.
Half-a-dozen Sharma loyalists, all Congress MLAs, have already declared their intent to go with him, obviously to don saffron colours. Again, the key issue here is not how many of the 78 Congress legislators are going to actually side with Sharma eventually and quit the party. In an election year it’s more about the message that goes out to the electorate. Congress MLAs making statements against the party’s leadership at this juncture is bound to damage the poll prospects. For example, a one-time Sharma loyalist Chandan Sarkar, now a minister in the Gogoi cabinet, decided to openly say on television that he and 51 other Congress MLAs had at one stage lent their support to Sharma after accepting him as their leader. He got agitated and said it was Sharma who went to the Governor and resigned his ministership ‘without telling us.’ Admissions like these by Gogoi’s ministers are damaging to the party.
Chief Minister Gogoi is right when he says the exit of one man from the party cannot impact its overall performance. But the issue again is not of Himanta Biswa Sharma quitting the Congress, it is about the party’s failure to quell the rebellion. Questions are being asked as to why the Gandhis refused to be bothered about the party affairs in Assam where it had come to power thrice in a row. What has been really perplexing is the AICC’s decision discipline Sharma any time during the past two years when he was leading the dissent in the state’s CLP. The result is there now for all to see. The Congress high command sent feelers to Sharma within 48-hours of his announcing his decision to join the BJP, but it was too late in the day.
Will the BJP gain by inducting Sharma? Well, the BJP’s organizational machinery is still far from satisfactory in Assam. Besides, the party is desperately trying to knit together an informal coalition of small ethnic political forces to work together and expand its vote base during the 2016 polls. In this endeavour, the BJP hopes to cash in with Sharma’s known connections and network with these groups. Already, the biggest ethnic political party in Assam, the Bodoland People’s Front (BPF), which is in power in the Bodoland Territorial Council (BTC), has expressed support to Sharma and his decision to join the BJP. This is what the BJP hopes to achieve with his induction—a realignment of political forces in the State ahead of the polls in 2016. Moreover, Sharma could emerge as a counter-balancing force within the Assam BJP where more than two leaders are in a race to emerge as the mascot for the polls next year, which will, of course, be fought under the banner of brand Narendra Modi.
(A political commentator, Wasbir Hussain is Executive Director, Centre for Development & Peace Studies, Guwahati)
Excerpts from an interview with former secretary of the Planning Commission N.C. Saxena on what we ought to really take away from the recently released religion data from the 2011 Census.
Sometimes, the more newspapers write on a subject, the more obscure it becomes, especially if it comes dressed in apocalyptic fervour. On August 26, most media reports on the just released Census 2011 data on ‘population by religious community’ could easily have been mistaken for a present-day stock market update: Hindus slide from 80.5 % to 79.8 %; Muslims climb from 13.4 % to 14.2 %, showing the highest surge in the rate of growth at 24.6 % as against Hindus at 16.8 %.
In this din, there were a few isolated examples, such as The Hindu, which provided a vital context for these figures by explaining that the rate of population growth among Muslims is slowing more sharply—from 29.5 % in 1991-2001 to 24.6 % in 2001-2011—as compared with Hindus for the same period (19.9 %to 16.8 %); and while the Muslim population is still growing at a faster rate, the gap between the two growth rates is decreasing. The two rates are beginning to converge over time.
So the question is this: should the Census data on religious communities be understood only in terms of religion? Does the data actually hold up to the kind of polarised scenario that newspapers have depicted, or is there a more comprehensive and nuanced way of looking at these facts to get a sense of the shifts underway in society?
In an interview to The Wire, ex-bureaucrat, former secretary of the Planning Commission and currently Supreme Court Commissioner for Food Security N.C. Saxena tells Chitra Padmanabhan that there are many more factors affecting the population growth rate than just the natural ones. Chief among these factors are regional patterns of population growth in India, the urban-rural dimension, and migration. Excerpts from the interview:
N.C. Saxena. Credit: Lal Bahadur Shastri National Academy of Administration
Q: How should one read the 2001-2011 data on population by religious communities released by the Census of India?
A: The share of Muslims has increased in the overall population; the Muslim rate of growth is higher than that of the other groups but the rate of increase is slowing. More importantly, the gap between the growth rates of Hindus and Muslims is narrowing.
Let me give an analogy. When the government says that inflation is coming down people turn around and say, but the prices are not coming down. Yes, the prices are still increasing but the rate of increase is declining. Similarly, the population of Muslims is certainly increasing at a faster rate than that of the Hindus or Christians but its rate of growth is coming down and it is said that by about 2050 it will stabilise at around 17 % to 18 %.
But it is important to understand the overall picture and the interplay of many more factors at work.
Q: What is the overall picture? How should we be looking at these facts? A: Most people give a religious colour to this data. But look closer and you will see a definite regional pattern at work. For instance, almost 60 % to 65 % of Muslims live in the northern states – Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, West Bengal, and Assam, with the overall population growth of northern states being faster than that of southern states. Within this framework let us compare Bihar, with a 15 % Muslim population with Kerala, which has a 25 % Muslim population. Yet, in 2001-2011, Bihar’s overall population grew by 25 percent while Kerala’s population grew by 5 percent – that is, despite the fact that there are more Muslims in Kerala, the overall growth rate of Bihar was five times the growth rate of Kerala.
Q: Are there any more interesting comparisons between Hindus and Muslims across regions? A: Yes, if you compare the Muslims of Kerala with the Hindus of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar you will find the rate of growth of Muslims is less, although it is higher than the growth rate of Hindus in Kerala. Southern states have experienced a lower rate of growth than the northern states of the country; really speaking the higher rate of growth among the 60 odd percent Muslims who live in the northern states is more or less part of a northern culture than a ‘Muslim’ culture.
Q: You mentioned something about the urban-rural aspect while looking at the higher rate of growth among Muslims in the country. A:In states such as Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and Maharashtra, a large percentage of Muslims live in urban areas: say 40 % of Muslims as compared to 25 % Hindus. Because of better health facilities, the mortality rate among Muslims is lower and plays a role in the increase in rate of population growth.
Q: Demographers are saying that the rate of increase among Muslims is higher than that of Hindus owing to higher fertility, higher child mortality among Hindus and greater life expectancy among Muslims. Is this connected to the urban-rural aspect? A: Muslims are more urban-based. They are mostly artisans. So, despite the fact that they are poorer, their mortality rate is lower. It is not just a question of how many children are born but also a question of levels of mortality.
Q: You mentioned migration as a third important factor influencing the growth rate of Muslims in India. A: It becomes clear when you compare a 1971 map of India with a 2011 map. The 1971 map of India shows that apart from Jammu and Kashmir there were only two Muslim majority districts in India: Mallapuram in Kerala and Murshidabad in West Bengal. The 2011 map of India shows between 10 to 15 districts in India in Bihar, West Bengal and Assam where Muslims are in a majority. It is not so much due to higher fertility as it is due to migration from Bangladesh. The rate of growth has to be seen in these terms as well.
Apart from the role played by regional patterns, the urban-rural dimension and migration, there is a fourth factor determining the rate of growth of various religious communities if you take a long-term view. What I am getting at is that fertility varies. There are historical reasons because of which fertility for certain groups is high or low. From 1971 to 2001, Kerala and Tamil Nadu had the least population growth in India and they were followed by – surprisingly – Orissa owing to the fact that fertility among the tribal population was low.
The rate of growth of various communities is a complex phenomenon and it is important that we understand that. I am aware that to there is a religious aspect to it as well when it comes to restriction on family planning – more explicit among Catholics but also found among Muslims at certain levels – but there are more important factors at work which play a role in increasing the growth rate of Muslims than just the natural growth of population.
Q: So there’s much more to Census data on religious communities than religion. Is there a way to read it in conjunction with other Census figures to get a more illuminating picture?
A: I would say that reading these figures with the data on rate of increase of population (2001-2011) will give you a very good picture. You will find that in Lakshadweep, which has a 100 % Muslim population, the rate of population growth has been very poor. To associate higher population growth with Islam may not always work. Digressing a bit, look at Bangladesh – its rate of population growth has fallen drastically, even more so than India and its health indicators are far better than India’s.
Q: Are you saying that when we see this data only in terms of Hindu population slipping below 80 % as against Muslims increasing to 14.2 %, we are liable to miss out several underlying patterns that have a bearing on how India develops?
A: Exactly. Let me give you an example. As I have already pointed out, a regional, state-wise analysis of the Census data will show that population growth and fertility is a regional phenomena because of which the share of Kerala’s population (with 25 % Muslims) has come down from 4 % to 2.5 % in the overall population in the last 40 years.
Kerala actually gains from this. For instance, Finance Commission grants are based on the 1971 population, so Kerala gets more funds per capita, while states like Uttar Pradesh and Bihar lose out because of their higher population growth.
Similarly, the number of parliamentary seats is fixed on the basis of the population of 1971. So even though the population of Uttar Pradesh increases, they can’t send more members of Parliament.
Long-term projections of climate change haven’t factored in the climatic impact of humanitarian crises and armed conflict.
Two years ago, a study in Science provided detailed analysis behind an idea that had already taken hold: that the unfavourable weather patterns climate change was creating around the world could be related to the world’s growing tendency toward conflicts. The study’s authors weren’t saying that bad weather caused the Second World War but only that it would be legitimate to consider if the changing climate had an adverse impact on human neurophysiology. But setting aside the specifics, the study’s bigger accomplishment was in encouraging a more holistic view of climate change’s impact on humankind.
Now, another study, based on satellite observations and economic data from the World Bank, sets out a karmic inverse of that idea: that political tension in the Middle East have led to cleaner air over the region.
The satellite data comes from Aura, which NASA launched in 2004 to make qualitative observations of Earth’s atmosphere. One instrument in the apparatus is the Ozone Monitoring Instrument (OMI) that measures variations in the ozone layer, and makes precision measurements of gases detrimental to the atmosphere across a 2,600-km field of view, which lets it log global data almost on a daily basis. And since around 2008, it has found that nitrogen dioxide emissions – released by burning fossil fuels – have been dropping over some cities in the Middle East and over Athens, Greece.
Specifically, OMI found that the density of nitrogen dioxide gas over Cairo, Athens, Tehran and Esfahan (Iran), Baghdad, Tikrit and Samarra (Iraq), the Palestinian territories, Beirut and Tripoli (Lebanon), and Damascus and Aleppo (Syria) bespeak a strong correlation with the shifting political climates in the region. The study describing the findings, published in Science Advances on August 21, 2015, is able to exclude natural variations because the trends were uniformly increasing until 2008-2010 – like in almost all places around world – before deviating significantly.
Since the Arab Spring in 2011 saw a popular uprising starting with Cairo and spreading out into the rest of the Middle East, the GDP of all the involved economies shrank. Now, the OMI data present the climatic impact of humanitarian crises and armed conflict – one that long-term projections of the impact of climate change haven’t factored in.
For example, the most significant changes are visible over Greece, Egypt, Iraq, Iran and Syria, as well as over Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. However, the latter two are discounted from the authors’ analysis for two reasons: the reversal in nitrogen dioxide emission trends over the two countries started before the region started to become turbulent, and began after 2006 and 2008 when the Emirates and the kingdom enacted laws to reduce their carbon footprints.
In Egypt, on the other hand, GDP rose by about 6% per year in 2005-2010 and then fell to 2% per year in 2011-2014. But OMI couldn’t spot any parallel decline in carbon dioxide, so the decline in nitrogen dioxide is being attributed to the reduction of vehicular emissions thanks to petrol becoming more expensive. In Greece, the economic recession caused nitrogen dioxide emissions to fall by 40% in the six years since 2008. In Iran, Tehran’s and Esfahan’s nitrogen dioxide emissions increased at 10% per year in 2005-2010 – as if the 2006 sanctions didn’t happen – but turned down to -4% per year since 2010, when the GDP also saw a sharp downturn by 2 percentage points before turning negative in 2012.
A and B) Tropospheric NO2 column density changes in 10^15 molecules/cm2 (A) between 2005 and 2010 and (B) between 2010 and 2014. Source: dx.doi.org/10.1126/sciadv.1500498
In Iraq, similar correlations between declining GDP and falling nitrogen dioxide emissions are observed over Baghdad, Mosul and Kirkuk, as well as additional declines over the cities of Tikrit and Samarra thanks to incursions by the Islamic State.
As the authors of the Science Advances article write, “such relatively short-term changes cannot be captured by air pollution emission inventories and future projections, including the Representative Concentration Pathways”. The RCPs are a set of projections used by the Intergovernmental Panel for Climate Change based on how much greenhouse gases are enforcing anthropogenic climate change. One of them, RCP4.5, assumes that NOx emissions in the Middle East will be constant from 2005 to 2030, and another, RCP8.5, that they’ll increase at the rate of 2% per year. OMI’s findings suggest these assumptions might be failing reality.
It also reveals how a better estimate of greenhouse gas emissions, as well as country-wise challenges, emerges when ground realities are combined with satellite-logged data. Consider the example of Lebanon, whose carbon dioxide emissions fell by 20% over 2011 and 2012, but whose nitrogen dioxide emissions spiked by 20-30% in 2014. When they probed further, the scientists realised it had to do with the influx of refugees from the Syrian civil war – 1.2 million of them, of whom 350,000 fled to Beirut alone.
Had the poet Ahmed Faraz been alive he would certainly have drawn this beautiful verse from his quiver to describe the current state of relations between India and Pakistan:
pehle se maraasim na sahi phir bhi kabhi to rasm-o-rahe duniya hi nibhaane ke liye aa
Our relationship may not be the same now, but even if infrequently
Let us at least meet to fulfil the rituals and traditions of the world.
Unfortunately, the two countries do not seem interested even in dialogue as the fulfilment of a ritual. They would much rather talk at each other via the media in order to appear stronger to their respective sides. There was much consternation in Delhi over Islamabad’s decision to meet Hurriyat leaders before the August 23-24 talks between Sartaj Aziz and Ajit Doval, and its desire to raise the Kashmir issue too. In response to India’s ultimatum over these issues, Pakistan decided to cancel the talks. There is today no clarity on when the two National Security Advisors will try to meet again.
At Ufa in July this year, both sides signed an agreement to “take collective responsibility to ensure peace and promote development”. For this, they said they agreed that they were prepared “to discuss all outstanding issues.” The statement said the two sides “also agreed” to take a number of steps, including holding a meeting in Delhi on terrorism.
Chronicle of a failure foretold
In my first article for The Wire, written before Ufa, I had argued that relations between India and Pakistan are only going to get worse. Ufa did not change things because both sides were not on the same page when it came to interpreting the document, or deciding how they intended to use the joint statement.
Had the Indian government paid attention, it might have realised earlier that Islamabad may have agreed to talk about terrorism but was not ready to not talk about Kashmir. In fact, immediately upon his return to Pakistan from Ufa, Aziz tried to dispel the impression that Pakistan had abandoned the Kashmir issue. Many commentators rapped Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and the NSA on their knuckles for the perceived sin of diverging from what was considered important by the military establishment. His critics savaged him as a man more obsessed with eating Lahori food — nulli nihari and siri paya – than protecting national interest. The old myth of Nawaz Sharif’s limited concentration span for serious matters began doing the rounds again, along with how he and the other Sharif – Raheel, the Army chief – were not on the same page in resolving the crisis of relationship.
India’s security community is quite conscious of Pakistan’s civil-military divide and that Raheel Sharif is in the driving seat as far as relations with India are concerned. Pakistan’s army is a powerful player with a capacity to impact current public perception. Nawaz was not ready to give up on the Kashmir cause, even if he may have been willing to relegate the issue to the back burner. But the risk of being projected as an enemy of the state and compromising on core national interests is not an attractive proposition, especially for a prime minister. Delhi surely knew about the peculiar distribution of power in Pakistan. It had the time to understand that Islamabad will talk about terrorism as long as it can also discuss Kashmir. Why was it expected that Kashmir would not be brought up at Delhi? In any case, since this was to be the first NSA-level meeting, it would have been natural for both sides to discuss—and agree or disagree over—modalities for further talks. It was not as if a final decision on Kashmir was to be taken on August 23-24.
Shoddy diplomacy at Ufa
The big mystery, of course, is why the Pakistani NSA and his team did not insist on including Kashmir as a sixth point in the main text at Ufa. Was it just a slip up or was the foreign office team in a hurry to create an impression that it was open to talks on terrorism only? While John Kerry had telephoned both Islamabad and Delhi to bring the temperature down before Ufa, why did Pakistan hurriedly agree to an agenda it was not interested in? Given the rising tension in the region, particularly on the Line of Control, it was in the interest of both states to talk. At Ufa, India had softened its earlier position of not talking without Pakistan first demonstrating a resolve to counter India-related terrorism. This meant Delhi was equally interested to engage. There was no reason why Pakistan should not have inserted Kashmir into the agreement. To argue that a weak prime minister tried a diplomatic counter-coup on the military is nothing but loose talk. For Aziz, not discussing Kashmir even in a small way at Delhi would have meant agreeing to relegate an issue that is of utmost importance to the powerful establishment. It was shoddy diplomacy and Islamabad is paying the price for it.
The problem with any formal talks between the two neighbours is the abnormally high expectations of a breakthrough each time—almost analogous to expectations of the doubling of an investment but without actually making the right kind of investment or the right calculations. If they want a positive outcome, Islamabad and New Delhi ought to build some bridges through a potent Track-II before attempting talks at the NSA level. But more importantly, both sides must be prepared to stop presenting talks as an ultimate end point in their media briefings. Dialogue will take years of consistent effort and clarity on objectives. What is most critical, however, is ownership of the peace initiative. Right now, each side seems to behave as if it has no interest in peace and that it is the other side which is desperate for talks.
India’s calculations
In fact, the way India and Pakistan conduct peace negotiations shows how the two sides view each other’s fighting capacity at a given point of time.
There is a perception in India, for instance, that it can get a better deal from a Pakistan that has its back to the wall. Islamabad is economically weaker, has a bad reputation of aiding and abetting terrorists like Osama bin Laden and Mullah Omar, and seems to be at cross purposes with western peace initiatives in Afghanistan. The prediction of Pakistan’s possible economic collapse and isolation means that Delhi could capture a better deal at the appropriate time and with the right amount of diplomatic and military pressure. Islamabad’s relations with Washington are part of the calculation. Delhi may have made a note of the US stopping counter-terrorism aid to Pakistan and assumed the neighbour-enemy is about to be ostracised by the West, especially America. Add to this perception Narendra Modi’s image as a tough talker—a man who does not want to be seen making concessions—and last week’s denouement becomes easier to understand. Of course, an outcome that may be rational from a realpolitik standpoint is not necessarily a helpful one, least of all for a PM who wants to turn India into an economic miracle and thus has higher stakes in regional peace.
Modi’s need for peace is certainly on the minds of Pakistan’s establishment. The Indian NSA may be tempted to take the advice of some international strategic adventurers that India should teach Pakistan a lesson through limited military strikes across the border. There is an on-going debate in certain circles regarding the possibility and potential of limited warfare. The underlying assumption is that Pakistan’s military is a rational actor and will back down and not escalate matters further. Besides, the US and China would become active in limiting further fireworks. But Modi’s India should be aware that even the remotest possibility of conflict escalation may prove costly.
Pakistan’s terror card
Islamabad feels under no moral obligation to pack up the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba and its entire network because it believes it now has a stronger case to argue that Delhi is playing the terrorism card too. It also believes it is not isolated in terns of selling this perception nationally or internationally. Although the allegations that MQM leader Altaf Hussain was funded by India’s R&AW are far from proved, there are far too many journalists in Britain who confidently talk about seeing evidence that links Hussain with India. Yes, not one journalist but several, some of whom have clearly got their information not from Pakistani but British sources. As for holding hard evidence that can be proven in a court of law, neither side has needed that before in its war of words. The MQM case has certainly given a lease of life to Pakistan’s claim and perception that India supports terrorism in Pakistan. Suddenly, all Taliban terrorists are being described as India’s produce.
Such perceptions, also fuelled by Narendra Modi’s recent speech in Dhaka staking Indian ownership of the creation of Bangladesh, give Pakistan enough to play with and argue about a real threat from the ‘humsaya dushman’. All this makes it all the more intriguing that Pakistan added its signature to the Ufa statement. The fear of going into negotiations and getting shortchanged is only too apparent.
At the moment, the only stakeholder in peace is a certain segment of civil society that seems to be shrinking rapidly.
Ayesha Siddiqa is an independent social scientist based in Islamabad and author of Military Inc: Inside Pakistan’s Military Economy
Government claims to be open to amendments on important bills
On Tuesday the government claimed to have an open mind regarding amendments to important bills such as the GST Bill. Parliamentary Affairs Minister met leader of the opposition in the Lok Sabha Malikarjun Kharge and later said that the government is willing to consider amendments to reforms the measures. The BJP had formerly opposed the bill during the reign of UPA II and has met with the Congress’ continued opposition once it came to power. The Congress has stated that it will stick to its stance and demand removal of one per cent additional tax, an authority to resolve disputes, capping of the GST rate at 18 per cent and compensation to local bodies.
Government moves to create monetary policy committee
The government has moved a cabinet note on the creation of a monetary policy committee (MPC) in an attempt to reset the framework to adhere to international best practices. It is said that the committee will have three government nominees and four from the RBI. The government is keen to introduce legislation to amend the RBI Act in the winter session of the Parliament. This will enable the committee’s creation with powers to decide on the monetary policy in line with the inflation target of 4% announced by the Arun Jaitley when he was delivering this year’s budget speech.
Islamic State recruits more Indians
The Ministry of Home Affairs called a meeting of the Directors General of Police and Home Secretaries from 12 states earlier this month to discuss cases of young Indians who are suspected to have either joined the Islamic State or are headed to its strongholds. List accessed by The Indian Express show 17 Indians are now missing, reported by Indian and foreign intelligence services to be active with the Islamic State or rival organisations like Jabhat al-Nusra. In addition a dozen cadre of the Indian Mujahideen have reportedly joined the Islamic State.
Nawaz Sharif says separatists are not third parties
Nawaz Sharif has stated that the dialogue between India and Pakistan would be futile if it excludes Kashmir. His comments came just days after Pakistan called off the National Security Advisers-level talks because India asked for a commitment that it would not meet Kashmiri separatist leaders.
Agenda exchanged for Indo-Pak BSF talks
Shortly after the cancellation of the NSA level talks, India and Pakistan have discussed the agenda for the Director General level talks at Wagah-Attari border on Tuesday. Sources said that while the agenda was shared, the details were not disclosed.
BJP under pressure from Bihar state partners
The BJP is under pressure from its NDA partners — the Lok Janshakti Party (LJP), the Rashtriya Lok Samata Party (RLSP) and the Hindustani Awam Morcha (Secular) (HAM-S) — to finalise the seat sharing arrangement for the forthcoming state election. The LJP has demanded 75 seats and the RLSP 66. Former CM Jitan Ram Manjhi has reportedly put forth a demand of 40 seats. Despite the pressure the BJP continues to state that it will contest 170-180 seats, which would leave only 88-93 seats for its allies in Bihar.
Ten people cannot impose a constitution, Modi tells Koirala
Expressing grief at the loss of life in Nepal due to violence on Monday, Prime Minister Narendra Modi told his Nepali counterpart that that five or ten people could not sit in a room and impose a constitution. Violence had broken out on Monday in the Kailai district of Nepal when Tharu protestors, demanding a federal state, turned aggressive. Six police officials were killed. The country has been witnessing protests over the shape of the federal map with excluded social groups, Madhesis and Tharus, in the plains bordering India, demanding greater rights. The country is in the process of finalising its constitution.
CEA says that deflation and not inflation are India’s problems
Chief Economic Advisor Arvind Subramanian has said that in the aftermath of the slowdown in China, India’s relative advantages would shine. He said this while suggesting that the RBI cut interest rates. He also stated that India had enough policy levers to ensure that losses concerning India’s export competitiveness could be counteracted.
